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ABSTRACT 
The impacts of unconventional risks and crises on organisation survival have shifted the focus 
not just to risk and crisis management but also on business continuity and organisational 
resilience. At the same time, the effectiveness of current risk and crisis management models or 
strategies in dealing with unconventional risks and crises remain a challenge, not least due to 
the regular re-occurrence of similar events. However, this thesis contends that the value of 
existing models of risk and crisis management is overestimated, resulting in risk 
underestimation and the same issues becoming evident, repeatedly.  
This thesis calls for need to subjecting risk/crisis management theories and models to more 
rigorous testing and re-evaluation against reality. Two significant unconventional crises were 
analysed within the context of risk/crisis management literature. It was found that moral 
disengagement is responsible for the difficulties in managing the response to each of the 
incidents. At the root of most organisational crises, ethical dilemmas underpin the decision-
making of leaders and organisational members which are suggested to have initiated a chain 
of events leading to those crises. It is argued that an awareness of selective risk perception, 
crisis miscommunication, inflated ethical business practice, trust deficit, organised corporate 
irresponsibility and moral disengagement is crucial towards improving the management of the 
Niger Delta crises and similar incidents in future. The thesis also found that issues of moral 
disengagement mechanisms are responsible for generating competing constructions of 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters. 
This thesis demonstrated that moral disengagement mechanisms weaken or destroy established 
approaches to mitigating and managing risks and crises; facilitate sanctionable behaviours in 
risk, crisis and disaster situations without self-condemnation; and help to maintain high moral 
self-image even in obviously detrimental and unethical conducts. It was argued that part of the 
reason for this was that organisations did not consider a link between moral disengagement 
and risk/crisis management to determine whether organisational crises are self-inflicted or 
within organisational risk appetite before escalation. This conceptualisation of moral 
disengagement contributes to better understanding of risk and crisis evolution and the wider 
implications for organisational resilience and growth. Of importance was the recognition that 
decision-based model of risk and crisis management could have address each of the issues that 
were identified in the case studies. The research implications and limitations were carefully 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
With the recent quest to limit the impacts of unconventional crises or disasters on organisation 
survival and promote organisational resilience (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Boin & Fishbacher-
Smith, 2011; Egan, 2011; Hopkins, 2006; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015; Roeschmann, 
2014), the question of how organisations manage unconventional risk, crisis and disaster 
matter. Why do organisations methodological approaches to risk, crisis and disaster 
management really matter? It has been extensively documented and empirically proven that 
organisational crisis and disaster affects organisational liquidity, credibility and reputation 
(Andrew, 2011; Garcia, 2006; Fink, 2002; Jourdan et al., 2012; Simola, 2003), threatens the 
market position and viability of organisation (Coombs, 2007; Knight & Pretty, 1997; Pearson 
& Clair, 1998; Wooten & James, 2008), threaten competiveness and sustainability of the 
affected entity (Morley, 2002; Snyder et al., 2006; Reza, 2011), cause extensive damage to 
human life and environment (Allan, 2003; Barton, 2008; Junglas & Ives, 2007; Lerbinger, 
2012; Toft & Roynolds, 2005), and disrupt organisational goals (Boin, 2004; Mitroff, 
Shrivastava & Udwadia, 1987; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Even more specifically today, 
posteriori observation indicates crises and disasters such as product defects, oil disaster, 
industrial accidents, environmental degradation, kidnappings, militancy, terrorisms, 
hijackings, hostile takeovers, flooding, tsunamis, and earthquakes have assumed greater 
vulnerability, exposure, impact, and consequences. Furthermore, such incidents are now 
apparently happening at alarmingly rate and dramatic interval such that can effortlessly destroy 
organisations (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Kim & Miner, 2007; Vaughan, 2005). 
In another perspective, crisis and disaster events such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
outbreak in Southeast Asia and North America in 2002-2003; the  so-called ‘Mad Cow Disease’ 
and London bomb attacks in the United Kingdom; the California brownouts of 2000 and 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the United States; the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010; the Exxon 
Valdez disaster, Bhopal disaster, Costa Concordia, Piper Alpha disaster, King’s Cross disaster, 
the Tohoku/Sendai earthquake and tsunami in March 2011; Bonga disaster; the Niger Delta 
environmental crisis in Nigeria; further demonstrate the negative consequences associated with 
unconventional crises. These dangerous events likewise reveal the vulnerabilities of societies, 
businesses, and environment to unconventional crisis and disaster. For example, at least 
100,000 small businesses were affected by the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, costing BP 
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$7.8 billion to settle compensation claims (Goldenberg, 2012). The central Thailand floods 
which occurred between October and November 2011 resulted in the loss of 2 million jobs and 
monthly losses totalling $2.5 billion during the period (Perwaiz, 2012).  
The 1979 Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant disaster cost the plant owners and operators 
$26 million in evacuation costs, financial losses, and medical surveillance, and estimated cost 
of repairs and electricity production was $4 billion (Mitroff et al., 1987). The Johnson & 
Johnson (J&J) contaminated of dozens Tylenol capsules with cyanide by unknown person or 
persons in 1982 causing the deaths of eight people and a loss of $100 million in products 
recalled further demonstrates the value of methodological approach to managing crisis. In fact, 
the second case of Tylenol capsules poisoning incident in 1986 forced J&J to withdraw all the 
products from the market at a cost of $150 million and the cost of switching to alternative 
medication was estimated at $500 million.  
Furthermore, in the Union Carbide – Bhopal disaster in December 1984 interim relief payment 
was agreed at $5 million in May 1986 by the Union Carbide Company (UCC) but after three 
years, full and final settlement was put at $470 million (Sanjib, 2002). Meanwhile, till the year 
2000 victims’ organisations were yet to get compensations and one lawsuit alone was for $15 
billion (Fink, 2002, p. 188). The Niger Delta environmental crisis has cost the Nigerian 
government over estimated £400 billion between 1998 and 2009; and multinational oil 
companies have lost over estimated £750 billion in revenues and escalation costs between the 
same periods (UNEP, 2011). Escalation costs relate directly to the associated factors such as 
kidnapping, militancy and oil terrorism which have seen multinational oil companies in Nigeria 
lose billions of pounds in the event of the crisis.  In fact, more recently in February 2014, Shell 
Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) was fined $6.5 billion (about N1.84 
trillion) over the December 2011 Bonga oil spill.    
These crises and disasters cases cited above typically confirm that managing crisis has never 
been as important as it is today. These dangerous events can mean the life or death of an 
organisation because they reveal crisis vulnerabilities, hostilities, ruptures, and associated 
damages. Therefore, it is not unexpected that organisations must find practical models or 
paradigms to manage such risks, crises, and disasters. Obviously, crisis is like a fire which 
requires starvation of oxygen. Existing crisis management methodologies/models have been 
quite useful in understanding how crisis evolves and what could have been done to prevent, 
mitigate and address such crises. In most cases, both traditional and contemporary crisis 
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management theories and research offer rich knowledge of what can be (or could have been) 
done in the events of crisis and disaster (Augustine, 2000; Boin, 2008, 2009; Fink, 1986; 
Seymour & Moore, 2000; Turner, 1976, 1994; Toft & Reynolds, 1997; Lagadec, 2004, 2009; 
Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff et al., 1987; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998; Shrivastava, 1993; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003) but 
unconventional challenges persist as discussed later in 1.5. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Past, current and emerging crises are a continual concern, so the need for risk and crisis 
management and new ways of managing risks and crises remains greatly essential. This 
research focuses on linking risk and crisis management framework to real life situations using 
case studies and questions some of the assumptions of risk/crisis management. The central 
contribution of this research lies in uncovering moral disengagement in risk, crisis and disaster 
management practice. The research aim is to uncovers the practicality of risk/crisis 
management theories and latent areas of crisis and disaster that appear neglected by experts 
especially how existing risk and crisis management models contribute to crises/disasters or the 
processes involved initiated them.  
This thesis broadly conceptualised unconventional crises and disasters in two forms: firstly, 
those that inflict organisations, and secondly, those that are self-inflicted by organisations (See 
Chapter Seven). This distinction is comparable to the notion of vulnerable society which is 
being aggressed from outside (externally) and the risk society which is being threatened by 
itself (internally) (Rudolf, 2007). The broad conceptualisation of unconventional crises and 
disasters adds nuance to previous risk and crisis management discussions in the context of risk 
society, risk homeostasis, normal accident, high reliability and disaster incubation. 
As discussed later in this thesis (See Chapter Seven), if unconventional crises and disasters are 
self-inflicted, the legitimate question should be: what is meant by self-inflicted disaster? I 
define self-inflicted disaster as a situation created from our deliberate attempt to disengage 
from emerging risks/issues, caused by contradictory responses to complex and uncertain events 
such that the response to those emerging events further amplified the situation. Specifically, 
‘self-inflicted disaster’ is defined on the basis that models, approaches and strategies pertaining 
to the management of unconventional crisis and disaster complicate the very processes of 
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managing them in ways that worsen or attenuate emerging crisis/disaster and make 
organisations disengage rather than meaningfully engage in managing the evolving 
crisis/disaster. This is due to the involvement of a heterogeneous set of stakeholders with 
different agenda in risk and crisis situations, and the moral disengagement mechanisms used 
by organisations that complicate unconventional risks and crises (Bandura, 2009; Baker et al., 
2006; Caprara et al., 2009; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). 
In this thesis, the notion of self-inflicted disaster captures a broad range of unconventional 
dangerous events which include safety disaster, environmental disaster, terrorism, large-scale 
fraud, and financial crisis which were initially under control of management or organisations 
but escalated because of moral disengagement and imagination failures. Noticeably, lacking 
from a growing body of knowledge in crisis management is the focus on practicality and 
effectiveness of crisis management models to solve emerging crises and real-life situations. To 
address this issue therefore, this study deliberately digresses from the existing view in crisis 
management suggesting that understanding crisis and how to manage crisis remains the 
fundamental instruments to effective risk/crisis management.  
Critically, it is contended that the assumption that crisis can be managed methodologically has 
often created the fallacies that crisis management experts and academics know how not to 
manage crisis. The fundamental contention is that it is not entirely what you manage but how 
you manage (or perhaps fail to manage) it that matters most in risk and crisis management. 
This contention and deliberate move represents an effort to encourage greater consideration of 
how risk and crisis management thinking may infiltrate organisations, how a methodological 
approach to risk/crisis management alone might spell doom for organisations, and reflects on 
how well-known models and strategies in risk/crisis management might not fit emerging 
unconventional risk/crisis situations. 
No doubt, theorists and practitioners will find this research most useful and timely because the 
study draws extensively across different ranges of literature – moral psychology, risk, crisis 
and disaster management, environmental management, public relations and communication, 
research methodology and general management. It also reorganises existing risk and crisis 
management methodologies into a more pragmatic conceptual and policy-oriented framework. 
Quite imperative and beneficial in this research is that the juxtaposition between moral 
disengagement and crisis management is revealed and the connection of several other 
apparently neglected factors which exacerbate crisis situations are carefully discussed. One 
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argument is that, had theorists and practitioners thoroughly considered the framework of crisis 
engagement presented in this thesis many of the unconventional crises could have been avoided 
and effectively managed. Similarly, that assumption further demonstrates why risk and crisis 
theorists and practitioners are so naturally predictable working on classically closed-cycle 
models. 
Within this context, the research questions are: Is there any relationship between crisis 
management strategy and moral disengagement? Do existing risk and crisis management 
models contribute to crises/disasters or the processes involved initiated them? Where can 
organisations obtain evidence to confirm current approaches might be escalating rather than 
ameliorating emerging crisis and disaster? Do existing risk and crisis management models fit 
emerging crises and disasters? Does crisis management suggest risk management failure or 
does it imply management crisis? These research questions lead to two main propositions 
generated from reviewing of existing risk/crisis management literature: Are current crisis and 
disaster management models working? Should crisis and disaster management practice and 
strategies be context based?  
Considering the research aims, the following objectives are critical to achieve the aims: 
The research critically seeks: 
 To advance an understanding of how moral disengagement perpetuate organisational 
crisis/disaster and explore potential possibilities in averting the ‘black swan’ 
implications. 
 To uncover moral disengagement – crisis management relationship and redirect 
academic debates, research agenda, policy issues and redefining responsible business 
practice. 
 To uncover whether existing risk and crisis management models contribute to 
crises/disasters or the processes involved initiated them? 
 To question the influence of vulnerability, risk perception and behaviour, and distrust 
on risk and crisis management practice. 
 To examine which risk and crisis management models would be most valuable to help 
solve unconventional risk and crisis, and crisis management responses/strategies. 
 To challenge the belief that existing conventional risk and crisis management 
methodologies fit emerging unconventional risks, crises and disasters. 
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1.3 THE RESEARCH SCOPE AND NIGER DELTA CRISES 
The research scope is the entire oil and gas industry in Nigeria. However, the prime focus is on 
the Niger Delta region (otherwise, refer specifically as ‘the Niger Delta’ throughout this thesis) 
of Nigeria because all oil and gas explorations and productions are primarily done with the 
region (Figure 1.1). In practical context, the Niger Delta is an area the size of England or 
Portugal (Mafimisebi, 2013) and comprises of nine states of Nigeria which are: Abia, Akwa 
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States respectively. These nine 
states of the Niger Delta region are spread across South-West, South-South and South-East 
geopolitical zones of Nigeria (Figure 1.2). The majority of the people in Nigeria especially in 
the Niger Delta region where estimated 35 million people live, over 85 percent, primarily 
dependent on their habitat for livelihood (Pyagbara, 2010; UNDP, 2006). It was, therefore, in 
their self-interest to conserve their environment. These efforts were often backed up with 
normative and ethical sanctions (Bandura, 2007).  
The people of the Niger Delta fundamentally depend upon the natural environment for 
livelihood and survival. These people are fed, clothed, provided with water, generate energy 
through firewood, and carry out agricultural activities (fishing and farming) on the natural 
environment. In fact, more than 97% of the businesses in Nigeria have been confirmed to fall 
under the category of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The environment and the people 
are most vulnerable to environmental pollution, degradation, climate change, flooding, rise sea 
level, coastal vulnerability, oil spill, gas flaring, and unclean water (Mafimisebi & 
Nkwunonwo, 2015). Although there is no clear evidence to suggest that environmental victims 
are worst impacted in fragile and conflict-affected states of the Niger Delta, the major challenge 
lies in providing holistic and sustainable solutions. 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Nigeria Showing Niger Delta Region and Study Area 
 
Source: Mafimisebi (2013) 
Figure 1.2: Map of Niger Delta Region of Nigeria 
 
Source: Mafimisebi (2013) 
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This research critically considers two main case studies – Shell v. Ogoni crisis and Chevron v. 
Ilaje crisis within the Niger Delta crises. These case studies are selected because they typically 
demonstrate situations of risk management failure and moral disengagement in processes of 
risk/crisis management. These crises are not exceptional phenomena in the history of 
organisational crises but classically revealed and changed how these terms ‘risk, crisis and 
disaster’ are perceived, interpreted, and managed. In both case studies, a posteriori observation 
of crisis intensification through the constructs of moral disengagement, vulnerable 
environment and vulnerable people suggest fundamental need for change in approaches to 
risk/crisis management. These case studies have been described both as crisis and disaster 
(Boele, 1995; Ikein, 1990; Richard et al., 2001; Saro-Wiwa, 1995). In 2011, a major new 
independent scientific assessment of the case carried out by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP, 2011) revealed that pollution from over 50 years of oil operations in the 
Niger Delta has penetrated further and deeper than many may have supposed. The Niger Delta 
crises revolves around cases of environmental risks (oil spillage, gas flaring, climate change, 
ozone layer depletion, acid rain, rise sea level, and environmental waste) and general pollution 
rocking the Nigerian oil and gas industry.  
Despite the environmental degradation by multinational oil companies (for example, Shell and 
Chevron), local experts and communities have accused them of practicing double standards 
therefore seen as environmentally irresponsible organisations (Adedayo, 2012; Bassey, 2008; 
ERA, 2012; Oruamabo, 2005; Richard et al., 2001; Steiner, 2010). Several environmental right 
activists have been beaten, detained and main leaders summarily executed because of the Niger 
Delta crises (Richard et al., 2001). Furthermore, the multiple effects have been reveal through 
militancy, oil terrorism, vandalism, kidnapping, oil theft and bunkering, illegal artisanal 
refineries, resource control agitation, and military suppression.  More critically, the crisis is 
characterised by both vulnerable environment and vulnerable people phenomena in which case 
local people have been forced to migrate to urban cities due to destruction of their livelihoods. 
Why should organisations be concerned about these phenomena in the Niger Delta crises?  
The Niger Delta crises fundamentally impact international communities through increases in 
global oil price and global warming; multinational oil companies through loss of revenue, 
reputational risk and associated damages; Nigerian government through loss of oil revenues 
and security challenges; the local communities through acid rain, loss of vegetation and 
farmland, health, safety and environment challenges. Thus, the methodologies and strategies 
use in processes of managing the Niger Delta crises remain imperative. In general, the 
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contention is that the existence of ‘vulnerable environment and vulnerable people’ phenomena 
in crisis situations not only raises ethical and moral issues concern in processes of risk/crisis 
management and governance but equally creates a condition which demands that the moral and 
ethical aspect of risk/crisis management practice be held up for thorough scrutiny and queries 
(Bandura, 1991, 1999, 2002; Beu & Bucley, 2004; Caprara et al., 2006; Detert, Trevino, & 
Sweitzer, 2008). 
Despite the statements made by the Nigerian government and oil companies, there is no 
evidence that improving environmental performance of multinational oil companies within the 
Niger Delta match the environmental degradation and environmental crises already created 
(UNEP, 2011). In another context, the Niger Delta arguably becomes an ‘environmental 
sacrifice zone’. Though the Niger Delta crises formed the foundation case for this thesis and is 
practically relevant to test risk and crisis management methodologies they remain incomplete 
without reference to the global cases of crises and disasters. In clear context, sustainable 
risk/crisis management involves critical appraisal of managing risk and crisis in a way that 
reflect the global agenda because crises are not anymore confined to national border but 
transboundary in nature.  
In application to existing theories of risk and crisis management, an explanation for the 
management of risk and crisis logically requires the inclusion of multiple paradigms approach 
to crisis situations. In addition, given the complexity involved in understanding and interpreting 
crisis situations (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; Weick, 
1988, 1993, 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Ren et al., 2008; Roux-Dufort, 2007) any discourse 
in risk and crisis devoid of the phenomena of moral disengagement, vulnerable environment 
and vulnerable people arguably undermine robust risk/crisis management. This argument 
echoes the position of a burgeoning literature concerned with the various aspect of the Niger 
Delta crises and environmental degradation (UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010) and the view further 
found expression in much of the different cases of crises and disasters (for example, Bhopal 
disaster, Exxon Valdez oil disaster, BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, Three Mile Island disaster, 
etc.). 
The case studies adopted in this thesis provided avenues to critically explore factors that 
contribute to either failure or success in the Niger Delta crises. In addition, the case studies 
illustrate a gap between empirical reality and literature, and the different perspectives involved 
further provide opportunities to review crisis incubation and what could trigger crisis, intensify 
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crisis, and hinder sustainable risk/crisis management. How these pragmatic review concepts fit 
into existing risk/crisis management framework further remains the subject of this thesis. The 
research is both explorative and interpretive and multiple sources of data were used, for 
example, commission reports, archives that were reduced and triangulated, company reports 
and interviews with key stakeholders in the crisis, and thorough reviews of existing literatures. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION AND FRAMEWORK 
This research is basically inclined by how two concepts – moral disengagement and crisis 
management impact one another. Can approaches from both concepts to identifying, analysing, 
and managing the complexity and unconventional nature of risks, crises and disasters be 
significant to solve real world problems? If an organisation was involved in unconventional 
crisis and disaster, should established models be challenged and what evidence must be 
provided to signal existing models might represent endemic organisational risks? The value of 
existing models of risk and crisis management may be completely overestimated but 
nevertheless significant in providing directions and guidance. What this suggests is the need to 
re-evaluate current approaches to the management of risks, crises and disasters facing 
organisations. 
The obvious twist to the research title is meant not to depart from concerns clustered around 
organisations benefitting from “risk, crisis and disaster situations,” but rather to advance the 
debate and offer a perspective compatible with them, perhaps even a perspective on what 
impels them. More pointedly, the research pragmatically demonstrates how moral 
disengagement mechanisms impact risk and crisis management practice. For critics who would 
not be persuaded by empirical data, the research framework is set and open avenues to explore 
how the framework presented converge or diverge within the risk, crisis and disaster 
management literature. Critically, this thesis appears to be more controversial and might 
therefore disappoint both traditional and conventional theorists and practitioners of risk and 
crisis management.  
To start, it is not research that merely fill the ‘literature gaps’ which could be worthless to read. 
In fact, just because there is a gap in literature does not mean that such gaps must be filled. The 
mere fact remains such research concludes by pointing out the gaps in existing studies; of 
course, there is a gap and so what? Thus, the novelty in this research is demonstrated through 
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the conceptual foundations underpinning the study and the juxtaposition of the contrast of 
moral disengagement and crisis management using empirical case studies of crises/disasters in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  
In context, the research contends and demonstrates that moral disengagement exploitation in 
crisis situations will exacerbate emerging crises, as empirically confirmed and supported in 
different studies (Bandura, 1991, 1999, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Beu & Bucley, 2004; 
Caprara et al., 2006; Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008). In critical term, the potential 
limitations of the framework and arguments presented in this research are recognised but the 
interdependencies within the broader risk theories including socio-technical systems 
(Borodzicz, 2005; Toft & Reynolds, 1997; Veil, 2011; Turner, 1976), normal accident (Perrow, 
1984; 1999; Smith, 2005), high reliability (Jarman, 2001; LaPorte, 1994; Shrivastava et al., 
2009), risk/crisis communication (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Hayenhjelm, 2006; Hutchins et 
al., 2009), and risk culture (Hopkins, 2006; Herbane, 2013; Roeschmann, 2014) are well-
established. 
 
1.5 THE UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 
There are arguably two main challenges confronting crisis management practice and research 
today. Firstly, complexity, ruptures, interdependence and uncertainty surrounding the modern 
business environment and unconventional crisis suggests that conceptually analysing historical 
data (case study of known crises and disasters) is no longer sufficient and reliable way of 
predicting and sustainably managing emerging and future crisis events and impacts. While 
lessons may be learnt but translating that lesson into reality and practice becomes the main 
challenge for organisations. Although, it has been argued that those concerned with crisis 
management pay closer attention to the evidence of history because crisis management is a 
learned behaviour. Unlike certain historical conditions that can never be duplicated, attitudes 
and techniques gained from historical experience can be studied, taught, and practiced to 
develops management abilities (see, Gilbert & Lauren, 1980).  
The contention in this thesis extends to how can such attitudes and techniques gained from past 
crises and disasters translate into managing emerging and future crises. Even more broadly, the 
debate is further extended to what constitute ‘historical reality’ and ‘real-life phenomenon’ in 
emerging crisis. This thesis calls for need to subjecting crisis management theories and 
12 
 
methodologies to more rigorous testing and re-evaluation against reality such that existing 
theories and methodologies might become even more sophisticated, differentiated, and capable 
of practically guiding practitioners and academics in solving unconventional crises and 
disasters. 
In critical term, crisis can engender cognitive rigidity, fears and anxiety due to the collapse of 
organisational frames of references and sensemaking practices that obviously decrease the 
lucidity of managers and may prevent them from learning anything from crisis (Jacques, Gatot, 
& Roux-Dufort, 1999). Impliedly, the need for paradigm shifts to crisis engagement and 
embracement of broader resilience management becomes more obvious than ever. Although 
many studies seek to understand how lessons learnt from previous cases of crises and disasters 
can be translated into reality (Boin, 2008; Elliott, 2009; Elliott & MacPherson, 2010; Jacques 
et al., 1999; Lagadec, 2004; Toft & Reynolds, 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003), the field of 
crisis management remains problematic and controversial. It is also unclear in existing risk and 
crisis management studies whether crises are entirely preventable or inevitable (for example, 
Augustine, 2000; Laere, 2013; Navestad, 2009; Roberts, 2009; Shrivastava, Sponpar, & 
Pazzaglia, 2009). More problematically, there are also challenges with the taxonomy of crises 
and disasters.  
Secondly, the indirect characterisation of crisis management practice into two main 
classifications – event and process has rarely been clearly resolved in most extant crisis 
management literatures (Borodzicz, 2005; Fink, 1986; 2002; Forgues & Roux-Dufort, 1998; 
Jacques & Gatot, 1998; Reilly, 1993; Mitroff, Pauchant, & Shrivastava, 1988; Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Shrivastava, 1987; 1995; ‘t Hart, 2013). Should crisis be 
treated as event, process or systemic failure? In addition, in past decades, organisational crises 
have been studied conceptually and empirically and most of these studies reveal the need for 
incorporating a systemic approach to further analyse crises and disasters to capture their 
complexity and ambiguity (Andrew, 2011; Kovoor-Misra, 1995; Deschamps, Lalonde, 
Pauchant, & Waaub, 1995; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Reza, 2011; Turner, 1976; Weick, 1988). 
What are the possible implications of these various approaches to crisis management practice? 
Fundamentally, the failure to explicitly recognise and precisely discuss the matter of different 
objectives, perspectives and definitions of crisis and crisis management has consequential 
implications in practice. A more recent unconventional challenge is the consequences of moral 
disengagement in risk and crisis management practice which are largely neglected in most 
extant CM research (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). The link between unconventional crisis and 
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moral disengagement is crucial in understanding whether organisational crises are self-inflicted 
or within organisational risk appetite before escalation. 
 
1.6 PRACTICALITY DILEMMAS 
The reality of applying crisis management methodologies during organisational crises and 
disasters (as seen in the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill, King’s Cross disaster, Piper Alpha oil 
platform fire, Thames boat disaster, Hillsborough Stadium disaster, Challenger Space Shuttle 
explosion, Gulf crisis, Shell Brent Spar and other critical dangerous events) reveal severe 
threat, high degree of uncertainty, urgent and irreversible decisions (Hopkin, 2010; Lerbinger, 
2012; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Veil, 2011). On one hand, traditional and conventional 
research of crisis management suggest the use of strategies such as denial, evading 
responsibility, silence, no comment, ignoring accusations and blame shifting as some of the 
most effective approach to managing organisational crisis. On the other hand, recent empirical 
works found that these strategies are flawed because they eventually amplified and 
compounded emerging crises as well as raising serious ethical dilemmas labelled as 
mechanisms of moral disengagement in process of risk/crisis management. Why does moral 
disengagement in crisis situations matter?  
Moral disengagement (MD) theory was established to expound why certain people can engage 
in inhumane and unethical conducts without apparent distress and mitigate the moral 
consequences of harmful behaviours (Acquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Bandura, 1986; 
1991; 2002; Bandura et al., 2000; Caprara et al., 2009; Moore, 2008; McAlister, 2001; Jackson, 
& Spar, 2005; Rogers, 2003; Young, Zhang, & Prybutok, 2007). Moral disengagement presents 
a fundamental paradox in risk and crisis management. First, it is indispensable for empirically 
understanding crisis intensification and sustainable risk/crisis management. In addition, a 
critical analysis of moral disengagement mechanisms in risk and crisis domain reveals that 
crisis intensification and hostility perhaps occur largely because of the use of moral 
disengagement mechanisms as risk/crisis management strategies (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 
2015). A crucial problem, however, remains the control of MD mechanisms in risk, crisis and 
disaster situations and their management. 
In this thesis, the debate is extended to capture mechanisms of moral disengagement (moral 
justification, euphemistic labelling, advantageous comparison, distorting the consequences, 
14 
 
dehumanisation and attribution of blame) as a spectrum which perhaps unnecessarily 
exacerbates crisis and disaster situations (Bandura, 2000; Vardi, & Weitz, 2004; Hauser, 2006; 
McAlister, Bandura & Owen, 2006; Moore, 2008; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). The 
mechanisms of moral disengagement cognitively affect the quality of decision making during 
risk and crisis situations. Well documented historical evidence bears out this phenomenon with 
examples such as the Bhopal disaster, and the Niger Delta crises. A neglected area in the field 
of risk and crisis management is the implications of moral disengagement mechanisms in crisis 
responses and different conceptual methodologies to crisis and disaster. Therefore, this thesis 
draws on the moral psychology, risk and crisis management literature to delineate the linkage 
between moral disengagement and crisis management to unravel unconventional solutions to 
emerging crises/disasters especially in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
The world of risk and crisis management in the 21st century witnesses different and 
unconventional kinds of risks, crises and disasters demanding unconventional approaches and 
responses. Rightly so, what constitutes these phenomena and their management continue to be 
more problematic. Previous cases of crises and disasters such as Tylenol case, Exxon Valdez 
oil spillage, Three Mile Island, Piper Alpha disaster, 9/11 terrorist, Bhopal disasters, BP Texas 
refinery explosion, BP oil spills, all appear to differ fundamentally in context and provides 
important lessons for future crisis management practice and research. It is on this basis some 
theorists and practitioners have developed risk analysis models, organisational risk 
management techniques, textbook techniques, risk and crisis communication rules, best 
practice in risk and crisis management, risk and crisis management methodologies.  
During this research, there is a growing realisation that the distinction between risk 
management and crisis management is artificial but necessary for critics. The argument here is 
that these phenomena – risk management and crisis management appear undistinguishable. In 
theory, it is much easier to differentiate between the two terms and divert attention to a 
paradigm shift in risk management. In practice, what theorists and practitioners manage 
whether called ‘risk, crisis or disaster’ is not so much distinguished from the approaches use to 
manage them. In context, as revealed later in this thesis, risk management frameworks have 
been applied to crisis situations and the so-called crisis management frameworks used to 
manage risks. The methodological tools used classically depend on whether the dangerous 
event is perceived as risk, crisis or disaster by those responsible for their management.  
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From another perspective, both risk and crisis management involves decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty and complexity. Thus, both can be described as a ‘balancing act’ to 
normalise dangerous events (risks, crises, or disasters) within the organisation risk tolerance 
level (Andrew, 2011; Barton, 2008; Lerbinger, 2012). This thesis contends that using business 
case always to make decisions in risk/crisis situations could be practically problematic and 
cause “black swans” (or unexpected events). Quite notably, the business case comes with 
endless challenges, for example, the reluctance within organisations to commit resources and 
the assumption that crisis ownership is present. In addition, changes in management practices 
during crisis create little resilience to thoroughly cope with emerging crises (or threats) because 
of flatter organisational approaches, inept crisis leadership, risk tolerance and appetite, flaws 
in business continuity plans, relying on weak and untested crisis management plans, ineffective 
crisis communication strategy, escalated commitment, moral disengagement and financial 
inability to absorb crisis impacts. 
In critical terms, unconventional risks, crises and disasters are developing new characteristics 
which do not fit existing risk and crisis management models (Borodzicz, 2005; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Therefore, it is arguable that the most important 
attribute in crisis management is practicality – and it appears that most of the contemporary 
risk and crisis management models lack it. Although some crisis management models have 
been useful in gaining some important insights in managing crisis/disaster. However, these 
existing CM models still lack the ability to resolve emerging unconventional crises which are 
arguably outside traditional approaches. To say these words – unbelievable, unimaginable, 
inconceivable, unexpected, unthinkable in crisis situations is to admit four kinds of failure: in 
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management (Lagadec, 2009; ‘t Hart, 2013). In modern 
crisis situations, the unthinkable is clearly thinkable and the unexpected is arguably imaginable. 
In context, the argument presented in this thesis is integral to our understanding of ensuring 
sustainable risk/crisis management and prevent imagination failures in crisis management 
practice. 
Although the stakes are exceptionally high and the difficulties more severe than ever, the onus 
is to rethink our current CM models, tools, culture, mentality, strategies, and training, 
communication and implementation processes accordingly. To confirm the need for alternative 
complementary crisis management framework, previous research demonstrates that many fault 
lines converge in the present approach to managing risk, crisis and disaster (Andrew, 2011; 
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Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Jacques et al., 1999; Lagadec, 2005; Hiles, 2011). In fact, since 
the natural philosophers of the 17th century it is as if our approach has remained inert: 
“Causes which result in effects which are rare, violent and sudden must not affect us, 
they are not part of the ordinary process of Nature. Our causes and reasons are the 
effects that occur each day, movements that follow one another, effects that are 
continually renewed and endlessly repeated” (Buffon, 1749) cited in Larousse (1987, 
p. 397). 
Perhaps, this reveals a more radical paradigm shift and new challenges requiring both moral 
engagement and resilience approach to unconventional crises or disasters. The argument 
presented here resonates with Uriel Rosenthal one of the pioneers in crisis study who notes that 
this tradition has remained central and currently blocks crisis management (Lagadec, 2005). 
Simply put, scientists feel uncomfortable with phenomena that seem beyond the scope of the 
neatly crafted theories which have been developed based on normal circumstances and events. 
Crises seem to be in total opposition to the very foundations of modern social science 
(Rosenthal, Charles, & ‘t Hart, 1989). Albeit this study questions the idea of ‘neatly crafted 
theories’, we would like to advance the debate, background of analysis, and our understanding 
of what constitute ‘self-inflicted crises’ in the field of organisation science and risk/crisis 
management. It is not the most well-crafted crisis management models that can successfully 
help manage crisis, nor the most structured models, but the one most responsive to consider 
flexibility, normality, vulnerability, victims perspective, business case challenges, broader 
resilience and morality theory of crisis management. 
In another instance, crisis management is arguably a global phenomenon which can has 
numerous and far-reaching implications across borders. The Niger Delta crisis using the case 
law of Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Shell Group demonstrated the impact of crisis mismanagement 
across borders. The case of Kiobel Vs. Royal Dutch Shell Group was instituted in 2000 at the 
United States (U.S) and the U.S Supreme Court finally decided the case on April 17, 2013. The 
Kiobel case arose because of the Ogonis protest over environmental effects of oil extraction, 
exploration and degradation including gas flaring, oil spillage, construction of oil pipelines and 
climate change by Shell Nigeria.  
The Nigerian Federal Government attempted to end the protests over Niger Delta pollution in 
1994 led the Nigerian military forces to suppress protests organised by the Movement for 
Survival of Ogoni People against continues oil pollution and exploration in the Ogoniland 
within Niger Delta (Owolabi & Okwechime, 2007; Social Action, 2009). The Ogoni 
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communities were looted and vandalised, and indigenes were systematically shot, beaten, 
raped, arrested, tortured, and killed for raising environmental concerns about oil exploration 
and production in Ogoniland (Ubhenin, 2013; UNEP, 2011). In fact, nine prominent Ogoni 
environmental activists (including Ken Saro-Wiwa and Kiobel) were summarily sentenced to 
death and executed by a corrupt Nigerian military tribunal (Boele, 1995; TRIP Report, 1999; 
Pyagbara, 2010). The Kiobel case points to changing corporate culture in multinational 
organisations and fundamental effect of crisis across the globe. The case also raises important 
question about the implication of moral disengagement in risk and crisis management practice.  
The first round of Kiobel briefing in the Supreme Court focused on corporate liability and the 
central question was ‘whether victims of the world’s worst atrocities’ who are denied justice at 
home can turn to U.S courts as their last resort under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) which was 
enacted in 1789. A basic premise of the ATS is that it applies universally but the U.S Supreme 
Court decided the case on a narrower ground. These cases represent the problems facing the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The complaint alleged that Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
(incorporated in the Netherlands), Shell Transport and Trading Company (incorporated in 
England), and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (incorporated in Nigeria) 
aided and abetted the Nigerian military in committing extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes 
against humanity, and other human rights violations. The plaintiffs argued that Royal Dutch 
Shell “armed, financed, and conspired with” Nigerian military forces to dehumanise the Ogoni 
people over environmental degradation protests. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). Other lawsuits included Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum, Wiwa v. Anderson, 
and Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. These cases were settled in 
2009 but concerns over environmental disasters and pollution in the Niger Delta linger. In 
addition, both the 1994 and 2001 US financial crisis further demonstrate how crisis has 
suddenly becomes a global phenomenon. In retrospective, between 1992 and 1998, the Niger 
Delta crisis forces the global oil price to dramatic escalation figures (UNEP, 2011). 
 
1.7 MORAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN RISK AND CRISIS SITUATIONS 
Moral and ethical issues are common in organisational crises and responses in which different 
behavioural norms and interests overlap because of crisis dimension, high uncertainty and 
complexity, and risk involved, ill-defined roles, constants environmental pressure to get things 
right, and vulnerability of the different stakeholders. Most commonly, crisis leaders encounter 
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moral issues in crisis situations when choosing between pursuing self-regulation, the type of 
crisis response to use and upholding normative organisational ethics (Bandura, 2002; 2007; 
Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). In this thesis, moral and ethics are used interchangeably to mean 
the same. Albeit moral and ethical issues appear to often be neglected in risk, crisis and disaster 
management partly because of the difficulty in establishing consensus about what constitute 
morality and ethics. Yet, lacking such insight has significant implications because a situation 
of unconscious morality and ethics arguably promotes immoral behaviour and unethical 
decision making in risk/crisis management practice.  
In other words, this thesis contends that neglecting morality issues in processes of 
organisational crisis could intensify crisis/disaster situations (although this might depend on 
the crisis dimension or kind). However, as contended later in this thesis, morality and ethical 
consciousness in the processes of risk, crisis and disaster management cannot be ignored. The 
critical question is not whether the moral and ethical issues of crisis will be revealed but rather 
when that moral and ethical aspect will become public and under what situations. Ignoring 
issues of morality and ethics, and perception in crisis management practice would arguably 
intensify crisis and promote hostility in the Niger Delta crisis (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). 
In addition, crisis challenges the explicitness of an organisational ethical beliefs and the 
commitment level of its top management (Snyder, 2006). The moral pragmatism of 
organisation is also reveal during organisational crisis. It is contended that crises have a way 
of activating moral beliefs in a manner that everyday events do not (Fritzche & Becker, 1983).   
As revealed later, most theorists and practitioners in risk and crisis management are currently 
advocating ideologies which create avenues suitable for the exploitation of moral 
disengagement mechanisms in risk, crisis and disaster situations. This perhaps is the source of 
most crisis intensification especially in the context of the Niger Delta crises. The argument 
advance here is that incorporating morality and ethical theory into risk and crisis management 
is crucial in managing conflicting interests of diverse stakeholders in crisis situations. During 
organisational crises, crisis leaders are frequently confronted by ethical and moral issues that 
entail risky decision making between ending crisis and prolonging crisis, profiting from crisis 
and losing in crisis, compromising existing rules and stick to the rules. It may also involves 
maintaining and compromising behavioural norms and organisational ethics, and draw a line 
between the pursuit of organisational goals and causing harm to other stakeholders.  
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More explicitly, high profile cases of crises and disasters such as the Bhopal disaster, Shell 
Brent Spar, Three Mile Island, Shell-Ogoni crisis brought to limelight the moral and ethical 
risks present in the processes of risk/crisis management practice. There is disturbing trend in 
risk and crisis management as existing models appear to ignore the issue of moral 
disengagement and it is quite easier to exploit moral disengagement weapons in crisis 
unnoticeably. For stakeholders, it is about their specific interest but there could be real shift in 
culture and mentality if the concept of moral disengagement is introduced in risk/crisis 
management practice and research. 
 
1.8 FUNDAMENTAL AVENUES OF CRITICISM 
If risk and crisis management is about how to methodologically manage risk and crisis then 
what is lacking appears to be the ability to recognise and understand how not to manage risk, 
crisis and disaster. The premise is that attempt to understand the best ways of managing risk 
and crisis over the years often create the misconception and presumption that practitioners and 
academics alike know how not to manage risk, crisis and disaster. This argument can be 
revealed in both traditional and conventional theories of risk and crisis management. A 
universal maxim in crisis management literature is that organisational crises differ contextually 
and likewise the management strategies use to manage such crises (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 
2010; Benoit, 1997; Bergeron & Cooren, 2012; Coombs, 1999; 1995; Laere, 2013; Simpson, 
Clegg, & e Cunha, 2013). 
Traditional thinking in crisis management views crisis as an exceptional event, generating 
alternative behaviours and coordination patterns (Milburn, Schuler & Watman, 1983a; Milburn 
et al., 1983b; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977, 1984). The research and 
practice of crisis management over the recent years fundamentally appears to have been built 
upon that assumption (Benoit, 1997; Boin, 2009; Boin, Hart, & McConnell, 2008; Coombs, 
1995, 1998, 2006; Jackson, Sullivan, & Wills, 2011; Lagadec, 2004; 2009). This thesis 
question not the notion that crisis is an exceptional event but creating alternative behaviours 
and coordination patterns seem avoidable. In fact, the alternative behaviours and strategies such 
as simple denial (Benoit, 1995), finding a scapegoat and attacking the accuser (Allinson, 1993; 
Benoit, 1995), establish and attribute blames (Coombs, 2007; Drabek & Quarentelli, 1967), 
contributory errors (Health, 1998), lack of organisational openness (Allinson, 1993), redefining 
the origin and nature of the crisis (Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011) are argued to be 
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mechanisms of moral disengagement in processes of risk/crisis management in this thesis. 
These crisis management response strategies are useful to think of organisations using business 
case and conscious of restricting litigation in crisis, and protect their public reputations 
(Coombs, 2007; Hearit, 2006). However, these crisis management response strategies are 
classified as ‘crisis disengagement’ in this thesis.  
In examining how this contextual structure indicates moral disengagement in processes of 
risk/crisis management, this thesis draws on the conceptual framework of vulnerable 
environment and vulnerable people underpinning the Niger Delta crises as discussed in chapter 
two and three. So, what could be the possible implications of such approach and practice to 
risk/crisis management? The possible implications are well articulated in the later part of this 
thesis. Though moral disengagement is coined as an essentially contested concept because of 
the several meanings and framings of what constitute morality and ethics. Despite this 
criticism, the concerns for managing risks, crises or disasters must balance with the concerns 
for how not to manage them. This is the cornerstone of this thesis. 
 
1.9 DESCRIPTION OF GAPS IN LITERATURE 
The specific gaps and challenges in this thesis are identified under the following six main areas: 
(1) Moral disengagement: organisational moral disengagement, crisis disengagement 
issues and implications, and organisational crisis engagement framework; 
(2) Risk governance: the role of risk and crisis leaders in managing unconventional crises 
and disasters, risk culture implications within organisation, the controversial debates in 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster, and risk perception; 
(3) Vulnerable environment and vulnerable people: vulnerability, environmental justice, 
resource curse and environmental victims, risk identification and assessment, and 
reducing underlying risk factors; 
(4) Risk and crisis management models: examining relevancy and practicality, issue of 
theoretical debates and implications, discrepancy in clarification of the phenomena 
among experts and laypeople, crisis management responses and implications; 
(5) Transcontinental vulnerabilities: risk society, environmental risk and transboundary 
crisis, and issues of reciprocal susceptibilities in organisational crisis and disaster; 
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(6) Environmental sustainability: environmental pollution and degradation, local 
communities in vulnerable environment, turbulent small and medium enterprises in 
crisis-affected region, organisational resilience, and resource sustainability in low-
income countries (Nigeria). 
These are the key areas for developing a robust and relevant sustainable framework for action 
in managing unconventional risks and crises, and contribute effectively towards the 
achievement of Nigeria Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nigeria. The present study 
relates more specifically to environmental sustainability in developing nations as captured in 
the Nigeria MDGs report (2010). This research accentuated the need for crisis engagement 
framework, and developed methods of identifying moral disengagement in processes of 
risk/crisis management, and building communities and organisational resilience to crises and 
disasters. 
 
1.10 CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRACTICE, METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE 
This research makes several contributions to knowledge, method and practice in risk and crisis 
management which are discussed in tripartite dimensions. 
KNOWLEDGE DIMENSION 
As its first contribution to knowledge, this research contributes to the established bodies of 
literature in risk, crisis and disaster management, and to the practice within these fields. In 
context, the research brings a new perspective to the field of risk, crisis and disaster 
management, terrorism and resilience management through the concept of moral 
disengagement. The fact that when moral disengagement fragment into risk and crisis situations 
causes rogue and detrimental behaviours that may not be originally intended, signal the need to 
revisit current thinking in risk and crisis management. In addition, this thesis challenges both 
stage-based and process-based models of risk and crisis management as deficient in managing 
emerging unconventional crises/disasters. Similarly, the notion of best practice or universal 
application of risk and crisis management models or strategies are refuted due to multiple 
perspectives and complexities that characterise unconventional risk, crisis and disaster 
situations. Thus, this research calls for unique fit and decision-based model of risk and crisis 
management to improve risk/crisis management practice and organisational resilience. The 
vast amount of previous risk and crisis literatures are mostly dominated by Western thinking 
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and philosophies over the decades (e.g., Andrew, 2011; Boin et al., 2010; Borodzizc, 2005; 
Constantinides, 2013; Elliott, 2009; Hiles, 2011; Lagadec, 2004; 2009; Mitroff & Anagnos, 
2001; Perrow, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011; Roux-Dufort, 2007b; Shrivastava, 
1993; Turner, 1976; ‘t Hart, 2013) but this thesis adds African perspective using case studies 
from developing countries (Nigeria) context to the body of knowledge in risk and crisis 
management. Albeit it is essential to notes that different cultures exist within the African 
context, however moral disengagement mechanisms are prevalent within the notion of self-
inflicted disasters which could cut across different cultures. 
As another contribution to knowledge, albeit extensive studies have been conducted to evaluate 
risk and crisis management across organisations in different sectors following the aftermath of 
major organisational scandals, crises and disasters, the link between moral disengagement and 
risk/crisis management has not been examined and the implications for practice in risk and 
crisis management are still under-researched or lacking. This thesis complements this focal 
area of risk and crisis research due to empirical evidence that individuals and organisations 
with moral disengagement may make, or at least superficially present as artificial effective risk 
leaders and organisations (cf. Bandura, 2007; 2009; Caprara et al., 2009; Chugh et al., 2014; 
Fiske, 2004; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Ntayi et al., 2010; White et al., 2009). The claim is 
made that when ethical and moral implications in processes of crisis management are 
neglected, ontological harmful consequences and ethically problematic issues arise. In another 
perspective, when ethical and moral effect of crisis management are considered, the question 
of moral nature of an ethically ambiguous situation become epistemological contestable. Thus, 
the construct of moral disengagement mechanisms is pragmatically fussed into crisis 
management practice to delineate the linkage between the two phenomena. As a result, this 
research contributes to earlier body of knowledge on risk and crisis management models (e.g., 
Andrew, 2011; Boin et al., 2010; Borodzizc, 2005; Constantinides, 2013; Elliott, 2009; Hiles, 
2011; Lagadec, 2004; 2009; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Perrow, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998; 
Reza, 2011; Roux-Dufort, 2007b; Shrivastava, 1993; Turner, 1976; ‘t Hart, 2013) by 
connecting them to moral disengagement perspective. Following the recommendation in the 
literature (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et al., 2002; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Moore et al., 
2012), this thesis examined moral disengagement mechanisms in unconventional risk and 
crisis, whereas most of the previous risk and crisis management studies are devoid of moral 
consideration in risk/crisis cases. In context, this thesis extends existing knowledge in risk and 
crisis management by demonstrating that high moral disengagement is associated with 
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ineffective crisis management response whereas low moral disengagement is associated with 
unsustainable crisis management. 
In addition, this research specifically builds on important risk and crisis management studies 
such as Andrew (2011), Ansell, Boin, & Keller (2010), Augustine (1995; 2000), Bland (1998), 
Boin (2004), Boin, ‘t Hart, McConnell, & Preston (2010), Borodzicz (2005), Coombs (2007), 
Cutter (2005), Dombrowsky (2007), Fink (2002), Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015), Mitroff, 
Shrivastava & Udwadia (1987), Pearson & Clair (1998), Reza (2011), Shrivastava (1993), 
Turner (1976), ‘t Hart (2013), Toft & Reynolds (2005), and Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow (2007) 
by uncovering that existing risk/crisis models may amplify emerging risks/crises which 
suggests a new direction when responding to unconventional risks and crises. Therefore, this 
thesis complements this focal area of risk and crisis research due to empirical evidence that 
individuals and organisations with moral disengagement may make, or at least superficially 
present as artificial effective risk leaders and organisations (cf. Bandura, 2007; 2009; Caprara 
et al., 2009; Chugh et al., 2014; Fiske, 2004; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Ntayi et al., 2010; 
White et al., 2009). At the same time, ample evidence from this thesis suggests that individuals 
and organisations using moral disengagement mechanisms can be self-destructive in the long-
term. 
Furthermore, this thesis is the first original attempt to empirically investigate the relationship 
between moral disengagement and crisis management. In support of moral disengagement 
approach to risk and crisis management (Mafimisebi &Thorne, 2015; 2017), this thesis findings 
confirm results of previous moral disengagement studies (Bandura, 1999; 2007; Bandura et al., 
2000; Fiske, 2004; McAlister et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2012; Rogers, 2003; White et al., 2009; 
Young et al., 2007) by showing a divergence in relationship between moral disengagement and 
crisis management leading to misclassification of dangerous events and overestimation of 
existing risk/crisis models. This insight goes beyond existing explanations and models 
available in the extant risk and crisis research through which previously independent concepts 
become associated. The models as presented in this research deny certain assumptions of 
existing risk/crisis management research and practice and suggest ‘synthetic a posteriori 
propositions’ (Davis, 1971: 310) grounded in empirical world and provide avenues for new 
debates and directions in risk/crisis management for practitioners and academics who perhaps 
are already thinking about it. 
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METHOD DIMENSION 
This thesis has been structured in what has been appropriately described as inverse research 
approach (See Section 1.11 for more details). The structure is labelled as ‘inverse research 
approach’ because it contrasts with existing studies on how risk and crisis investigations are 
often conducted and presented (cf. Boin & McConnell, 2007; Borodzizc, 2005; Reza, 2011; 
Saunders et al., 2012; Vaughan, 2004). Moreover, as noted later, this thesis argues that crises 
and disasters are unique, ambiguous, complex and socially constructed which cannot be 
subjected to the classical close-cycle research approach dominating existing studies (Ansell et 
al., 2010; Augustine, 1995; Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Coombs, 2007; Fink, 2002; Roux-
Dufort, 2007b). Therefore, given the nature of unconventional risks/crises which do not 
conform to typical close-cycle risk/crisis models (Andrew, 2011; Borodzicz, 2005; Frandsen 
& Johansen, 2017; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2017), existing traditional ‘best practice approach’ 
to researching and presenting risk, crisis and disaster phenomena are no longer sufficient.  
Therefore, this thesis addresses a methodological limitation that is identified as hindering 
effective risk and crisis management (Andrew, 2011; Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; ‘t Hart, 2013). By doing so, this thesis makes methodological contribution to 
risk and crisis management literature by advocating inverse research approach to risk, crisis 
and disaster phenomena investigation which entails seven stages of selecting, contextualizing, 
reviewing, method, conceptualizing, analysing and concluding (See Section 1.11). In addition, 
this thesis finds that existing research approaches, which typically manifest as close-cycle 
risk/crisis models, to the investigation of emerging risks, crises and disasters are unfit for 
unconventional dangerous events. Likewise, this thesis makes the case for understanding the 
nature of emerging risks, crises and disasters prior to reviewing literature to gather empirical 
evidences about how best to manage them. In context, the seven stages of inverse research 
approach propose in Section 1.11 serves as methodological guidelines and contribution to risk, 
crisis and resilience management. Therefore, the adoption of inverse research approach to 
risk/crisis investigation as used in this thesis serves methodological contribution to risk and 
crisis management literature. 
PRACTICE DIMENSION 
This thesis also adds to existing practice in the risk and crisis domain by identifying the crisis 
management – moral disengagement relationships, albeit from the Niger Delta crises context. 
Precisely, moral disengagement mechanisms such as moral justification, attribution of blame, 
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dehumanisation and distorting the consequences are more specific to the Nigeria case. The 
wider application is restricted to unconventional risks, crises and disasters involving moral or 
ethical considerations. In clear terms, this implies that the wider application is restricted to self-
inflicted disasters even though several lessons could be learnt from failure to prevent self-
inflicted disasters. A conceptual model of crisis/moral engagement (see Figure 5.2) was 
developed which does not currently exist in risk/crisis management literature. In similar view, 
the decision-based model of risk and crisis management (see Figure 8.11) was also developed 
as existing risk/crisis models are rooted in process, event, and systemic views of crisis/disaster. 
Moreover, the research provided new contextual insights about factors that hinder effective 
risk and crisis management practice in Nigeria. These factors include selective risk perception, 
inflated ethical stance, organised irresponsibility, trust deficit, relying on past successes, and 
misinterpretation of dangerous events. Previous studies investigating the Niger Delta crises 
have identified broken trust and corporate irresponsibility as part of the main factors affecting 
risk and crisis management in Nigeria (Aghalino, 2009; Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; Bassey, 2008; 
Bolorunduro et al., 2005; Emmanuel, 2010; Ogbodo, 2009; Okon & Akunna, 2010; Mafimisebi 
& Nkwunonwo, 2013; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016; Steiner, 
2010; Vidal, 2011). This thesis corroborates these existing findings and extended them by 
considering their practical implications for sustainable risk/crisis management practice. 
This research also made contribution to the risk and crisis management practice by examining 
the practicality of existing risk/crisis models in context of developing countries, not least due 
to risk culture and risk governance which tend to vary across organisations and countries. 
Another contribution of this thesis is that the vast amount of risk and crisis literatures (for 
example, Allan, 2003; Augustine, 2000; Booth, 1993; Borodzicz, 2005; Buchanan & Denyer, 
2013; Curtin & Hussein, 2005; Fink, 2002; Hiles, 2007; Hopkin, 2010; Lalonde, 2007; 
Lerbinger, 2012; Regester & Larkin, 2008; Shrivastava, 1993; Shrivastava et al., 2009; Smith 
& Elliot, 2006; Veil, 2011) are dominated by the assumption that all crises and disasters are 
analogous but this thesis refute this claim by showing that every crisis/disaster is unique and 
standardisation of risk/crisis management remains inadequate. The broader implication calls 
for adaptation and unique fit in risk and crisis management practice. 
In practical settings, this research adds that risk and crisis management should not proceed as 
if all crises/disasters are equivalent in which case best practices or standards become a norm. 
As a result, best fit or unique fit in risk and crisis management which aligns and integrates the 
risk/crisis management processes with broader organisational strategy, environment, tools, 
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context, culture, perceptions, governance, moral engagement and social acceptability are 
proposed as the future of risk and crisis management. The implications are far-reaching for 
both academics and practitioners. 
In addition, the case studies presented in this thesis can serve as springboard for understanding 
ethical risk and crisis management practice, especially in context of developing countries. This 
thesis findings are rooted in providing understanding on how Nigeria can achieve its 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Vision 20:2020 with reference to Nigeria MDGs 
goal 1 – Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; goal 7 – Ensure environmental sustainability; 
and goal 8 – Develop a global partnership for development. Markedly the more vulnerable is 
the environment and the people are, the greater the risk of achieving the Nigeria MDGs. The 
MDGs report (2010) indicated that despite unprecedented progress towards the achievement 
of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and MDGs by 
2015, several challenges persist. The cultural specificity of the case studies should be taken 
into consideration when using practical insights from this thesis. 
Thus, this research connects and builds on Nigeria government policy on NEEDS and MDGs 
to investigate the notion of self-inflicted disasters; and provide effective strategies or 
approaches that will help environmental victims and multinational oil and gas companies to 
build resilience to environmental crises and disasters. The results of the project have been 
published in high impact and relevant international journals and sent to all targeted stakeholders 
such as Niger Delta Development Commission, Nigeria MDGs Committee, National Planning 
Commission, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Federal Ministry of 
Environment, Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission, and presidential 
group on MDGs who can monitor frequently the progress of the project results implementation. 
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1.11 THESIS CHAPTER STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The structure of this thesis is as shown in the above diagram. However, some clarifications and 
justifications should be made about the main reasons why this thesis is structured in this way 
(that is, case studies chapters then literature and methodology chapters, and analysis chapters). 
The question of how should risk, crisis and disaster be research remain unexplored and 
insufficient attentions have been paid to this issue. The assumption has been that risk, crisis 
and disaster be research in the conventional form of researching most phenomena. The 
prevailing views suggest that research aims/objectives, and questions are captured in 
introduction phase, follow by risk/crisis literatures phase, methodology phase, analysis and 
discussion phase, and conclusion (cf. Boin & McConnell, 2007; Reza, 2011; Saunders et al., 
2012; Vaughan, 2004). 
Introduction Chapter 
with Research Context: 
Chapter One 
Case Study One: Shell 
& Ogoni Crisis:  
Chapter Two 
Case Study Two: 
Chevron & Ilaje crisis 
Chapter Three 
Self-Inflicted Disasters: 
Unconventional Risk, 
Crisis & Disaster 
Chapter Four 
Moral Disengagement 
in Crisis Management 
Chapter Five 
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However, this thesis argues that crises and disasters are unique, ambiguous, complex and 
socially constructed which cannot be subjected to the classical close-cycle research approach 
dominating existing studies (Ansell et al., 2010; Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Coombs, 2007; 
Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Roux-Dufort, 2007b). Therefore, given the nature of 
unconventional risks/crises which do not conform to typical close-cycle risk/crisis models 
(Andrew, 2011; Borodzicz, 2005; Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2017), 
existing traditional ‘best practice approach’ to researching and presenting risk, crisis and 
disaster phenomena are no longer sufficient. Hence, this thesis follows unconventional research 
approach which can be appropriately described as ‘inverse research approach’. This inverse 
research approach as applicable to risk, crisis and disaster phenomena investigation entails the 
following seven stages: 
1. Selecting: This is the first stage in the inverse research approach as used in this thesis. 
This thesis started with selecting or identifying problem in current risk and crisis 
management literature. Specifically, the issue of moral disengagement mechanisms was 
identified as being responsible for generating competing constructions of 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters (See Chapters Five and Eight). The selection 
or identification of problem stage is consistent with how previous risk/crisis studies 
normally began researching most risk/crisis issues (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Ansell, 
Boin, & Keller, 2010; Fink, 2002; Pearson & Clair, 1998) which are often capture in 
the introduction section of research. Therefore, the main issues identified as hindering 
effective risk and crisis management are captured in Chapter One of this thesis. The 
research aim, objectives, research questions, gaps in literature and research 
contributions are capture in the introduction chapter (Chapter One). 
2. Contextualizing: This involves situating the phenomena (i.e., moral disengagement 
and risk/crisis management) of interest in the research context. This thesis makes the 
argument that risk/crisis case studies or incidents should be presented in research prior 
to reviewing of existing literature. This is because when previous risk/crisis studies 
(e.g., Augustine, 1995; Andrew, 2011; Fink, 2002; George & Pratt, 2012; ‘t Hart, 2013) 
review risk/crisis literatures before understanding the risk/crisis phenomena, existing 
risk/crisis models are force on to emerging crises and disasters. Thus, to overcome this 
criticism regarding lack of flexibility and standardisation of risk/crisis models, this 
thesis contextualizes the phenomena by presenting the case studies (Chapters Two and 
Three) before reviewing risk/crisis literature. One significant value of this approach is 
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that it introduces risk/crisis model’s adaptation and flexibility into risk and crisis 
management literature.  
3. Reviewing: This involves conducting extensive reviews of existing risk/crisis 
management literature. In context of this thesis, the reviewing of existing literature is 
divided into two main chapters (Chapters Four and Five). Chapter Four contains the 
risk and crisis management theories relevant to this thesis with special focus on risk 
perception, risk/crisis communication, risk society, risk culture and learning from 
disasters. The concern raised about each of these theories was not about their validity 
but rather on their collective synergy which could produce more far reaching effects 
than when applied in isolation. Chapter Five reviewed the literature on crisis 
management and moral disengagement. The moral disengagement concept is central to 
the discussion surrounding this thesis; hence Chapter five examines the issue of moral 
disengagement in risk/crisis management practice. 
4. Method: This stage involves discussing the research method and approach used in this 
thesis. This thesis argues that method section of risk/crisis research should start after 
the reviewing stage especially when using the inverse research approach. Thus, Chapter 
Six of this thesis presents the issues of research design, data collection and research 
philosophy, choice of analysis, and ethical considerations. 
5. Conceptualizing: This deals with the conceptual framework as used in this thesis. 
Therefore, Chapter Seven of this thesis deals with the philosophical thinking 
underpinning this research. This thesis argues that the conceptual framework of 
risk/crisis should be presented prior to data analysis and discussion. The essence of 
Chapter Seven is to presents theoretical model of self-inflicted disaster. It is essential 
to state that Chapter Seven is a combination of philosophical and theoretical issues to 
identify the framework of analysis for the specific case studies. This implies a robust 
research approach because it does not follow classically close-cycle risk/crisis models 
which are often force on emerging risks/crises as earlier highlighted. 
6. Analysing: The analysis of the case studies is presented in Chapter Eight. The analysis 
is a synthesis of the theoretical conclusions regarding the research aims and objectives 
as well as recommendations which incorporated notable risk and crisis theories such as 
learning from disasters/failures, risk perception, risk culture and risk governance, and 
risk/crisis communication. In addition, this thesis follows an integrated analysis in the 
presentation of both primary and secondary data (See Table 8.1; Figures 8.3, 8.4, 8.6 
and 8.7, for example) to ensure evidences of moral disengagement mechanisms are 
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questioned, corroborated and refuted (if necessary). The reason is that the duality nature 
of moral disengagement mechanisms has been revealed in previous empirical studies 
where on one hand it could be used as crisis disengagement and on the other hand it 
could be used as organised corporate irresponsibility (Bandura, 2007; 2009; Moore, 
2008; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; 2017). In addition, the rationale for embarking upon 
integrated analysis of primary and secondary data are (1) due to data sensitivity which 
can cause harms to the informants and (2) unique nature of the crises (Chapters Two 
and Three). These crises as presented in Chapters Two and Three are still ongoing and 
some specific statements have been made in the past which are linked to certain 
individuals within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Therefore, it was necessary to 
undertake integrated analysis to ensure that informants’ identities are not revealed, 
particularly when the disclosing or quoting statements of informants can be linked back 
to them. The broader implications from this thesis empirical findings and lessons 
learned from the discussions are carefully discussed in Chapter Nine. The focus is to 
address the ‘so what’ aspect of this thesis and integrate that discussion into broader risk, 
crisis and disaster management practice. 
7. Concluding: The last Chapter Ten concludes this thesis with overall considerations for 
robust risk, crisis and resilience management practice. One crucial argument presented 
in Chapter Ten is that cases of risk failures, crises and disasters as demonstrated in the 
case studies of Shell and Chevron should be viewed as learning opportunities noting 
that this requires active learning, collaboration, communication, engagement with other 
stakeholders, ethical decisions, and constant risk/crisis management auditing. 
This thesis argues that knowledge about unconventional risk, crisis and disaster extends beyond 
linear problems to complex, uncertain and ambiguous problems. This implies that using 
traditional method of researching the phenomena do not help us better understand their unique, 
complex and ambiguous nature. One compelling disapproval of existing research approaches 
to the investigation of risk, crisis and disaster is that of their classical close-cycle model which 
are often force upon emerging risks, crises and disasters (Andrew, 2011; Augustine, 2000; 
Fink, 2002; Lerbinger, 2012; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). This makes conventional research 
methods approach to the investigation of risk, crisis and disaster situations unfit for 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters. Therefore, this thesis calls for the adoption of inverse 
research approach as discussed in the above seven stages to the investigation of future 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters. 
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1.12 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides the overall context to this research and highlights the research aims and 
objectives, introduces the conceptual framework of moral disengagement, and reveals the 
unconventional challenges facing risk and crisis management. It also discusses the practicality 
dilemmas of unconventional risk and crisis management, and draws attention to the hidden 
moral and ethical risks in unconventional risks and crises. Furthermore, it highlights the 
fundamental gaps in literature covered within this thesis and clearly state the research 
contributions. The next chapter discussed one of the case studies underpinning this thesis. It 
focuses on the case of Shell – Ogoni crisis, from the perspective of vulnerable environment 
and vulnerable people in Nigeria. This is an ongoing crisis for over two decades and extant 
studies have not specifically examined the issues from moral disengagement perspective, not 
the least due to the broader implication for organisational sustainability and resilience within 
the crisis and conflict-affected areas of Nigeria. 
  
32 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
CASE STUDY ONE: VULNERABLE ENVIRONMENT AND VULNERABLE 
PEOPLE: SHELL NIGERIA & OGONI CRISIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The case study of Shell Nigeria and Ogoni crisis demonstrates a situation of risk management 
failure. This case study contains valuable lessons and crucial information for those involved in 
risk and crisis management especially in African context. In fact, this case study was included 
in this research because it revealed the moral and ethical risks hidden in the processes of risk 
and crisis management. Thus, the Shell Nigeria and Ogoni crisis is a useful learning tool for 
multinational companies and those interested in ethical risk/crisis management, not least 
because reviewing the crisis and similar incidents reveals opportunities to deal with emerging 
or future unconventional crises/disasters. The crisis involves the people of the Ogoni in Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria and Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) over 
environmental pollution, oil spillage, constant gas flaring and environmental degradation of 
Ogoniland. 
The case commences by sketching the background to the discovery of oil in Nigeria, the 
background to Shell Nigeria and its operations, oil business in Ogoniland and government 
involvement in oil business. A tripartite detail of the behaviours of the parties and the issues 
involved are presented. The case continues by examining the roles of the parties, the 
organisation’s (Shell Nigeria) crisis management response and its business operations and 
concludes with a brief description of several challenges now facing the organisation. The case 
arguably contains five fundamental lessons for those individuals and organisations involved in 
the management of unconventional risks, emergencies, crises and disasters:  
 Firstly, neglect of moral and ethical obligations in risk and crisis situations undermines 
risk/crisis management practice.  
 Secondly, local risk perceptions when ignored create trust deficit among stakeholders.  
 Thirdly, the unconventional crisis was self-inflicted because of risk underestimation 
and inappropriate crisis management responses.  
 Fourthly, risk/crisis responders and emergency organisations may be unable to respond 
or manage this form of unconventional crisis due to its rapid, instantaneous, amorphous 
and ill-structured nature.  
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 Finally, risk/crisis communication plays a central role in bridging trust deficit and 
responding to unconventional crises. 
The Shell Nigeria – Ogoni crisis escalated on November 10, 1995 when Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
eight other Ogoni environmental activists were hanged in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria 
for leading a successful protest over environmental degradation and pollution in Ogoniland 
(Niger Delta region of Nigeria) by Shell Nigeria and other multinational oil companies (Boele 
et al., 2001; Ibeanu, 2000; Nweke, 2013; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). The environmental 
pollution in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria by multinational oil companies has attracted 
national and international attention. However, Shell Nigeria, the largest oil producer in Nigeria, 
had been subject of environmental pollution accusation and targeted for attack by the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), in a campaign that successfully closed 
Shell’s oil production in Ogoniland in 1993 (Boele et al., 2001; Shell Report, 2010; 2012). 
Following the prosecution of the leading Ogoni activists, Shell was blamed both locally and 
internationally as the Nigerian government brutally suppressed protests by MOSOP, and finally 
tried and executed the core of the organization’s leadership (Aigbedion & Iyayi, 2007; ERA, 
2012; Steiner, 2010; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015). The response of Shell to the attacks 
on its record in Nigeria forms an interesting study in risk and crisis management, and crisis 
communication practice. The case also creates an avenue to explore moral disengagement 
issues in risk/crisis management practice, test existing risk/crisis models and explore 
organisational readiness to deal with unconventional crises/disasters. Collectively, the 
understanding of these issues can potentially help evaluate risk/crisis management maturity, 
improve risk/crisis management capability and enhance organisational resilience, advancing 
and validating this research aim and purpose. 
 
2.2 SHELL IN NIGERIA: A BRIEF REVIEW 
The commencement of the Nigerian oil industry can be traced back to 1908 when a German 
corporation, the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation and British Colonial Petroleum commenced 
operations in Araromi (present day Ilaje Local Government Area of Ondo State) – South West 
of Nigeria. The First World War in 1914 affected oil production and exploration but oil 
prospecting efforts resumed in 1937 when Shell D’Arcy Petroleum (the forerunner of SPDC) 
was awarded the sole concessionary rights covering the whole territory of Nigeria. However, 
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oil exploration activities were also interrupted by the Second World War but resumed in 1947. 
In 1956, Shell Nigeria discovered crude oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri (present day 
Bayelsa State) – Niger Delta region of Nigeria. However, actual oil production and export 
started in 1958. This discovery opened the oil industry in 1961 bringing in Mobil, Agip, 
Tenneco, Amoseas (Texaco and Chevron), Safrap (now Elf) and others oil companies (both 
indigenous and foreign) to join the exploration efforts both in the offshore and onshore areas 
of Nigeria (ERA, 2012; Steiner, 2010). 
Shell Nigeria carried out operations via four subsidiaries (Shell Nigeria Exploration and 
Production Company, Shell Nigeria Gas, Shell Nigeria Oil Products and Nigeria Liquefied 
Natural Gas) mainly through Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) 
Limited (Shell, 2008). SPDC is the largest fossil fuel company in Nigeria which operates over 
6,000 kilometres of pipelines and flowlines, 87 flowstations, 8 natural gas plants and more than 
500 producing wells (Shell, 2012). The company is an operator of the joint venture which 
composed of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (55%), Shell (30%), Total S.A 
(10%) and Eni (5%) (Steiner, 2010). This is due to Nigerian nationalisation decree in the 1970s 
which compelled foreign firms to transfer certain percentage of their shares to the Nigerian 
public. However, Shell is responsible for the daily operations and management of the joint 
venture in Nigeria (Boele, Fabig, & Wheeler, 2001, p. 75). 
According to Shell International (1995b), Shell Nigeria operations are viewed as arguably 
Shell’s largest and most complex exploration and production venture outside North America. 
There are several important challenges facing Shell Nigeria including corruption, kidnapping 
and vandalism, militancy and government inability to provide essential infrastructures and 
development in Nigeria. The local oil producing communities in the Niger Delta often demand 
responsible environmental behaviours and other social benefits from Shell and other 
multinational oil firms (Nwike, 2013; Social Action, 2009; Steiner, 2010; Mafimisebi & 
Thorne, 2015). However, Shell argues that its’ most effective contribution to Nigeria is through 
taxes and royalties they pay to the Nigerian federal government (Shell International, 1995a). 
The conflicting views of the different stakeholders about who is responsible for clean-up of the 
environment and provision of social benefits complicated risk and crisis management practice 
in Nigerian oil and gas sector. 
 
35 
 
2.3 SHELL IN OGONILAND 
The people of Ogoni mainly occupy Khana, Gokana, Tai and Eleme Local Government Areas 
(LGAs) of Rivers State, Nigeria (Figure 2.1) and their livelihoods are based on agriculture and 
fishing. The Ogonis, based on 2006 national census, numbered about 832,000 as an ethnic 
nation in the present Rivers State, Nigeria (UNEP, 2011, p. 32). Shell discovered oil in 
commercial quantities within Ogoniland in 1958 where it has since drilled 116 oil wells from 
twelve oilfields (UNEP, 2011, p. 24). Shell Nigeria and its joint venture partners have five 
major fields in Ogoniland dating from the 1960s and 1970s, each with its own flowstation 
(where gas is separated and flared from the oil collected from different individual wells and 
the oil pumped on to terminals for export). Figure 2.2 shows the oil industry infrastructure 
within Ogoniland. The total production potential from SPDC’s Ogoni fields was estimated at 
185,000 barrels per day, representing about 3 percent of SPDC’s overall production in Nigeria 
(Nwike, 2013; Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011). In perspective, Shell estimates that a total of 634 
million barrels of crude oil valued at US$5.2 billion were produced from Ogoniland until 1993 
but argues that 79% of the amount were paid via taxes, royalties and equity to the Nigerian 
federal government (Boele et al., 2001). 
However, it is essential to state that Chevron Nigeria Ltd also operated on smaller scale until 
1993 when oil exploration and production were suspended in Ogoniland. Therefore, because 
of decades of oil exploration and production in Ogoniland, the local environment was degraded 
due to constant gas flaring, oil spillages, and pollution arising from Shell’s operation (UNEP, 
2011). Local environmental activists such as Ken Saro-Wiwa argued that the environment in 
Ogoniland had been completely devastated by three decades of reckless oil exploitation or 
ecological warfare by Shell (Beole et al., 2001; Ekpu, 1996; Ikporukpo, 2004; Eweje, 2006). 
Although, Shell refuted these allegations of environmental devastation in Ogoniland and other 
areas where it operates in the Niger Delta as simply untrue (Shell Report, 2011; 2012). Yet, in 
critical context, a recent commission of inquiry estimated that it would take more than 30 years 
to clean-up the damages to the environment and local people sources of livelihoods in 
Ogoniland (UNEP, 2011). 
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Figure 2.1: Map of Ogoniland Showing Eleme, Tai, Gokana and Khana LGAs 
 
Source: UNEP (2011) 
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Figure 2.2: Oil Industry Infrastructure within Ogoniland 
 
Source: UNEP (2011) 
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2.4 EVENTS OF THE SHELL & OGONI CRISIS 
The events of the Shell and Ogoni crisis started in December 1992 when MOSOP sent demands 
notice with an ultimatum to Shell, Chevron, and NNPC to pay back royalties and compensation 
for environmental damages and degradation in Ogoniland within 30 days or quit operations in 
the area. The non-compliance with MOSOP demands resulted into a mass non-violent protest 
which was attended by thousands of Ogoni people on 4th January 1993 (Boele et al., 2001; 
Steiner, 2010). This date has been described as the “Ogoni Day” and widely celebrated among 
the Ogonis every year (Boele et al., 2001; Ereba & Dumpe, 2010). The main purpose of the 
protest was to drawn national and global attentions to the environmental devastation and 
extreme pollution in Ogoniland (as shown in Figure 2.3) which have affected their livelihood 
for decades (Nwike, 2013; UNEP, 2011; Pyagbara, 2010). As a result, Shell was put under 
pressure from the Ogonis and finally forced to pull out and withdrawal its staff from Ogoniland 
in January 1993. In fact, Shell cited intimidation and attacks on its staff as the main reason for 
ceasing production at its Ogoni facilities (Shell, 2008; Shell Report, 2012). 
However, the Ogoni protest against environmental pollution by oil companies provoked a 
military crackdown (Boele et al., 2001; Nwike, 2013). Following a successful military coup in 
November 1993, which placed General Sani Abacha in power, this repression became more 
severe in which Ken Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders were detained (Boele et al., 2001; 
Social Action, 2009). The Nigerian government specifically created a military unit called the 
Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) in January 1994 to deal with the Ogoni 
crisis. But, there are several reports (e.g., ERA, 2012; Eweje, 2006; Social Action, 2009; 
Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011) of human right violations, detentions, harassment, and 
extrajudicial executions of MOSOP activists. Also, security forces were accused of promoting 
violent clashes between the Ogoni and neighbouring ethnic groups (Ibeanu, 2000; Nwike, 
2013). 
In perspective, the Head of RSISTF was quoted to have made claims that they were acting on 
Shell’s behalf so that oil production could resume and that they had been risking their lives in 
order to protect Shell installations and infrastructures in Ogoniland (Boele et al., 2001). 
However, Shell group has refuted these claims noting these allegations were simply untrue 
(Shell Report, 2010; 2011; 2012). The event of May 1994 involving the death of four prominent 
Ogoni leaders associated with a faction of MOSOP who was considered as government 
collaborators resulted in the immediate arrest of Ken Saro-Wiwa and several other Ogoni 
activists on charges of murder and incitement to murder (Boele et al., 2001). 
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Albeit, there was lack of credible evidence to connect them to the deaths (Boele et al., 2001; 
Nwike, 2013; Pyagbara, 2010). Nonetheless, sixteen members of the MOSOP leadership were 
put on trial and nine of them including Ken Saro-Wiwa were eventually convicted and 
sentenced to death by a special military tribunal established for the case (Boele et al., 2001). 
These ‘Ogoni nine’ were summarily executed on November 10, 1995 without the right to 
appeal the decision. Furthermore, several other MOSOP activists were detained in Port 
Harcourt prison without charge for several days and months, sometimes in deteriorating health, 
until September 1998 (Nwike, 2013; Social Action, 2009; Ibeanu, 2000). The death of Nigerian 
president General Sani Abacha in June 1998 helped reduce the level of repression in Ogoniland. 
Therefore, MOSOP has often organise events to coincide with January 4th as Ogoni Day and 
November 10th the anniversary of the execution (Boele et al., 2001). In fact, MOSOP and other 
local environmental and human rights activists, following military crackdown on protesters 
against Shell activities, continue to make allegations that Shell colluded with the Nigerian 
military during and after the crisis (ERA, 2012; Social Action, 2009; Nwike, 2013; Pyagbara, 
2010; Steiner, 2010). 
A useful insight into the crisis can be gained from a leaked internal Nigerian government 
memorandum in May 1994 which noted that ruthless military operations were needed for oil 
production to resume in Ogoniland and that oil companies including Shell should be pressured 
to bear the cost (Boele et al., 2001). Although the authenticity of the document was questioned 
by the Nigerian government officials and Shell also disassociated itself from the contents (Shell 
Report, 2009; 2010; 2012). Nonetheless, there were claims that members of the Nigerian 
mobile police force attached to Shell facilities and paid for by Shell, were involved in 
dehumanisation and intimidation of protesters during 1993 and 1994 protest over Shell’s 
activities in Ogoniland (Boele et al., 2001; Nwike, 2013). All these claims and allegations were 
refuted by Shell (Shell, 2009; Shell Report, 2012). Similarly, Shell denied any direct collusion 
with the Nigerian government authorities but later admitted having made direct payments to 
the Nigerian security forces during the crisis (Shell Report, 2010; 2011).  
But, critics continue to argue that such payments were and remain a regularly practice among 
multinational oil companies in Nigeria (Alaba & Ifeola, 2011; Bassey, 2008; Ibeanu, 2000; 
Steiner, 2010; Pyagbara, 2010). Notwithstanding, Shell continue to emphasise its roles and 
contributions to the Nigerian federal government and corporate social responsibility in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Shell Report, 2007; 2008; 2010; 2012). In conclusion, there 
were conflicting views about what happened in the Shell and Ogoni crisis (Boele et al., 2001; 
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Bassey, 2008; Emmanuel, 2010; ERA, 2012; Ibeanu, 2000; Nwike, 2013; UNEP, 2011; Social 
Action, 2009; Steiner, 2010). These conflicting accounts of the crisis complicated the risk and 
crisis management efforts of Shell Nigeria. The crisis provides opportunities to evaluate current 
risk and crisis management practice in part because of the hidden ethical risks and moral 
disengagement. 
Figure 2.3: Shell Pipelines in Okirika - neighbouring Ogoni Communities 
 
Source: UNEP (2011) 
2.5 ROLE OF MEDIA AND SHELL’S RESPONSE 
The Nigerian local media and other international media regularly painted Shell as an unethical 
organisation and a supporter of dictators in Nigeria during the crisis (Boele et al., 2001; Ibeanu, 
2000; Nwike, 2013). In fact, following the death of the ‘Ogoni nine’, Shell became an object 
of ethical analysis in the media and questions were raised about how far should a multinational 
corporation in nations with unstable democratic systems go in pursuit of profits (McElvoy, 
1996; Nwike, 2013; Steiner, 2010). A few reports suggested that Shell had been in negotiation 
for the import of arms for use by the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) during the crisis (Boele et 
al., 2001; Emmanuel, 2010; Steiner, 2010; Pyagbara, 2010). Shell responded to these 
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allegations by noting that it had indeed imported side arms on behalf of the NPF and that the 
last time weapons were purchased was 15 years before 1993 (Shell, 2009; 2011). 
However, court papers filed in Lagos in July 1995 showed that Shell was negotiating for the 
purchase of weapons for the NPF as at February 1995 (Boele et al., 2001). Shell claimed that 
these arms were for use against general crime and vandalism to oil infrastructures in the Niger 
Delta. In fact, Shell acknowledged that it had conducted these arms negotiations but stated that 
none of the purchases had been concluded while noting: 
“[We] cannot give an undertaking not to provide weapons in the future, as, due to the 
deteriorating security situation in Nigeria, we may want to see the weapons currently 
used by the Police who protect Shell people and property upgraded.” (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999, p. 14). 
During the trials of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogonis, Shell came under increased pressure 
both within and outside Nigeria to intervene on behalf of the accused during the trial and after 
conviction of the Ogoni nine (Boele et al., 2001; Vidal, 1995; Robinson, 1996). However, Shell 
initial response was that it would be dangerous and wrong to intervene in the trial process or 
even have the court judgement against the Ogoni nine overturned (Human Rights Watch, 
1999). Specifically, Shell claimed that that “a commercial organisation like Shell cannot and 
must never interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state.” (Human Rights Watch, 
1999, p. 10). In fact, Shell criticises those who advocate public condemnation of Nigerian 
government actions and suggested that quiet diplomacy is the most appropriate course of action 
during the crisis (Boele et al., 2001; Vidal, 1995; Robinson, 1996). 
Nevertheless, as pressure mounted, Shell sent letter to the Nigerian president General Sani 
Abacha on November 9, 1995 after the conviction of the Ogoni nine, pleading for clemency 
and commutation of the death sentences against Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-accused on 
humanitarian grounds (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Shell Report, 2010; 2011). At the same 
time, Shell explicitly denied that this intervention was a comment on the proceedings of the 
tribunal (Shell Report, 2008; 2010; 2012). The company also reaffirmed that as a multinational 
company to interfere in such processes such as the Ogoni nine case, whether political or legal, 
in any country would be wrong.” (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Shell Report, 2008). Despite 
Shell’s response, there were mounting pressures from local and international campaigns such 
as Human Rights Watch and Environmental Rights Action to boycott Shell’s products in 
Europe and the United States (Human Rights Watch, 1999).  
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These campaigns and pressures had affected Shell’s reputation and create trust deficit among 
all relevant stakeholders in Nigeria (Social Action, 2009; Pyagbara, 2010). In context, Shell 
realise that its corporate image had been damaged because of its statements claiming that 
human rights concerns are not for business to get involved with (though its share price was not 
significantly affected) (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Thus, Shell adjusted its public position 
earlier made in the early 1996 and reaffirmed on several occasions its commitment to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights while continuing to state that it could not comment on 
any specific case (Shell, 2008; Shell Report, 2010; 2012). However as local communities and 
activists continue pressure and agitations in the Niger Delta because of the Ogoni crisis, Shell 
was forced to respond (ERA, 2012; Ibeanu, 2000; Social Action, 2009; Pyagbara, 2010).  
Therefore, in May 1996, in response to concerns about the Ogoni nine, Shell stated: “The 
Nigerian Government has a duty to investigate the murder of the four Ogoni leaders. And if 
those investigations lead to the arrest and trial of suspects, then no-one has the right to oppose 
due legal process. But trials must be fair. And they must be seen to be fair.” (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999, p. 16). Yet, Shell’s responses were insufficient to resolve the crisis due to claims 
by local communities and activists that there had been no change in the company’s behaviour 
on the ground (ERA, 2012; Social Action, 2009; Steiner, 2010; TRIP Report, 1999). This is 
despite Shell’s commitment to clean-up polluted sites across Ogoniland and upholding good 
corporate behaviour in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Shell Report, 2010; 2011; 2012). 
2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 
The issue of environmental stewardship is central to the Shell – Ogoni crisis. Shell’s reputation 
and corporate image largely depends on whether local people view the company as a 
responsible corporate organisation. Although Shell has shown its commitment to corporate 
social responsibility (Shell Report, 2009; 2011; 2012), environmental responsibility and ethical 
corporate behaviour requires more than a statement of commitment. Quite importantly, for 
Shell, a return to Ogoniland would be a powerful symbol that its corporate commitment to be 
a socially responsible company is being translated into action in Nigeria (Pyagbara, 2010). 
However, there is still little trust between the company and the Ogoni people and their 
representative organisation, MOSOP (ERA, 2012; Shell Report, 2012). This is due partly to 
destruction of farmland and water pollution which affects sources of livelihoods because the 
Ogonis were, and are, still largely depend on farming and fishing for their livelihoods (UNEP, 
2011). In fact, the Ogonis regarded their land, before the commencement of oil exploration and 
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production in the 1960s, as the ‘breadbasket’ of the region (Boele, 1995). The oil infrastructures 
are intertwined with local houses, not least because oil wells and residential homes are located 
a few metres apart in some extreme cases (Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.4: A house constructed on a well pad (Yorla 9, Khana LGA) 
 
Source: UNEP (2011) 
2.7 THE RESOURCE CURSE AND SHELL’S ROLES 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) found that oil exploration and 
production in Ogoniland affect the environment and impact on sources of livelihoods of the 
local people (UNEP, 2011). In fact, the Ogonis claimed that Shell has devastated their 
environment since its operations in 1958 (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a; MOSOP Canada, 1998c). In 
addition, Shell was also accused by MOSOP of specific acts of organised corporate and 
environmental irresponsibility in the Niger Delta (Boele et al., 2001). In perspective, local 
activists believed that these organised environmental irresponsibility manifest in form of 
constant operational oil spills, gas flaring, land use, water pollution and deforestation to pave 
way for oil pipelines across the region (ERA, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Social Action, 
2009).  
Shell acknowledges that there were environmental impacts but sought to put these into a wider 
context of over-population, over-farming, deforestation and industrialisation (Shell 
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International, 1995c). Nonetheless, the Ogonis argued that Shell’s equipment is out-dated 
because it was poorly maintained over the years and noting that this led to numerous spills 
across the Niger Delta (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a; MOSOP Canada, 1998c). By contrast, Shell noted 
that the Ogonis were very active saboteurs as 69% of all spills within Ogoniland between 1989 
and 1994 were due to sabotage (in comparison to 28% for the rest of the Niger Delta) (Shell 
International, 1995c). This claim has been rejected by the Ogonis and other environmental 
activists (Boele et al., 2001; ERA, 2012) because there was never independent assessment of 
the oil activities in Ogoniland until 2011 (UNEP, 2011). 
During the escalation period of the crisis, oil spills which were never cleaned or partially 
cleaned remain a crucial source of the unresolved conflict between Shell and the Ogonis. In 
fact, local people in Ogoniland believed that Shell often claimed that oil spills were due to 
sabotage to avoid paying compensation (ERA, 2012; Social Action, 2009). This is because 
under the Nigerian law, oil companies are not obliged to pay compensation for oil spillages 
which occurred because of sabotage (Steiner, 2010). The Ogonis believed that Nigerian 
government depended on oil money for survival and Shell depended on profit for survival 
(Boele et al., 2001). This sentiment was also expressed during the trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa: The 
military dictatorship holds down oil-producing areas such as Ogoni by military decrees and 
the threat of or actual use of physical violence so that Shell can wage its ecological war without 
hindrance and so produce the oil and petrodollars as well as the international and diplomatic 
support upon which the military dictatorship depends” (Saro-Wiwa, 1995b) cited in Human 
Rights Watch (1999, p. 16). 
Specifically, Shell was accused of always seeking and assisting the intervention of the Nigerian 
security forces when confronted with protest by the local oil producing communities (Duodu, 
1996; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1995; Vidal, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Robinson, 
1996). Therefore, the Ogonis argued that Shell maintained a ‘special’ relationship with the 
Nigerian government. Human Rights Watch/Africa noted that: ‘Because the abuses set in 
motion by Shell’s reliance on military protection in Ogoniland continue, Shell cannot absolve 
itself of responsibility for the acts of the military . . .  The Nigerian military’s defence of Shell’s 
installations had become so intertwined with its repression of minorities in the oil-producing 
areas that Shell cannot reasonably sever the two’ (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1995, p. 10). 
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2.8 CRISIS COMMUNICATION FAILURE 
The evidence from numerous accounts of the Shell and Ogoni crisis pointed to communication 
breakdown between Shell and the Ogoni people. In perspective, Shell’s difficulty in 
recognising the role of MOSOP and inability to communicate effectively with local community 
was noted (Boele et al., 2001; Pyagbara, 2010). According to Boele (1995), Shell’s crisis 
communication was very poor during the crisis. It was noted that Shell also failed to engage 
MOSOP which represents the bulk of the Ogoni community but instead chose to work with 
some selected conservative Ogoni leaders. There are reports that adequate communication 
between MOSOP and Shell would have prevented the ensuing crisis (e.g., ERA, 2012; Social 
Action, 2009). Shell initial crisis communication response was arguably understandable 
because efforts were directed at mitigating any potential reputational damages and minimise 
potential for litigation.  
However, much of the crisis communication strategies were that of denial, attribution of blame, 
distortion of the consequences and displacement of responsibility (Boele, 1995; Frynas, 2000; 
Robinson, 1996; Steiner, 2012; Vidal, 1995). Had good risk/crisis communication strategies 
rooted in ethical and moral principles existed such as discussed at 4.7 and Chapter Five, Shell 
crisis management team may have altered their thinking and perhaps change their 
communication strategies. The local communities however highlighted the impossibility of 
Shell to engage and communicate with them such that legitimate concerns over ecological 
devastations are addressed (Boele et al., 2001; ERA, 2012; Pyagbara, 2010). A useful insight 
can be gained from the closing statement made by Ken Saro-Wiwa during the trial of the Ogoni 
nine: 
‘Shell is here on trial [. . .] The Company has ducked this particular trial, but its day 
will surely come and the lessons learnt here may prove useful to it for there is no doubt 
in my mind that the ecological war the Company has waged in the Delta will be called 
to question sooner rather than later. . .’ (Saro-Wiwa, 1995b) cited in Human Rights 
Watch (1999, p. 10). 
The lack or inadequate communication between Shell and MOSOP leading to escalation of the 
crisis draws worldwide condemnation of Shell (Frynas, 2000; Wheeler, 1995; O’Sullivan, 
1995; Hammer, 1996). One school of thought is that Shell should have engaged with MOSOP 
to resolve the ensuing crisis (Boele et al., 2001). Alternative schools of thought believed that 
MOSOP do not represent the sole organisation and representation of the entire Ogoni people 
(Shell, 2008). However, research suggested that Shell’s crisis communication team during the 
crisis incubation period misdirected their messages; and misplaced the real issue of 
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environmental degradation and pollution in Ogoniland (Boele et al., 2001; Steiner, 2010). This 
is an issue that most indigenes of Niger Delta recognised and deeply shared as responsible for 
the crisis within the region (Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015). The concern was shared as 
early as 1986 by Ken Saro-Wiwa when he wrote that “We refuse to accept that the only 
responsibility which Shell-BP owes our nation is the spoliation of our lands [. . .]” Saro-Wiwa 
(1995a) cited in Human Rights Watch (1999, p. 11). Regardless of what local people believed 
however, Shell operates in a complex and turbulent environment in Nigeria. Thus, it is possible 
that Shell cannot be strictly responsible for the demands of local people in the Niger Delta. 
 
2.9 EMERGING ISSUES AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are five strategic emerging issues arising from the Shell and Ogoni crisis. Firstly, the 
crisis reveals there was greater reluctance to proactively engage with, or discuss, ethical issues 
in risk/crisis situations. Accordingly, risk and crisis management plans and capabilities were 
mainly directed at reducing damages to corporate reputation and minimise disruption to 
business operations and continuities within the Niger Delta. This implies that all indispensable 
issues that would enhance robust risk/crisis management decisions, to mitigate or reduce the 
effects of Niger Delta crises and strengthen organisational resilience were not completely 
integrated within crisis management strategies or responses. In context, those involved in the 
management of the crises clearly demonstrated failure of imagination and lack of readiness to 
such unconventional crises.  
Secondly, the Nigerian crisis and disaster management systems were largely set up so that local 
and state governments are responsible for initial disaster/crisis management response. The 
accounts of the crisis clearly indicate corporate organisations such as Shell play a significant 
role in funding the operations of emergency/crisis responders in the Niger Delta (Boele, 1995; 
Boele et al., 2001; Robinson, 1996; Frynas, 1999, 2000). However, given the unconventional 
or ill-structured nature of the crisis, it was clear that multinational organisations such as Shell 
need to take practical measures and responsibilities to reduce environmental damages arising 
from their operations.  
Thirdly, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) responsible for coordinating 
and managing disasters in Nigeria was largely absent in ensuring the clean-up of polluted sites 
across the Niger Delta. The potential implications of this should be considered because local 
communities and indigenes do not have resources to embark upon disaster mitigation.  
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Fourthly, despite all the corporate activity in Shell International, one of the MOSOP leaders 
Ledum Mitee was still forced to conclude in November 1998 that: “Shell – the organisation 
which promised to balance principles with profit – has not made a single concession to help 
bring about the peace and reconciliation it says it wants to see. I have a simple question for the 
Directors of Shell: when will you balance principles with practice in Ogoni” (MOSOP 
International Secretariat, 1998). In context, because of Shell’s US$16 million advertising 
campaign, environmental activists argued that Shell should spend its money cleaning up its 
mess in Nigeria and not its image (Essential Action, 1999). Although Shell was thought to be 
strong on the environment, ethical issues and committed to human rights (Boele et al., 2001). 
Nonetheless, the commitment to doing something right is not necessarily the same as getting 
them right. Thus, it is essential that senior managers and leaders responsible for managing 
risks/crises embrace all-inclusive strategies in which local risk perceptions are not discounted 
but formed part of the risk/crisis management plans and strategies.  
Finally, Shell noted in 1998 that all ‘past impacted areas’ will be rehabilitated by the end of 
2003 (SPDC, 1998e). However, to date, the impacted areas within Ogoniland and other places 
across Niger Delta are yet to appropriately clean-up as recommended by the UNEP commission 
of inquiry in 2011 (UNEP, 2011). In conclusion, the events of crisis suggest that multinational 
oil companies are judged by how they act and not what they intend to do across the Niger Delta. 
 
2.10 THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP) 
COMMISSION REPORT AND CONCLUSION 
The case of Shell Nigeria and the Ogoni people provides many beneficial lessons for businesses 
seeking to operate successfully and ethically in developing countries such as Nigeria. This case 
shows how risk management failure especially over-reliance on established risk/crisis models 
can escalate instead of ameliorate emerging unconventional crises. In addition, the case reveals 
how contextual factors such as culture and resource control can mediate risk and crisis 
management practice in Nigeria. On the other hand, the case typically shows how emotionally 
induced-crisis can escalate and further suggests that facts are not enough in risk/crisis 
management and that perceptions clearly matter. This implies that local risk perception is at 
least an essential part of unconventional risk and crisis management.  
 
However, the broad themes identified from the case include lack of consensus about the 
proximate cause of the crisis, lack of engagement with local people, physical security including 
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terrorism and kidnapping issues, communication issues and moral disengagement problems 
among all stakeholders. These issues are also seen in the next case study at Chapter Three of 
this research, highlighting the necessity for the research conducted here and the values to the 
wider risk/crisis management practice. Given the lack of independent scientific evidence on 
the extent of damages caused by oil exploration and production across the Niger Delta, 
especially in Ogoniland, the Nigerian federal government invited the UNEP to conduct a 
comprehensive study which was completed in 2011 (UNEP, 2011). Nevertheless, the UNEP 
commission of inquiry did not consider the social, cultural and ethical issues of the crisis. This 
is an important omission which could have vital implications for resolving the unconventional 
crises in the Niger Delta. Therefore, the report of the UNEP may have reproduced some of the 
errors in Shell’s own internal reports and accounts of the crisis (Shell Report, 2005; 2007; 
2008; 2010; 2011; 2012). 
 
In conclusion, the UNEP reported that pollution from over 50 years of oil operations in the 
Niger Delta region has penetrated further and deeper than many may have supposed (UNEP, 
2011). Therefore, it is not surprising that the commission of inquiry proposed an initial sum of 
US$1 billion to cover the first five years of clean-up operations within Ogoniland. It was noted 
that clean-up operations and sustainable recovery of Ogoniland could take 25 to 30 years and 
will require long term financing of $30 billion (UNEP, 2011). This clearly show the need for 
comprehensive strategies which involves all stakeholders and take account of both technical 
and normative issues. The moral and ethical risks involved in the crisis were unexplored in 
existing research and the broader implications for sustainable and ethical risk management 
were neglected. This is an area of the Shell – Ogoni crisis which is central to this thesis. The 
following chapter will discuss the second case study of Chevron – Ilaje crisis to build on the 
knowledge and lessons gained here, to inform this thesis recommendations. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
CASE STUDY TWO: ENVIRONMENTAL VICTIMS: THE CHEVRON NIGERIA – 
ILAJE CRISIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The case of Chevron – Ilaje crisis is presented to form part of the foundational case studies to 
explore risk and crisis management practice. The detailed accounts and controversial 
implications are presented for managerial lessons and practical application. Undoubtedly, both 
the lessons learned and not learnt from the case will ultimately have far reaching future 
implications on risk and crisis management models. In context, it is intended that organisations 
could use this case as well as the Shell – Ogoni crisis to improve decision making in risk, crisis 
and disaster situations. The case study of Chevron & Ilaje crisis is based on original reports 
produced by Human Rights Watch, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD), Earth Rights International, Chevron Corporate Responsibility Reports 1999-2013, 
and the transcripts of landmark human rights case of Bowoto vs. Chevron 99-2506. 
The Ilajes were environmental victims, as Turner & Brownhill (2004, p. 70) concurs, due to 
extreme environmental conditions affecting their living standards. The events of Chevron – 
Ilaje crisis began on July 26th, 1998 when an estimated 300,000 barrels of crude oil from 
Chevron’s Deepwater Ewan oil field spilled into the environment across Ilaje riverine 
communities (ERA, 1998). The use of military forces by multinational oil companies to supress 
and harm protesters over environmental degradation had altered Chevron’s reputation and so 
its ethical business practice and moral responsibility was questioned. The management of 
unconventional crises cannot be devoid of moral consideration (Andrew, 2011; Bandura, 2007; 
Lagadec, 2005; Reza, 2011; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015), something which was neglected in 
the Chevron – Ilaje crisis. It is because of this that Chevron – Ilaje crisis is central to any 
discussion on risk/crisis management in developing countries such as Nigeria and why it is 
crucial to include this case study in this thesis. 
The Chevron and Ilaje crisis, as reflected in the Bowoto vs. Chevron case, could reasonably be 
argued to have altered the way multinational companies operate in Nigeria. The crisis was 
emotionally triggered but intensified due to risk underestimation, militarisation approach in 
crisis management responses, and inability to engage local oil producing communities in 
Nigeria. The leading plaintiffs’ experts’ witness, during the Bowoto vs. Chevron trial, notes 
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that: during the successive military regimes of the 1990s, and especially in the period of the 
Sani Abacha government between 1993 and 1998, the Nigerian government security forces 
engaged in a course of conduct involving a pattern of violent repression of individuals and 
communities who organised to opposed or protest aspects of petroleum development in the 
Niger Delta, and of individuals and communities who were alleged or perceived to be 
associated with such opposition (Illston, 2007).  
It is important that clarifications on the difficult position of multinational oil companies 
operating in Nigeria are made. The Oputa Commission when examining multinational oil 
companies’ activities in Nigeria concluded that the oil companies’ “interest became State 
interest” which must be protected. This logically led to the systematic and generalized 
violations and abuses which occurred in the Niger Delta during the dark period of military rule 
in Nigeria as detailed in the Oputa Commission Report (ERA, 1998; Illston, 2007). The 
political, cultural, economic and legal environment of the local communities, national and 
international levels complicates the crises in the Niger Delta (Turner & Brownhill, 2004). This 
brings to light the issue of standardisation or adaptation of risk and crisis management models. 
This is another reason for the inclusion of the Chevron – Ilaje crisis case study within this 
thesis. This chapter will now consider background of oil prospect in Ilaje, history and activities 
of Chevron in Nigeria, its risk management assurance and events of the crisis facing Chevron 
in Ilaje. The chapter will move on to explore Chevron’s initial response and the subsequent 
crisis management response. It is intended that lessons identified and learned here could be 
useful to other organisations when responding to unconventional crisis and developing 
capabilities for resilience. 
 
3.2 ILAJE IN CONTEXT: HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF OIL PROSPECT 
AND IMPACT 
Ilajeland is located along the Atlantic coast of Nigeria between longitude 4o28’ and 5o1’ east 
of the Greenwich Meridian and latitude 5051’ and 6021’ north of the Equator (Ololajulo, 2009, 
p. 4). Ilaje local government area covers an area of 3,000 km2 and therefore remain the largest 
LGA in Ondo State in terms of its landmass (Figure 3.1). The area has a shoreline covering 
about 180 km thereby making Ondo State, a state with the longest coastline in Nigeria (Alaba 
& Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010). 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Nigeria Showing Ondo State and Ilaje LGA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mafimisebi & Ogbonna (2016) 
According to the 2006 National Population Census, Ilaje LGA has a population of 290,615 
people. Ilajeland is predominantly fishing communities with over 90 percent of the people 
involved in fishing directly or indirectly within the area. The Ilajes are a distinguished and 
distinct linguistic group of Yoruba people and made of four traditional geo-political entities 
namely Mahin, Ugbo, Etikan and Aheri (Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). The people of Ilaje 
speak indigenous dialect of Ilaje (Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010). 
The Nigerian Bitumen Corporation (a German firm) was the first to prospect for oil and found 
oil at Araromi, Ilaje Local Government Area (ILGA) of Ondo State, Nigeria in 1908. However, 
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the outbreak of World War I and II disrupted oil exploration and production activities in 
Nigeria. However, in 1952, oil was later discovered at Ogogoro, ILGA, Ondo State of Nigeria 
but oil production could not commence due to insufficient quantity for commercial sales 
(Bayode, Adewunmi, & Odunwole, 2011). Modern oil and gas exploration and production 
began in Ilajeland in 1967 and the activities has been predominantly dominated by Chevron 
Nigeria. As at 2005, many oil and gas companies including oil servicing organisations are 
dispersed across Ilaje communities. A number of these oil companies include Chevron Nigeria 
Limited, Shell Petroleum Development Company, Conoco Energy Nigeria Limited, Express 
Petroleum & Gas Company, Cronicle, Consolidated Oil & Allied Energy, Agip Oil Nigeria 
Limited, Atlas Oil Company, Oil & Industrial Services Limited, Cavendish Oil Company, and 
Global Pipeline (Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016).  
Chevron Nigeria, for example, operates in 42 communities across Ilajeland. Although, Chevron 
is the main oil company operating within the Ilaje Local Government Area of Ondo State, 
Nigeria (Fatusin, Afolabi & Adetula, 2010, p. 189). The company had its first oil field, Meren 
oil Field, within Ilajeland in November 1968. Consequently, operations seem to have spread to 
other oil fields such as Parabe and Malu oil fields in February and March 1971, Opuekeba flow 
station in October 1993, the Esan oil field in February 1997, and the Opolo and Ewan oil fields 
in March 1997, and some other oil fields that were later returned to Ilaje such as Tsekelewu 
(Bayode et al., 2011; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). There are more than twenty-five different 
gas flaring stations within Ilajeland which include Mahin 1, Mahin 2, Odofado, Odonla, Ago, 
Ikorigho, Molutehin, Jiringho, Meren, Parabe, Malu, Isan, Opolo, Ewan, Opuekeba, Okagba, 
Tapa, Mejo, Omuro, Ojumole, Opuama, Bela, Eko, Obe and Tsekelewu oil fields (Alaba & 
Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010). In all these flow stations, gas flaring and other oil production 
activities are going on but Ibeanu (2000), Ikporukpo (2004), Omeje (2005) and Ovuakporaye 
(2012) argued that these activities are harming the environment and have adverse effects on 
human health within the area. 
 
3.3 CHEVRON NIGERIA: HISTORY AND ACTIVITIES 
Chevron began doing business in Nigeria in 1913 when Texaco products were first marketed 
in the country (Chevron Nigeria Fact Sheet, 2012). However, following the Nigerian 
Indigenization Decree of 1978 which was designed to raise the level of Nigeria participation 
in business, Chevron divested 40 percent of its shareholding to the Nigerian public while 
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retaining 60 percent equity in Chevron Oil Nigeria Plc. In energy exploration and production, 
Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) obtained oil prospecting license and began business in Nigeria 
in 1961. In 1963, American Overseas Petroleum Limited – which later became Texaco 
Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Company, discovered oil at the Koluama Field, offshore Nigeria. 
In the same year, Chevron Nigeria Limited started drilling near the Escravos River and found 
the Okan Field (Chevron Nigeria Fact Sheet, 2012).  
Most notably, Chevron Nigeria is the third-largest oil producer in Nigeria and one of its largest 
investors, spending more than $3 billion annually (Chevron, 2012). The company operates in 
Ondo, Delta, Rivers, Imo and Akwa Ibom States of Nigeria under a Joint Venture Contract 
(JVC) arrangement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (60% stake in 
the NNPC/Chevron Joint Venture) and has assets on land, swamp and near-offshore 
concessions covering approximately 2.2 million acres (8,900 sq km) in the Niger Delta region. 
Chevron Nigeria holds a 40 per cent interest in 13 concessions under the JVC arrangement with 
the NNPC. In 2011, total daily production of Chevron in Nigeria averaged 516,000 barrels of 
crude oil (232,000 net), 343 million cubic feet of natural gas (142 million net) and 11,000 
barrels of liquefied petroleum gas (4,000 net) (Chevron, 2011). 
Chevron has general interests in Deepwater oil projects in Nigeria and was the first to develop 
the Okan Field – Nigeria’s first successful offshore oil field in March 1965 at Escravos River, 
about 11km into the Atlantic Ocean (Chevron, 2012). The Agbami Field which is one of 
Nigeria’s largest Deepwater discoveries was developed by Chevron with a 67.3 percent interest 
in the field (Chevron, 2011). Agbami Field was discovered in 1998 at a water depth of 
approximately 4,800 feet (1,463 m). Chevron also has an interest in another Deepwater 
development, the Usan Field which began production in 2012. Chevron has interests ranging 
from 18 percent to 100 percent in 10 Deepwater blocks in offshore Nigeria (Chevron Nigeria 
Fact Sheet, 2012). The activities of Chevron Nigeria are discussed within the following sub-
sections. 
 
3.3.1 PROTECTING PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENT 
According to Chevron (2012), managing operational risk is a commitment to protect people 
and the environment which includes developing energy safely and reliably. In 2013, Chevron 
stated that “we strive to develop a culture in which everyone believes that all incidents are 
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preventable and that zero incidents are achievable. Our priorities every day are to get our 
employees and contractors home safe and to protect the environment.” (Chevron Social 
Responsibility Report, 2013, p. 4). It is not entirely clear whether these commitments 
automatically translate into protecting the local people in areas where Chevron operates in 
Nigeria. This observation was made based on extensive reviews of Chevron social 
responsibility reports over 15 years which raises serious concerns about environmental 
pollution and degradation in Nigeria (Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). 
Chevron Nigeria manages its risks by applying policies, processes and technologies to maintain 
focus on having zero incidents (Chevron SRR, 2013). However, there have been several cases 
of oil spill from Chevron oil fields in Niger Delta; for example, the total number of oil spill 
cases recorded was 8,054 in 2009; 9,584 in 2010; and 10,164 in 2011 from Chevron Nigeria 
operation in the Niger Delta (Chevron SRR, 2013, p. 10). These oil spills are indicative of the 
how Chevron’s activities might be harming the environment and affecting sources of livelihood 
in Niger Delta (Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). Although, Chevron constantly argues that its 
commitment to environmental issues are captured in its four environmental principles that 
define such environmental responsibility: (1) we include the environment in decision making, 
(2) reduce our environmental footprint, (3) operate responsibly, and (4) steward our sites 
(Chevron SRR, 2013). 
 
3.3.2 CHEVRON OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
(OEMS)  
Chevron has an OEMS model believed to be a comprehensive and proven means of systematic 
management of process safety, personal safety and health, the environment, reliability, and 
efficiency (Chevron SRR, 2013). It is through the application of OEMS that Chevron identifies 
risks and integrates operational excellence processes, standards, procedures and behaviours 
into daily operations. The OEMS is aligned with ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001, and the Center 
for Chemical Process Safety’s Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. However, questions 
have been raised in this thesis about whether risk management practice should be standardised 
or adapted to the local condition in which an organisation operates. 
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3.3.3 RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE 
The risk management assurance statement of Chevron is “fulfilling our goal involves managing 
the risks inherent in our industry. We work tirelessly to mitigate those risks, even as the scale 
and complexity of our projects continue to increase. Fulfilling our goal also involves a 
commitment to responsible and ethical behaviour, which is embedded in our system of values. 
The expectations of our stockholders, our partners and communities have never been higher. 
They expect that we will live up to these values and that we will achieve our results the right 
way. We understand that the stakes are high and the tolerance is low for events that affect 
people and the environment. We are working to eliminate incidents. Managing risk and 
executing with excellence are critical to our company’s success. Equally critical are the 
stability and vitality of the countries and communities where we operate. Chevron operates in 
some of the most challenging, complex and dynamic places in the world. In many locations, 
communities must confront critical and economic issues including access to health care, 
education and the resources needed for sustained prosperity” (Chevron SRR, 2012, p. 2).  
The Chevron Social Responsibility Report (SRR) (2012; 2013) revealed how the organisation 
progresses toward world-class performance in Operational Excellence, highlighting how the 
organisation builds a consistent safety culture, manages Deepwater risk, eliminates flares, 
protects biodiversity in global operations and improves the livelihoods of communities near its 
operations. These efforts are guided by the organisation Operational Excellence Management 
System which aligns with international standards for safety and environmental performance. 
One observation based on review of existing Chevron’s social responsibility reports is that its 
risk management assurance could have been overrated. This is because despite Chevron’s 
strong risk management assurance, local communities in the Niger Delta continue to have 
endless crises with the organisation (Fatusin et al., 2011; Eweje, 2005; Ogbodo, 2009; 
Ologunorisa, 2001; Ololajulo, 2009; Turner & Brownhill, 2004). 
 
3.3.4 PEACE AND SECURITY  
Chevron has reviewed its approach to environmental protests and engagement with local oil 
producing communities in Nigeria. In 2005, Chevron Nigeria adopted a new approach to 
community engagement in the Niger Delta to encourage local participation in determining the 
needs its programs should address (Chevron SRR, 2012). This model is called the Global 
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Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) and gives communities a greater role in managing 
their development through Regional Development Committees. The main objective of the 
model is to bring peace and stability to areas where Chevron operates in Nigeria. Chevron 
provided seed-funding in 2010 for the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foundation, 
which was established to help alleviate poverty and promote peace in the region by building 
public-private partnerships in focus areas: capacity building, economic development, peace 
building, analysis and advocacy.  
Chevron endowed the NDPI Foundation with $50 million over five years, 2010 to 2014. The 
NDPI has also generated an additional $50 million in funding commitments from other donor 
partners (Chevron SRR, 2012, p. 33). The NDPI opened the Economic Development Center in 
Warri as a coordinating hub for development activity in 2012. Three pilot projects were 
launched to create jobs and increase income for Niger Delta residents within the aquaculture, 
cassava oil and palm oil sectors (Chevron SRR, 2012). 
 
3.4 EVENTS OF THE CHEVRON – ILAJE CRISIS 
On the 26th of July 1998, an estimated 300,000 barrels of crude oil spilled into the environment 
across Ilaje riverine communities from Chevron’s Deepwater Ewan oil field (ERA, 1998). The 
environmental disaster caused widespread pollution and contamination of water, and affected 
more than 50,000 micro, small and medium businesses in the area (Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; 
Fatusin et al., 2010). It was also reported that fresh water which remained the normal source of 
drinking and cooking in Ilaje was polluted and more than 3260 animals died from drinking 
polluted water (The Concerned Ilaje Citizens, 1998). As a result, there were widespread 
condemnations of Chevron due to the devastation to the local environment and people’s sources 
of livelihoods in Ilaje (Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; Bassey, 2008; ERA, 1998; Fatusin et al., 2010).  
However, Chevron did not start clean-up of the affected areas until after one week and months 
later the presence of crude oil was still visible across numerous Ilaje communities (ERA, 1998). 
In fact, it was reported that children and women were used as volunteers to contain the spread 
of the crude oil across Ilaje communities (ERA, 1998). Arguably, the event changed Ilaje 
people’s perception about Chevron operations within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Several 
reactions from local people to the crisis are documented in the Environmental Rights Action 
Field Report (1998, p. 1): 
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“Chevron wants to turn this place into another Ogoniland; we are fast becoming an 
extinct people because of the danger from Chevron’s activities here” (Esan Malumi). 
“This is what I do to feed myself and the children, now it has all gone. We are helpless. 
The last time our youths went to the Chevron platform to demand our rights; they used 
solders to kill them” (Madam Stella Omoetan). 
“This oil spill has murdered all my livestock I don’t know how I am going to survive 
now. I know I am going to die now” (Mrs Mariam Ibinuolapo). 
These reactions from local people within the affected Ilaje communities give an insight about 
impact of Chevron’s oil spills disaster. This is the source of tensions between Chevron’s and 
local oil producing communities in the Niger Delta. 
 
3.4.1 ILAJE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST 
The accounts of the Ilaje environmental protest was clearly documented in the landmark human 
rights case of – Bowoto vs. Chevron which was first instituted on October 27, 2008 in the 
Federal Court in San Francisco, USA where Chevron has its global corporate headquarters. 
The case of Bowoto vs. Chevron was brought for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim 
for crimes against humanity under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The case was instituted in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Crimes against humanity 
are a valid claim under the ATS. The case narrative here is based on the court document 1637, 
filed 08/14/2007 and several other documentary reports and witnesses accounts. The account 
of the crisis begins on May 25th, 1998 when more than 100 Ilaje youths, formed the ‘Concerned 
Ilaje Citizens’ group, from over 42 communities within Ilajeland travelled via canoes and 
speedboats miles into the Atlantic Ocean where Chevron has an offshore drilling facility – 
known as the Parabe platform in Niger Delta (The Concerned Ilaje Citizens, 1998).  
The Parabe offshore platform is operated by Chevron Nigeria in territorial waters 
approximately 15 kilometres off the coast of Ilaje. There was a construction barge adjacent to 
the platform. The protesters occupied the barge that was servicing the platform (Chevron, 
2012). The intention of the protesters was made known on arrival at the platform to members 
of the Nigerian Security Forces guarding the facility. One of the activist leaders – Larry Bowoto 
stated during the court case between Bowoto and Chevron “we went there for peaceful 
demonstration because of the activities of Chevron in our area. We went there to just protest 
for the development of our community because for 30 years or 33 years now, in which Chevron 
is operating we don’t have anything (fade) so that’s the reason we went there” (Illston, 2007, 
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p. 2). The main leader of the protesters – Bola Oyinbo noted that “we don’t even have any 
weapon, not even a placard. But this is our grievances we have been marginalised that is why 
we are here. We called Chevron and want them to come but they refused to come. That is why 
we are here and want them to come to barge” (Illston, 2007, p. 12). 
The Ilaje activists demanded to meet with Chevron’s managing director – an American named 
George Kirkland. At the time of the protest, it has been estimated that 20% of Chevron Nigeria 
oil production came from Ilajeland or sites immediately off the coast of the area. In addition, 
Chevron Nigeria only has two Ilaje workers out of approximately 2,500 Nigerian employees.’ 
The Concerned Ilaje Citizens (CIC) have written to Chevron Nigeria on several occasions 
detailing the extent of environmental impacts of oil and gas, and the problems facing the 
communities in Ilajeland due to Chevron’s operations. In context, the CIC specifically detail 
the accounts of environmental devastation across Ilajeland to then Ondo State Military 
Administrator on May 5th, 1998 in a memo as follows: 
“The ecological effects of oil exploration and exploitation in any area cannot be over 
emphasized. Erosion, sea incursion, destruction of the aquatic lives and its effects on 
fish farming, destruction of farm land are some of the after effects of oil exploration. 
The effects of physical and ecological pollution were more pronounced and 
experienced when Chevron Nigeria opened our freshwater canals into sea for drilling 
a well at Awoye sea-shore. Later, so many canals were dredged which open visually all 
the creeks into the ocean. This was the beginning of problems of drinkable water as all 
the creeks became salty with the introduction of sea water. Before the drilling of the 
canals into the sea by Chevron, people were enjoying drinking fresh water throughout 
the years.  
The present suffering for portable drinking water was not as severe as this. The rivers 
and canals that were formerly 1.8m – 3m deep are now dry land. Fishing which is the 
major occupation of all the inhabitants has now become a thing of the past since the 
rivers and canals had been silted up because of sea-mud passing through the open 
canal dredged by Chevron Nigeria. This has resulted into mass unemployment of our 
people. Our predicaments because of these problems are unspeakable. The hazards do 
not sparse human lives and properties. The excessive carbon-monoxide flared into the 
air has polluted our air to a high degree. The erosion from the gigantic waves and the 
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dredging of canals by chevron Nigeria have displaced the inhabitants, e.g. Awoye, 
Jiringho, Odofado, Odo-nla, Ikorigho, etc.” The Concerned Ilaje Citizens (1998, p. 2). 
These concerns about environmental devastation in Ilaje were ignored at the time (Alaba & 
Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010). The crucial challenge is that some of the demands from the 
Ilaje Concerned Citizens are primarily government responsibility. Therefore, it is difficult for 
multinational oil companies such as Chevron to meet some of those demands. 
 
3.4.2 INITIAL REACTIONS AND FAILED DIALOGUE 
The Ondo State Administrator joined with the Concerned Ilaje Citizens (CIC) in requesting 
that Chevron meet with the CIC. The Concerned Ilaje Citizens report (1998) indicate that 
Chevron failed to attend any of the meetings. Given the silence from Chevron, the CIC decided 
to conduct a peaceful protest at the Parabe platform to draw attention to their grievances 
(Bustany & Wysham, 2000). The protesters occupied Chevron Nigeria for three days between 
May 25th and May 28th, 1998. After three days of occupation, Chevron decided to seek 
assistance of the Nigerian Government Security Forces (GSF). It was revealed that Chevron 
asked the head of the GSF in Delta State – Captain Ita, to intervene and rescue the situation on 
May 27th, 1998 (ERA, 1998; Illston, 2007). On the evening of the same day, soldiers flew to 
the barge and platform in Chevron Nigeria helicopters to oust the protesters. The events that 
followed were traumatic as a protester (Arolika Irowarinum) was killed, and others including 
Bassey Jeje and Larry Bowoto were shot and some taken into custody by the GSF and tortured 
in the days following the event (Earthrights International, 2008).  
The second similar set of attacks occurred on January 4, 1999 where the government security 
forces attacked the villages of Opia and Ikenyan shooting unarmed civilians and burning the 
villages to the ground (Turner & Brownhill, 2004). The attacks began when government 
security forces circled the villages in helicopters leased by Chevron Nigeria, and fired at the 
villagers for several minutes. Within the same day, GSF in Chevron-leased ‘sea trucks’ arrived 
at the villages by river and burned them to the ground. Many communities’ members were 
killed. In another different account, on 8th May 2002, it was estimated that 60,000 barrels of 
crude oil was spilled into the environment from Chevron’s well A and B located between 
Ojumole and Ikorigho communities in Ilaje (Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010). The 
environment was covered by an oil slick and advanced with the tide and flow of the river (Alaba 
& Ifelola, 2011; Earthrights International, 2008; Fatusin et al., 2010). 
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3.5 NEW LENS SCENARIOS: KEY REFLECTION ON CHEVRON CRISIS 
RESPONSE 
In the Bowoto case, Chevron’s failing to address the concerns of the protesters has generated 
far-reaching condemnation (Bassey, 2008; Earthrights International, 2008; ERA, 2008). The 
report of Earthrights International (2008) which documents accounts of the Bowoto vs Chevron 
reveals that communications within Chevron Nigeria, and between Chevron Nigeria and 
Chevron USA reflected that the Parabe protest was peaceful. Despite this, armed members of 
the Nigerian Navy and Military Police remained on the barge and in control always (ERA, 
1998). It was revealed during the court case that at some point during the protest, additional 
military personnel were deployed to the platform (Illston, 2007). On 28th May 1998, Chevron 
Nigeria security personnel and government security forces arrived in several Chevron leased 
helicopters and attacked the unarmed protesters (ERA, 1998). 
It was on record that the government security forces started firing from helicopters even before 
landing as contained in a testimony of one of the pilots involved (ERA, 1998). The helicopter 
pilots who flew to Parabe platform received their instructions from Chevron Nigeria personnel 
on board, and not the government security forces. Many of the protesters were arrested and 
beaten by the Nigerian security forces (ERA, 1998). A group of eleven protesters were locked 
in a small container, beaten with gun buts and horse whips. They were then taken by the 
government security forces to Escravos (Delta State) by boat and were told that they would be 
killed (Earthrights International, 2008). These protesters have suddenly become prisoners of 
environmental victims, and were later transferred to another prison in Warri (Delta State) from 
Escravos (ERA, 1998).  
Bustany & Wysham (2000) and ERA (1998) revealed that these Ilaje protesters were placed in 
a jail cell at a naval base with their clothes removed and subjected to torture. They were 
subsequently placed in another small room where they were constantly tortured for three days 
(Bustany & Wysham, 2000; Illston, 2007). It was noted that they were later transferred to 
Akungba, Ondo State and then Akure, Ondo State where it was alleged that Nigerian security 
forces continued to beat and torture them forcing them to confess they are criminals and 
militants (Bustany & Wysham, 2000). Quite sadly, among those beaten and constantly tortured 
was Bola Oyinbo (on whose behalf several claims were brought under the Bowoto v. Chevron 
case) who died three years later in Lagos, Nigeria because of the crisis (Bustany & Wysham, 
2000). There is widespread dehumanisation, attribution of blame, distortion of the 
consequences and displacement of responsibility throughout the crisis involving Chevron 
61 
 
Nigeria and Ilaje people (Bustany & Wysham, 2000; ERA, 1998; Earthrights International, 
2000). 
3.6 CHEVRON NIGERIA CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED AND NOT LEARNT 
There are several lessons that can be identified from the Chevron Nigeria crisis. Firstly, the 
issue of environmental degradation and pollution however trivial it could be, should be 
carefully addressed (UNEP, 2011). The findings from Alaba & Ifelola (2011) and Fatusin et 
al. (2010) studies have shown that local oil producing communities want environmental audit 
and impact assessment of the environmental effects of oil exploration and production, and 
remediation of polluted sites. In addition, local communities’ demands also include demand 
for compensation because of polluted lands and waters which destroyed sources of livelihood; 
disaster risk reduction and mitigation for the damages to local properties, farmland and fishing 
equipment; provision of basic infrastructures, jobs and contracts to local indigenes; stoppage 
of constant gas flaring and investment in clean air programmes; and local participation and 
involvement in resource control of the region (Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010; 
UNEP, 2011; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). 
Secondly, the lack of preparedness to deal with emerging unconventional crisis/disaster was 
evident in the case. In fact, Chevron’s failures to appropriately identify, analyse and manage 
host communities discontent and protest exacerbated the crisis (Bustany & Wysham, 2000). 
Thirdly, the crisis strategy of violently supressing demonstrators using Nigerian security forces 
as in the case of Bowoto v. Chevron fundamentally required self-evaluation (ERA, 2012). This 
would arguably create reputational risk and intensify the crisis instead of solving it. Although 
Chevron was found not liable for the military’s actions, the company confirm paying the 
soldiers, transporting them and directing them on the day of the attacks (Bustany & Wysham, 
2000; Illston, 2007). The decision of the court however was challenged by the plaintiffs in the 
court of appeal. 
It was clear lessons were not learnt or partially learnt from the Ilaje crisis because in November 
2008 Chevron called the Nigerian security forces (now called Joint Task Force – JTF) to 
violently supress another peaceful protest in the Ugborodo, outside Warri city close to Escravos 
terminal (ERA, 2012). The community members were protesting a lack of jobs and an ongoing 
request for Chevron to honour a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that the community 
signed with Chevron in 2002 regarding the allocation of a certain number of jobs for residents 
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(Turner & Brownhill, 2004). The Vice Chairman of Ugborodo Community Trust (Mr Isaac 
Botosan) narrated why the protested and what happened: 
To our greatest shock our youths, women and children met with gunfire from Chevron 
Nigeria Limited security personnel who started shooting at the sight of the community’s 
peaceful demonstrators’ boat . . . all we want are the jobs for our youths and contracts 
for the able community people. (ERA, 2012, p. 2) 
However, Chevron state: “Chevron companies have demonstrated commitment to the social 
and economic development of the country because we recognize that success in business is 
linked to human progress” (Chevron SRR, 2012, p. 1). While Chevron Nigeria through the 
NNPC/Chevron Joint Venture in 2005 introduced the Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(GMoU), the application of the theory behind the GMoU was not evident in the organisation’s 
crisis management response to recent events. The GMoU is based on the principles of 
participatory partnership and stakeholder engagement, transparency and accountability, 
sustainability assurance, peace building, monitoring and evaluation, and most importantly, 
community driven development planning (Faleti, 2009). Meanwhile, in the Bowoto v. Chevron 
case, Chevron’s attorneys argued that its use of the Nigeria security forces was a reasonable 
response to the peaceful protest at Parabe (Bustany & Wysham, 2000). Nonetheless, the U.S 
State Department noted that the Nigerian security forces used excessive force and engaged in 
gun battles, which occasionally resulted in civilian casualties and worsened security 
(Earthrights International, 2008). With continuous exploitation of moral disengagement 
techniques by Chevron in Nigeria, can we conclude that indeed lessons were not learnt from 
this case? 
 
3.7 EMERGING ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 
The emerging issue from the case study is best described using the illustration of Niger Delta 
by Emem Okon (a Niger Delta Women’s Rights Activist): “Think about the women who fish 
in the waters of the Niger Delta in their paddle canoes. Their rivers are filled with oil. Consider 
the fact that their sources of livelihood – fishing and farming – are crudely destroyed by the 
powerful and wealthy multinational companies, who have become even more powerful and 
wealthy by the oil resources derived from the destruction of the environment and the 
destruction of the women’s means of livelihood. Think about the children, whose destinies 
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have been repackaged by oppression, exploitation, oil politics and the oil business.” (Chevron 
Alternative Annual Report, 2010, p. 45).  
However, the public risk perceptions of environmental impact of oil and gas activities in the 
Niger Delta may have been utterly underestimated (Alaba & Ifelola, 2011; Fatusin et al., 2010). 
In context, public misperceptions of the environmental risks and disasters could arise due to 
the environmental victims’ perspective. The Chevron crisis was complicated by wide range of 
issues: the perception underpinning the question of who are the real environmental victims and 
how the relationship between perceived and actual risk are judged (Earthrights International, 
2008; ERA, 2012). Similarly, public controversies surrounding environmental disasters and 
crises in the Niger Delta are based on differences in experts’ elucidation and laypeople accounts 
(UNEP, 2011). 
The difficulty in experts’ elucidation to provide a guarantee that observable risk and acceptable 
risk are totally different raises the most concerns that possible precautions might not have been 
taken to avert, and where necessary manage, potential hazards of oil and gas activities on both 
the environment and the people. On this basis and without exception, people living with the 
consequences of environmental risks of oil and gas are often construed as ill-informed. A 
cautionary remark here is that even the polluters also suffered the consequences of their 
activities in Nigeria. This is a situation which makes the issue of who are the real environmental 
victims most controversial in the Niger Delta. The observation and argument made here clearly 
resonates with a point made by Wynne (1996a: p. 76) who summarises the position laconically: 
“According to this widespread view, expert systems have unmediated access to nature hence 
peddle only natural knowledge, whilst lay publics are epistemically vacuous, and have only 
emotional wellsprings of culture and ephemeral local knowledge’s”. 
When the exclusiveness of traditional science, according to Beck et al. (1994), is broken down 
through reflexive modernisation, the explicit observation of Eden in public understanding of 
science become more accurate to define the case of environmental victims: “The politicization 
and democratization of science allows people, primarily activists within environmental NGOs, 
to become ‘counter-experts’ who are scientifically competent through self-education, but also 
employ traditionally ‘non-scientific’ forms of argument, such as morals and emotions, 
particularly where the issues under discussion could have enormous public impact.” Eden 
(1996, p. 194). 
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The Chevron and Ilaje case provides an avenue for risk and crisis management models to be 
empirically tested, and range of several academics’ concepts to validated or refuted. In 
conclusion, it would be utterly unreasonable to halt oil and gas exploration and production in 
Nigeria. However, the pursuits for oil production will have to be responsible, ethical, 
sustainable, and reduce the vulnerability phenomenon associated with crude oil. The next 
chapter will analyse the issue of self-inflicted disasters within the broader risk and crisis 
management literature, with reflection on the case studies presented in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SELF-INFLICTED DISASTERS:  UNCONVENTIONAL RISK, CRISIS AND 
DISASTER (THE CASE OF NIGERIA) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A critical issue is that the waves of series event of disasters and crises in the eighties (1980s) 
including Bhopal (1984), Challenger (1986), Chernobyl (1986), Piper Alpha (1988), Exxon 
Valdez (1989) and recent disasters/crises like the Malaysia Airline MH370 (2014), Fukushima 
Nuclear Power Plant (2011), Bonga Oil Spills (2011), BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosions 
(2010), Air France Flight AF447 (2009), BP Texas City Explosions (2005), and Columbia 
Space Shuttle Launch (2003) have created conditions that demand crisis and disaster 
management models and theories are reconsidered and tested whether such models contribute 
to crises/disasters or the processes involved initiated them. This is rather a novel form of 
investigating dangerous events (risk, crisis and disaster) – something which has long been 
obscured and neglected in risk and disaster research. 
The analysis of the impact of risk, crisis and disaster management approaches – and resulting 
crises intensification leads to the conclusion that risk and crisis management models when 
inappropriately apply initiate future crises. Of course, the theoretical and empirical approach is 
informed by the large fragmented literature on risk and crisis management and the determinants 
of self-inflicted or initiated disasters or crises. An important consequence of this perspective is 
that organisation strategies and approaches in dealing with emerging crises and disasters are 
not only likely to affect and complicate the successful management of such events but also 
become the precursor of future crises and disasters becoming self-initiated or inflicted. 
To illustrate this argument, there is general reflection on a widespread consensus that tends to 
emerge after crises or disasters – that this should never happen (or this could have been 
prevented), and reliance on practical examples of crises and disasters from developing 
countries (Nigeria). It is proposed that crises and disasters continue to occur for the same 
reasons it would or could have been avoided. A previous research conducted indicates that the 
‘crisis of disaster’ is the most crucial issue that demand attention and empirical research 
(Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). Therefore, this research argues that organisational crises and 
disasters can be self-inflicted or initiated over times. As a result, it reveals radical innovative 
options/solutions to deal with these amorphous and unconventional problems that plague 
organisations, communities and governments especially in developing countries (Nigeria). The 
real issue is where can organisations obtain evidence to confirm current approaches might be 
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escalating rather than ameliorating emerging crisis and disaster? These issues are crucial to 
sustainable risk and crisis management. 
The main question addressed in this research is to determine the possibilities that organisational 
crises and disasters could be self-initiated or inflicted contrary to established convention in risk 
and crisis management. The importance of questioning and investigating risk, crisis, and 
disaster management models and practice is critical because most often when organisational 
disasters and crises happen – lessons from past events are hardly learn, conclusion emerged 
that such crises and disasters could or should have been avoided, and devastation remains 
evident. In this research, it is argued that most theories and models of risk and crisis tend either 
to be too narrow in focus to build a complete risk framework or too general and abstract to be 
applicable to specific risk and crisis situations. More explicitly, the implied universality in risk, 
crisis and disaster theories is ineffective because unconventional risks/crises are unique events 
which render standardisation approach to risk/crisis management unfit for purpose. 
One of the core questions in recent risk and crisis management research concerns the extent to 
which models and methodologies of crisis management are inconsistent, untested and maybe 
even faulty (e.g. Beck, 2009; Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011; Boin & Schulman, 2009; Elliott, 
2002) or the extent to which past events of crises and disasters – learning from failures and 
accidents remain a viable strategy for organisational crisis and disaster management (Labib, 
2014; Labib & Read, 2013; Chourlaton, 2001; De Vries, 2004; Hovden, Storseth, & 
Tinmannsvik, 2011; Le Coze, 2013; Lindberg, Hansson, & Rollenhagen, 2010). This 
research’s approach is unique and novel in that it explores how established scientific 
knowledge and evidence, science for government and organisation, and technical expertise, 
decisions about crisis and disaster models or theories and scientific evidence on crises and 
disasters are vulnerable to experts’ (government and organisations) interest which refute local 
concerns, interpretation and interest, and complicate the very process of managing crises and 
disasters. The basis of such approach is informed by risk communication theory as discussed 
later in this chapter. This area of investigation is often obscured in literature surrounding risk, 
crisis and disaster management. 
In the last two decades, research and policy applications of risk and crisis management have 
improved or increased substantially but early studies appear to underestimate the nature of 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters. Albeit it must be accepted that early studies were 
not as weak or poor as their critics appear to have concluded (Ansell et al., 2010; Andrew, 
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2011; Simpson, 2008; ‘t Hart, 2013; Reza, 2011) but many of the first-generation studies 
(Shrivastava, 1987; Turner, 1976; Weick, 1988) and less traditional studies (Bland, 1998; Boin, 
2004; Hiles, 2011; Reason, 2004; Cutter, 2005) misinterpreted a lack of empirical evidence 
supporting the possibilities of eliminating and preventing risks and crises as evidence that 
unconventional risks, crises or disasters are normal accident (Perrow, 1984; 1999), systemic 
failures (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), consequences of risk society (Beck, 2009), high reliability 
failures (LaPorte, 2011; Rochlin, 2011; Rosa, 2005), misperception of risk (Dombrowsky, 
2007) and inaccuracy in risk prediction (Ulmer et al., 2007). These studies arguably muddled 
absence of proof in risk and crisis research with proof of absence within the same risk domain. 
Risk, crisis and disaster management models are increasingly recognised to play significant 
roles in organisational disasters and crises (Andrew, 2011; Augustine, 2000; Reza, 2011; ‘t 
Hart, 2013; Ulmer et al., 2007). Likewise, it is established that crisis and disaster management 
models are particularly useful and helpful in times of pre-and-post crises/disasters in different 
high-risk industries like nuclear power, oil and gas, banking, aviation, and national security 
(Fink, 2002; Lerbinger, 2012; Perrow, 2007; Regester & Larkin, 2008). However, little is 
known about their values during the evolving period of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster 
situations. These models and theories as explained later in this chapter provide a rich 
framework for describing and explaining why organisations cause or fail to prevent crises and 
disasters such as oil spills, products recall, financial crisis, environmental disasters, explosions, 
vandalism and terrorist attacks (Augustine, 2000; Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011; Fink, 2002; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). Nevertheless, this research advanced the 
notion that when organisations unwittingly institutionalise practices that encourage gradual 
erosion of standards then self-inflicted disaster is imminent (Boin et al., 2010; Shrivastava et 
al., 2009; Pidgeon, 2010; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). There is a general acceptance that 
companies as well as their Boards need to be mindful of the risks associated with their strategic 
objectives (including the risks that those objectives may themselves be deficient). 
From another corollary perspective, this research further illustrates how crisis management 
models and methodologies can deteriorate and escalate emerging crises, and sabotage crisis 
management success and reveals strategic sustainable solutions. This statement is rooted in 
Beck’s (1992) risk society thesis that institutionalised scientific knowledge and technical 
expertise have contributed to the proliferation and worsening of risks rather than their 
amelioration. We are even more justified to explore self-inflicted disasters given the several 
questions surrounding the notion of risk and Turner’s revelation that whether risk should be 
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consider as something that is taken or something that afflicts us (is it a choice or circumstance) 
(Turner, 1994, p. 149). The failures of organisations in risk and crisis management have called 
for a need to rethink existing models and strategies toward emerging crises and disasters. This 
study suggests that as much as risk and crisis management models and practice are transferring 
the benefits (profits) or advantages of crises and disasters to a relatively few (organisations and 
government) at the detriment of many (vulnerable group – local communities, indigenous 
people and civil societies, creditors and world economy) future crises are inevitable and 
perhaps self-initiated. The limitations of this line of thinking are acknowledged given the 
context (i.e., the Niger Delta crises) in which the proposition is made.  
 
4.2 KEY ISSUES IN RISK, CRISIS AND DISASTER STUDIES 
There is a simple paradox that lies in risk and crisis management models: the more these models 
are developed and supported, the more their validity and practicality are questioned. Focusing 
on these under-theorised and masked aspects of risk, crisis and disaster management, there are 
two fundamental research propositions address here. First, are current crisis and disaster 
management models working? Second, should crisis and disaster management practice and 
strategies be context based? The purpose of these propositions is to reassess the practicality of 
existing risk, crisis and disaster management models in managing unconventional risks, crises 
and disasters. 
The original contribution and focal thesis in this research argue that organisations, all too often, 
unintentionally create their own perfect or worst disasters – a world that is incompatible with 
what they want to see. The main contention remains that the unintended consequences 
connected with self-inflicted disasters can be extreme, irreparable and long-lasting. These can 
range from instability and insecurity; negative publicity; reputational damage; huge, sudden 
costs; lost revenues; regulatory penalties; lawsuits and criminal judgments; liquidation and 
take-over; hostile attacks – vandalism, and kidnapping; fallen share prices; shareholder value 
reduction; to reduced production. Here, it is argued that initial triggers of crisis or disaster 
which are contextualised to be systemic and exogenous event(s) were often under management 
control and critical decisions that could have averted disasters or crises are hardly acted upon. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the potential downside and consequences of risk 
underestimation, moral disengagement, over-ruling established frameworks and reducing risk 
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management to a ‘tick-box’ approach are often known in advance. This view draws from 
theorists who argue that rationally organised bureaucracy can translate human errors into crisis 
outcomes (Turner, 1992; Toft & Reynolds, 1997) and that human errors initiate future crisis 
(Reason, 1990; Hopkins, 2006). It also advances existing findings that organisations contribute 
to crises through combination of sloppy management and inherent blind spots (Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997; Veil, 2011). The suggestion is inherent in established views that human 
limitations and environmental factors facilitate crises (Boin, 2004), technical systems produce 
disasters in waiting because of technical complexity and tight coupling (Perrow, 1984; 1999; 
Smith, 2005). It reinforces the view that organisations emphasise on efficiency and output 
targets over safety goals due to environmental pressures compound existing problems and 
cause future crises (LaPorte, 1994; Sagan, 1993; Shrivastava et al., 2009).  
The real issue remains that it is difficult to predict with a high degree of certainty that a future 
disaster or crisis is inevitable. In addition, it is unclear what effects the use of certain crisis and 
disaster management models will be because of misperception and miscalculation. This 
inadvertently leads to diminished perception of risk over time and inappropriate organisational 
behaviours become normal practices which arguably initiate a future disaster due to companies 
overlooking or sidestepping their risk management practices – and slowly get into self-inflicted 
behaviours. 
 
4.2.1 PROPOSITION 1: ARE CURRENT CRISIS AND DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT MODELS WORKING? 
If our views of risk, crisis and disaster are ambiguous, our thinking on risk, crisis and disaster 
management is even more confused. Therefore, understanding risk, crisis and disaster is crucial 
towards their effective and sustainable management. It was reflected in general admissions by 
both theorists and practitioners that most models of risk/crisis management do not seek to 
practically connect with cases of emerging crises and disasters or to specifically address the 
assumption that understanding crisis and disaster management present the opportunities for 
successful management of crises. This means that crisis and disaster management models 
present a condition that demands the processes of managing organisational crises and disasters 
be held up for examination and questions. Following the pioneering work of Roxburgh (2010), 
Beck (1992; 2009), McConnell & Drennan (2006), Borodzicz (2005), Bauman (2002), Turner 
& Pidgeon (1997), Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), and Boin & Fishbacher-Smith (2011) there has 
been substantial interest in antecedents and consequences of organisational crises and disasters. 
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Indeed, empirical studies have found that models and strategies are useful in responding to 
crises and disasters. However more recent attention has been drawn by increasingly sceptical 
public and experts on the wanes of superiority and validity of these scientific models and 
strategies used by venerable authority structures and figures (organisations, politicians, the 
legal system, police officers, scientists and engineers, doctors, etc.) in crisis and disaster 
situations. 
Crisis management models and strategies can cause considerable and sometimes irreparable 
damage to organisations and vulnerable people in crisis, for example, Shell Nigeria & Ogoni 
crisis. The case for examining ‘impact of CM models and strategies’ on crisis management 
outcomes seems to be even robust and telling when we considered the arguments made by Beck 
(2009, p. 10):  
“Over the past two centuries the judgment of scientists has replaced tradition in 
Western societies. Paradoxically, however, the more science and technology permeate 
and transform life on a global scale, the less this expert authority is taken as a given. 
In discourses concerning risk, in which questions of normative (self-) limitation also 
arise, the mass media, parliaments, social movements, governments, philosophers, 
lawyers, writers, etc., are winning the right to a say in decisions.” 
By contrast, in developing countries such as Nigeria, methodological scepticism about 
venerable authorities and organisations, especially in oil and gas sector, are prevalent and 
experts’ judgement never replaced tradition but instead they are rejected or at least not taken 
seriously. This argument is validated by the reaction of the Niger Delta people and other publics 
to environmental devastation and disasters such as constant gas flaring, frequent oil spills and 
widespread pollution blamed mostly on the multinational oil companies in Nigeria. Examining 
the western societies, Roxburgh (2010, p. 9) maintained that:  
what began to emerge in the late 20th Century was a radical shift in the locus of meaning 
in western societies from a culture where meaning and identity were grounded in 
loyalty to institutions and structures (like the State and church) to one in which meaning 
and identity are grounded in the self as the primary agent of meaning. Overnight the 
institutions and structures of the 20th Century quickly entered a place where their 
legitimacy was questioned and most loyalty to them removed.  
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In the perspective of this research findings the suspicion surrounding current models and 
strategies in crises and disasters management create a credibility crisis and make both 
environment and people vulnerable to instability, insecurity, pollution and forced migration in 
developing countries, for example Nigeria. Thus, several tough questions arise regarding the 
validity of current approaches in risk/crisis and disaster management (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; 
Topper & Lagadec, 2013). For Beck, science as well as the forces of law and order also face 
credibility crisis. For example, unable to deal satisfactorily with suicide bombers, hijacked 
aircraft used as flying bombs and other manifestations of asymmetrical warfare, the State’s 
legitimacy is undermined and victimised populations unnerved (Beck, 2009). Consistent with 
this explanation, Okotoni (2004) discovered that most of the crises in the oil producing areas – 
known as the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, are traceable to what host communities consider 
as either outright negligence of environmental management or a poor approach to its 
management. This further resonates with the question of whether the current approach and 
strategies of dealing with crises and disasters in developing countries are working.  
Numerous studies provide important insights as to whether current CM models and strategies 
are working or not. Example of some studies in risk, crisis and disaster management that have 
examined whether models and strategies of risk and crisis management are relevant to 
practitioners and emerging crises and disasters include but are not restricted to Hoare (1997) 
and Thompson (1997). Traditional research of Rittel & Webber (1973, p. 160) bluntly 
concluded that “the classic paradigm of science and engineering – the paradigm that has 
underlain modern professionalism – is not applicable to the problems of open societal systems”. 
In view of the practical implication in crisis and disaster management, variables such as 
fundamental and normative values become part of the problem and can easily be elusive in 
analysis, decision or implementation; risk culture and judgement is crucial and a probabilistic 
approach becomes ineffective (Topper & Lagadec, 2013). In partial agreement with Topper & 
Lagadec (2013, p. 7) “every single move triggers possible global alterations within the system 
and within its global context, trial and error strategies are no longer appropriate: every move is 
a one-off move”. In fact, this thesis findings suggest that the origin of the crises is no longer 
the proximate cause, blame identification is insufficient, neither the stick nor carrot approach 
is appropriate and sustainable particularly in the context of environmental disasters and 
terrorism (militancy) crises. 
Empirical studies such as Adrot & Moriceau (2013), Hutchins et al. (2009), Shrivastava et al. 
(2009), and Roeschmann (2014) reveal that not all theories of risk, crisis and disaster are always 
72 
 
relevant to real problems. It is therefore unacceptable to reason that theories of risk, crisis and 
disaster are irrelevant and ignoring these theories, other than specific theory routinely used by 
organisations and institutions, is not expected to result in best practice. However, it is 
acknowledged that theories must be tested, modified, adopted or rejected (Hoare, 1997). 
Although according to Beck (2009) there is a suspicion that the ‘old’ sources of wealth and 
comfort (like large-scale industry and the development and propagation of new chemical 
compounds) may pose a threat to human survival, for example witness concerns about global 
warming and the synergistic and antagonistic effects of new compounds. For Bauman (2002) 
it the citizens apprehension with ‘body-cultivation’ that amplifies awareness of manufactured 
risks. These entire issues combine reveal the complicated nature of current approaches and 
strategies in risk, crisis and disaster management. 
To the frustration and perhaps disappointment of those seeking the quick solution to 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters, this research does not provide answers as to which 
crisis and disaster management models and strategies should be generally or universally 
applied to emerging unconventional crises and disasters in ensuring sustainable success. These 
answers do not yet exist but rather provocative questions and issues that will provide such 
answers in the future are the subjects of discussion in this research. In retrospect, Weart (1988, 
p. 7) in Kirkwood (1997) states that: “at the start of the 20th century many felt that science 
would lead humanity to an abundance not only of material goods but of brotherhood and 
wisdom, . . . progressive elites believed that even politics would soon be made scientific.”  
While science has a role to play, the real life decision-making process is a mix of science and 
subjective perception (Kirkwood, 1997). This is relevant to unpredicted surprises and 
dangerous events like crises and disasters. Cognitive biases will perhaps affect the quality of 
decision making regarding crisis and disaster. There are several bias issues such as 
confirmation, retrievability, and illusion of control that can affect risk/crisis management 
actions. For example, if we form a hypothesis, it is possible that we will pay more attention to 
information that confirms this. This is utterly dangerous for crisis and disaster management 
practice because opposing perspectives such as local perceptions are perceived as irrelevant or 
not important enough (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015). 
Therefore, the theoretical framing of crisis and disaster as a monolithic view which tends to 
portray experts and scientists as the most experienced in dealing with emerging unconventional 
cases of risks, crises and disasters are not particularly useful and sustainable when social 
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agents, such as local experts, civil societies group, indigenes and communities capacity for 
active sensemaking are ignored. A striking manifestation is the noticeable attachment to one 
specific crisis and disaster framework, in which experts have become fundamentalists, within 
the world of method frameworks – that is, the distinction between experts’ framework and lay-
people’s approach to risk and crisis. This also demonstrate the value of risk and crisis 
communication in bridging the gaps between experts and lay-folks.  
The focus should be on how integrated and collaborated frameworks can enhance and enable 
sustainable solutions to unconventional crisis/disaster.  Therefore, the hard question becomes: 
is the paradigm in which our practices and theories are anchored still valid (Topper & Lagadec, 
2013)? If disputed, the perspective of ‘crisis management in crisis’ offered by Kouzmin must 
be taken on board (Kouzmin, 2008). For an effective approach in dealing crises and disasters, 
analytical tools must be able to grasp present realities which are no longer those of the last 
century (Topper & Lagadec, 2013). In conclusion, all known theories and practices of risk, 
crisis and disaster do not need to be thrown overboard but new windows and paradigms that 
reflect realities and multiple interests must be embraced.  
 
4.2.2 PROPOSITION 2: SHOULD CRISIS AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICE AND STRATEGIES BE CONTEXT BASED? 
Managing unconventional crises and disasters is a notoriously problematic endeavour. This 
provokes the question whether crisis and disaster management practice and strategies should 
be context based or applied homogenously. It is even more thought-provoking given the 
‘boldness of denial’ which impedes co-operation between the Board, the risk manager and the 
external stakeholders if the risk outcome is perceived as negative. While the boardrooms are 
more interested in answers rather than problems, understanding problems such as flaws in 
current approaches and strategies can produce practical dialogue through which emerging 
crises and disasters can be managed is critical. There is general recognition that crisis and 
disaster management practice varies when responding to unconventional crises and disasters in 
different contexts and various scholars in risk and crisis management have examined the 
phenomena in different contexts: normal accident, high reliability, systemic failure, human 
errors, failure of foresight and man-made disasters, risk society, risk perception; risk culture 
and governance, for example. Despite this, extant literature concluded that prior research on 
cases of crises and disasters often tended to treat such dangerous events as homogenous 
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(Hannah et al., 2009) rather than heterogeneous which provides valid grounds to apply and 
localise models and strategies to a specific situation. 
In responding to and building upon these previous studies, the proposition is that crisis and 
disaster management practice will be most effective when contextual factors and issues are 
taken into consideration and models or strategies are localised. This is not particularly a recent 
insight because taking contextual focus in risk, crisis and disaster management has been 
acknowledged and established in several past studies (Blatt et al., 2006; Lagadec, 2007; 
Underhill, 2013; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Pidgeon, 2010; Shrivastava et al., 2009; Smith & 
Elliot, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These empirical and theoretical studies have made 
numerous calls for risk and crisis researchers to take greater account of contextual factors in 
the formulation of risk and crisis theories as well as in operational definitions, models and 
strategies of managing risk and crisis. The basic issue is that crisis and disaster management 
models and strategies cannot be applied uniformly to all cases of crises and disasters; and the 
appropriateness of any of such models and strategies to emerging cases of crises and disasters 
should be determined by the organisation (and the crisis management team).  
The attention given to practicality of risk/crisis management models and strategies in past 
studies are critiqued and organisations’ focus on this issue appears inadequate. The lack of 
awareness of practical implication (i.e. what organisations do in crisis situations) and context 
(i.e. what are the unique conditions in which the crises and disasters is being managed) may 
account for organisational failure in crisis. This understanding is essential because once 
frameworks have been developed they become routines (Hoare, 1997). Thus, such practice in 
risk and crisis management become routines and essentially formed part of the organisations 
DNA when responding to unconventional crises and disasters. 
However, in Africa, models and strategies in risk, crisis and disaster management as developed 
and recommended by Western theorists and practitioners cannot be adopted as a wholesale 
paradigm. Albeit this is not to suggest that risk and crisis theories as developed in Western 
context are irrelevant to African context. There are no guarantees that risk and crisis 
management theories and strategies developed within the cultural context and values of one 
country can have positive effects when applied in another country. There are several reasons 
behind this preference. Some of the Western theories and models in risk, crisis and disaster 
management are unwelcome, undesirable, and perhaps exclusively or partially inapplicable and 
irrelevant to other cultures like African countries. The cultural context such as values at work 
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and in social settings in which crisis and disaster materialise, must be acknowledged and 
recognised when managing these events. The cross-cultural problems in applying existing CM 
models and strategies make their universal application impossible. 
Another striking flaw in universal application of CM models and strategies is the lack of a 
pragmatic approach in addressing the interdisciplinary dimension of crises and disasters. These 
existing models and strategies tended to suggest that crises and disasters are analogous and 
therefore lessons from previous cases can help us understand how these dangerous events 
happen or evolve, responded to and best addressed across a range of settings, policy domains 
and contexts. Although theoretically valid, when we examine from diverse practical 
perspectives and transnational insights, such approaches can be misleading, dangerous and 
unsustainable in practice. The interpretation is that risk, crisis and disaster management models 
and strategies cannot be universally valid or applicable to different cases of emerging 
unconventional crisis and disaster in different industries, organisations and countries. 
There is an additional captivating issue which is the notion of ‘methodological fit’ in crisis and 
disaster management research where the state of prior studies, questions, models and strategies 
recommended for managing risk, crisis and disaster are difficult to converge with emerging 
unconventional crises and disasters. The suggestion is that organisations must continuously 
question their crisis management response actions and intentions in view of real-world 
circumstances. In this regard, organisations can become more receptive to a range of diverse 
explanations in crisis or disaster situations with intent to filter inconsistent perspectives and 
become empowered to make sound decisions in increasingly complex situations which involve 
high stakes for organisations, communities, and societies. Specific to this research focus, the 
positive association between crisis management response and models and strategies of 
organisations is challenged for several reasons:  
 First, senior managers’ perceptions of their own organisation, task environment, crisis 
and activities for preventing or coping with crisis situations profoundly affect their 
organisations’ practice of risk and crisis management (Penrose, 2000; Liu, Chang, & 
Zhao, 2009).  
 Second, crisis management models and strategies may not work effectively due to lack 
of collaboration, disengagement, inadequate implementation, and divergence in 
commitment at various levels of the process.  
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 Third, there are intrinsic barriers to crisis management practice, including organisation 
ignorance, misclassifying the event, organisation denial and over-confidence, 
dismissing local concerns, distrust, absolute reliance on scientific account or evidence, 
and disregarding normative issues.  
 Fourth, given the unstructured and unconventional nature of crisis and disaster 
including the non-linear impacts of crisis management actions and responses, a 
superficial approach to crisis and disaster management, and the complexity of 
stakeholders, with possible rival explanations, can inhibit organisations’ ability to think 
the unthinkable.  
Given these arguments, the proposition that crises and disasters are mutually exclusive events 
that require different methodological solutions depending on the effectiveness of the models 
and strategies relevant to the context of the complex situations is supported. The complexity of 
unconventional crises and disasters arguably presents multiple realities and further reveals the 
significance of social context in risk and crisis management practice. This conclusion 
collaborates the position of social scientists stating that risk is a socially-constructed concept 
which means different things to different people in different contexts. In fact, it is argued that 
a ‘unified theory’ of risk and crisis which applies across all areas of unconventional cases of 
risks, crises and disasters is irrelevant to social life. The pursuit of such a multi-disciplinary 
theory of risk and crisis will be too vague and unrealistic, and attempt to vigorously force theory 
to suit emerging crisis and disaster when the social and political context differs will be a 
mistake or lead to crisis intensification and escalation.  
It is now well-stated that crises and disasters occur in several different contexts which make 
comparisons extremely difficult (Borodzicz, 2005). The amorphous nature of crises and 
disasters and the different and unpredictable contexts in which they occur makes methodical 
models and strategies controversial. The possible interpretation is that unconventional crises 
and disasters will place different difficulties on diverse institutions, agencies and organisations 
and at different times (Borodzicz, 2005). For example, from the Bhopal, Challenger, Space 
Shuttle Columbia, Tylenol, Kings Cross, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, Hurricane Katrina, Piper 
Alpha, Fukushima disasters to Bonga oil disaster in Nigeria – these indicate our vulnerability 
and susceptibility to dangerous, multifaceted and unconventional events. These unconventional 
events reveal some novel paradigm shifts from uncertainty to ignorance both intellectual or 
managerial, large-scale to off-scale, interactive complexity to the unreadable, tightly-coupled 
to unbounded totalities, local events to transnational disruption, high speed to instantaneity, 
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obstinate-response to collaborative-response and disengagement to engagement. These are the 
lig hts under which unconventional crises and disasters must arguably be understood to enhance 
effective as well as sustainable practices.  
Interpretation of the research results taken from these indispensable perspectives is consistent 
with previous investigations of Boin & Lagadec (2000), Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort (2001), 
Kouzmin (2008), Helsloot et al. (2012), Lagadec (2012), Tooper & Lagadec (2013), and 
Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015). The general patterns of the results suggest that the best approach 
to the management of crises and disasters remain the intention to limit both intended and 
unintended consequences of crises and disasters – called self-inflicted disasters. The basic 
predictions of the argument have achieved support in several previous studies (Beck, 2009; 
Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011; Hannah et al., 2009; Hopkins, 2007; LaPorte, 2011; 
Shrivastava et al., 2009). Therefore, and more conclusively, crisis and disaster management 
practice should be relevant to the contexts, organisations and institutions, location and people 
involved in the crises or disasters. 
4.3 RELEVANT THEORIES AND SCIENCE OF RISK, CRISIS AND DISASTER 
In this section some relevant theories and science of risk, crisis and disaster are identified, 
critically discussed in the subsequent sections and their implications for sustainable risk and 
crisis management practice explored. These theories are presented because of their relevance 
to the research context and focus. The second, and most vital, reason is that reviewing the 
selected theories remains fundamental for how organisations and stakeholders in crisis may a 
develop sustainable approach to managing the problems presented in the case studies especially 
with respect to the research recommendations. Crisis management is not an exact science – it 
is a combination of science and art. Sometimes crises are well managed and at other times, they 
are mishandled or mismanaged. This raises the question or suspicions as to whether crises and 
disasters can be self-inflicted or initiated as contended in this research.  
For Turner (1994, p. 149), as previously indicated, the issue is whether risk is something that 
is taken or something that afflicts us (that is, is it as choice or a circumstance?). If crises and 
disasters are complex and uncertain, and can be self-inflicted, what are the consequences for 
practices in crisis and disaster management, and consequences on models of risk and crisis 
management? It is noted that consensus on the exact nature of unconventional risk, crisis and 
disaster does not yet exist and the practice of risk and crisis management is still problematic. 
Major contemporary research in risk and crisis management is responsible for reproducing 
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facile interpretations of crises and providing façade strategies for dealing with emerging crises 
and disasters without addressing the proximate cause and normative issues. In fact, most studies 
have advanced to produce global crisis and disaster management models and strategies to a 
local crisis and disaster. This is arguably an exact opposite of sustainable crisis management 
and can arguably lead to self-inflicted or initiated disasters for organisations in the long run.  
The suggestion is to widen the epistemology of risk and crisis management, from one of 
disengagement, to one which embraces the possibility for resilience and adaptability, crisis 
negotiation, collaboration, partnership, communication, inclusivity, local influences and 
context, integration and engagement as radical change process and supporting transformative 
cultural changes. The main emphasis is that multiple realties exist in unconventional risks, 
crises and disasters. Therefore, there is need to consider multi-classification approach to risk, 
crisis and disaster as most relevant approach. Although there is suggestion that risk theories 
can basically be divided into three areas: sociological, psychological and cultural (Borodzicz, 
2005). While this is not the only method of categorisation, the tri-fold classification was argued 
to be the most useful approach to the theories of risk because it is an intuitive breakdown of 
the approaches (Thorne, 2010, p. 51). The support for tri-fold classification in the research 
conducted by Thorne (2010) was noticeably based on the relevance to the research context and 
focus. This should not be confused to mean the most appropriate method of classification in 
risk and crisis research. 
However, a multi-classification approach to risk is considered most useful because of the 
interdisciplinary nature and context of this research which reveals that multiple realities exist. 
It is argued that this reflects the unconventional phases of risk, crisis and disaster theories which 
are manifested in terms of the interdisciplinary nature of research. Although irrespective of 
different empirical frameworks, there are in general substantial problems in current models and 
strategies of crisis and disaster management. At the root of all risk, crisis and disaster research 
is the question of how best to manage risks, crises and disasters. This question of how to 
conceptualise, categorise and manage these phenomena described as mishap, emergency, 
crisis, disaster, catastrophe, major incident, accident, and dangerous event poses many 
challenging problems. Research confirms that the apparent uniqueness of event aetiology and 
manifestation indicate that a general rule categorisation may be difficult to stipulate in advance 
(Borodzicz, 2005). Generally, research shown that without a model to understand the 
phenomena that we are describing event response and theorising is made more difficult. This 
provides a fundamental rationale for several theoretical frameworks and strategies in dealing 
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with cases of crises and disasters. Universal discussion of these theories and strategies of risk 
and crisis management in a single research focus seems unrealistic. Therefore, the following 
risk and crisis theories which directly contribute to the focus and context of this research are 
discussed: 
 Risk society 
 Risk perception 
 Isomorphic learning 
 Risk communication 
 Risk culture 
Each of the above identified theories are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
4.4 RISK SOCIETY 
The paradigm that social and political change contributes to how risk is both perceived and 
managed in postmodern society is now increasingly endorsed in risk and crisis research (Beck, 
1992a; Borodzicz, 2005). Two essential theories of sociological risk research that have 
dominated the field of risk and crisis management are: the risk society and risk culture 
approaches. The former as propounded and developed by Ulrich Beck is carefully discussed in 
this section and the latter expatiate towards the end of this section. Several sociologists and 
political theorists have explored these important areas in risk research (some notable examples 
include: Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Beck, 1992a; 1997a; The Royal Society, 1992; 
Dingwall, 1999; Adam & Loon, 2000; Japp, 2000; Elliott, 2002). The notion of risk society is 
rooted in sociological approach and a significant proposition of research on sociological 
publications encourages the concept (Beck, 1992b; 1994). Ulrich Beck has been credited for 
promoting and advancing the concept of risk and risk research through his world “Risk Society 
Thesis” (Beck, 1995; 1996). For Beck (1992a) we are in a state of transition from a class to a 
risk society. Risk exposure is replacing class as the principal inequality of modern society 
because of how risk is reflexively defined by actors and due to the context of postmodernist 
influences (Beck, 1997b). This is presented in Table 4.1 below 
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Table 4.1: Conceptualising the distinction between Class Society and Risk Society 
Issues Class Society Risk Society 
Basic social organising 
principle 
Collectivization (into 
families, classes, 
corporations, status groups, 
etc.) plus tradition 
Individualisation plus 
reflexivity 
Form of inequality Social class position Social risk position 
Core contentious 
issues/questions of justice 
and fairness focus on 
Distribution of scarce goods 
(wealth) 
Distribution of ‘bads’ (risks) 
Experienced personally 
paradigmatically as 
Hunger  Fear 
Experienced collectively 
potentially as 
Class consciousness Risk consciousness 
Utopian projects aimed at  Elimination of scarcity Elimination of risk 
Source: Scott (2000) 
It is useful to draw upon Scott’s (2000) explanation of risk society to provide conceptual 
clarification about the possible implication that the risk society thesis could have in risk/crisis 
management practice. In full agreement with Scott (2000, p. 39) “what Beck characterizes as 
the ‘risk society’ may thus be more appropriately labelled the ‘risk-averse society’, or, 
polemically, the angst society”. From another perspective, one interesting implication of the 
risk society thesis in risk management practice is the issue of risk perception – by extension 
the distinction between real or actual risk and perceived risk. Although it would be naive to 
deny that risk issues are more frequently discussed and recorded, generating local and 
international attention from theory, policy and practice perspectives, we cannot but 
acknowledge that the notion of risk society is an interesting observation that does not 
necessarily help us manage unconventional risks and disasters.  
In this context, we are justified to label the risk society as a passive approach to risk 
management. Nevertheless, risk society is described as an inescapable structural condition of 
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advanced industrialisation, and the ‘mathematicised morality’ of expert thinking and public 
discourse on risk profiling is criticised (Beck, 1995; 2006). The concept maintained that even 
the most restrained and moderate-objectivist account of risk implications involves a hidden 
politics, ethics and morality. This is something that is also acknowledged in this research: that 
the management of risk, crisis and disaster embraces multiple paradigms ranging from 
scientific, anti-scientific, to normative issues and the avoidance of over-confidence on the 
validity of certain evidence (models and strategies) compared with others. The premises for 
such contention are anchored on the theory of moral disengagement in processes of risk and 
crisis management.  
In the contemporary world, Beck stressed that industrial modernity has reached its limits and 
is undergoing a period of transformation moving irreversibly to a new historical epoch that is 
labelled “Reflexive Modernity” (Beck, 2000) – a concept which implies that as modern society 
becomes reflexive it constitutes an issue and problem for itself. However, there is caution that 
risk is not reducible to the product of probability of occurrence multiplied with the intensity 
and scope of potential harm, but a socially constructed phenomenon in which some people have 
a greater capacity to define risks than others. According to Beck, the inequalities of definition 
enable powerful actors (Western governments or powerful economic actors) to maximise risks 
for ‘others’ and minimise risks for ‘themselves’. Beck (2006) concludes that not all actors 
really benefit from the reflexivity of risk – only those with real scope to define their own risks. 
In this perspective, the transformation is propelled by industrial modernity and represents a 
natural outgrowth of its success rather than any systemic crisis or contradiction. It is this 
success of industrial modernism and the near ubiquitous spread of industrial capitalism that 
produces global outcomes that are undermining their own material benefits.  
 
4.4.1 STRANGE PARADOX OF RISK SOCIETY 
The strong concept of risk society is the recognition of the strange paradox that risk might, in 
fact, be increasing due to technology, science and industrialism rather than being abated by 
scientific and technological progress. The paradoxical coexistence of progress and risk 
comprise the principal themes of Ulrich Beck research (Jarvis, 2007) but this theme is rather 
obvious within the context of risk evolution because there is little or no progress without risk. 
It is acknowledged here that Beck’s risk thesis provides a useful explanation within the context 
of risk evolution or aetiology but arguably fall short of revealing a sustainable approach in 
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dealing with unconventional risks, crises and disasters. In this regard, there are five identifiable 
elements (though inconsequential considered in isolation but collectively significant) that 
undermine modernisation and modernity in the world risk society. These interrelated processes 
include:  
 Globalisation,  
 Individualisation,  
 Gender revolution,  
 Underemployment, 
 Global risks (e.g. global financial markets crisis and ecological crisis).  
Furthermore, we can argue that what makes modernity appear utterly dangerous as claimed in 
the risk society thesis is the so-called ‘climate of fear’ (Alvarez & Bachman, 2008: 248) and 
publicisation of risky activities or wider coverage devoted to the issue of risk and disaster. For 
Beck (2006) the more emphatically the existence of world risk society is denied, the more 
easily it can become a reality. In other words, the ignorance of the globalisation of risk increases 
the globalisation of risk. Meanwhile explanation of the phenomenon (i.e. risk) which Beck 
designates as perception (Beck, 1992) has not always received the same meaning in the debates 
surrounding risk and crisis management – making Beck’s idea of risk globalisation 
questionable. If we label and equate every risk in knowledge and perception of risk as “risk”, 
with its implications for pragmatic risk and crisis management, then organisations can be 
considered as “risks” even when these are situations that can be diagnose or predicted. 
 
4.4.2 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RISK SOCIETY 
There are other notable limitations and controversial implications of the concept of risk society 
when contextualised within this research focus and questions. The ontological limitation of the 
risk society thesis cannot allow its universal application to some modernism in unconventional 
cases of risk, crisis and disaster. Beck’s theory of risk society arguably provides over-
simplification of risk because risk interpretation at a micro level of analysis is not accounted 
for, and Beck is criticised for being unduly pessimistic and rationalistic (Denney, 2005). 
Furthermore, the risk society approach will be more relevant and practicable in some specific 
contexts such as environmental disasters than others like terrorism related crises in developing 
countries such as Nigeria.  
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Beck’s profound argument that reflexive modernity (from structure to agency) where the 
overall frameworks and assumptions of early modernity were questioned and radically 
challenged, does not particularly appear most relevant to developing countries (a case of 
Nigeria) where traditional model of structures like the Churches still flourished within 
professionalised and corporate model of organisational life. This is contrary to Beck’s claims 
that Church systems and their leaders are struggling to understand why it doesn’t work any 
longer, most church members couldn’t care less and younger, ‘emergent’ type leaders direct 
their critiques against these forms but tend to use more universalising arguments about structure 
and institutions in general (Beck, 1992a; 1995). Quite understandably, Beck’s view is perhaps 
influenced by European and Western observations but fundamentally devoid of an African 
perspective and it appears from the risk society thesis that Beck’s explanation failed to account 
for wider generalisation.  
In the context of the explanation above, there is an implication that a scientific approach to risk 
communication and management would remain ineffective when other traditional and widely 
celebrated institutions and structures as well as cultural climate are neglected in Nigeria. This 
is consistent with Cottle’s (1998, p. 17) argument that “Beck’s statements on the cultural 
resonance of the environment remain underdeveloped and has yet to incorporate findings and 
discussion of, inter alia, cross-cultural differences including national political cultures; the 
romanticised and historically informed opposition between the urban and the rural; and the 
cultural and hermeneutic dimension of reflexivity.”  
In another context, Beck’s risk society thesis is further censured for falling short on the 
recommended praxis for dealing with the immediate problems of crisis management 
(Borodzicz, 2005). In a controversial framework, the risk society thesis is accused of 
“presentism” – a preoccupation with proximate current events and an assumption of both their 
ubiquity and universal validity as indices of a new risk civilisation (Jarvis, 2007). The risk 
society thesis should never be considered as a local strategy for global problem or global 
strategy for local problem; but more correctly and arguably a representation of current state of 
risk. Nevertheless, Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ has been particularly influential and his thesis of 
reflexive modernisation arguing that modernising processes has led to reflexive and intensely 
risk-aware societies (Adam & Loon, 2000; Shaw, 2004). It remains relevant in understanding 
conventional risk, crisis and disaster. Finally, while risk society as a concept may not offer 
much empirically and appeals to only some, the concept do a encourage debate in the academic 
environment and contemporary social theory. 
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4.5 RISK PERCEPTION 
One inevitable problem regarding unconventional risks, crises and disasters is the issue of 
perception. Lack of consensus exists between experts and laypeople on what constitutes risk, 
and even among experts themselves different interpretations exist. For many decades, several 
studies have explored this question whether risks are perception or reality and this trend has 
significantly impact the management practice of risk, crisis and disaster (Rahm & Reddick, 
2011; Leiserowitz, 2006; Carlton & Jacobson, 2013; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). Concerns 
about risks and crises including environmental disasters are not uncommon (Tam & 
McDaniels, 2013; Adger et al., 2009; Constantinides, 2013), having sporadically characterised 
public and policy debates in Nigeria over the last three decades. The role of several Nigeria 
stakeholders (media, local communities, indigenes, government agencies, and organisations) 
in the social amplification of risk has been highlighted (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). The 
research found that in crisis management, perception often becomes reality. This finding 
resonates the position of local people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria over environmental 
disasters. 
This is also consistent with some selected notable research findings. For example, Rosa (1998) 
reveals that risk is the same as risk perception. In another case risk coincides with the 
perceptions of it (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Freudenburg, 1989). Beck (1992) concludes 
that because risks are risks in knowledge, perceptions of risks and risk are not different things, 
but one and the same. The idea of risk perception as advanced by Beck (1992) does not 
sufficiently discuss other aspects of risk such as culture, religion, politics, personality and 
economic factors that may influence risk perception. The notion that “whether accurate or not, 
the public’s perception is its reality” (Seeger, 2006, p. 239) collaborates with Mafimisebi & 
Thorne’s (2015) findings regarding risk perception of the Niger Delta crises. In another striking 
feature, the dislocation in understanding of risks and crises between laypeople and experts was 
found to be responsible for crisis disengagement in the Niger Delta crises (Mafimisebi & 
Thorne, 2015). 
The risk perception approach is central to experts and lay people’s discourse of risk, crisis and 
disaster. In terms of empirical research, within sociology and related disciplines, several studies 
which can be seen in many publications of risk and crisis research such as Beck (1992; 1999; 
2006), Wildavsky & Dake (1990), Dunlap et al. (2000), Gerber & Neeley (2005), Siegrist et 
al. (2000), and Hawcroft & Milfont (2010) have discussed the issue of risk perception. It is 
worthy to note that it is the pluralistic nature of risk which often brought about asymmetrical 
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issues (in which stakeholders’ roles and agenda differs) that have made risk perception a focal 
issue in risk, crisis and disaster management practice. 
 
4.5.1 FIVE THEORIES OF RISK PERCEPTION 
There are various risk perception theories that have been discussed in risk and crisis research. 
For example, five theories of risk perception were examined in the research conducted by 
Wildavsky & Dake (1990). These five theories of risk perception are: knowledge, personality, 
economic, political and cultural. Firstly, the knowledge theory emphasises that individual 
perceive things to be dangerous because they know them to be dangerous (Mafimisebi & 
Thorne, 2015). This knowledge comes from different sources such as education, experience, 
culture and simulation. However, the possibility of uncertainty and imperfection of knowledge 
creates difficulties when managing unconventional crises and disasters. Secondly, personality 
theory suggests that some individuals that are risk neutral will accept a possible risk while other 
categories of individuals are risk averse and therefore will try to avoid as much risks as 
possible. The implication of this model is that vulnerabilities of communities are influence by 
personality.  
Thirdly, economic theory relates to when individuals take risks based on the perceived greater 
marginal benefits of undertaking an activity than the marginal costs. In this regard, 
organisations are more likely to act in a way that promotes profiting from crises and disasters 
than repairing the damage where the marginal cost is less than the marginal benefit. This is 
dangerous for sustainable crisis and disaster management practice. Fourthly, political theory 
suggests that politics account for significant elements of risk perception because it struggle 
over opposing interests of stakeholders in crisis and disaster. Lastly, cultural theory suggests 
that attention to risk is a result of the cultural bias or ideologies and worldviews of the people 
concerned. For example, findings from this research indicate that when compared with Western 
culture, there are significant major gaps in the cultural view of local indigenes and public 
managers towards risk and crisis in developing countries such as Nigeria. These differences 
stem from contextual factors such as traditional values, customs, languages, religion, and social 
norms.  
 
86 
 
4.5.2 TWO MAIN APPROACHES TO RISK PERCEPTION 
In another perspective and in additional to the above discussion, two main approaches to risk 
perception have been identified in the literature (Borodzicz, 2005). One such approach is the 
cognitive/decision-making strategies which questioned the idea of humans acting as rational 
beings and advocated that human beings may often make certain types of irrational choices or 
preferences with a degree of regularity. The validity of this decision-making theory when it is 
applied to practical risk and crisis management contexts has been questioned (Borodzicz, 
2005). This approach has only been found to be most effective when applied in the contexts of 
laboratory tests but certainly not in crisis and disaster management situations. The second 
approach which is the psychometric paradigm, arose because of the need to explain lay 
perceptions of risks (often different from experts’ account of risks) and balance it with risk 
estimates of experts. This research agenda seeks to explain why some hazards with low 
probability of negative outcomes (e.g. airplane travel, and nuclear weapons) were perceived as 
riskier than others that carried a much higher probability (e.g. car travel). 
The psychometric paradigm of risk perception reveals two factors: dread and risk of the 
unknown as a set of psychological risk dimensions that influence risks. The dread of an event 
is reinforced when a hazard has severe consequences (even if rare) thus provoking a gut-level 
“dread” reaction and effects that are perceived as catastrophic and sudden (instead of chronic 
or gradual). In the second category, the risk of the unknown is reinforced by characteristics 
such as novelty, delayed impact, or undetectability. There are other variables (such as the origin 
of the hazard (natural or man-made), voluntariness of the exposure to the risk, and the real or 
perceived controversy in the scientific community) that also contribute to the two 
psychological risk factors. These factors combined make public risk perception judgements 
outweigh expert judgements of risks. This is comparable to the finding that public perception 
of risk is much richer than that of the expert (Slovic, 1997).  
Furthermore, there are several studies, mostly traditional, using respondents, from different 
countries like Sweden (Slovic et al., 1989), the former Soviet Union (Mechitov & Rebrik, 
1989), Norway (Teigen et al., 1988), Hungary (Englander et al., 1986), Hong Kong (Keown, 
1989), Canada (Slovic et al., 1991), France (Bastide et al., 1989; Slovic et al., 2000), Bulgaria 
and Romania (Sjoberg et al., 2010), Australia (Nursey-Bray et al., 2012), and USA (Weber & 
Aucker, 2010) that have validated the two-factor structure of the psychometric paradigm of 
risk perception. The conclusion that emerged from these studies suggested that risk 
interpretation and models are not only confined to experts’ estimates of risk but also to lay 
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perceptions of risks. These research agendas established that both experts and laypeople can 
make sense of risk and disaster in a way that promotes effective risk management when 
appropriately utilised. The goal of psychometric studies is to define risk not purely as the 
probability of adverse consequences but with extension of some measure of the uncertainty of 
outcomes (Weber & Aucker, 2010). In practice, Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015) caution that risky 
decision making based on empirical evidence of risk perception can prove problematic when 
viewed in the context of practical crisis and disaster management. The findings collaborate 
with existing empirical research findings that social theories of risk perception when viewed at 
once is indispensable and insufficient (Wilkinson, 2001).  
When the argument that risk perception is based on both probabilistic and non-probabilistic 
measurement of risk in which case certainty is combined with uncertain outcomes, the 
psychometric paradigm remains a valid approach to risk management especially as the concept 
of risk communication grew from this school of thought. The clear illustration is that 
probabilistic risk measurement does contribute to risk perception by increasing the vividness 
and salience (including the availability) of the risk. The non-probabilistic risk measurement 
such as heuristics and intuitive validation of models help concretised risks in realistic term 
(Weber & Aucker, 2010). 
Risk perception requires cross-validation of models using other risk and crisis management 
approaches such risk and crisis communication, robust risk and crisis leadership, risk appetite 
and risk culture, and stakeholders’ engagement to aid decision makings when proactively and 
pragmatically managing risks and disasters. In conclusion, when the debate between “experts” 
and “lay-folks” about risks and disasters is considered, the lame rabbit often wins over the 
turtle because one would be perceived as providing objective evidence and the other subjective 
evidence. This is where scientific explanation particularly in risk evolution contexts becomes 
dangerous given the premise that if you have the correct reference, experts are entitled to say 
whatever they want, perhaps? 
 
4.6 ISOMORPHIC LEARNING 
There is increasing recognition that organisational systems are more complex, fragile and 
susceptible to risks, crises and disasters partly due to the transnational nature of unconventional 
risks, world risk society and the collapse of risk culture (Beck, 2011; Stengers, 2011). It is 
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propounded that risks, crises and disasters are classified as unconventional partly because of 
their fragile nature in which multiple interests exist, pluralistic meaning of the events emerges, 
and there is increased attention on what can done to avert future similar disasters. The striking 
issue in these so-called ‘fragile fragilities’ is that capacity to adequately and consistently 
identify, prevent and manage potential systemic organisational failures and disasters are much 
harder. There are cases where lessons have been correctly identified from past risk failures.  
Nonetheless, lessons are not learned in past disasters and collapses in organisation risk culture 
further increase the propensity for unconventional risks and disasters. The unique 
circumstances of unconventional major disasters and crises may explain why ‘lessons learned’ 
from one incident are not applied in comparable settings (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013). Fressoz 
(2011, p. 201) reveals that ‘Fukushima’s nuclear accident demonstrates once again that we 
(regulators, organisations, industry and civil society all together) do not learn from the past 
because technological disasters continue to reoccur. The more disasters there are, the less we 
seem able to learn from them. Our faith in progress and our concern for economic efficiency 
make it clear that, contrary to postmodernist claims, we have not escaped from the illusions of 
modernity’.  
Based on the explanation provided above, isomorphic learning remains useful because it 
suggests organisations can manage risks better if they are able to learn from similar practices 
and failures observed in different organisations across the industry (Toft & Reynolds, 1994). 
Lessons from disasters and organisational failures can serve as isomorphic learning 
opportunities for other organisations operating within the same industry (or perhaps different 
settings), even when such organisations do not experience an extreme event (disaster). The core 
premise behind isomorphic learning is that predicting extreme or dangerous events based 
mainly on organisation’s own operational histories is insufficient instead adopting similar 
practices on an industry wide-scale is most beneficial, as Borodzicz (2005) seems to imply.  
For Toft & Reynolds (1994) because disasters are normally low-event, high impact incidents, 
it is impossible that an organisation would be able to effectively predict such disasters basically 
through reflecting on its own experiences. Nonetheless, Toft & Reynolds (2005) establish that 
lessons from one extreme event can be applied in other settings through isomorphic learning: 
cross-organisational isomorphism (different organisations, same sector), common mode 
isomorphism (different sectors, similar processes), event isomorphism (separate incidents, 
identical hazards) and self-isomorphism (sub-units operating in similar ways). With respect to 
89 
 
this insight, the two case studies included in this research in chapter two and three are 
considered most useful and relevant to risk and disaster management practice and research. 
The same disasters keep occurring simply because lessons were hardly learned and collapses 
in institutional and organisational risk culture became apparent. A typical example is the case 
of Bonga oil disaster where investigators found that inappropriate organisational procedures 
and mismanagement in the Bonga field contributed to the disaster despite several similar cases 
of oil explosions in Nigeria. Buchanan & Denyer (2013) argue that isomorphic learning is a 
form of naturalistic generalisation and that these modes of generalisation are neither discrete 
nor mutually exclusive. 
Following the pioneering ground breaking research of Turner (1976; 1978) on man-made 
disasters and Toft & Reynolds (1994; 1997) on isomorphism, recent trends of research have 
begun to explore ways of learning from failures (Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002; 
Chuang, Ginsburg, & Berta, 2007) and whether organisations can learn from failures and 
disasters that occur within the same organisation or other organisations (Haunschild & 
Sullivan, 2002; Denrell, 2003; Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Vaughan, 2005; Kim & Miner, 2000; 
2007; Desai, 2008; 2010; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Labib & Champaneri, 2012; Labib & Read, 
2013). Conditions for experiential learning are more likely to increase with learning from 
failures (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Haunschild & Rhee, 2004) because failures are enablers for 
change in the status quo and challenge old assumptions (Labib & Read, 2013). It is now 
generally accepted that even when organisations are isomorphic and disciplined mistakes are 
still inevitable (confirming Perrow’s normal accident thesis). By contrast, new lines of research 
emerge that learning from disasters are not particularly innovative (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 
2015) with Borodzicz (2005) suggesting that organisations learn more by focusing on 
successful organisations instead of looking at sick ones, correlating with the argument in 
traditional schools of thought which also emphasise learning from successes (Sitkin, 1992; 
McGrath, 1999; Kim & Miner, 2000). 
However, past failures and disasters are believed to force decision makers to reflect on what 
happened, why and how it happened (Morris & Moore, 2000), with Fink’s (2002, p. 43) 
research also recognising that the best predictor of future events is past events. In agreement 
with Thorne (2010, p. 61) learning from past disasters appears to be a sensible part of risk 
management but lessons learned need to be passed on effectively so that appropriate action is 
encouraged. The difficulties in learning from past failures and disasters are acknowledged in 
Labib & Read’s (2013) research where it is correspondingly pointed out that learning as a 
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process is more beneficial than learning as an outcome. By contrast, Le Coze (2013) argued 
that learning from accidents and disasters is more effective and useful when multidisciplinary 
frameworks relevant to specific country, industry and context are adopted. This line of thinking 
has already been previously recognised in this research especially with the second research 
question.  
The cognitive processes behind learning from failures and disasters are scarcely known in 
extant literature. For example, self-discipline (whether organisational or personal) which is 
contextualised as critical to achieving real or actual learning is often obscured in discussions 
surrounding risks and disasters. In addition, the subjects and issues of ethical and moral 
consideration when learning from disasters is unfortunately neglected – something that is 
strongly emphasised in this research. The other factors that can complicate learning from 
disasters are even more telling. First, Pidgeon & O’Leary (2000, p. 19-20) maintain that (1) 
information difficulties as well as (2) blame, organisational politics and cover-up are the main 
barriers to organisational learning from failures and disasters. There are information difficulties 
in both individuals and organisations attempts to deal with problems that are, in foresight at 
least, highly uncertain and ill-structured.  
Likewise, organisational learning from failures and disasters is likely to be constructed in ways 
that contribute to the construction of different versions of reality during an emerging event to 
serve group interests. An indication of that might be the question raised by Shrivastava (1993) 
was Bhopal disaster a “technical incident” as claimed by Union Carbide or a “catastrophe” as 
claimed by the victims? The other perspective which can serve as an illustration is Sagan’s 
(1993) convincing accounts of the failure of the US nuclear weapons command and control 
systems to learn from incidents and failures during the Cold War in which conflicts over 
parochial interests lead to faulty reporting of incidents, secrecy, normalisation of errors in the 
face of external accountability, and the reinterpretation of failure as success.  
Second, Borodzicz’s (2005, p. 27) research suggests that isomorphic learning constitutes 
hindsight and how this form of learning could be brought about in managing current situations 
and disasters remains controversial. The literature is replete with illustrations from a range of 
different sectors where lessons had been clearly and correctly drawn from failures and 
experience, but for one reason or another these lessons had not been translated into effective 
risk and disaster management in prevent current and future disasters. Although Thorne (2010, 
p. 62) echoes the significant of having “explicit exchange of information between those who 
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learn from the disaster and those who are responsible for managing the risk of disaster” to 
bridge the gap, it is hard for actual learning from disasters to happen if the initial understanding 
of what has happened is utterly flawed. Examples of this can be found in the UK cases of 
Taunton train fire and Bradford football ground fire. These cases are explained below. 
In the Taunton train fire which occurred on 6th July 1978 at Taunton, Devon, UK, bed linen 
stored against an electric heater in a railway sleeper car caught fire and set the rest of the car 
ablaze. There were 12 passenger fatalities with 16 others injured despite the commendable 
speed with which staff and travellers had reacted. Following an inquiry after the disaster on a 
Glasgow-Euston train, investigators found that British Rail had received a warning five year 
previously that bed linen left on the sleeping car heater was a source of danger. The lessons 
from the accident were not passed on because at the time of the incident all the sleeping cars 
on the Western Region were steam heated. Regrettably, when the Western Region sleeping 
cars were converted to electric heating nobody thought it is appropriate to inform them of the 
previous incident (Toft & Reynolds, 1997). 
The Bradford football ground fire started in the main stand during a match at Bradford City’s 
Valley Parade ground on 11th May 1985 causing the death of 56 people and injuring 200 more. 
Prior to the disaster, the 1969 publication by the Fire Prevention Association entitled ‘Playing 
Safe in Sporting Arenas’ which gave details of several fires which had taken place in football 
stands such as the one at Bradford, had warned that should a fire break out especially if a game 
is in progress, a major disaster could result (Toft, 1992). Despite this, rubbish which had been 
allowed to gather beneath the wooden stand was ignited by what is believed to have been a 
discarded cigarette and within a matter of minutes the stand was ablaze.  
Also, in the case of the BP Texas City Refinery disaster of 2005 involving a fire and explosion 
causing death of workers, like all organisations of such complexity, systems and procedures 
were essential but there was a lack of enforcement in following procedures, and complacency 
became the norm. There were reports of incidents which had occurred affecting similar 
facilities which were relevant to the plant’s operations, however, a lack of learning culture and 
the lessons which could have prevented the disaster were not captured or acted upon. 
Organisational failures and disasters continue to occur despite abounding studies on 
isomorphic learning and learning from failures and disasters. There is little scepticism 
regarding the benefits of isomorphism to organisation risk management in risk and disaster 
contexts. However, in practice, it is often challenging to learn the lessons of the past because 
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of several barriers to organisational learning and paradigm shifts. Table 4.2 illustrates and 
provides useful checklist on barriers to organisational learning from failures derived from 
empirical and theoretical research in risk, crisis and disaster management. 
Table 4.2: Complexities and Rigidities that Inhibit Isomorphic Learning in Organisations 
 An excessive or undue focus on the immediate event rather than on the proximate causes of failures 
 Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions, which may develop over time – learning is resisted if it 
contradicts these views 
 Lack of corporate responsibility – it may be difficult, for instance, to put into practice solutions which are 
sufficiently far-reaching 
 Latching onto one superficial cause or learning point to the exclusion of more fundamental but sometimes 
less obvious lessons  
 Ineffective communication and other information difficulties – including failure to disseminate information 
which is already available 
 An incremental approach to issues of risk and disaster – attempting to resolve problems through tinkering 
rather than tackling more fundamental change 
 People are often unwilling to learn from negative events, even when it would be to their advantage 
 Contradictory imperatives – for instance communication versus confidentiality 
 A tendency towards scapegoating and finding individuals to blame – rather than acknowledging and 
addressing deep-rooted organisational problems 
 Pride in individuals and organisational expertise can lead to denial and to a disregard of external sources of 
warning – especially if a bearer of bad news lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the individuals, teams or 
organisations in question 
 The difficulties faced by people and organisations in ‘making sense’ of complex unconventional events is 
compounded by changes among key personnel within organisations and teams 
 Human or organisation alliances lead people or organisation to ‘forgive’ other team members their mistakes 
and act defensively against ideas from outside the team 
 Inability to recognise the financial costs of failure thus losing a powerful incentive for organisations to change 
 High stress and low job satisfaction can have adverse effects on quality and can also engender a resistance to 
change 
Source: Derived from Wason (1960), Pidgeon & O’Leary (2000), Firth-Cozens (2000), Toft & Reynolds (1997; 
2005), Borodzicz (2005), Haunschild & Sullivan (2002), Haunschild & Rhee (2004), Vaughan (2005), Kim & 
Miner (2007), Desai (2010), Labib & Read (2013), Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015). 
The purpose of Table 4.2 is to offer several of the complexities and rigidities that inhibit 
isomorphic learning in organisations. Learning and organisation are both dynamics because 
people within organisations may come and go, however an effective risk culture must persist. 
This point is expanded in the latter part of this research particularly under the discussion on 
risk culture and governance reiterating the importance of informed organisational risk culture 
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and governance as useful sustainable strategy to make learning from disasters active and 
effective. In this context, a combination of research and experience likewise suggests several 
ways in which some of the blockades to active organisational learning from failures and 
disasters can be overcome or abated, thereby facilitating effective risk and disaster management 
efforts in organisations. These suggestions as presented in Table 4.3 might as well influence 
research in risk, crisis and disaster management. One could argue that with hindsight it is not 
difficult to perceive a disaster waiting to happen but the need to develop capability to achieve 
the much more difficult task – to spot one coming, remain imperative. 
Table 4.3: Overcoming Barriers to Organisational Learning from Failures and Disasters, 
and Building an informed Risk Culture 
 Avoid simplistic counting. Data must be analysed and synthesised to reveal their underlying lessons  
 Raise awareness of the costs of not taking risk seriously. There is a need for more routinely available data on 
the human and financial costs of adverse events 
 Ensure that concerns can be reported without fear. Bearers of bad news may fear that they will be ostracised 
or silenced: clear rules about what must be reported, and regarding reporting as good behaviour rather than as 
disloyalty will all help 
 Focus on ‘near misses’ as well as actual incidents. This can arguably remove the emotion from an incident 
and allow learning to take place more effectively. It is also easier to keep near miss data anonymous, itself a 
factor in encouraging reporting 
 Ensure effective communication and feedback to front-line or operational staff 
 Develop effectively-led teams as mechanisms for cultural change 
 Use external input to stimulate learning. External input can help teams to think outside established parameters 
and challenge assumptions about the way things are done. User involvement can be of particular value in 
encouraging learning 
 Teams need to be firmly linked into the wider management structure to ensure that alliances within them do 
not hamper learning. It is here that team-based training can also be useful and relevant. 
 Recognise staff concerns. Try hard to emphasise the personal and service benefits of change rather than the 
threats 
 Give a high-profile lead on the issue. Make it clear both internally and externally that safety and quality are 
key goals 
 Teams and organisations must operate on genuinely two-way communication, not just ‘top down’. 
Communication systems need to be in place to allow people to see what has changed because of incident or 
near miss reporting 
 Constant and consistent evidence-based training on risk and crisis management. Outsourcing of some selected 
risk management functions within the organisation to professional risk management consultants can help solve 
some old assumptions and evaluate the effectiveness of risk management plans. 
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Source: Derived from Firth-Cozens (2000), Toft & Reynolds (2005), Borodzicz (2005), Haunschild & Rhee 
(2004), Vaughan (2005), Kim & Miner (2007), Desai (2010), Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015). 
 
4.7 RISK COMMUNICATION 
Arguably the risk communication field still lack rigorous empirical evidence and event-specific 
risk communication strategies are waning, as strongly supported in several studies (e.g. Badr, 
2009; Heilbrun et al., 1999; Petts & Niemeyer, 2004; Glik, 2007; Covello et al., 2001; Reynolds 
& Seeger, 2005; Löfstedt, 2008). There is no comprehensive empirical guidance in mediating 
how best to communicate risk, to whom, for what purpose, what should be (or not be) included, 
and in what contexts. These issues as summarised from recent research make risk 
communication problematic for risk managers and crisis responders (policymakers, leaders or 
regulators) charged with the task of managing risks and disasters (Sellnow, Ulmer, & Seeger, 
2009; Covello, 1991; 2003; McInnes, 2005).  
In this research, the goal is to redirect risk communication debates towards two-way and 
inclusive risk communication approach linking risk assessment and decision-making about risk 
together in a form that encompasses scientific risk assessment, value judgement, and normative 
concerns in which scientific-experts, policymakers and lay folks all have their voices. From 
this perspective, it is argued that risk communication which negates value judgement and 
normative concerns will be ineffective and can absolutely render otherwise well-conducted risk 
assessment useless, if wrong impressions are sent to the public. Table 4.4 summarises some of 
the reasons why risk communication is crucial. 
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Table 4.4: Some Reasons Why Risk Communication is Imperative 
 Too much complexity and technical difficulty in risk messages 
 Difficult to integrate different organisational cultures and perception 
 People and media will want to know what could go wrong, why, and what the 
company intends to do about the situation. 
 Inability to achieve common risk perception 
 Ethical issues may be involved and organisation will be expected to be co-operative, 
open, honest, knowledgeable and consistent. 
 Too many perspectives and expectations 
 Risk communication is based on ongoing projections and calculations of the potential 
for future harm. 
Source: Author (2017) 
While some risk communication theorists have argued that risk communication is a science-
based and emerging field with evidence from several applied disciplines (e.g. media studies, 
disaster management, environmental risk studies), this field is still problematic and complex 
due to the dynamic and interactive process involved in risk communication and the exchange 
of information about risk between different groups. Risk communication, even though it is 
identified as conceptually significant because of some fright factors captured in Table 4.5, may 
be a more convoluted process than initially imagined, supported by both Heilbrun et al. (1999) 
and Fischoff (2005). It is unclear from early studies (for example, Slovic, 1987; Fischoff, 1995; 
Mileti, 1991; Powell & Leiss, 1997; Renn, 2003; Borodzicz, 2005) in risk communication how 
risk-relevant messages should be effectively and appropriately communicated – and how they 
should not. 
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Table 4.5: Fright Factors Which Make Risk Communication Challenging. Within this 
Framework, risks are generally perceived to be more worrying (and less acceptable) if 
perceived: 
 To arise from unfamiliar or novel sources 
 To result from man-made rather than natural sources 
 To cause hidden and irreversible damage, e.g. through onset of illness many years 
after exposure 
 To be involuntary (e.g. exposure to pollution) rather than voluntary (e.g. dangerous 
sports or smoking) 
 As inescapable by taking personal precautions 
 As inequitably distributed (some benefit whilst others suffer the consequences) 
 To pose some danger to small children or pregnant women or more generally to 
future generations 
 To be poorly understood by science 
 To threaten a form of death (or illness/injury) arousing particular dread 
 As subject to contradictory statements from responsible sources from responsible 
sources (or, even worse, from the same source) 
 To damage identifiable rather than anonymous victims 
Source: Adapted from Calman, Bennett, & Coles (1999) 
Risk communication can have serious consequences when risk messages are poorly informed, 
inaccurate and represent exaggerated assessments of risk. Following this contention, there is 
clear need for informed, valid and more accurate risk assessment communications that take 
into consideration perspectives of different stakeholders. For illustration, when people are 
concerned about risk or disaster, there are different scenarios that can happen. Firstly, people 
focus more on the negative than on the positive nature of risk (Negative Dominance Theory). 
The negative dominance model is based on an essential modern psychological theorem: when 
people are upset they put greater value on losses and other negative information or outcomes 
than on gains or positive information and outcome (Glik, 2007; Covello et al., 2001; Maslow, 
1970; Petts & Niemeyer, 2004). In practice, within a risk communication context, negative risk 
messages should be counterbalanced by a larger number of positive or solution oriented 
messages (Covello, 1998; Renn, 2003). This concept specifically means that risk messages 
would be most effective and efficient when the central focus is on what is done to prevent and 
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mitigate the consequences of risk. People want to know that they would be fine and that the 
impact from the risk situation will not affect them, especially, given that “lay people tend to 
arrive at different assumptions from the experts” (Maule, 2004, p. 19). Therefore, positive risk 
messages are imperative for sustainable risk management practice in this context.  
Secondly, the gaps between risk perception and reality often become wider in complex, 
ambiguous and unpredictable risk situation (Risk Perception Theory). There are more gaps in 
risk perception when there is high concern possibly because of factors such as 
untrustworthiness in risk sources, risk is controlled by others, unfairness, human origin; high 
and clear vulnerability, unclear benefits, multiple victims involved in risk and disaster cases, 
and fright factors which are represented in Table 4.5. Risk communication would remain 
ineffective when attempts have not been made to bridge risk perception. One of the consistent 
findings in risk and crisis research is that specific activities such as obtaining risk information 
through focus groups, interviews, or surveys on public judgements and perceptions of risk and 
sustaining an interactive exchange of risk information with potential stakeholders about 
identified areas of concern, can help overcome the challenges of risk perception and make risk 
communication effective and productive. In a similar view, Thorne (2010, p. 53) upheld that 
narrowing the gap between expert and lay folk through information and education, and 
providing instruction for dangerous events would improve risk management because both sides 
(experts and lay people) would be talking about the same thing which will ultimately create a 
more unified approach to the management of risk. It would be difficult to refute the value of 
such approach in the context of responses to environmental risk, vandalism crisis, and terrorism 
but there are more issues like the debate regarding moral and ethical risk communication that 
must be resolved. 
Furthermore, people want to know that organisations (or policymakers) care about those 
potentially affected, before they care about what the risk and crisis-responders (organisations 
or policymakers) know about the risk and disaster situation (Trust Determination Theory). Risk 
communication often operates in emotionally-charged environments where anxiety, fear, 
anger, frustration, helplessness, outrage and distrust are common reactions to dangerous events 
(e.g. environmental disasters). A decline in trust in the institutions and organisations 
responsible for managing risks can affect risk messages. Trust is an integral part of risk 
communication if it is to be successful (Covello et al., 2001; Slovic, 1999; Peters, Covello, & 
McCallum, 1997; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). When people are frustrated or upset they do 
not particularly trust venerable authorities (government, experts, organisations). This is the 
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tenet of the trust determination model. Thus, it is imperative that trust is established well in 
advance even before risk communication begins and crisis ensued. This can be difficult to 
achieve in practice. A good analogy is that there is no scientific basis to determine and establish 
who exactly is at risk and whose trust has been breached. Like in the case of Niger Delta 
disasters, proactive community outreach, public engagement, sense of ownership and control, 
environmental remediation activity, corporate social responsibility, public education about the 
problems and what to do in avoiding the problems are arguably some of the most effective 
means for achieving trust (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mafimisebi & Ogbonnna, 2016). In 
such contexts, when inappropriately planned, risk communication can amplify or worsen risk 
situation.  
In addition, people focus on what they hear first and often have difficulty hearing, 
understanding; and remembering information when they are concerned, upset and stressed 
about the risk and disaster situation (Mental Noise Theory). This mental noise model, according 
to traditional studies of the National Research Council (1989), Baron, Hershey, & Kunreuther, 
(2000), and Fischoff (1989) hold that when people are in a state of high concern because a 
significant threat is perceived, their ability to process information effectively and efficiently is 
severely impaired. Conversely, the risk messages provided are more likely to be understood 
and accepted by the public when there is a conceptual map or mental model to help them 
understand the risk (National Research Council, 2000).  
From another standpoint, social and cultural factors, within the social constructionist 
approaches, have been recognised as something which cannot be examined in isolation from 
risk. These socio-cultural factors and processes might include how risk is actually perceived 
and acted upon, as well as public trust and individual risk communication. For risk 
communication purposes, this implies that the same risk can be perceived differently altogether 
(Gustafson, 1998; Borodzicz, 1999; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). This view further reiterates 
the proposition that risk and crisis management should be context based and practice-specific. 
For this reason, risk messages need to be consistent to consider environmental, social and 
cultural characteristics; language preferences; past experiences and attitudes towards experts 
opinions and policymakers interventions; appropriateness of the message to target audiences; 
cultural sensitivity; stakeholders assessment and needs, particularly of those most vulnerable 
(at greatest risk), as Covello (1991), Hutchins et al. (2009), Joffe (2003), Garvin (2001), Maule 
(2004) and Morgan et al. (2001) support. 
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Therefore, we can contextualise risk communication as a critical mechanism for transforming 
risk management knowledge into effective risk practice, as equally reinforced by Fischoff, 
Bostrom, & Quadrel (2002) and Maule (2004); given one of the core arguments in this research 
that risk management will be meaningless and unproductive without substantial 
communication. There are two main methodological perspectives about risk communication 
that have dominated risk and crisis management studies over the recent decade. These 
methodological perspectives are one-way and two-way risk communication. In a one-way risk 
communication agenda, risk message is professed as a means of public education, theoretically 
not at least, in bringing about dialogue or perhaps lack of it between experts and lay people 
(Borodzicz, 2005).  
Characteristically, risk communication is argued to be more relevant in risk management and 
decision-makings due to an asymmetrical relationship between multiple stakeholders and the 
pluralistic landscape of risk, with evidence from Fischoff (2005), Hayenhjelm (2006) and 
Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015). The asymmetrical roles of stakeholders in responding to risky 
situations become most noticeable when participants (stakeholders) have access to different 
information and agenda setting. However, risk communication when properly anticipated and 
planned can help identify and predict in advance most of the concerns and questions people 
can have about risk and disaster. Table 4.6 summarises a few benefits of risk communication, 
when planned appropriately. 
Table 4.6: Potential Benefits of Risk Communication 
 To provide improved risk management practice 
 To reduce asymmetrical relationships in risk message 
 To reduce conflict between experts and lay-folks, and among rival groups of experts 
 Build trust and credibility in risk and disaster situations 
 Encourage appropriate attitudes, behaviours and beliefs 
 Encourage working relationships amongst all interested parties or stakeholders 
(including the public) 
 Gain control over the risk situation 
Source: Author (2017) 
Even more fundamentally, lack of opportunity to relate specifically to individual needs, values 
and perceptions as well as fright factors (summarise in Table 4.5 above) make communication 
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with folks en masse difficult and problematic. In this context, we can draw evidence or perhaps 
useful advice from the words credited to Abraham Lincoln: “If I had 8 hours to chop down a 
large tree, I would spend 6 of those hours sharpening my axe.” When contextualised within 
the risk communication domain, possible stakeholders must be anticipated in advance, risk 
messages vetted and screened for anticipated questions, media relation and engagement 
practice, information should be clear, concise, layered and devoid of technical complex jargons 
(terminologies). In terms of risk communication practice, one emerging recommendation is the 
need to continuously update risk communication plans and resources; ensure that risk messages 
reach intended audiences, and communities, especially vulnerable people. Needs assessments 
and public engagement plans are useful in this context. 
The one-way risk communication based on the notion of disseminating information to the 
public (which is largely promoted by those giving scientific or policy advice) tends to 
underestimate challenges and overestimate capabilities when dealing with multiple 
stakeholders and multiple realities in a risk situation. Within the one-way risk communication, 
the goal is to provide the public with meaningful, relevant, accurate and timely information in 
relation to environmental risks and disasters, for example, to influence choice. Nevertheless, 
this one-way risk communication can be a complicated and challenging process in that all risk 
communication operates in a realm of uncertainty where facts about risk could be unclear and 
science-based underpinning potential responses imperfect. The usual rules of risk 
communication, for example in oil terrorism and environmental disasters in Niger Delta, can 
often fall short or make the situation worse. 
The second methodological perspective of risk communication, the two-way risk 
communication, becomes most useful when common risk perception weakens and public 
involvement in risk and crisis matters are perceived as an integral part of sustainable and 
effective risk and crisis management. This two-way risk communication stems from the fact 
that risk communication would remain ineffective when the public concerns are ignored in risk 
matters, and incorporating the public in risk issues, implementation and monitoring of risk 
management decisions is considered as a “sustainable-move”. This notion finds support in 
several studies (such as Wynne, 1992b; Renn, 1991; Irwin, 1995; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; 
Hayenhjelm, 2006; Hutchins et al., 2009; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015) – a notion which 
established that risk communication should be based on dialogue, shared decision-making, 
dissemination of information from experts to lay folks and vice-versa, open discussion which 
recognise the social amplification of risk and pluralistic nature of risk. A synthesis 
101 
 
representation of risk communication principles and strategies that could be used is provided 
in Table 4.7. This could be argued to suggest that risk communication should be appropriately 
and strategically plan and implement even when the risk environment appears normal. 
Table 4.7: A Synthesis Representation of Risk Communication Principles and Strategies 
 Identify a risk related issue or scenarios 
 Identify main stakeholders (audiences) and accept as well as involve the public as a 
legitimate partner 
 Identify stakeholders’ concerns and questions; listen to public concerns and plan 
carefully and evaluate efforts to overcome potential issues 
 Develop key messages consistent with risk communication principles such as 
openness, honesty, and collaboration with other credible sources 
 Develop supporting information and engage key stakeholders. Risk messages and 
approaches should be tailored for the different audiences identified and intended. 
 Conduct testing to eliminate possible ambiguity in risk messages. Use simulation 
exercise to test existing plan and communicate outcome through debriefing. 
 Plan for delivery – provide explanations of the complexities and uncertainties 
associated with the nature, magnitude, significance and control of a risk. 
 Address media and public needs with clear and compassionate voice; and take 
immediate action to deal with emerging issues 
Source: Author (2017) 
Risk communication, as exhibited in Figure 4.1 based on review of literature, is a participatory 
process which involves reciprocal relationships between experts and lay folks through the 
appropriate communication channels. From the conceptual model of risk communication 
(Figure 4.1), risk information emanates from the organisation to different channel deemed 
appropriate to reach the target audience and allow feedbacks from lay folks to ensue. Risk 
communication should arguably match both risk audience and risk characteristics – 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. 
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual Model of Risk Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
For construct clarity and consistency in this research, risk communication is concisely 
distinguished from crisis communication – even though some studies have often used both 
terms as synonymous (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005) but they are not necessarily the same. 
Therefore, for distinction purpose, risk communication is argued to be a proactive and 
interactive process in which risk messages are based on ongoing projections and calculations 
of impending future harms. In this context, risk messages aim at reducing the likelihood of risk 
becoming a crisis and occur before the occurrence of crisis. This contextual explanation will 
remain valid if we accept Borodzicz’s (2005) notion that a risk could give rise to crisis which 
in turn could become disaster.  
Risk communication is based on what could happen rather than what does happen. By contrast, 
crisis communication is perceived as a spontaneous and reactive process which usually happens 
when dangerous events (crisis or disaster) occurred. In this regard, crisis communication is 
based on what is known and unknown about a crisis (including its cause, magnitude, 
consequences, blame, control, duration). In conclusion, risk communication need to target, and 
be appropriate for, the right audience using the right communication channels. Thus, we can 
argue and conclude that effective risk communication between organisation (experts) and 
heterogeneous public (lay folks) leads to better and efficient risk management practice both 
with and outside the organisation. 
 
 
Target Risk 
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Risk Management 
Practice in 
Organisation 
Risk Messages 
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4.8 RISK CULTURE 
Risk culture is critical to the development of robust risk management practice. This is because 
the risk management process is influenced and mediated by it (Roeschmann, 2014). In the 
present research, ‘risk culture’ is ontologically different from culture. For Borodzicz (2005) 
there are two commonest forms of understanding ‘culture’ in relation to risk: 1) culture is 
perceived as a way of describing an autonomous group or population. 2) culture is a system of 
ideas, values and behaviours associated with one or more social groups. However, just like 
culture is often described as “the way we do things around here”, risk culture fundamentally 
means “the way we do or manage risk around here”.  
In this research, risk culture is defined as the consequences of values, beliefs, morality, 
knowledge, understanding and perception about risk shared broadly within organisation by a 
group of employees. This definition which is derived from Acharyya & Johnson (2006), 
Hopkins (2006), Edwards & Jabs (2009), Weber & Ancker (2010), Ashby, Palermo, & Power 
(2012), Roeschmann (2014) and Nordlof et al. (2015) and applies to different kinds of 
institutions and organisations including oil and gas, and financial institutions such as banks and 
insurance firms. The way risk culture is defined and conceptualised in this research advances 
existing definitions of risk culture as presented in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: A Selection of Risk Culture Definitions and Statements 
 
Source: Derived from Ashby et al. (2012); Berkelaar & Dutta (2007); Hofstede & Hofstede 
(2005); Power et al. (2013); McConnell (2013); Smillie & Blissett (2010) and Roeschmann 
(2014) 
The greater emphasis within risk culture is the perception of value of risk management. Risk 
management must be perceived and socially validated by most employees of an organisation’s 
as adding real value to the organisation’s goals and objectives. For example, resourcing risk 
management practice can become a shared value and consequently shared assumption, if the 
Practice 
Literature
•...the general awareness, attitude and behaviour of its and appointed representatives to risk and the 
management of risk within the organisation (FSA, 2006).
•...the norms and traditions of behaviour of individuals and of groups within an organisation that 
determine the way in which they identify, understand, discuss, and act on the risk the organisation 
confronts and the risks it takes (IIF, 2009).
•...organisational behaviours and processes that enable the identification, assessment and management 
of risks relative to objectives rangingfrom compliance to operational, financial and strategic (PWC, 2009).
• an organisation's risk culture determines the way risks are identified, understood, discussed, and acted 
upon in the organisation. A strong risk culture is an essential building block for effective risk governance 
and is typically seen as heavily dependent on the tone at the top and clear and consistent actions by 
boards members and senior management (IIF, 2012).
Practice 
Literature
•...the norms of behaviour for individuals and groups within and organisation that determine the 
collective ability to identify, understand, openly discuss, and act on the organisation's current and future 
risks. it is the last line of defence in grave situations (McKinsey, 2010).
•...the system of values and behaviours present throughout an organisation that shape risk decisions. 
Risk culture influences the decisions of management and employees, even if they are not consciously 
weighing risks and benefits (KPMG, 2010).
• the combined set of individual and corporate values, attitudes, competencies and behaviour that 
determine a firm's commitment to and style of operational risk management (Basel Committee, 2011).
•...the norms and traditions of behaviour of individuals and groups within an organisation that determine 
the way in which they identify, understand, discuss and act on the risks the organisation confronts and 
takes (Towers Watson, 2011).
•...the values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding about risk shared by a group of people with a 
common purpose, in particular the employeees of an organisation or of teams or groups within an 
organisation (IRM, 2012).
Academic 
Literature
• a risk culture is based on particular beliefs and assumptions. These can be clustered according to  
specific cultural tenets; namely risk, integrity, governance and leadership, decision making, 
empowerment, teamwork, responsibility and adaptability... These tools are expressed in everyday 
workplace practices via attitudes and behaviours and, when they are expressed by leaders, they serve as 
powerful (human) culture embedding mechanisms (O'Donovan, 2011)
•Risk culture encompasses the general awareness, attitude, and behaviour of an organisation's employees 
to risk and the management of risk within the organisation (Sants, 2012)
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Boardroom decision to increase risk management investment is generally perceived to reduce 
risk and increase organisation resilience to disaster. 
 
4.8.1 WHY RISK CULTURE? 
One of the emerging fundamental issues dominating current research in risk and crisis 
management is the need to question and address why culture is relevant to risk management 
practice. To buttress this point, Waring & Glendon (1998) in Borodzicz (2005, p. 42) stated: 
“official inquiries into safety disasters such as Chernobyl, King’s Cross, and Piper Alpha 
specifically pinpointed cultural characteristics as important both to understanding why the 
disasters occurred and as indicators for other organisations in reducing the likelihood that 
they would experience similar events.” Furthermore, drawing empirical evidence from the 
global financial crisis, commission of enquiries, several regulators, risk and crisis management 
scholars, market commentators and the media have all referred to failures in institutional “risk 
culture” as a key contributing factor to the various collapses of banks and by extension the 
global financial crisis. In this context, it is now well-established via research that cultivation of 
a consistent ‘risk culture’ throughout organisation is the most important element in risk 
management practice. 
Recent empirical investigations into how organisations responded to low-probability, high-
impact risk events recognised that understanding risk culture is imperative for robust and 
effective risk management practice (Hopkins, 2006; Nordlof et al., 2015). The rationale is self-
evident because the cultural context in which risk decision-making takes place in organisational 
settings impacts risk management practices (Borodzicz, 2005; Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 
2007; Alper & Karsh, 2009). Likewise, the cultural context affects how individuals initially 
define and identify crises and subsequently how they address and negotiate the situation 
(Berkelaar & Dutta, 2007). Following this foundation, it is arguable that cultivation of a 
consistent ‘risk culture’ throughout organisations is the most important, but least understood, 
element in risk management practice.  
On the other hand, it is essential to acknowledge that the concept of risk culture remains a 
rarely and inadequately defined phenomenon despite its relative wider acceptance and coverage 
in recent research (e.g. Hopkins, 2006; Guldenmund, 2010; Nordlof et al., 2015). There are 
several factors or issues responsible for this ambiguity and controversy surrounding the use 
and application of the concept of risk culture.  
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 Firstly, what are the main features and parameters of an organisation’s risk culture and 
how can such a risk culture be maintained?  
 Secondly, is the view of risk culture consistent at different levels of the organisation?  
 Thirdly, what are the main indicators of a robust risk culture and how mature is the risk 
management culture within the organisation?  
These issues require open and honest debate as well as having common understanding of what 
risk culture means in practice. This point is expounded in much more detail in Chapter Eight 
of this research. 
 
4.8.2 TAXONOMIES OF RISK CULTURE 
Taxonomies of risk culture are grouped into two main classical schools of thought – namely 
(1) safety culture and (2) cultural theory. In the first classification, safety culture represents a 
remarkable theoretical construct for the study of risks, crises and disasters. For Borodzicz 
(2005) the safety culture model advocates that a risk or safety culture operates at an 
organisational level and provides a method for perceiving the risk management processes in 
hazardous operations. Some safety culture theorists like Pidgeon (1991) and Turner (1991) 
believed that ‘safety culture’ represents a set of administrative procedures including training, 
emergency plans and attitudes to safety which cannot exactly be regulated. This view is 
strongly contested in this research because safety culture assessment is not particularly a 
mission (Antonsen, 2009) but may create unintended consequences when left unregulated 
(Edwards & Jabs, 2009) and initiate future disasters.  
In Chib & Kanetkar (2014) research, safety culture is conceptualised as a multidimensional 
concept in terms of the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions and values that employees share in 
relation to safety. There is recognition or assumption that every organisation has a safety 
culture that may affect safety (Hopkins, 2006; Nordlof et al., 2015) in which case such 
organisational safety culture can form the basis for unsafe acts and behaviour. This position is 
equally shared and supported in extant research (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000; Edwards & 
Jabs, 2009). The situation described here suggests that future crisis and disaster could be self-
inflicted especially when organisational safety culture inhibits proactive risk anticipation, 
assessment and management. 
107 
 
The climate of risk and risk awareness as well as risk communication requires careful 
consideration when discussing safety culture which is controversially considered as a subset of 
organisational culture. Following this line of philosophy, how well safety procedures and 
regulations are followed within an organisation is measured to be influenced by the governing 
culture of the organisation (Hopkins, 1999; 2006; Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2010). 
Therefore because safety culture, particularly in high-risk industries (e.g. oil and gas, nuclear 
and aviation, even banking and insurance), regulates organisational norms and policies related 
to safety (Atak & Kingma, 2011; Hale & Borys, 2013); organisational commitment and 
communication regarding safety (Haukelid, 2008; Edwards, Davey, & Armstrong, 2013); 
common values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours regarding safety (Hopkins, 2006; Edwards & 
Jabs, 2009); and the collective values and risk-taking behaviour in organisation (Nordlof et al., 
2015), we can argue that focusing on sociotechnical understanding and implications of safety 
culture remain relevant in eliminating and preventing crises and disasters. The real challenge 
however is how to recognise an effective organisational safety culture given that accurate 
analysis is only possible when organisations are essentially faced with crisis or disaster 
scenarios, as Borodzicz (2005) supports. 
In the second taxonomy of risk culture, classified as cultural theory, risk is not decided at an 
individual level but rather is culturally constructed (Weber & Ancker, 2010). The cultural 
experiences of risk are likely to differ across different regions and organisations. It is only 
appropriate that the cultural frame of risk serves as an alternative but valuable approach to 
understanding and managing emerging risk and disaster. A risk within the cultural theory 
model is perceived as an event that threatens values held to be important at the cultural or 
societal level. For example, environmental risk in the Niger Delta region is culturally 
constructed because of the perceived threats to values and customs believed to be significant 
at community or societal level (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016).  
In this perspective, culture becomes valid grounds for perceiving what is a dangerous event 
(risk or disaster) and evaluating possible impacts on the value attached to such events including 
both the probability of the event and severity of its outcome. This perspective shares Douglas’s 
(1992) and Weber & Ancker’s (2010) convictions that providing information about 
probabilities fails to change risk judgements not particularly because the public does not 
understand sums, but because many other objectives which it cares about have been left out of 
the risk calculation. Although this is not principally what risk means to most organisations and 
how it should be managed, cultural theorists argued that risk perception reflects what a 
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community or society fears and seeks to blame for individual or group misfortune (Dake, 1991; 
Douglas, 1992; Rippl, 2002). 
The cultural theoretical model focuses on reducing human culture into three terms: (1) social 
relations (grid), (2) cultural biases (group) and (3) ways of life – which represents a 
combination of both social relations and cultural biases. It is doubtful whether any meaningful 
conclusion can be reach from restricting human culture into just three terms as noted because 
issues such as ethics and morality are equally imperative. As Borodzicz (2005, p. 43) noted, 
cultural theorists claimed that there are four universal predispositions namely: (1) hierarchical, 
(2) individualist, (3) egalitarian, and (4) fatalist, which will mediate the nature of any 
individual’s perception and response to risk. Following Weber & Ancker (2010), cultures and 
individuals that value both rigid societal structures and strong social group loyalties are called 
hierarchists. The hierarchists are less inclined to accept risks except if it is mainly part of an 
institutional sanctioned process (Borodzicz, 2005). In context, hierarchical disposition is 
expected to be found where orientation to both grid and group is high. Those who value neither 
group solidarity nor societal rigidity are called individualists. Individualists are distinct from 
hierarchists in that they are expected to accept high risk level based on the notion that it 
represents entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Additionally, those who view group solidarity as valuable but at the same time disapproving 
of rigid social hierarchies are called egalitarians. Risk, for the egalitarian, is an ever-present 
threat of disaster caused by the actions of significant others. Dake (1991) and Weber & Ancker 
(2010) found that egalitarians are sceptical or distrustful of technological risks that may 
threaten equality by disproportionately harming the poor or the environment. For example, 
environmental risks were found to be important than economic risks in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria because of the perceived threats to the environment and people’s sources of 
livelihood (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). Moreover, those who accept risk because they have 
little or no control over it and feel trapped in a social hierarchy without feeling strong social 
bonds are termed fatalists. It has been observed from literature that most scholars tend to limit 
their focus to the first three categories because fatalists and hermits are uncommon.  
The cultural theory specifics have been debated and criticised. For example, Wilkinson (2001) 
criticised Dake’s categories of predisposition as “polemical abstractions”, too rigid to 
adequately capture the complex and dynamic experience of risk perception or cultural 
predisposition in the real world. Corresponding to this, Rippl (2002) and Sjoberg (2002) 
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lamented the flaws in the data collection and statistical analyses of Dake’s categories of culture; 
and the adequacy of the original instrument as a measurement of culture by Dake has been 
challenged (Weber & Ancker, 2010). By comparison, the general overarching theoretical 
framework of culture in relation to risk and disaster is still lacking. As an example, in the case 
of the perceived risk of nuclear waste, calls have been made for the rejection of psychometric 
model and cultural theory in support of regression models combining attitude toward nuclear 
power and nature (the tampering with nature factor), risk attitude as a trait, different attributes 
of the nuclear and radiation risk itself, and perception of moral aspects of risk (Sjoberg, 2002). 
While this is the case, the globalisation of the economy and media means that political or 
professional groups may have more in common with similar groups in other countries than 
with others of their own country (Rohrmann, 2000).  
In critical terms, organisational risk culture is blamed whenever there is organisational crisis 
and disaster, safety failures, and major corporate scandal (Acharyya & Johnson, 2006; 
Roeschmann, 2014) but at the roots, moral disengagement underpins organisational risk 
behaviour and culture. As a rule, organisational risk culture is more than just a statement of 
values, beliefs, perceptions and knowledge but relates to how these translate into concrete 
actions when managing risks. What is more, it includes the notion that pragmatic risk culture 
embraces safety culture and a cultural model of risk interpretation as well as the ways in which 
risk culture can be measured and determined within organisations. In many ways, risk culture 
is measured and determined through some profound indicators found in extant literature – 
presented in Figure 4.3 and interviews or surveys with employees. 
Figure 4.3: Ways of Measuring Risk Culture 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
personal 
predisposition to risk
personal ethics
behaviour
organisation culture
risk culture
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These risk culture indicators, as depicted in Figure 4.3 above, are integral in making a risk 
culture framework actionable within organisations. In conclusion, how senior managers or 
individuals in an organisation initially perceive and define risks or crises and subsequently how 
they seek to manage or address the risks or crises are influence by the cultural context (see also 
Harro-Loit, Vihalemm & Ugur, 2012). The main issue however is that risk culture can be 
moderated by moral disengagement. As a result, risk management practice becomes ineffective 
due to emerging risks being framed in ways that are suitable to the organisation. Therefore, as 
explained in the next chapter, issues of moral disengagement should be carefully managed if 
risk and crisis management is to be effective. 
This chapter was intended to help understand the issue of self-inflicted disaster and whether 
current approaches to risk and crisis management are still valid. It is arguable that without such 
theoretical insights, responses to unconventional risk, crisis and disaster will be ineffective as 
we may be using inappropriate risk models and strategies to manage unconventional events. 
The theoretical insights generated from this chapter when combined with the subsequent 
chapters, it is intended that the reader will have a far better understanding of unconventional 
risk and crisis and how we may develop capacity for resilience. The next chapter will consider 
the theoretical framework of moral disengagement in risk and crisis management. The 
information presented will be used to inform practical recommendations for risk and crisis 
management, as well as lessons learned from the case studies in Chapters Two and Three.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to critically discuss the theoretical framework of moral 
disengagement in the context of risk and crisis management. This was necessary because this 
thesis is based on the hidden implications of moral disengagement in processes of managing 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters. There is a growing realisation during this research 
that moral disengagement presents a fundamental ethical paradox in risk and crisis 
management practice. Arguably, on one hand, moral disengagement mechanisms (whether 
used consciously or unconsciously) in crisis management processes and practice could be well-
intentioned but constitute ‘organisational self-centredness’ and moral violation because other 
stakeholders’ interests are disregarded without broader consideration. This view implies that 
organisations may use moral disengagement mechanisms as clear strategic moves for corporate 
gains especially when it appears convenient for them.  
On the other hand, moral disengagement in processes of risk and crisis management creates 
serious ethical dilemmas for organisations which undermine their trustworthiness and 
reputation. The issue of ethical and moral awareness in crisis management decision making 
calls for detailed and comprehensive investigation because sustainable crisis solutions arguably 
depend on the normative impact of organisational crises and disasters. Most essentially, it is 
easier for organisations managing crises or disasters to blame others without destroying their 
credibility and reputation. However, promoting the use of blame fixing, denial, bolstering, 
defeasibility, provocation, good intentions and claiming accidental or natural accidents as 
strategies for managing crises and disasters (Benoit, 1995; Hearit, 2006; Ulmer, Seeger, & 
Sellnow, 2007; Coombs, 2007; Smudde & Courtright, 2008; Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 
2011) raises ethical and moral issues with their consequent implications. In fact, there is 
evidence that moral behaviour begins with moral awareness or the identification of the moral 
issue (Trevino, 1986; Jones, 1991; Frey, 2000; May & Pauli, 2002; Reynolds, 2006).  
Furthermore, the evidence extends to moral imagination, moral evaluation, sense of moral 
obligation, and integration of managerial and moral competence as fundamental elements in 
making moral decisions or judgments in different contexts (Bandura, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Krebs 
& Denton, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007; Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Moore, 2008; Mafimisebi & 
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Thorne, 2015). However, in this thesis, there is reflection on the argument that although many 
acts unethically because they intend to, others simply do not recognise the moral aspects of the 
situations in which they are involved and thus do not initiate the moral decision-making process 
(Reynolds, 2006).  
The main contention is that by applying moral and ethical decision-making in crisis 
management, publicising the detrimental impacts of moral disengagement and improving 
managerial moral awareness, most future self-inflicted crises or disasters could be avoided. A 
handful of researchers have applied such explanations to several cases of questionable ethical 
and moral events including Exxon Valdez case, Ford Pinto recall, Three Mile Island, and the 
Nestle case highlighted in Section 1.1 (Gioia, 1992; Key & Popkin, 1998; Bandura, 1998; 
2002). Markedly, moral disengagement approaches have appeared in management science 
research, psychology research, social science for a couple of decades (Bandura, 1986; 1990; 
1999; 2002; 2007; Beu & Buckley, 2004; Caprara & Capanna, 2005; Baker, Detert, & Trevino, 
2006; Moore, 2008; Caprara et al. 2009; Chugh, Kern, Zhu, & Lee, 2014).  
Nevertheless, throughout the literature search and review, though this research focused on 
moral disengagement in processes of risk/crisis management, very little work and mostly 
traditional studies have explored moral and ethical decision-makings in a range of different 
contexts (for example, Bandura, 2002; Fritzsche & Becker, 1984; Victor & Cullen, 1988; 
Weber, 1992; Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Dukerich, Waller, George, & Huber, 2000; Butterfield, 
Trevino, & Weaver, 2000; White, Bandura, & Bero, 2009) but empirical investigation and 
analysis of moral disengagement in risk/crisis management studies remain underdeveloped 
(Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015).  
Thus, what this thesis contends is that the current theories and horizons in risk, crisis and 
disaster related studies need to be expanded to incorporate a moral disengagement perspective 
of risk/crisis management. As a result, this research is constructed using the moral 
disengagement (MD) framework in the context of organisational crises and disasters and 
examines the practicality of crisis management (CM) models (Augustine, 1995; 2000; Coombs, 
2007; Fink, 2002; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Specifically, this thesis probes Albert Bandura’s 
theory of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990a; 1990b; 1992; 2002) and Augustine’s crisis 
management framework (Augustine, 1995) to find sustainable solutions to the notion of 
unconventional crises/disasters pervading the Niger Delta region of Nigeria for decades.  
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These concepts of moral disengagement (MD) and crisis management (CM) which were 
formerly viewed as distinct ideas or unrelated concepts are observed and contended as being 
capable of unified and integrated. In the sciences, integration is a key means by which progress 
is made and attained because it represents neither a rejection nor an acceptance of existing 
paradigms (Sternberg, 2007). The prevailing insights of moral disengagement within risk and 
crisis studies are reviewed, and a broader risk/crisis management typology which incorporate 
moral engagement view is presented. In addition, an empirical model of MD implication is 
revealed that helps to identify perceived moral and ethical challenges in processes of risk/crisis 
management. Thus, this thesis contends that acknowledging and understanding ethical or moral 
dimensions of unconventional risks, crises or disasters remains one of the cornerstones of 
sustainable risk and crisis management and increasing organisational resilience. The following 
section examines the concept of moral disengagement, crisis management, CM frameworks, 
CM responses and strategies, and then considers MD implications within this research scope, 
context and aims. 
 
5.2 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT: A BRIEF CRITIQUE 
Albert Bandura (1986) was the first to initiate the notion of moral disengagement and ever 
since several scholars have explored the theory in diverse circumstances (Bandura, 1999; 
Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, Caprara, & Zsolnai, 2000; Fiske, 
2004; Moore, 2007; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Ntayi, Eyaa, & Ngoma, 2010). Although 
there is lack of theoretical and empirical studies about the association between MD and CM 
throughout the literature search and review. However, there are some studies that examine MD 
in different contexts that are critical to understanding how MD mechanisms operate. 
Specifically, there has been extensive investigation of moral disengagement in the context of 
computer hacking (Rogers, 2003; Young, Zhang, & Prybutok, 2007), peace and conflict 
(McAlister, 2001; Jackson & Sparr, 2005), violent and deviant behaviours (Bandura, 1999; 
Ntayi et al., 2010), genocide, war, greater aggression, and terrorism (Bandura et al., 1996; 
Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007), ethical intervention (Chugh, Kern, Zhu, & Lee, 2014), 
ecological sustainability (Bandura, 2007), organisational corruption (Moore, 2008), corporate 
transgressions (Bandura et al., 2000; Beu & Buckley, 2004; White, Bandura, & Bero, 2009), 
and oil terrorism (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015).  
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The application of moral disengagement to organisational crises and disasters is still limited 
and remains underdeveloped in prevailing risk and crisis management research (Mafimisebi & 
Thorne, 2015). Nevertheless, in reviewing mechanisms of moral disengagement across 
different contexts, several methods and measures were used to meet specific features of 
misconducts under analysis (Caprara et al., 2009). Even though moral disengagement has been 
extensively researched, most existing research has focused on outcomes (Bandura et al., 1996; 
Bandura et al., 2001; Beu & Buckley, 2004; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006; White, 
Bandura, & Bero, 2009) and neglected the causes. This research explores both causes and 
outcomes of moral disengagement to determine how MD in processes of risk/crisis 
management can be averted.  
Moral disengagement can be defined as an individual’s propensity to evoke cognitions which 
restructure one’s actions to appear less harmful, minimise one’s understanding of responsibility 
for one’s actions, or attenuate the perception of the distress one causes others (Moore, 2008). 
However, for Bandura (1990), moral disengagement is a psychological process by which 
individuals engage in sanctionable behaviour without distress or self-condemnation. Research 
suggested that it is moral disengagement that allows ordinary people to do unethical things or 
actions despite their consequences either in neglect of moral standards or harmful conduct 
(Bandura, 1990). In a practical context, empirical studies have confirmed that moral 
disengagement is a process that enables people to engage in negative behaviours, from small 
misdeeds to great atrocities, without believing that they are causing harm or doing wrong 
(Fiske, 2004; Moore, 2008; Ntayi et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2012). In fact, studies have well-
established and documented the link between moral disengagement and unethical decision-
making (Bandura et al., 2002; Detert et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012). As a result, several 
existing moral disengagement studies conceptualised organisational moral disengagement as 
unethical and cruel behaviours across organisational structures and systems which 
consequently perpetuate poor decision-making process and cause unethical and inhumane 
actions.  
However, research reveals that individuals still maintain a positive self-image while using 
moral disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 1986; 1999; 2009; Bandura et al., 1996; 2002). 
In a practical context, moral disengagement mechanisms can create inflated ethical beliefs 
which negate reality or that harm is being caused by an individual or organisational action. In 
fact, the assertion made by Bandura (2002, p. 101) is particularly useful to validate the 
contention: 
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“Moral agency has dual aspects manifested in both the power to refrain from behaving 
inhumanely and the proactive power to behave humanely; moral agency is embedded 
in a broader socio-cognitive self-theory encompassing affective self-regulatory 
mechanisms rooted in personal standards linked to self-sanctions; moral functioning is 
thus governed by self-reactive selfhood rather than by dispassionate abstract 
reasoning.” 
The above quote clearly indicates two main dilemmas of moral disengagement: First, moral 
disengagement can create the illusion that individuals or organisations moral standards often 
remain at equilibrium. Second, moral disengagement can facilitate and sanction inhumane 
behaviours. Therefore, it is crucial that organisations have a clear moral engagement 
framework to counteract issues of moral disengagement. The following sub-section further 
explains the mechanisms of moral disengagement as related to this research context. 
 
5.2.1 MECHANISMS OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
The mechanisms of moral disengagement are particularly useful to understand and clarify how 
misconducts and unethical practices like thefts, vandalism, terrorism, environmental crisis, 
financial crisis, embezzlement, corruption, business and financial transgression penetrate 
organisations and serve self-exonerative functions. More specifically, moral disengagement in 
detrimental conducts either within organisations or individuals’ level can be achieved through 
eight cognitive mechanisms which include moral justification, advantageous comparison, 
attribution of blame, euphemistic labelling, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of 
responsibility, dehumanisation and distorting or disregarding the consequences. These 
cognitive mechanisms of MD are explained in greater details in Table 5.1.  
The crucial question is why should there be consideration of moral disengagement when 
managing crises and disasters? More clearly, why should organisations seek to better 
understand moral disengagement in crisis and disaster situations? Bandura (2007) and Bandura 
et al. (2002) provide an excellent overview and evidence of how moral disengagement 
mechanisms (e.g., displacement of responsibility, dehumanisation, and attribution of blame) 
are often enlisted in industrial disasters. More recently, Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015) provide 
additional evidence that moral disengagement is the proximate cause of unconventional crisis 
intensification because mechanisms of MD routinely operate in environmental crises or 
disasters and force organisations to re-evaluate their ethical and moral decision-making when 
managing crises. Although this observation is made in respect to the Niger Delta environmental 
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crises involving multinational oil companies and local communities, it can be advanced that 
such observations found expression in most cases of organisational crises and disasters. 
Previously, and more crucially, Moore et al. (2012) maintain that the propensity for moral 
disengagement predicts a broad range of work-related behaviours above and beyond individual 
difference constructs commonly associated with unethical behaviour. What this suggests is that 
moral disengagement provides clarification of how unethical practices including moral 
decision-makings within organisations are perpetuated. From another perspective, research 
found that moral disengagement explains variance in unethical decision making beyond that 
expounded by empathy, moral identity, trait cynicism, and chance locus of control orientation 
(Detert et al., 2008). It has been documented how corporate vindication is achieved by shifting 
the blame, simple denial, dehumanisation and displacement of responsibility (For example, 
Bandura, 2007).  
In a practical context, the industrial disaster which happened in Bhopal where 40 tons of methyl 
isocyanate gas escaped from the Union Carbide pesticide production plant killing thousands of 
people and causing several injuries or partial disability and where approximately 200,000 
people were severely affected, illustrates the position. For example, Bandura et al. (2002) 
reveal how Union Carbide blamed the explosion on sabotage (attribution of blame) and blamed 
the Indian government for its failure to regulate the plant and for allowing people to live nearby 
(displacement of responsibility and distorting the consequences).  
The critical, yet logical, question is how should organisations respond to organisational crisis 
and disaster without exploitation of moral disengagement mechanisms, and should there be 
fundamental shifts in the way organisations manage crisis and disaster? These questions 
consistently guide investigation in this study and the entire research is framed on the theory of 
moral disengagement and crisis management models.
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Table 5.1: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement & Implication 
S/N Mechanisms Meaning & Implication 
1 Moral justification People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their actions 
(Bandura et al., 2000). Terrorists, for example, preserve a sense of self-worth by perceiving themselves as fighting a due cause 
while causing harm to others by their actions. Likewise, soldiers penetrate and cause harm to civilians when combating terrorism 
and their actions perceive as serving and obeying legitimate authority (nation). In another illustration, organisations in the oil 
and gas industry accused of causing harm to the environment and people through their activities can sanctify their detrimental 
practices through compliance with industry standards and best practices aimed at dispelling concern over the environmental 
degradation and harm. 
Social and moral justifications sanctify harmful practices by investing them with worthy purposes and this enables people to 
preserve a sense of self-worth purposes while causing harm by their activities (Bandura, 2007). The justifications can take the 
form of societal benefits, strengthening national security, national, constitutional and economic justification, curbing intrusive 
government, and competitive global marketplace, among others. 
2 Advantageous comparison Reprehensible conduct can assume very different qualities depending on what it is compared with. When compared with other 
detrimental conducts, reprehensible industrial practices can be made more righteous. Militants vandalise oil pipelines of 
multinational oil companies in Nigeria because of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region. They accused 
multinational oil companies like Shell Nigeria of causing harm to the environment and taking away sources of livelihood of the 
local people. In the process, they too are interested in producing the same oil perceived as a resource curse and several militant-
owned artisanal refineries clustered in the Niger Delta operate but likewise pollute and degrade the environment. In their 
perspective, militants argued that they own the resources and therefore have right to carry out production of oil and raise the 
living standard of their people. 
In another perspective, multinational oil companies like Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria justified their environmental 
pollution problems of endlessly oil spills and ceaseless gas flaring by comparing their activities with that of illegal artisanal 
refineries operated by militants which lack standardised safety procedures and industry regulations. This calls for environmental 
responsibility not just shifting responsibility. Through advantageous comparison, the competing parties freed themselves of 
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restraint over their polluting practices (Bandura, 2007). In clear term, how lifestyle and industrial practices are perceived is 
coloured by what they are compared against. 
3 Attribution of blame Blaming one’s adversaries or compelling circumstances can serve self-exonerating purposes. Bandura et al. (2000) revealed 
that in moral disengagement by attribution of blame, people perceived themselves as faultless victims driven to injurious 
conduct by forcible provocation. This means that by fixing the blame on others or on circumstances, not only are one’s own 
injurious actions excusable, but one can even feel self-righteous in the process. This notion find root in the case of the Niger 
Delta crisis involving multinational oil companies and local communities in Nigeria. For example, militants in Nigeria known 
for causing harm to others by attacking oil pipelines, kidnapping and terrorising assets of multinational oil companies for 
sometimes alleged pollution and degradation of the environment often express grievances over the circumstances but exploit it 
for their own gain. 
From another context, even though there was an internal report on the dangers of the methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas at the Union 
Carbine India Limited two years before the Bhopal disaster in 1984, and the report had recommended various changes to reduce 
the risks at the plant but the recommendations were never implemented. The Union Carbide instead blamed the Indian 
government for its failure to effectively regulate the plant and for allowing people to live nearby (Bandura et al., 2000). The 
victims were blamed for causing negative outcomes and technically victims were blamed for causing their own death. 
4 Euphemistic labelling Language shapes perceptions and thought processes on which actions are based. Activities can take on quite different 
appearances depending on what they are called (Bandura, 2007). Rothwell (1982), in his book – Telling It Like It Isn’t, 
characterises the sanitising form of euphemisms as ‘linguistic novocain’ that numbs us to unpleasant and harmful realities; and 
the convoluted form as ‘semantic fog’ that obscures and conceals detrimental practices (Bandura, 2007). Reprehensible 
conducts are made benign through convoluted verbiage and sense of personal agency become obscure. For example, through 
the power of hygienic words, even killing a human being loses much of its repugnancy (Bandura, 1991).  
Specific examples of euphemistic labelling include: terrorists label themselves as freedom fighters. Soldiers waste people rather 
than kill them. When mercenaries speak of fulfilling a contract, murder is transformed by admirable words into the honourable 
discharge of duty (Bandura, 1991, p. 79). In teaching business students how to lie in competitive transactions, the instructor 
speaks euphemistically of strategic misrepresentation (Safire, 1979). The acid rain that is killing our lakes and forests loses 
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much of its acidity in its euphemistic form as atmospheric deposition of anthropogenically derived acidic substances 
(Hechinger, 1985). 
Likewise, the tobacco industry, eager to deny the addictive qualities of nicotine found in cigarettes repeatedly relied on soft 
language or euphemistic labels in describing the drug-like qualities of ingredients in their products as producing 
“pharmacological satisfaction” (White et al., 2009).  
5 Displacement of 
responsibility 
Personal accountability can become obscure through displacement of responsibility as people view their conducts as springing 
from social pressures or dictates of others rather than as something for which they are personally responsible. Bandura, Caprara, 
& Zsolnai (2000) maintain that because people refrain as not the actual agents of their actions, they are spared self-censuring 
reactions. For illustration purpose, during his trial for war crimes, Adolf Eichmann employed the moral disengagement 
mechanism of displacing one’s responsibility to organisational superiors and legitimately claims he was not guilty because his 
evaluation of his own actions has been so completely distorted. In fact, Adolf Eichmann consistently maintained that he would 
only “have had a bad conscience if he had not done what he had been ordered to do – to ship millions of men, women and 
children to their death” (Arendt, 1963/ 1994, p. 25) cited by Moore & Gino (2013). 
Like in the case of Ford Pinto which caused a serious accident by explosion on 10 August 1978, on US Highway 33 near 
Goshen, Indiana; sisters Judy and Lynn Ulrich and their cousin Donna Ulrich were struck from the rear in their 1973 Ford Pinto 
by a van. The gas tank of the Pinto ruptured, the car burst into flames and the three teenagers were burnt to death. Previously, 
the Ford Pinto has caused at least estimated 500 burn deaths by explosion and the top management of the organisation had been 
informed about the serious design problem of the model. However, despite the warning from their engineers the company 
continue to manufacture and sell the car with the dangerously defective design. Ford maintained that the ‘Pinto is safe’, therefore 
denying the risk of injurious consequences. Ford used the technique of displacement of responsibility to justify their claim by 
referring to the US safety regulation standards in effect till 1977 (Bandura et al., 2000). The responsibility for causing several 
hundreds of deaths through faulty design to the driving practices of people who would not have been seriously injured if their 
Ford Pinto had not been designed in a way that made it easily inflammable in a collision was displaced (Bandura et al., 2000). 
Displacement of responsibility also operates in situations in which hostages are taken. Terrorists warn officials of targeted 
regimes that if they take retaliatory action they will be held accountable for the lives of the hostages.  Bandura (1991) revealed 
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that at different steps in negotiations for their release, terrorists continue to displace the responsibility for the safety of hostages 
on the reactions of the regime. In environmental crises of the Niger Delta, Shell displaced responsibility to achieved corporate 
vindication by shifting blame of pollution of gas flaring on lack of adequate funding from the majority partners – the government 
owned Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in its joint venture operations in Nigeria. 
6 Diffusion of responsibility The deterrent power of self-sanctions is weakened when the link between conduct and its consequences is obscured by diffusing 
responsibility for culpable behaviour (Bandura, 1991). In the case of Bowoto vs. Chevron Nigeria, Ilaje activists occupied 
Chevron offshore platform for three days protesting over environmental pollution and degradation. Chevron brought more 
Nigerian security forces to the platform in several Chevron’s leased helicopters and attacked the protesters. The attack caused 
untold brutal death of two activists instantly on 28h of May 1998, personal injuries on several others as they were tortured and 
beaten, large scale physical displacement of communities and properties. Chevron used different moral disengagement 
strategies to defend its highly controversial decision and crisis management efforts. First, Chevron continuously claimed that 
its use of the Nigerian security forces was a reasonable response to the peaceful protest at the Parabe offshore platform in Ilaje, 
Ondo State, Nigeria (Chevron, 2012). 
In a critical context, Chevron justified their claim by continually referring to the security situations in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria in 1998 where there were constant attacks on oil pipelines, oil companies, hostage taking and oil terrorism. The 
company tried to diffuse responsibility through division of labour. The Nigerian security forces that carried out the attack on 
behalf of Chevron were argued to have exercised personal judgments in carrying out the actions but their actions were remote 
and link to the result of the crisis. 
The aim was to routinize the activities or actions of the Nigerian security forces into sub-functions thereby shifting attention 
from the impact of Chevron has done to the details of the roles Nigerian the security forces play in the crisis. This obviously 
represents diffusion of responsibility in processes of environmental crisis management. 
Furthermore, group decision making was another fundamental factor that enable such unethical conducts to have been 
perpetuated because no single individual feels responsible for the decisions that intensify the crisis. Bandura (1991) argued that 
where everyone is responsible no one is responsible. In conclusion, collective action has been found as another diffusion 
expedient for weakening self-restraints because any harm caused can easily be ascribed to the behaviours of others 
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7 Dehumanisation Evidence suggests that the strength of moral self-censure for harmful practices depends on how those who suffer the 
consequences are regarded. Quite critically, research found that it is difficult to inflict suffering on humanised persons without 
risking self-condemnation (Bandura, 1992). However, when such people are re-categorised or perceived differently as sub-
human objects or as terrorists, militants, separatists, criminals, etc., it becomes easier to inflict harm on them. In a clear term, 
people perceived as sub-humans are not only regarded as lacking sensitivities but as being influenceable only by severe 
methods. This implies that self-sanctions against cruel conduct can be disengaged or blunted by divesting people of human 
qualities. The possible implication is that once dehumanised such people are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, 
and concerns but as subhuman objects. Bandura (1991) advocate that if dispossessing antagonists of humanness does not blunt 
self-reproof, it can be eliminated by attributing bestial qualities on them. Therefore, it becomes easier to brutalize victims when 
they are re-classified or re-defined. 
However, a sense of common humanity arouses empathy and compassion for the plight of the needy and the most vulnerable, 
and such sentiments motivate efforts to improve their life conditions (Bandura, 2004). In a practical sense, the Union Carbide 
Bhopal disaster (causing at least 2,500 people deaths, 10,000 serious injuries, 20,000 partial disabilities, and 180,000 others 
affected in one way or another) the company could locate its industrial gas factory in the middle of Bhopal, just 2 miles from 
the Bhopal railway station. All the three worst-affected communities in the disaster apparently existed before the Union Carbide 
plant opened. However, in court trials Union Carbide refused to pay anything to the Indian victims and their families whose 
impoverished status made them easy to be dehumanised and disregarded (Bandura et al., 2000). The victims were blamed for 
living close to the plant and initial strategy was to attribute the cause of the disaster on sabotage suggesting the victims caused 
their own havoc and death. 
8 Distorting or disregarding 
the consequence 
When people pursue activities that serve their interests but produced detrimental effects they avoid facing the harm they caused, 
or they minimised it. Bandura (2007) maintain that if minimisation does not work, the scientific evidence of harm can be 
discredited. This allows doubt and controversial version of the harm despite considerable evidence to the reality. In specific 
term, the consequences of the action are deliberately misrepresented. The misrepresentation may involve active efforts to 
discredit evidence of the harm they caused and therefore there is little reason for self-censure to be activated. For example, the 
case of Three Mile Island (known as the most severe accident in US commercial nuclear power plant and occurred at the Three 
Mile Island Unit 2 in Harrisburg on 28 March 1979) – involving Babcock and Wilcox who built the reactor, General Public 
Utilities ran Three Mile Island, and Metropolitan Edison owned it. The seriousness of the accident was disregarded and the 
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consequences distorted by Metropolitan Edison as the company continually issuing denials and minimising the accident 
(Bandura et al., 2000). 
Research found that it is relatively easy to hurt others when their suffering is not visible and when causal actions are physically 
and temporally remote from their effects (Bandura, 1991). This argument echoes the position of vulnerable people in the Niger 
Delta, Nigeria where the impacts of oil and gas activities are obscure and invisible in extreme cases but the enormous public 
impacts are most evident (UNEP, 2011). The consequences of oil and gas activities on the local communities are disregarded, 
distorted, minimized or refuted. This makes the affected local communities farther from the end results and the restraining 
power of the foreseeable destructive effects becomes weaker. Clearly, obscuring or distorting mechanisms reduce the causal 
link between unethical actions and outcomes so that moral self-sanctioning is no longer required (Johnson & Buckley, 2014). 
To put the environmental crises of the Niger Delta in perspective of moral disengagement by disregarding or distorting the 
consequences, gas flaring scientifically proven and known to have contain mostly large amount of methane and limited quantity 
of carbon dioxide and has significant effects on global warming, climate change, acid rain and rise sea level is a continuous 
practice in Nigeria (Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011). Methane is more powerful than carbon dioxide in trapping heat in the 
atmosphere (Bandura, 2007). Organisations responsible for this practice of flaring gas often use lack of complete scientific 
certitude as a handy justification for inaction. However, despite there are substantial unpredicted effects on the world’s 
atmosphere, local environment and health, the disputes about the true causes of the detrimental outcomes are disputable. Flaring 
of gas is illegal and considered as violation of the rights to life and dignity in Nigeria under the Associated Gas Re-Injection 
Act 1979, 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Federal High Court ruling in 2005 (Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 
2016). Nonetheless, oil companies continue to flare gas and result to paying nominal fines of $0.003 (0.3 cents) per million 
cubic feet of gas flare but now increased to $3.50 for every 1000 standard cubic feet of gas flare for breaking the law. The 
consequences of the effect of gas flaring are disregarded or distorted because it is cheaper to pay fines than investment in gas 
flaring elimination projects to stop the practice. From another view, multinational oil companies often blamed the majority 
partner (NNPC) in their joint venture operations in Nigeria for not providing appropriate funding for investment in gas 
elimination projects. 
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Like in the ‘Ford Pinto case’, Ford convinced itself that it was better to pay millions of dollars in Pinto jury trials and out-of-
court settlements than to improve the safety of the model. By placing dollar values on human life and suffering, Ford simply 
disregarded the consequences of its practice relating to the safety of millions of customers (Bandura et al., 2000). 
Source: Author (2017) 
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5.3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
The context of the research evidence here is that no firm is exempt from the potentially 
overwhelming effects of crises or disasters. Critically, unconventional crises have become a 
fact of postmodernity and the risk society in which organisations operate. Thus, crisis 
management models and responses to crises really matter because unconventional crises can 
impair, threaten and make it impossible for organisations to achieve their fundamental strategic 
goals. While there is ongoing debate about the definition of crisis management (Andrew, 2011; 
Borodzicz, 2005; Clarke, 2005; Dombrowsky, 2007; Perrow, 2006; Regester & Larkin, 2002; 
Rudolf, 2007), it is widely agreed that crisis management concerns the development and 
application of the organisational capability to deal with crises.  
The complexity in organisational structure and even technological systems are becoming more 
interdependent, vulnerable, and problematic in their intended and unintended consequences, 
industrial organisations and societies are confronted with an increasing susceptibility to 
numerous and diverse catastrophic events (Perrow, 1984; Lagadec, 1982; Rosenthal & 
Kouzmin, 1997). The consequent implications have been the development and design of 
several crisis management models or frameworks. These crisis management frameworks as 
discussed in 5.4 are intended to provide strategies and steps crucial to ensure a crisis 
management capability and response, organised around anticipation, identification and 
assessment, preparation, response and communication, recovery, review and learning from risk 
failures and crises. These are the essential phases during which risk and crisis managers should 
put their crisis management frameworks or models to test. 
 
5.4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS 
Several academics and practitioners (Alpaslan, Green, & Mitroff, 2009; Coombs, 2007; 
Comfort, 2007; Fink, 1996; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
have sought to develop frameworks for managing and responding to crises and disasters, which 
can be useful in making appropriate managerial and strategic decisions. In this context, crisis 
management is the systematic attempt to identify and detect possible crises in advance and to 
take actions and measures to prevent them, contain their effects or disruption, and recover and 
learn from risk failures (Constantinides, 2013; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015).  
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Typically, crisis management involves two broad phases – the preparation phase and response 
phase (Alpaslan et al., 2009). At the preparation phase, organisations aim to identify and 
interact with stakeholders and/or potential victims to prevent crises from happening and 
affecting stakeholders. The response phase, provide organisations opportunity to minimize 
stakeholders’ losses that result from the crises. However, Boin & ‘t Hart (2003) observed that 
crisis management consists of at least three broad phases – before (revolves around a crisis 
audit and developing the skills needed to manage the crisis – proactive phase), during (involves 
the use of organisation’s capabilities to contain the damage occurring during the crisis – 
reactive phase), and after (revolves around examining and learning from what one did right, as 
well as wrong, in past crises in order to improve the system for dealing with future crises – pre-
active phase). These three broad phases of crisis management are consistent with findings from 
most of recent risk and crisis management studies. 
Empirical studies (e.g., Pearson & Clair, 1998; Fink, 2002; Morley, 2002; Boin, 2004; Lagadec, 
2005; Coombs, 2007; Reza, 2011; Andrew, 2011) have confirmed that crisis management 
framework, crisis management teams, crisis leaders, business continuity plan, crisis 
communication team and crisis communication strategies are some of crucial fundamental 
factors affecting whether an organisation will survive a crisis or not. Thus, a few crisis 
management frameworks or models were developed in response to the need to increase 
organisational capability and resilience before, during and after major organisational crises 
(For example; Cassedy, 1991; Booth, 1993; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Smith & Sipika, 1993; 
Turner, 1976; 1997; Seymour & Moore, 2000; Augustine, 2000; Fink, 2002; Clarke & Varma, 
2004; James & Wooten, 2005). There are comparable phases such as warning signs, avoidance, 
incubation period, precipitating event, rescue and salvage, and cultural readjustment (Turner, 
1976; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Seymour & Moore, 2000) in most of 
these crisis management frameworks as represented in Table 5.2 below. 
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Table 5.2: Crisis Management Frameworks 
3-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Alpaslan et al., 
2009) 
3-Stage CM 
Framework: 
General 
3-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Smith, 1990) 
3-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Richardson, 1994) 
4-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Myers, 1993) 
4-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Fink, 1996) 
5-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993; James & 
Wooten, 2005)  
6-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(Augustine, 2000) 
6-Stage CM 
Framework: 
(BSI, 2014) 
Preparation 
phase 
 
Before the crisis Crisis of 
management 
Pre-crisis/disaster 
phase 
Normal operations Prodromal crisis 
stage 
Signal detection Avoiding the crisis Anticipate 
Preparation/preven
tion 
Preparing to 
manage the crisis 
Assess 
Response phase 
 
During the crisis Operational crisis Crisis impact/rescue 
phase 
Emergency response Acute crisis stage Containment/dama
ge limitation 
Recognising the 
crisis 
Prepare 
Interim processing Chronic crisis stage Containing the 
crisis 
Respond 
Recovery phase After the crisis Crisis of 
legitimation 
Recovery/demise 
phase 
Restoration Crisis resolution 
stage 
Recovery Resolving the crisis Recover 
Learning Profiting from the 
crisis 
Review and learn 
Source: Author (2017)
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These crisis management frameworks as shown in Table 5.2 above account for various stages 
of crisis but evidence about whether crisis manifest as a stage or process and event remain 
blurred in previous studies (Andrew, 2011; Coombs, 2007; Fink, 2002; Morley, 2002; Boin, 
2004; Lagadec, 2005; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011). This lack of robust empirical 
evidence represents shortcoming in existing traditional CM models and questions the validity 
of both stage and event views of crisis management frameworks. As expounded in 8.1, it 
suggests a significant paradigm shift towards decision-based framework/model of risk/crisis 
management. Although critics suggest that such processes and event frameworks of crisis 
management are a useful way to organise and classify the phenomena of dangerous events. 
Nonetheless, the nature of unconventional crises characterised by unpredictability, urgency, 
rapid change, complexity and transnational impact (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Comfort, 2007; 
Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015) appear to have rendered traditional 
stage and event views of crisis management archaic and unsuitable for most emerging 
unconventional crises. 
Though, as revealed in Table 5.2 above, British Standards Institution (BSI) 11200 CM 
framework involves six stages of anticipate, assess, prepare, respond, recover, and review and 
learn (BSI, 2014). This BSI CM model represents some of the latest thinking in crisis 
management.  Although the BSI 11200 CM model (BSI, 2014) is comparable to Augustine’s 
(2000) CM model which includes avoiding the crisis, preparing to manage the crisis, 
recognising the crisis, containing the crisis, resolving the crisis and profiting from the crisis. In 
contrast, Fink’s (2002) crisis management framework revolves around four stages – prodromal 
crisis stage, acute crisis stage, chronic crisis stage and crisis resolution stage. On the other hand, 
Mitroff & Anagnos (2001) developed a CM framework which identified five factors (the types 
and risk categories of crises, mechanisms, systems, stakeholders and scenarios) companies 
must manage before, during and after a major crisis.  
James & Wooten’s research (2005) identify five crucial phases: signal detection, preparation 
and prevention, containment and damage control, business recovery, and learning. In critical 
terms, most of the existing authors that have developed crisis management models are not 
explicitly clear whether such models represent an ideal event sequence or phases in the sense 
of a predictable sequential process. Although Buchanan & Denyer (2013) were more specific 
in their six-phase event sequence: pre-crisis or incubation, event, crisis response management, 
investigation, organisational learning, and implementation; incubation to implementation 
perspective as suggested by these researchers are inadequate for several reasons: 
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 Firstly, crisis management is very practical and so it is appropriate to depend on models 
with practical orientations and implications. While the theoretical foundation cannot be 
underestimated, the complex networks of risk behaviour, perception, organisational risk 
culture, proximate cause factors (systems, structures, accident, etc.) and transnational 
nature of the unconventional crisis would render any universal generalization and 
application of model inappropriate and ineffective.  
 Secondly, organisations should methodologically and strategically determine which 
model is appropriate for the nature of crisis it wants to manage. This would ensure that 
there is assurance that clear and robust crisis management strategies and processes are 
in place before the occurrence of any major disruption and crisis.  
 Thirdly, flexibility and creativity, which are essential when responding to 
unconventional crises, appear to be lacking in most extant CM models.  
 Fourthly, unconventional crises require unconventional crisis management which 
challenge an ‘inside the box’ thinking and create fierce sense of urgency with robust 
engagement with all relevant stakeholders before, during and after dangerous events.  
 Finally, empirical evidence suggests that most CM models lack discussion about moral 
and ethical dimension of crisis management.  
Therefore, with respect to the cases of risks, crises and disasters under investigation in this 
research, the Bandura moral disengagement framework and Augustine’s crisis management 
framework are integrated to explore and provide effective management strategies that can help 
shed insights into the ongoing crises in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Albeit, initially, the Augustine 
and Fink crisis management models are influential to this thesis, however both models are in 
themselves unpredictable in managing crisis situations. These models (Augustine, 2000; Fink, 
2002) represent a single paradigm model which can lead to intellectual provincialism with the 
researcher biased either consciously or unconsciously against alternative accounts of the 
phenomenon investigated.  
Thus, the investigation and adoption of the concepts – crisis management and moral 
disengagement, used throughout this research are well-grounded in a general systems model of 
scientific inquiry called “the diamond model” (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1978). This model 
involves: grounding the problem and question, developing a conceptual model to address the 
question, evaluation of how well the model applies to the case, and implementation of solutions 
that solve the problem/question (Figure 5.1). In conclusion, this is the most, arguably, useful 
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and well-established approach that is relevant to policy, industry and practice of risk and crisis 
management. 
Figure 5.1: Diamond Model of Scientific Inquiry: Transdisciplinary Systems Thinking 
 
Source: Adapted from Mitroff & Kilmann (1978) 
 
5.5 CRISIS MANAGEMENT RESPONSES: ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND TRUST 
Crisis management responses can be defined as the behaviours which an organisation exhibit 
as well as the communication strategies used during and after major crises. Previous studies 
have concentrated on communication, coordination, control and cognitive (4Cs) processes of 
risk detection, recognition and interpretation that initiate the crisis and emergency response 
process (Comfort, 2007; Lalonde, 2007). In another context, several guidelines for the selection 
of the appropriate crisis management response strategies have been developed in extant 
research (Coombs, 1995). More specifically, some selected conceptual and empirical studies 
offer different frameworks for understanding crisis management responses (Coombs, 2007; 
Quarantelli, 1988; Shrivastava, 1993; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Seeger, 2006; Smith & Elliot, 
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2006) and most research favoured scientific and experts’ elucidation for crisis responses 
(Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Comfort, 2007; Dezenhall & Weber, 2007; Hannah et al., 2009; 
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smith & Elliott, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). The crisis management responses are best understood within the context of crisis 
communication. 
 
5.5.1 CRISIS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND STRATEGIES 
This section discusses the most important theories of organisational crisis communication: (1) 
corporate apologia, (2) image repair theory, (3) organisational renewal theory (or image 
restoration discourse), (4) attribution theory, (5) situational crisis communication theory, (6) 
terminological control theory, and (7) blog-mediated crisis communication model. Each of 
these crisis communication theories contain basic assumptions and strategies that organisations 
can use in the process of crisis management. Here it is important to make the distinction 
between crisis management and crisis communication.  
The main distinction between crisis management and crisis communication is that the former 
deals with the reality of the crisis whereas the latter deals with the perception of the reality. At 
this stage, the focus is on crisis communication which is simply define as the ‘dialogue’ 
between the organisation and its publics (Fearn-Banks, 1996). Although this definition of crisis 
communication is criticised as insufficient (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017), it does offers initial 
insight about crisis communication. Sturges (1994) makes a distinction between three types of 
external crisis information: 
(a) Instructing information, which is ‘information that tells people affected by the crisis 
how they should physically react to the crisis’ (p. 308). 
(b) Adjusting information, which is ‘information that helps people psychologically cope 
with the magnitude of the crisis’ (p. 308). 
(c) Internalising information, which is ‘information that people will use to formulate an 
image about the organisation’ (p. 308). 
These three types of crisis information are mutually independent communication strategies but 
sometimes combine in different ways depending on the crisis stage. Frandsen & Johansen 
(2017, p. 91) pointed that Sturges’ (1994) definition of crisis communication is questionable 
because of ‘his distinction between the three types of crisis information and their distribution 
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according to a staged approach to crisis management, not least due to how image or reputation 
is conceptualised’. The previous approach to crisis communication favour mainly 
communication from the organisations to outside stakeholders (Coombs, 2007; Fink, 2013; 
Hood, 2002; Fishman, 1999; Sandy & Ian, 2009; Seeger, 2006; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). 
However, the perceived extrication of ‘local interpretation’ from ‘sole scientific elucidation’ 
infuse into crisis management responses in recent years is responsible for ‘crisis disengagement 
approach’. The fundamental task then requires uniform interpretation and de-constructing the 
crisis in the context of multiple interests and multiple meanings and carefully select appropriate 
solution from the available options. 
Therefore, this thesis recognises that crisis communication is made up of two parts: (1) 
managing information (collecting and analysing crisis-related information) and (2) managing 
meaning (influencing how people perceive the crisis and the organisation in crisis) (Coombs, 
2015). In context, each of these two parts exists in two variations, (a) public crisis 
communication (directed at external stakeholders) and (b) private crisis communication 
(directed at employees or exchanged among members of crisis management teams) (Frandsen 
& Johansen, 2017, p. 91) which could assist in managing both rational and normative 
expectations in processes of crisis management. This point is significant because when 
responding to organisational crises rationality must be separated and distinguished from 
morality. The reason is that the commitment that an organisation is doing something right is 
not the same as getting them right. Quite critical to this debate is the fact that there is a parallel 
line between “doing the right thing” and “doing things right” in risk and crisis management 
responses. The most useful instrument to manage crisis and respond appropriately is the 
organisational moral courage to commit planning into action, remain flexible and be 
responsible to other key stakeholders in crisis. The following subsections briefly discuss each 
of the crisis communication theories earlier identified. 
 
5.5.1.1 CORPORATE APOLOGIA 
This thesis has shown that an organisational crisis forces an immediate decision or reaction 
from the organisation (cf. Stephens, Malone, & Bailey, 2005). The corporate apologia is a post-
crisis communication theory which suggests that organisation should focus on managing 
threats and apologising and features strategies for the apology. The notion of corporate 
apologia is originally seen as language of self-defence and used by an organisation to account 
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for its actions after a crisis (Coombs, 2007; Reza, 2011; Ryan, 1982). This thesis has found that 
crisis places survival of the organisation at serious risk due to element of surprise and issues 
outside the organisation’s complete control (Coombs & Holladay, 2010; Mafimisebi & 
Nkwunonwo, 2015; Stephens et al., 2005). Organisations are often criticised during and after 
major crises which could lead to turbulent circumstances beyond management’s control. 
Therefore, corporate apologia which is not an apology but a response to criticism, can help 
organisations offer a competing account in process of crisis management. 
This is mainly defensive strategies and implies that crisis arises from accusation of wrongdoing 
(Hearit, 2006). Corporate apologia is rooted in the assumption that organisation can carefully 
craft its own version of the crisis events to redeem lost reputation, protect itself and others, as 
well as to regain control. The main corporate apologia strategies include persuasive accounts, 
expressing sorrow, and using dissociation strategies such as opinion/knowledge dissociation, 
individual/group dissociation, and act/essence dissociation (cf. Hearit, 1995; Frandsen & 
Johansen, 2017, p. 102). However, according to previous risk and crisis studies, crisis 
management response towards stakeholders in crisis situations can also range from denial, 
avoidance (Hood, 2002; Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003; Sandy & Ian, 2009), defensive, reaction, 
accommodation, pro-action (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), forced compliance, voluntary 
compliance above legal expectations, making extra efforts (Shrivastava & Siomkos, 1989), 
aggressive, pretending and ignoring, blaming, admit, differentiating, bolstering, and 
transcending (Boin, ‘t Hart, McConnell & Preston, 2010; George & Pratt, 2012). To put into 
perspective, a number of these crisis management responses are consistent with four-fold 
typologies provided by other scholars: deny responsibility, admit responsibility but fight it, 
accept responsibility, anticipate responsibility (Clarkson, 1995, p. 108-109); fight all the way, 
do only what is legally required, be progressive, and lead the industry (Carroll, 1979). 
Alpaslan et al. (2009) suggest that organisations should adopt the principles of stakeholder 
models of corporate governance when responding to crises, which perhaps will lead companies 
to engage more frequently in proactive and/or accommodating crisis management behaviours 
even if these CM behaviours are not perceived to maximise shareholders value. These 
researchers further provided examples of different crisis management behaviour (reactive, 
defensive, accommodative, and proactive) in both the preparation and response phases of crisis 
management (Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3: Crisis Management Behaviour in Preparation and Response Phases of a Crisis 
CM Behaviour Preparation Phase Response Phase 
Reactive Deny the responsibility of a crisis. 
Deny the potential effects of a crisis on 
the firm and its stakeholders. 
Deny any responsibility for the 
crisis and its effects on 
stakeholders. 
Be uncooperative, hide the truth, 
and shut all communications. 
Defensive Perform cos-benefit analyses, and 
prepare only for crises with high 
expected cost to the firm. 
Involve stakeholders in crisis 
preparations, only if mandated by law. 
Admit some responsibility for 
the crisis but fight it. 
Comply when forced, and do 
only what is mandated by law. 
Accommodative Accept the possibility of the crisis and 
its effects both on the firm and on a 
broad set of stakeholders. 
Involve in crisis preparations a broader 
set of stakeholders than mandated by 
law. 
Accept responsibility for the 
crisis. 
Voluntarily attend to the needs 
of the victims, and tell the truth 
as you know it. 
Proactive Develop mutual trust and cooperation 
based relationships with all 
stakeholders. 
Try to involve in crisis preparations all 
stakeholders that may be harmed by 
organisational decisions and actions. 
Anticipate that the crisis may 
trigger a chain reaction of other 
crises. 
Get the worst about yourself out 
on your time before the media 
dig it. 
Source: Adapted from Alpaslan et al. (2009) 
 
5.5.1.2 IMAGE REPAIR THEORY 
The image repair theory is initially known as image restoration discourse, which depends on 
the complaint or attack which in turn motivates the corporation to respond (Benoit, 1997). The 
image restoration discourse focuses on message options and how a corporation can use them 
to respond in crisis situations (Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011). The image repair theory is 
credited to Benoit (1995) who developed the concept to explain how and why individuals and 
organisations defend their reputation by applying a set of image repair strategies when accused 
or suspected of wrongdoing. It is based on two main axiomatic assumptions: (1) 
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communication is a goal-oriented activity, and (2) a key goal of communication is to maintain 
a favourable reputation (Benoit, 2015).  
In context, image repair theory explains how organisations and individuals attempt to correct 
negative public perception of themselves after a specific event or series of events (Harlow et 
al., 2011). Although some of crisis communication and management strategies (as shown in 
Table 5.4) are aim at repairing organisational image and reputation and avoiding legal liability 
(Benoit, 1995; Hearit, 2006; Harlow et al., 2011) but given their moral implications and 
potential negative effect on organisational sustainability and resilience, their sustainable 
impacts in repairing corporate image and reputation become contestable. The image repair 
strategies are attempt by organisations to change or create new beliefs (or values) about an 
offensive act and the accused’s blame for this act (Benoit, 2015). 
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Table 5.4: Strategies of Responding to Crisis  
Code Strategy Example 
(1) Simple denial We did not do it 
(2) Shifting blame Someone else did it 
(3) Provocation We did it, but were provoked 
(4) Accidents  The incident was an accident 
(5) Defeasibility Lack of information or control 
(6) Good intentions The error was the result of good intentions 
(7) Bolstering Our good characteristics outweigh any error 
(8) Minimization The problem is not that bad 
(9) Differentiation This incident is different from some other act 
(10) Transcendence The act should be understood in a different context 
(11) Attack accuser The person blaming us is the one at fault 
(12) Compensation The victims will be compensated 
(13) Corrective action We will fix the problem 
(14) Mortification We admit responsibility, apologise and ask for forgiveness 
Source: Derived from Benoit (1995); Hearit (2006); Harlow et al. (2011) 
It should be made clear that the nature of crises (whether environmental crisis, product recalls, 
terrorism, industrial disaster, financial crisis, or ecological crisis, etc.) affects the effectiveness 
of crisis management response strategies. More critically, a number of these crisis management 
response strategies such as minimisation, denial, shifting blame, provocation, bolstering, and 
good intentions correspond greatly to and are rooted in moral disengagement mechanisms. 
Although these crisis management could as well be classified as crisis disengagement 
techniques or strategies, they raise serious ethical and moral concerns. This represents 
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fundamental flaws in previous crisis management responses/strategies and suggests the need 
for a paradigm shift towards ethical risk and crisis management responses. 
The basic image repair situation, which serves as the platform for the verbal defense strategies, 
can be represented as a process with two phases (see Table 5.5). In conclusion, image repair 
strategies contain five general strategies ranging from denial, evading of responsibility, 
reducing offensiveness of event, corrective action to mortification (Benoit, 1997; 2000). 
 
Table 5.5: The Basic Image Repair Situation 
Process Example 
Phase (1): from attack to crisis 
An undesirable event takes place 
An actor accuses or suspects another actor 
for being responsible for the undesirable 
event 
The image of this actor is threatened  
On December 20, 2011, an oil spill occurred 
off the coast of Niger Delta. It was estimated 
that more than 40,000 barrels (or 1.68 million 
gallons) spilled into the environment and 
spread along the Nigerian coast. The spill 
was regarded as one of the worst spills in the 
area for a decade. A group of affected local 
communities draw attention to the 
environmental and economic damages 
resulting from the disaster. Shell received 
much of the blame for the disaster, and that 
blame resulted into what Benoit (2015) 
called image restoration strategies. 
Phase (1): from crisis to image repair 
The accused or suspected actor defends itself 
against the attack by means of one or more 
image repair strategies 
If the defense is successful, the image of this 
actor will be repaired (Frandsen & Johansen, 
2017) 
In a press release, Shell defend itself against 
local communities’ attack and disputed the 
$4 billion fine levied upon it by the 
government. Shell statement claims that at 
the time of the incident it was oil from a 
third-party spill that impacted some parts of 
the shoreline. The company regrets that the 
incident took place and promises to be 
cleaned up impacted areas and notes that it 
will continues to review and respond to all 
claims received in respect of the spill. 
Source: Author (2017) 
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5.5.1.3 ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL THEORY 
The core assumptions of organisational renewal theory are rooted in constructive 
communication and ethical communication before, during and after the crisis. It emphasises 
organisational learning and building on lessons learned from crises. As noted previously, some 
of the CM response strategies which are advocated in previous studies raise ethical and moral 
implications and amount to neglecting vulnerable people in crisis. The claim has been made 
that people suffer from the wrongs done to them regardless of how perpetrators justify their 
inhumane actions (Bandura, 2002; Jordan, 2009). This claim reflects the environmental 
pollution and crises in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Chapters Two and Three). As found 
in previous studies, the success of crisis management response efforts depends on at least two 
factors: the nature of an organisation’s established relationship with its stakeholders, and the 
accuracy of an organisation’s understanding of how its stakeholders might behave in the 
context of crises (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Ulmer, 2001). 
It was argued that some indicators of successful crisis management outcomes such as early 
warning signals detection, effective damage containment, minimal crisis downtime, positive 
effects on corporate reputation, and profit from crisis can only happen when organisations 
exhibit appropriate crisis management behaviours, build alliances and share accurate and 
truthful information with the stakeholders (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Coombs, 2012; 
Kouzmin, 2008; Lagadec, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011; Sellnow & Ulmer, 1998). 
Although, critics argued that crisis management response strategies and behaviours are mostly 
conferred within public relations and communications research. In context, several traditional 
researchers have discussed some fundamental crisis communication and response strategies 
which organisations can adopt when responding to crisis situations (Burns & Bruner, 2000; 
Burke, 1970; 1973; Coombs, 2007; Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011; Rosenfield, 1968; 
Ryan, 1982; Smudde & Courtright, 2008; Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Of importance is that crisis 
communication has also extends to moral and ethical field as demonstrated in this thesis. 
Therefore, as indicated from this research, there is a need to re-evaluate existing crisis 
management response strategies because of their impacts on future organisational 
sustainability, flexibility and resilience. For example, some of the crisis communication and 
management strategies such as consigning responsibility for the crisis to oneself or others, 
attacking an accuser, redefining the origin and nature of the crisis, and refocusing attention on 
post-crisis activities as established in previous research have implications on organisational 
sustainability and resilience. 
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In view of the above discussion, researchers have called for evidence-based management and 
the use of scientific evidence to guide managerial decision-making because of the presence of 
moral dilemmas in risk and crisis situations (Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010; Comfort et 
al., 2004; Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010; Palttala, Boano, Lund & Vos, 2012; Rousseau, 2005). 
Therefore, in response to calls for evidence-based crisis management strategies, this research 
through comprehensive review of existing CM literatures models the crisis management 
response strategies and moral disengagement mechanisms to show evidence of their association 
in practice (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Moral Disengagement & Crisis Management Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
Figure 5.2 shows the synthesis of crisis management communication/behavioural strategies 
and moral disengagement mechanisms. In context, based on review of existing empirical 
studies, it was found that crisis management strategies such as mortification, compensation and 
Dehumanisation 
Attribution of blame 
Moral Justification 
Displacement of 
Responsibility 
Distorting the 
Consequences 
Euphemistic Labelling 
Advantageous 
Comparison 
Diffusion of 
Responsibility 
Simple denial 
Provocation 
Blame shifting 
Defeasibility 
Accidental 
Bolstering 
Minimization 
Differentiation 
Transcendence 
Attack accuser  
Good intention 
Moral Disengagement Mechanisms 
Crisis Management Strategies 
Mortification 
Compensation 
Corrective Action 
Control Variables: 
1. Risk Perception 
2. Risk Culture 
3. Risk Governance 
4. Organisational size 
5. Nature of Crisis/Disaster 
139 
 
corrective action are more effective than others. In fact, the results in Figure 5.2 clearly suggest 
that other forms of crisis management strategies with the exemption of mortification, 
compensation and correction action, are rooted in moral disengagement mechanisms. 
Although, all crisis management strategies are influenced or moderated by factors such as risk 
perception, risk culture, risk governance, the size of the organisation and the nature of crisis or 
disaster. In a practical context, organisations that aim to maintain and enhance their credibility 
and reputation during and after major crises should focus more on using mortification, 
compensation and corrective action. 
 
5.5.1.4 ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
The concept of attribution is built on the assumption that people need to assign responsibility 
for events (Weiner, 1986) cited by Coombs (2007, p. 136). Therefore, attribution theory 
suggests that people look for causes of events, especially unexpected and negative events. 
Within the context of attribution theory, the threat of a crisis is a function of crisis responsibility 
and blame (Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; 2010; 2015). This implies that 
managers should evaluate the crisis to determine which crisis response is best for the situation 
(Coombs, 2015). It is expected that crisis response can help reduce or eliminate the negative 
effects of crises on market share, stock prices, sales of the recalled product, purchase intentions, 
and sales of other products by the company (Coombs, 2007).  
However, when inappropriately planned, crisis communication or response to unconventional 
crises can escalate or harm the organisation’s image and reputation, not least disrupt working 
relationship with external stakeholders. In a practical context, the attributions stakeholders 
make about crisis responsibility have affective and behavioural consequences for an 
organisation (Coombs & Holladay, 2005; 2006). If the organisation is deemed responsible for 
the crisis, the reputation will suffer (Coombs, 2007). In turn, stakeholders may exit the 
relationship and/or create negative word-of-mouth. At the extreme, like the Niger Delta crises, 
external stakeholders such as local youths have resulted into vandalism of oil and gas 
infrastructures because of the perceived corporate irresponsibility of oil companies. 
From another perspective, crisis management response usually involves dealing with a high 
degree of uncertainty (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), ‘wicked problems’ (Stubbart, 1987), crisis 
perception divergence (Penrose, 2000), communication issues and challenges (Burns & 
Bruner, 2000; Coombs, 2007; Smudde & Courtright, 2008), time pressure created by a sense 
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of urgency (Kotter, 2008), public relations and politics issues (Dezenball & Weber, 2007; 
Coombs, 2007), blame allocation and resentment (Elliott, Swartz & Herbane, 2010), 
ambiguity, crisis responsibility and ethical concerns. When taken collectively, it is critical to 
suggest that crisis management response may well be difficult to codify (Buchanan & Denyer, 
2013) or remain an impossible task to accomplish (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003).  
Alternatively, actions or strategies that are crucial to resolving the crisis may also escalate it 
when not properly planned and implemented. Therefore, it clear that standardisation or 
adaptation of crisis management strategies should be considered to ensures that appropriate 
messages and behaviours are exhibited before, during and after unconventional crisis. Albeit 
attribution theory can help to classify crises: victimised (natural disaster, rumours, etc.), 
accidental (challenges and technical error accidents), and preventable (human error and 
misconduct), resulting in categories that help to determine response strategies (George & Pratt, 
2012). This is consistent with the notion that crises may be considered as a function of external 
or environmental threats and internal or organisational weaknesses (Stephens et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, crises often create uncertainty (including ethical uncertainty) which could render 
crafted crisis communication strategies ineffective. As a result, some researchers suggested the 
need for situational crisis communication strategies as discussed below.  
 
5.5.1.5 SITUATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION THEORY 
The situational crisis communication theory is grounded in attribution theory but applies to a 
wider array of crises. It advances and test hypotheses related to how perceptions of the crisis 
affect the crisis response and the effects of crisis responses on outcomes such as emotions, 
purchase intention, and reputation (Coombs, 2007). The basic assumption of the situational 
crisis communication theory is that the best way to protect the reputation of an organisation in 
crisis is by selecting the crisis response strategies that best fit the reputational threat presented 
by the crisis (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017). There are three components of the theory: (1) a list 
of crisis response strategies, (2) a framework for the categorisation of crisis situations, and (3) 
a procedure for matching a given crisis with the right crisis response strategy. The situational 
crisis communication theory starts with the risk/crisis manager examining the crisis to assess 
the level of the reputational threat of a crisis. 
Coombs (2007, p. 137) notes that three factors such as (1) initial crisis responsibility, (2) crisis 
history, and (3) relationship history/prior reputation, shape the reputational threat in the crisis. 
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Two-step process has been identified when using these three factors to assess the reputational 
threat. Firstly, crisis managers need to determine the initial crisis responsibility attached to a 
crisis. This is stakeholder-centred approach, in which the initial assessment is based upon the 
crisis type. By identifying the crisis type, the risk/crisis manager can determine how much crisis 
responsibility stakeholders will attribute to the organisation at the onset of the crisis (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2001; 2006). The more cause of the crisis is perceived as beyond an organisation’s 
or individuals control, the lower the attribution of responsibility. Secondly, the reputational 
threat can also be assess using two intensifying factors, consistency and distinctiveness. 
Consistency is operationalised as crisis history whereas distinctiveness is operationalised as 
relationship history/prior reputation (Coombs, 2007). In a practical context, high consistency 
or low distinctiveness increases the threats from a crisis. This could intensify attributions of 
crisis responsibility thereby indirectly affecting reputational threat (Coombs, 2007; 2010). 
Thus, a victim crisis becomes treated as an accident crisis and an accident crisis becomes 
treated as an intentional crisis when either distinctiveness is low (negative relationship history) 
or consistency is high (crisis history) (Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Coombs, 2007; 2015). 
So, what can organisations in crisis situations do to overcome the challenges associated with 
crisis management responses? The fact that ‘action that is instrumental to understanding the 
crisis often intensifies the crisis’ (Weick, 1988, p. 305) demands that crisis management 
response should be considered in a normative context of both ethical and moral implications. 
Given several practitioners’ debates on the adoption of crisis response plans and procedures 
and ‘the mere existence of policies and procedures which may be false signals of preparedness’ 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 68), the logical question is should innovation and decentralization 
be allowed or encouraged (‘t Hart, Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1993) for people at the ‘sharp end’ 
during and after organisational crises (Flin, O’Conner, & Crichton, 2008)? This is because 
fundamental factors such as intuition and recognition (Zsambok & Klein, 1997), improvisation 
and bricolage (Weick, 1993), flexibility (Turner, 1994), leadership roles in crisis situations 
(Flin & Yule, 2004; Hannah et al., 2009; Probert & Turnbull, 2011), and moral disengagement 
issues (Bandura, 2002; 2007) are critical in effective and sustainable crisis management 
response. In conclusion, and in the context of this research, for research in risk and crisis 
management to be helpful and translate into sustainable management of emerging 
unconventional crises and disasters, moral disengagement implications of the various strategies 
of crisis response must be acknowledged and pragmatically considered and addressed. 
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5.5.1.6 TERMINOLOGICAL CONTROL THEORY 
This is credited to Keith Michael Hearit and it is grounded in apologetic ethics of crisis 
communication (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017). The apologetic ethics is ‘a method by which to 
ethically judge the apologetic decision making offered by individuals and organisations’ 
(Hearit, 2006, p. 77). The core premise of terminological control theory is that in any crisis, it 
is essential for the organisation in crisis to be able to control the terminology and thus to 
influence the interpretations and counter-interpretations used and produced by the actors 
involved (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017, p. 101). In this context, “crises are terminological 
creations conceived by human agents and, consequently, are managed and resolved 
terminologically” (Hearit & Courtright, 2003, p. 87). The terminological control theory is 
presented as a process model of crisis management response involving five phases: 
 First, an action is committed that is considered wrongful by (certain parts of) society. 
This wrongdoing can be traceable to a specific organisation. 
 Second, an accusation (i.e., what the rhetoricians call a kategoria) is made against the 
organisation, which is made responsible for the wrongdoing. 
 Third, because of the accusation, organisation now face a legitimacy crisis. That is, part 
of the society perceives the organisation as either unprofessional, incompetent and 
unable to ‘get the job done’ or as indifferent to the laws, rules, values, and norms of the 
society (Hearit, 1995). 
 Fourth, the organisation in crisis defends itself against the accusation. The organisation 
can use corporate apologia strategies such as persuasive accounts, expressing sorrows, 
and using dissociation strategies to handle the crisis. 
 Fifth, this is last phase which signifies the potential end of the crisis to the extent that 
the corporate apologia allows the organisations to restore its legitimacy and to continue 
its business. 
Recent research has shown that terminological control theory of crisis communication is yet to 
receive the attention it deserved (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017). The value of terminological 
control theory of crisis communication is most evident in a crisis involving multiple actors, and 
in a situation where organisations risk facing multiple socio-cultural orders simultaneously. 
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5.5.1.7 BLOG-MEDIATED CRISIS COMMUNICATION MODEL 
The blog-mediated crisis communication model focuses on the use of social media as 
instrument of crisis communication. Organisations operate in dynamics environment where 
they must constantly evaluate how they will respond to stakeholders. Research suggests that 
organisations should examine the attributes of stakeholders to classify how they may formulate 
their reactions to pressures and inquiries in process of crisis management (Stephens et al., 
2005). The age of risk society implies that crisis information can be disseminated 
instantaneously using social media. Therefore, blog-mediated crisis communication model can 
help managers to identify influential external blogs and bloggers to engage them. In this 
process, understanding blog content is as important as the need to identify the dissemination 
process of that content. 
The blog-mediated crisis communication approach can help to inform, convince, or motivate 
certain stakeholders to action (Stephens et al., 2005). Social media can impact organisational 
crisis coverage because events of the crisis can spread quickly to numerous stakeholders. 
Influential bloggers can spread information about the crisis, which may further damage the 
organisation image and reputation. Therefore, it is essential that organisations in crisis target 
the right audience and attempt ‘damage control’ to prevent drastic negative changes in 
relationships with environmental components (Sturges, 1994). As a result, the blog-mediated 
crisis communication model can help follow up issue involvement when bloggers discuss 
experiences or self-involvement when they seek self-affirmation by discussing the crisis with 
others. 
 
5.5.2 TRUST ISSUES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT RESPONSE: A REVIEW 
Trust is a multidimensional construct containing both cognitive and affective contents, and 
both micro (interpersonal) and macro (inter-organisational) elements (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, 
& Camerer, 1998). This implies that trust is a complex phenomenon, shaped by environmental, 
organisational, and individual contingencies (Luo, 2002). Given the multidisciplinary nature 
of trust, it is essential to understand what it means and why it matters in risk and crisis 
management. Traditionally, trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” 
(Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). This definition suggests that trust composed of two interrelated 
cognitive processes. The first involves a preparedness to accept vulnerability to the actions of 
another party. The second is that, despite uncertainty about how the other will act, there are 
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positive expectations regarding the other party’s intentions, motivations, and behaviour 
(Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). 
Baier (1985, p. 235) suggested that trust is “accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not 
expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one”. In a similar view, trust is also defined as a 
person’s “expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the likelihood that another’s future actions 
will be beneficial, favourable or at least not detrimental” (Robinson, 1996, p. 576). 
Furthermore, trust is defined as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform an action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). This implies that trust is a situation characterised by uncertainty 
where one party (trustor) is prepared to depend on the actions of another party (trustee) 
(Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). 
Most definitions of trust, as discussed above, are grounded in the assumption that a state of 
uncertainty exist between the trustor (the focal decision maker) and trustee (the receiver of the 
trust). Thus, the trustor must decide how much to cooperate with the trustee and is assumed to 
make this decision rationally (cf. Becerra & Gupta, 2003; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Hurley, 
2006; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). For example, in the context of the Niger Delta crises, 
research reveals that the local people have often rely on scientific experts in the past to provide 
information concerning severity of environmental hazards and disasters, and depend on 
multinational oil companies to take meaningful decisions in preventing, mitigating and 
addressing the ‘invincible’ environmental harms from oil and gas activities (Mafimisebi & 
Nkwunonwo, 2014; 2015). This suggests that the trustee’s intention, motives, and 
trustworthiness are inferred from the frequency and level of cooperative choices made. In 
unconventional crisis situations, trust is indicated by cooperative moves by the affected 
stakeholders, and distrust is manifested in competitive moves (Lewicki et al., 2006, p. 995). 
Therefore, the essence of trust in crisis management response is the choice to cooperate or not 
to cooperate. 
Indeed, trust is viewed as “confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct,” 
whereas distrust is “confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct” (Lewicki et 
al., 1998, p. 439). Albeit both trust and distrust are often invoked to describe certainty 
judgments about the other’s conduct (Luhmann, 1988). Trust allows the possibility of 
undesirable behaviour by the other to be removed from consideration whereas distrust reduces 
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complexity by allowing undesirable conduct to be likely (if not certain) and to be managed 
(Lewicki et al., 2006, p. 1002). Trust and distrust are separate dimensions independent of each 
other. Research suggests that a breach of trust between those who take (and manage) risks and 
those who are (apparently) victimised by the risks others take is at crossroad (Mafimisebi & 
Thorne, 2015). In such situation, there may be simultaneous reasons to both trust and distrust 
another stakeholder experiencing the same crisis due to the complex view in which 
unconventional crisis normally occurs. 
In this perspective, trust is a crucial factor of crisis management response and becomes even 
more important if individual knowledge about potential cause of crisis is low. Research has 
demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between the uncertainty of the risk and the role 
of trust (Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013). Paton (2008) argues that trust only 
becomes necessary when the decision-maker faces a situation of uncertainty. When responding 
to crisis, decision-makers are normally confronted with uncertainty. In this situation trust 
functions to reduce the uncertainty and complexity that people encounter when faced with 
novel events such as crises (Paton, 2008). Trust then becomes a construct of considerable 
importance when responding to crises. This means that organisations need to develop trust with 
stakeholders before, during and after major crises. Effective measures to enhance cooperation 
of stakeholders should be developed as part of the crisis management plan. Trust remains an 
essential element of successful crisis communication or crisis management response.  
 
5.6 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT OR CRISIS DISENGAGEMNT: 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Previously, it was emphasized that despite extensive research on moral disengagement 
mechanisms in different contexts such as war, terrorism, aggressive behaviour, organisational 
corruption and transgression, little or no research exists on moral disengagement implications 
in crisis management. However, the lack of investigation into moral disengagement in 
processes of crisis management might simply demonstrate ‘crisis disengagement’ rather than 
‘moral disengagement’. The fact that moral disengagement focuses mostly on outcome rather 
than proximate cause, is controversial and can simply denote organisational business case 
strategy to manage crisis or disaster, and not moral disengagement. Nonetheless, since the 
contention in this thesis is that moral disengagement represents an ‘irony of evil’ because 
irrespective of how it’s justified – evil is evil. 
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While the focus is not to sound too philosophical, the fundamental purpose is to argue that 
moral disengagement or crisis disengagement might potentially escalate, rather than reduce, 
organisational crisis. In this context, crisis disengagement refers to the collective instruments 
of denial, blaming, provocation, accidental defense, good intentions or justification, bolstering, 
minimisation, attack accuser, differentiation, transcendence, and provocation to selectively and 
strategically detach or disengage from organisational crisis with the view of building 
reputation, recover from the crisis, and ensure business continuity despite the moral 
implications. Therefore, this thesis suggests the need for a crisis engagement approach based 
on moral consideration as a vital tool towards effectively managing unconventional risks, crises 
and disasters (see Figure 5.2). Furthermore, it is argued that under certain circumstances in risk 
and crisis situations employing moral disengagement mechanisms might spell organisational 
doom, cause crisis intensification and initiate future disasters. 
In an alternative context, crisis disengagement, more than any other crisis management 
strategy, illustrates both the intensification and mystification of risk and crisis situations. In 
most cases, risk and crisis management research has advanced as if crises and disaster decision-
making, models and response strategies are, restricted to rational behaviours and culture of 
scientific clarification of the phenomena. Again, this characterises overly rationalised accounts 
of unconventional crises and disasters rendering a landscape penetrated by organisation’s 
transgression and technical irrationality in decision-making leading to crisis intensification and 
crisis management failures. The recent cases of unconventional crises and disasters (e.g. 
MH370, VW emission scandal and Bonga oil disaster) suggest how superiority of rational 
decision-making and the experts (scientific) mentality in managing crises and disasters have 
become doubtful and even unreliable.  
In practice, the question of moral disengagement mechanisms, and the processes that lead to 
them, can be masked, disguised, or denied, and organisations can use business case to justify 
their rational decision-makings. In this thesis, the most fundamental assumption of moral 
disengagement mechanisms is that application of morality and ethics in processes of crisis 
management is appropriate when such application does not challenge, undermine, or counteract 
organisation’s business case to risk and crisis management. To confirm the validity of this 
paradigm, some years ago, Chris Argyris in Overcoming Organisational Defenses (Argyris, 
1990, p. 10 - 13) recognised that: 
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“Management, at all levels, in many organisations, creates, by their own choice, a 
world that is contrary to what they say they prefer and contrary to the managerial 
stewardship they espouse. …This, of course, is a prime illustration of the disparity 
between espoused theory – what we say we do – and theory-in-use – what we actually 
do”. 
As put forward in this research, moral disengagement represents unnoticeable moral and ethical 
extermination inconsistencies in crisis management response strategies, and organisations most 
often act as if such immoral conducts are humane and ethically consistent. But, such ‘irony of 
evil’ becomes conformable to organisational norms, risk culture and risk governance. This 
logic perhaps found expression in the way Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria manage the 
environmental risks and crises in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria especially the Ogoni crisis. 
Likewise, the logic can also be established in the Bhopal disaster of 1984 involving Union 
Carbide and the Bhopal local community. These cases demonstrate that crisis intensifications 
are the results of dehumanisation, moral justification, euphemistic labelling, attribution of 
blame, advantageous comparison, distorting the consequences, displacement and diffusion of 
responsibility – all these are mechanisms of moral disengagement. More specifically, it is 
expected that understanding how moral disengagement penetrates organisational crisis and 
disaster management can help practitioners, policymakers, and academics redirect strategies, 
policies, and debates. 
Of what value is the epistemological clarification of moral disengagement to organisational 
methodological approaches in crisis management? It has been contended, and very accurately, 
that there is irrefutable thesis lacking empirical proof and evidence that the way organisations 
manage crisis and disaster absolutely matters. Therefore, the theory of moral disengagement, 
as applied in this research, provides an avenue to understand why most organisations are 
vulnerable to unconventional crises and disasters and perhaps clarify how crisis management 
strategies can become flaws and archaic. 
A distinction should be made between deontological and consequentialist ethical (moral) 
transgression in risk and crisis management practice. Deontological ethical perspectives 
consider certain acts as wrong (or good) in and of themselves whereas the latter looks at the 
consequences of an act for guidance of whether it is right or wrong. Furthermore, this research 
contends for both moral absolutism (certain actions are wrong irrespective of the reasons) and 
moral consequentialism (a perspective that whether an act is morally right depends only on 
consequences) approach to risk and crisis management decision making as a pragmatic guide. 
This is because one person’s morality is another person’s evil. In relation to the consideration 
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of moral disengagement in crisis management, deontological arguments tend to prevail – 
especially in terms of the moral disengagement mechanisms covered in this thesis, for example, 
advantageous comparison, dehumanisation and euphemistic labelling are regarded as ethically 
and morally wrong.  
On the other hand, consequentialist arguments in moral psychology and management science 
literature do occasionally surface. Clearly, some have argued that some people engage in 
unethical practice because they do not recognise it’s ethically wrong and as such the 
consequences become unclear. With specific reference to the Niger Delta crises, Alaba & 
Ifelola (2011), Bustany & Wysham (2000), ERA (1998), Fatusin et al. (2010), and Steiner 
(2010) have provided consequentialist arguments that environmental practice such as gas 
flaring is wrong because it causes harm to the environment and affect the health of the local 
people. As such, the current and future debates would perhaps require thorough examination 
of both deontological and consequentialist perspectives when discussing moral disengagement 
in crisis management processes.  
In conclusion, whatever one’s position, there is apparently agreement that justifiable evils such 
as moral disengagement mechanisms are harmful and risky strategies; arguments that would 
remain valid despite the perceived benefits of moral disengagement exploitation in risk and 
crisis management processes. The next chapter will consider the research methodology used in 
this thesis. The case study research method was adopted because of the need to studied risk, 
crisis and disaster in their practical context. The basis for the chosen research method is that 
the utility of existing risk and crisis management models cannot be known without their 
practical application. Therefore, several issues such as research strategy and design, data 
collection methods and triangulation, and sampling techniques and case studies selection, 
research philosophy and ethical considerations are covered in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most crucial aspect in the research process is the methodology underpinning the 
research; and the second issue is how to build explanations from data generated from the 
research process (Vaughan, 2004). The question of how should risk, crisis and disaster be 
research remain unexplored and insufficient attentions have been paid to this issue. In this 
thesis, a research method refers to a technique for collecting data such as a self-completion 
questionnaire, structured or semi-structured interview, or participant observation. It is a 
systematic process of collecting, analysing and interpreting information (data) to increase our 
understanding of the phenomenon in which we are interested or concerned (Saunders et al., 
2012). This process involves questioning assumptions, theories and perceptions through 
objective or evidence-based approach in providing ground-breaking alternative, innovative, 
radical and novel ways of examining the familiar such that it contributes to existing knowledge 
and made significant contributions to the field of risk and crisis management. Therefore, this 
chapter discusses some methodological issues within the context of this research. 
Firstly, it introduces the research philosophy and strategy underpinning this research and 
explains the rationale for mixing philosophical paradigms. The issue of research design and 
justification for adopting a qualitative approach via a multiple case-study approach was 
explained. Secondly, it discusses the instruments used for data collection (semi-structured 
interviews, documents, transcripts of case laws, group network videos, reports and fact sheets) 
and explains how and why these sources of data were selected and used in this thesis. 
Furthermore, the chapter discusses sampling procedures, sample size, informants’ inclusion 
criteria and justification, and issues related to confidentiality and anonymity. This follows by 
discussion of why the research settings (cases) were selected as appropriate for this study. After 
this, there is discussion about data and method triangulation. Thirdly, the chapter explains how 
the data were managed and procedures used for analysis. Fourthly, it explains how the research 
dependability and transferability were achieved. Finally, there were discussion about the ethical 
issues and how this thesis complied with them. 
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6.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
This research extends past theoretical and logical curiosity and aims not simply to uncover the 
interaction between moral disengagement and crisis management but also builds the empirical 
paradigm in ways that existing risk models and strategies are tested, probed, validated. And, as 
a result, alternative effective and sustainable strategies or approaches to deal with 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster are revealed. Specifically, risk and crisis research is 
crucial to understand the utility of existing risk models and strategies given the view that “like 
theories, methodologies cannot be true or false, only more or less useful.” (Silverman, 2001, p. 
2). Thus, the approach taken in conducting this research is guided by the researcher’s 
philosophical standpoint and his view of the relationship between ontology (nature of reality 
or knowledge) and epistemology (how knowledge is generated or acquired). 
Of what relevance is research philosophical awareness to risk, crisis and disaster management 
research? The significance of paradigm in risk research cannot be overemphasised. As Guba 
& Lincoln (1994, p. 116) explain it: “paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, 
ought to go about the business of inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs 
and guides his or her approach.” Previous research found that the philosophical commitments 
and positions adopted in research have a substantial impact on both what we do and how we 
understand what it is we are examining (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 128). Therefore, it is 
imperative to make clear, the core philosophical assumptions underpinning this thesis.  
Firstly, this thesis is not intended to generate or test hypotheses about moral disengagement 
and crisis management to predict events and try to avert them. This perspective implies that a 
positivist and quantitative approach was inappropriate in this study (Saunders et al., 2012). 
This is because positivism approach is concerned with discovering rules and patterns (Hatch & 
Cunliffe, 2006), look for causality and fundamental laws (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008), and 
obtain theories that are almost universal in their implications (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2007). The thesis also rejected positivism paradigm because of its basic tenet that only one 
reality exists, which is inconsistent with core assumption of this study. 
Secondly, this thesis argues that it is practically possible to understand reality from multiple 
views. Thus, the alternative view of anti-positivist/interpretive paradigm was adopted as the 
philosophical orientation for this study. This was confirmed as the most appropriate as the 
research is concerned with multiple conflicting versions of the Niger Delta crises and to some 
extent, understanding the subjective meanings attached to moral disengagement and crisis 
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management from informants’ own frame of reference (Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003; Saunders et al., 2012). This last point is supported by the fact that crises and 
disasters are ambiguous, complex and socially constructed, and therefore cannot be well 
understood and managed from a single viewpoint (Ansell et al., 2010; Buchanan & Denyer, 
2013; Coombs, 2007; Elliott et al., 2010; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Vaughan, 2004; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007). As a result, the phenomena of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster are 
conceptualised as a formless reality which creates unprecedented challenges not in terms of 
how best to analyse the capability of the flea but rather, the failures of the elephants. In 
determining the most appropriate responses to such unconventional events, it is imperative to 
obtain multiple perspectives about the Niger Delta crises to develop a robust theoretical and 
empirical account of such events. 
Thirdly, this thesis favoured practical implications of research due to the researcher “analytical 
curiosity” to understand how moral disengagement and crisis management shape each other 
and affect established risk management standards, firm’s reputation and growth, and weaken 
organisational resilience and risk culture. Through such an “analytic curiosity” in which it is 
argued that risk professionals and academics need to move away from often examining 
primarily responses to managing risks and crises, not in terms of the catastrophic nature of risks 
and crises but in terms of probing and questioning flaws in risk and crisis models or strategies. 
Specifically, risk and crisis research is dominated with multiple interpretations and diverse 
perspectives focusing on how best to manage events (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Coombs, 2007; 
2012; George & Pratt, 2012; Harlow et al., 2011; Kouzmin, 2008; Lagadec, 2007; Pearson & 
Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011; Sellnow & Ulmer, 1998) without spending more time analysing the 
failures of risk models and strategies. This suggests that perhaps we should also spend more 
time analysing the failure of the elephants rather than the capability of the fleas. From a 
pragmatic perspective, it becomes clear that such complex and sensitive issues cannot credibly 
be studied without considering their practical implications. 
Fourthly, although the critical issue is not so much whether research should be philosophically 
informed, but how well we are able to reflect upon our philosophical choices and defend them 
in relation to the alternatives we could have adopted (Johnson & Clark, 2006; Saunders et al., 
2012; Table 6.1). Nonetheless, when philosophical positions are neglected, the appropriateness 
or relevance of the research is undermined and the reliability of the findings when matched 
with objective evidence becomes questionable. Therefore, this thesis takes the position that 
dangerous events (risks, crises and disasters) are not necessarily governed by pre-determined 
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configurations (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991; Collis & Hussey, 2003; Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Saunders et al., 2012) but evolve over a period because of individual and 
organisation actions; and that risk/crisis models are mostly relevant where they support action 
(Kelemen & Rumens, 2008).  
Lastly, the discussion above suggests that this thesis approach is based on an interpretivist 
paradigm. This is largely the case, but not exclusively so. This thesis asserts that the relevance 
of risk and crisis management models and strategies is their practical implications. To inform 
practice, part of this research is to challenge the belief that existing conventional risk and crisis 
management methodologies fit emerging unconventional risks and crises. Therefore, the thesis 
involves evaluating risk and crisis theories or beliefs in terms of the success of their practical 
application, aspects associated with a pragmatist paradigm. It is reasonable to state that the 
philosophical approach is mixed: a mainly interpretivist approach with some aspects of 
pragmatism. Hence, pragmatist and interpretivist paradigms were adopted using subjective 
evidence combined with multiple existing secondary data and primary data as discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Table 6.1: Research Paradigms Affecting Risk, Crisis and Disaster Research 
Paradigms Basic principles Investigator Role Implication and ideal methods 
Positivism  The world is external and 
objective. 
 Knowledge is valid only if it 
is based on world 
observations of external 
reality. 
 Universal or general laws 
exist or that theoretical 
models can be developed that 
are generalizable, can explain 
cause and effect relationships 
and which lend themselves to 
predicting outcomes (Hatch & 
Cunliffe, 2006). 
 Observer is independent. 
 Science is value-free. 
 Focus on facts 
gathered through 
direct observation 
and experience 
(Saunders, Lewis, 
& Thornhill, 
2007). 
 Look for causality 
and fundamental 
laws. 
 Reduce 
phenomenon to 
simplest elements. 
 Formulate 
hypotheses and 
then test them. 
 Operationalising 
concepts so that they can 
be measured. 
 Taking large samples. 
 Measurement takes the 
form of using quantitative 
methods such as surveys, 
experiments, and 
statistical analysis 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008). 
 Data gathering is meant 
to move toward universal 
theories and prediction of 
behaviour. 
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 Neutral-objective 
person with an 
authoritative voice 
in write-up. 
 Obtain theories 
that are (nearly) 
universal in their 
implications. 
 Uses quantitative 
measures to show 
relationship 
between a small 
numbers of 
variables 
abstracted from 
context. 
Phenomenologist  How humans make sense of 
the world around us. 
 The world is socially 
constructed and subjective. 
 Observer is part of what 
observed. 
 Science is driven by human 
interests. 
 Focus on 
meanings. 
 Try to understand 
what is happening. 
 Look at the totality 
of each situation. 
 Develop ideas 
through induction 
from data. 
 Using multiple methods 
to establish different 
views of phenomena. 
 Small samples 
investigated in-depth or 
over time. 
Pragmatism  Concepts are only relevant 
where they support action 
(Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). 
 The relevance of the meaning 
of an idea (or a research 
finding) is its practical 
implications. 
 Concentrate on the 
research questions 
which help 
determine the 
researcher position 
on the continua. 
 Evaluate theories 
or beliefs in terms 
of the success of 
their practical 
application. 
 It is perfectly possible to 
work with different 
philosophical positions 
(Saunders et al., 2012). 
 Reflecting this research 
position that multiple 
methods are often 
possible and highly 
appropriate within one 
study. 
Interpretivism  Consider that multiple 
realities exist. 
 Grasp the 
subjective 
 Clarification and 
explanation is made 
through the researcher 
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 Understanding is subjective. 
Meanings and understandings 
are plural; individuals and 
groups see and interpret 
reality through their own 
lenses. 
 All knowledge is relative to 
the knower. 
 How people view or perceive 
an object or event and the 
meaning that they attribute to 
it are what really matter. 
 People look at matters 
through distinct lenses and 
reach somewhat different 
conclusions. 
 Multiple conflicting versions 
of the same event or object 
can be true at the same time. 
For example, the person who 
call for adoption of denial, 
blame, and attack the accuser 
as strategies for managing 
crisis is no more correct than 
the person who calls for 
apology response, accidental 
issue, and/or differentiate the 
fact. Each person has different 
experiences, knowledge, and 
perspectives. 
meaning of social 
action. 
 Taking an 
interpretative 
stance can mean 
that the researcher 
may come up with 
surprising findings 
or at least findings 
that appear 
surprising if a 
largely external 
stance is taken. 
 Understand 
differences 
between humans in 
our role as social 
actors. 
 Highlights the 
difference between 
conducting 
research among 
people rather about 
objects (Saunders 
et al., 2012). 
own lenses base on 
participants’ observation, 
and/or interviews. 
 Describe particular 
events, processes, or 
culture from the 
perspective of the 
participants often using 
qualitative techniques. 
 Specifies the conditions 
under which themes seem 
to hold. 
 Interested in contending 
and overlapping versions 
of reality. 
 Many truths are possible. 
 Descriptions and analysis 
foster understanding of 
political, social, and 
cultural processes and 
practices; may be 
relevant to theory, 
practice or policy on 
which action can be 
based. 
Realism  Relate to scientific enquiry. 
 What we sense is reality: that 
objects have an existence 
independent of the human 
mind (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 There is a reality quite 
independent of the mind. 
 Focus on finding 
independent 
objective facts. 
 Contrast two 
practices of 
realism to 
illuminate 
meanings. For 
example, realism is 
opposed to 
 Using comparative 
analysis to map different 
philosophical stance to 
make the philosophical 
assumptions 
underpinning research 
becomes clearer. 
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idealism – the 
theory that only the 
mind and its 
contexts exist 
(Crotty, 1998). 
Postmodernism  Reality is not fully knowable. 
 Truth is impossible to define. 
 At the extreme, claim that 
nothing at all can be known 
and experiences and feelings 
can only be share with one 
another. 
 Neutrality is impossible 
because everyone has 
interests and attitudes that 
influence how topics are 
selected, what questions are 
asked, and what means of 
analysis are considered 
appropriate. 
 Consider that the 
researcher’s view 
is only one among 
many views and 
has no more 
legitimacy than the 
views of the people 
studied. 
 There is no one 
correct view as 
positivists claim. 
 Aware that literary 
texts do not have 
objective 
meanings and true 
interpretations. 
 Present a range of 
views and 
conclusions in as 
raw a fashion as 
possible. 
 Consider that only 
the interviewees’ 
voices should be 
presented through 
unedited 
videotapes or 
transcripts of 
recordings of what 
was said. 
 Find out what to do now 
that both the age of faith 
and the enlightenment 
seem beyond recovery. 
 Use different analysis and 
aware of the limitations. 
Given that no two 
researchers are exactly 
alike, so the conclusions 
researchers are unlikely 
to match. 
Feminism  Reality is interpreted through 
gendered lenses often in ways 
that reflect existing 
male/female hierarchies. 
 Emphasis on how 
gender relations 
and gender 
dominance impact 
social behaviours. 
 Research is undertaken to 
increase understanding of 
gender-based differences 
and dominance patterns 
often with the goal of 
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 Respectfully listen 
or observe and 
show empathy 
toward those being 
studied. 
reducing gender-based 
inequalities. 
Source: Author (2017) 
 
6.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN 
This thesis views research strategy as a general orientation to the conduct of social research 
(Bryman, 2008). The current view is that the ontological and epistemological standpoints of 
researchers’ influence their research strategy, whether they chose a qualitative or quantitative 
research (Creswell et al., 2003; Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Saunders 
et al., 2012; Mkansi & Acheampong, 2012). In a practical context, qualitative research strategy 
is associated with an interpretive philosophy (Saunders et al., 2012) because researchers need 
to make sense of the subjective and socially constructed meanings expressed about the 
phenomenon being studied (Bryman, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012).  
Qualitative approach is focused more on the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of human behaviour. It usually 
emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data; and 
maintains that researcher’s role is to try to make sense through interpretation: to explore, 
elucidate and then interpret bits of reality (Bryman, 2008; Creswell et al., 2003; Saunders et 
al., 2009). By contrast, quantitative research strategy is generally associated with positivism, 
which tends to favour the notion that the objective facts can only be understood and mastered 
by statistics and experiments (Bryman, 2008; Johnson & Clark, 2006; Saunders et al., 2014). 
It entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research where focus is 
placed on the testing of theories; and it embodies a view of social reality as an external, 
objective reality (Bryman, 2008, p. 22). 
The qualitative/quantitative debate has been recognised as a useful way of classifying different 
techniques (Bryman, 2008), however research is a complex task and studies may employ one 
method or a combination of techniques (Saunders et al., 2012; Silverman, 2000; Steen & 
Roberts, 2011). The mixing of qualitative and quantitative approaches has also become popular 
in research. This has added another dimension to research strategy, called mixed-methods 
research. The general idea is triangulation and complementarity between research approaches 
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(Bryman, 2008). Though, it is found that some ideas are not categorically shared between 
approaches so triangulation of this kind may not function well. Thus, critics recommend the 
triangulating or complementing of data within one approach. This involves that the data used 
to investigate the same phenomenon come from two or more research methods, tools, or 
strategies (Bryman, 2008; Creswell et al., 2003; Saunders et al., 2012).   
As a result, there was greater attention paid to “mixing” of theories and data but given the 
nature of risk and crisis research (especially the research questions, context and focus of this 
study) quantitative and mixed research approaches were consider as inappropriate. Table 6.2 
provides a summary of the differences among qualitative, quantitative and mixed research 
orientation, in context of their various epistemological and ontological philosophies. 
 
Table 6.2: Fundamental differences between quantitative, qualitative and mixed research 
strategies 
 Qualitative  Quantitative Mixed 
Principal orientation to the 
role of theory in relation to 
research 
Inductive: generation of 
theory 
Deductive: testing of 
theory 
Deductive and inductive: 
theory testing and generation 
Epistemological orientation Interpretivism, post-
positivism (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; 
McNabb, 2008). 
Naturalism, positivism, 
post-positivism (Polit & 
Beck, 2008; Steen & 
Roberts, 2011) 
Interpretivism, critical 
realism, pragmatism and/or 
positivism (Johnson & 
Onwuegubuzie, 2004; 
Denscombe, 2007; Barrett, 
2010) 
Ontological orientation Constructionism, 
critical theory, critical 
paradigms (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Saunders 
et al., 2009) 
Objectivism, critical 
realism, social 
constructionism 
(Alvesson & Skoldberg, 
2009) 
Pragmatism, Objectivism, 
subjectivism, and/or 
constructionism (Saunders et 
al., 2009). 
Source: Author (2017) 
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6.3.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
This study adopted qualitative research strategy because of its relevance to the nature of the 
research aims, and not least due to the richness of qualitative data (Creswell et al., 2003). Yet, 
critics of the researchers who adopt a qualitative approach argue that interpretivist researchers 
have abandoned scientific rigour and that their studies are not valid because it is impossible to 
generalise about findings which are based on a specific set of circumstances or individuals 
(Bryman, 2008). The opponents also argue that findings of qualitative research are not tested 
to discover whether they are statistically significant or due to chance (Saunders et al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, there are four main reasons for chosen qualitative research in this study. 
Firstly, a qualitative paradigm was chosen because it offers the opportunity to operate within a 
natural setting or research context to establish trust, participation, access to meanings and in-
depth understanding (Saunders et al., 2012). This type of research allows the researcher to 
extract and understand the informants’ account of events, and copes better with uncertain and 
complex nature of unconventional risks, crises and disasters (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Elliott, 
2009; Elliott & Macpherson, 2010). It offers a richer explanation in our understanding of 
complex and unconventional risks, crises and disasters. 
Secondly, qualitative research adopts flexible methods that are sensitive to the social context 
in which data is produced (Bryman, 2008). This paradigm is relevant to this study because any 
investigation of an issue concerning unconventional risks, crises and disasters ought to be 
flexible enough to accommodate negotiated knowledge of reality being a subject that is 
multifaceted, sensitive and difficult to research (Gundel, 2005; Chikudate, 2009; Poortinga et 
al., 2004; Weick, 2010). The design of methods for this study is non-standardised and flexible 
enough to manage this necessary complexity. 
Thirdly, qualitative research embodies a view of social reality as a continuously shifting 
emergent property of individuals’ creation (Bryman, 2008). This position is integral to the view 
that unconventional risks and crises by their nature are always changing, and evolve in part due 
to individuals’ creation (Okon & Akunna, 2010; Perrow, 1999; Steiner, 2010; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997). The research aims and questions in a qualitative study can focus beyond 
individuals to entire organisations or industries. This was the case with this study, as the 
research extends to organisations and industry. 
Fourthly, qualitative research is also rooted in interpretivism philosophy because it is 
concerned with the interpretation of the social world (Bryman, 2008), in which unconventional 
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risks, crises and disasters are constructed, understood and experienced. Through qualitative 
research approach, which favour an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon, this study 
captured moral disengagement in processes of risk and crisis management. This helped the 
researcher to produce a holistic picture of the interaction between moral disengagement and 
crisis management in the Niger Delta crises. 
 
6.3.2 CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
The fact that qualitative research is a complex, changing and contested field because of multiple 
methodologies and research practices (Punch, 2005, p. 134), makes researchers to have difficult 
task in choosing an appropriate research method from the many available (including survey, 
experiment, archival analysis, historical and case study) (Yin, 2009). As described in section 
6.3.1 above, the nature of this study and type of data needed fall into a case study, multiple-
case study. Although case study research can involve quantitative or qualitative data, either one 
or both, there is a strong association between qualitative research with case study research 
(Saunders et al., 2014) owing to the need to consider in detail, intensity and contextual 
characteristics of the phenomena (Yin, 2009). Therefore, the case study design is selected due 
to the subjective and sensitive nature of risks and crises pervading the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. 
The case study strategy provided the means to test, validate, or refute existing risk/crisis models 
and their practical relevance. Furthermore, given that this research design is influenced by a 
pragmatic view asserting that it is perfectly possible to work with different philosophical 
positions and that mixing multiple methods are possible in a single research project (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012), a case study research design is adopted. The case 
study design provides opportunities to cover the multifaceted procedures of combining, 
integrating, linking, and employing multi-methods due to the amorphous nature of 
unconventional risk, crisis, and disaster (cf. Creswell, Plano, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003; 
Johnson & Onwuegubuzie, 2004). 
There are other two fundamental reasons for adopting case study research strategy. Firstly, 
research relating to risks, crises and disasters are now frequently studied in the context of 
practical past or current case studies (For example, Vaughan, 1996; Perrow, 1999; Gundel, 
2005; Chikudate, 2009; Weick, 2010). Despite being perceived as unexpected events; most 
crises and disasters are known to have several precursors or warnings identified in hindsight 
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by crises investigators and consultants. This expression is rooted in Barry Turner’s failure of 
foresight framework (Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) which was based on practical 
cases of risk, crisis and disaster. Turner examined public inquiry reports from 84 accidents over 
an eleven-year period published by the British Government, in developing his framework. 
Turner’s framework was developed using grounded methods by conducting, a more in-depth 
analysis of three practical cases of accidents (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). These accidents were 
the landslide disaster in Aberfan, Wales in 1966, the collision between a large road transporter 
with a train at a railway crossing in Hixon in 1968, and a fire in a holiday resort at the Isle of 
Man in 1973 (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). A common feature of these three accidents was that a 
large and complex safety problem was dealt with by several groups operating in separate 
organisations with information and coordination failures among them. Based on these findings, 
Turner emphasized the process leading up to a disaster, by proposing six stages of crisis 
development (notionally normal starting point, incubation period, precipitating event, onset, 
rescue and salvage, and cultural readjustment) which can unfold over long periods of time 
(Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3: Summary Explanation of Stages in Man-Made Disasters Model 
The Sequence of Events Associated with a Failure of Foresight 
Stage I Notionally normal starting point: 
(a) Initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards 
(b) Associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of practice, mores, and 
folkways. 
Stage II Incubation period: the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds with the 
accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance. 
Stage III Precipitating event: forces itself to the attention and transforms general perceptions of Stage II. 
Stage IV Onset: the immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural precautions become apparent. 
Stage V Rescue and salvage – first stage adjustment: the immediate post-collapse situation is recognised 
in ad hoc adjustments which permits the work of rescue and salvage to be started. 
Stage VI Full cultural readjustment: an inquiry or assessment is carried out, and beliefs and precautionary 
norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of the world. 
Source: Turner (1976, p. 381) 
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Like Turner & Pidgeon (1997), Constantinides (2013) studied the Mari disaster in a naval base 
in Cyprus in July 2011 where a large explosion killed 13 people and injured 62 others, whilst 
destroying the major power plant of the Island using secondary analysis of the public inquiry 
report (Polyviou Report) into the detainment of the vessel Monchegorsk by the Cypriot 
government in 2009 upon the request of the US government was used. More specifically, 
Constantinides’s (2013) methodology involves using mixed data which were carefully 
analysed by labelling and categorising the phenomena encountered, and following grounded 
methods of analysis (Glaser, 1992) patterns of relationships between the observed categories 
were sought and common themes were developed. Furthermore, in the study of the King’s 
Cross underground fire, Borodzicz (2005) employed a case study approach based on an original 
investigation report produced for the European Union by the Department of Transport under 
the direction of Desmond Fennell OBE, QC. The Inquiry produced a publicly available report 
and transcription of interviews carried out with selected witnesses and consultant experts, 
copies of letters and reports from all the key agencies involved and the transcripts which 
comprised 300 box files of data each relating to different aspects of the public inquiry were 
likewise available.  
Borodzicz’s (2005) underlying methodology used in the case study was an ethnographic 
treatment of secondary data, where both the findings of the inquiry and the inquiry process 
itself were problematically considered as data. In addition, several other studies have adopted 
the case study approach founded on Public Inquiries Reports (Toft & Reynolds, 2005; Brown, 
2005; Perrow, 2007; Elliott, 2009; Elliott & Macpherson, 2010). These past studies present 
robust evidence that risk, crisis and disaster research cannot be complete without a link to real-
life case. In fact, as suggested in this thesis, consultants have been like big game hunters 
embarking on their safaris for tusks and trophies while academics have preferred photo safaris 
– keeping a safe distance from the animals they pretend to observe (Lampel, Mintzberg, Quinn, 
& Ghoshal, 2014). Accordingly, risk and crisis research that does not link to case-studies 
arguably only raises interesting findings and observations that do little to support action or how 
to practically manage unconventional risks, crises and disasters. Thus, ‘relevance to practice’ 
is crucial in risk and crisis research. In context, this creates a “susceptibility problem” in which 
we simply end up analysing the capability of the flea instead of spending more time analysing 
the failures of the elephant. 
Therefore, like these previous studies (e.g. Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Perrow, 
1999; 2007; Borodzizc, 2005; Toft & Reynolds, 2005; Brown, 2005; Perrow, 2007; Elliott, 
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2009; Elliott & Macpherson, 2010; Constantinides, 2013), this study is anchored on practical 
case studies (Chapters Two and Three) in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria using datasets from 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) inquiry report into the investigation of  
risks, disasters and crises within the study area (see section 6.4.6). 
Secondly, the nature of the research context and questions inspired the case study research 
strategy due to evidence from empirical studies that concepts are only relevant where they 
support action (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008) and that combining different research methods can 
provide a more comprehensive view on risk issues than any one methodology alone (cf. 
Bryman & Bell, 2003; Poortinga et al., 2004). Albeit this does not provide conclusive evidence 
that one strand of research is superior to another. Moreover, the question of which 
approach/method is more or most appropriate for risk and crisis management research has not 
been explicitly addressed in extant studies. Thus, it was maintained in previous research that 
the appropriateness of the techniques/methods used in risk, crisis and disaster assessment 
should be reviewed by other experts who can comment on the data used in the risk assessment 
and the validity of the research (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). 
 
6.3.2.1 CASE SELECTION STRATEGIES 
The two foundational case studies of Shell & Ogoni crisis, and Chevron & Ilaje crisis (Chapters 
Two and Three) were selected because of the different allegations of human rights abuse in 
those crises, and the ineffectiveness of the risk/crisis management models used. The research 
also selects the case studies to investigate risk and crisis management methodologies and 
practices of two different multinational organisations in dealing with similar cases of crises and 
disasters in Nigeria. 
The two communities (Ogoni and Ilaje) were chosen for similar specific reasons. These 
communities are oil producing communities where multinational oil companies operate. Like 
in Ogoni where Shell Nigeria operated from 1958 until December 1993, Chevron Nigeria has 
been operating in Ilaje since 1962 to date (Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011). Likewise, the two 
multinational oil companies have both been accused of causing massive environmental harm 
to both the people and the environment where they operate. In addition, these companies have 
been extensively criticised for ineffective risk and crisis management practices within the 
chosen communities (Eweje, 2006; Aigbedion & Iyayi, 2007; Bassey, 2008; Aghalino, 2009; 
Ololajulo, 2009; Ubhenin, 2013). Furthermore, both companies have been accused of human 
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right abuses in processes of crisis management and for further causing devastation to the 
already vulnerable people where they operate (Okon & Akunna, 2010; Steiner, 2010; Alaba & 
Ifelola, 2011; Oshowofasa, Anuta, & Aiyedogbon, 2012).  
Shell and Chevron were often named as sponsors of Nigerian government soldiers known for 
their oppression, suppression, dehumanisation, abusing women, maltreating civilians, 
torturing, and killing protesters who possibly campaign against multinational oil companies for 
polluting and degrading the environment (ERA, 2012; Steiner, 2010). For example, the 
prominent case of Chevron vs. Bowoto in Ilaje community instituted in USA and Shell vs Saro-
Wiwa case in Ogoni community also instituted in the United States further provide additional 
information. In both court cases, these organisations were accused of environmental pollution 
and degradation, committing human right abuses and dehumanising the local communities, and 
sponsoring the Nigerian government solders’ who consequently attacked and killed protesters 
and local communities’ members because of environmental protests. 
Previous alternative standpoints maintain that the case study approach that focuses on an 
intense investigation of multiple variables within a real-life context could contribute to building 
the best available evidence to guide practitioners (Silverman, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Dattilio, 
2006; Saunders et al., 2012). This thesis further relies on comparing several other similar global 
cases of crises and disasters to increase the reliability and validity of the research data. Thus, it 
can be concluded that external and construct validity, credibility, and reliability of the findings 
from this research are greatly enhanced and improved through the chosen research 
methodology. 
 
6.3.3 PILOT STUDY OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis strictly complied with the recommendation that techniques or methods used in risk, 
crisis and disaster should be reviewed by other experts who can comment on their 
appropriateness (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). Thus, the research instruments or tools were 
initially piloted with five risk professionals and academics who comments on the 
appropriateness of the research method. The purpose of testing the research instrument (semi-
structured interview) was to ensure that informants will have no problems answering the 
questions (Saunders et al., 2014). It is also intended to ensure that the data collected will enable 
the research questions to be answered. Three risk professionals commented on the suitability 
of the questions and suggested areas that need improvement. Likewise, two other academic 
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experts make suggestion about the nature of the questions, purpose and fit to the research aims. 
These recommendations from experts allow the researcher to appropriately refine and structure 
the research questions and instruments (Yin, 2009). 
The pilot study also allows the researcher to ensure that main elements of a field research 
project (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) such as research question, prior work, research 
design, contribution, validity and reliability and organisation of results/findings are considered 
(Table 6.4). The opponents of pilot study argue that the research can become structured, in 
which case biases are introduced into the findings. However, following the pilot study, the 
case-study research design was found most appropriate given this research philosophical 
assumptions, context, questions and objectives. In fact, as previous stated, the fundamental 
purpose of this thesis is to explore and advance understanding of moral disengagement in risk, 
crisis and disaster situations.  
Thus, from the pilot study findings, alternative research strategies such as experiment and 
ethnography were not considered due to their inappropriateness as a framework for analysing 
the case studies of Shell and Chevron Nigeria. Also, the need to understand sensitive and 
normative issues like ethics, perceptions, trust and moral disengagement in risk and crisis 
situations make practical case studies most appropriate (Creswell et al., 2003; Johnson & 
Onwuegubuzie, 2004; Saunders et al., 2012). In conclusion, the influence of earlier research 
experience of the researcher also helped to make the final decision in chosen case study 
approach for this study. The researcher accepts that the case studies on their own are 
insufficient for drawing generalised conclusions for the whole population of multinational oil 
companies in Nigeria within a strict methodological sense (Saunders et al., 2012), it is intended 
that further research will support this research findings. Given the sensitive nature of the 
research topic under investigation, the researcher belief that the findings from these case studies 
can make a significant contribution towards a better understanding of moral disengagement in 
context of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster management. 
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Table 6.4: Highlights of Key Elements of This Thesis 
Element Description and Notable Issues Consider 
Research question  Focuses a study 
 Narrows the topic area to a meaningful, manageable size 
 Addresses issues of theoretical and practical significance 
 Points toward a viable research project – that is, the question can be 
answered 
Prior work  The state of the literature 
 Existing theoretical and empirical research papers that pertain to the topic 
of the current study 
 An aid in identifying unanswered questions, unexplored areas, relevant 
constructs, and areas of low agreement 
Research design  Type of data to be collected 
 Data collection tools and procedures 
 Type of analysis planned 
 Finding/selection of sites for collecting data 
Contribution to literature  The theory developed as an outcome of the study 
 New ideas that contest conventional wisdom, challenge prior assumptions, 
integrate prior streams of research to produce a new model, or refine 
understanding of a phenomenon 
 Any practical insights drawn from the findings that may be suggested by 
the researcher 
Reliability  Are the results of the study repeatable 
 Are the measures devised for concepts consistent 
Validity  What is the integrity level of the conclusions that are generated from the 
research 
 Does the measure of a concept really reflect the concept that it is intended 
(measurement validity) 
 Does the conclusion that incorporates a causal relationship between two or 
more variables hold water (internal validity). For example, if we suggest 
that x causes y, can we be sure that it is x that is responsible for variation in 
y and not something else that is producing an apparent causal relationship 
Organisation of results  How well is the objectivity of the research process through which the data 
and field notes are developed into conclusions demonstrated. 
 Are the process of the case description detailed and emerging issues or 
constructs carefully captured 
 Is there cross-case analysis which compares and contrast the patterns 
emerging from the detailed write-ups. 
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 Like in this research, the researcher selects two cases at a time and compares 
them noting the differences and similarities and repeat the procedure until 
all cases have been considered. 
 Results are organised on different chapters with each of the chapter having 
a separate research questions and background but linked to the overall aim 
and objectives. 
 The research outcomes in each of the chapter can be published and 
disseminated easily because of their nature. The work of every chapter is 
perhaps a mono-research within a broader study and therefore makes 
publication quite easy. 
Source: Adapted from Edmondson & McManus (2007) 
 
6.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Relevant studies (as discussed above) suggest that qualitative research through multiple case 
study is contingent on the use of multiple-sources for collecting rich evidence to understand 
the phenomenon. Therefore, data for this study were collected through five main research 
instruments: (1) semi-structured interviews with practicing risk/crisis leaders and other 
stakeholders; (2) transcripts of case laws and historical records; (3) reports and fact sheets; (4) 
archival videos and footage; and (5) documents. The data were collected between October 2013 
and September 2015, guided by saturation of the information, when the non-contribution of 
new data relating to the research aims was observed. 
 
6.4.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
The semi-structured interviews are one of the main sources of data used in this study. The 
informants responded to several questions (see appendix 3) to helped offer special insights in 
the understanding of moral disengagement and crisis management in the Niger Delta crises as 
a phenomenon of investigation (Creswell et al., 2003). Although interviews are labour 
intensive, time-consuming and sometimes responses can be open to bias (Bryman, 2008; 
Saunders et al., 2014; Silverman, 2000), there are associated advantages to consider in this 
research. First, the semi-structured interviews were necessary to explore what might have 
changed over the period of the crisis incubation and the current reality of the case studies under 
investigation (historical period covered: 1990-2016). Secondly, the researcher was able to elicit 
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local communities’ concerns and observe their emotional responses to the environmental crises 
and disasters in the Niger Delta, and endeavour to deal with ethical implications of the research. 
Thirdly, the semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to elicit more relevant information 
that would help to further answers the research questions relating to impact of vulnerable 
environment on vulnerable people, moral disengagement and crisis management in Nigeria. 
More specifically, the targeted interviewees/informants were selected through purposive 
sampling as to ensure that only those directly responsible for the management of the crises and 
those affected are recruited and included. Although, purposive sampling has relative limitations 
because other stakeholders involved in the crisis but outside the researcher knowledge could 
have possibly been neglected. However, given the research context, time and cost, the semi-
structured interviews were used to validate findings from other sources of data (e.g. national 
inquiry documents, case laws, and archival videos) as confirmed in previous research 
(Saunders et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, research has even confirmed that open-interviews (in-depth interviews or semi-
structured interviews) are perhaps the most frequently used form of qualitative research in 
management science and linked to exploratory and explanatory research (Saunders et al., 
2012). In total, there were twenty (n=20) semi-structured interviews conducted due to time and 
resources constraint, and feasibility of the research project. Each of the interviews lasted an 
average of thirty minutes to one hour. The interviews were tape recorded with the informants’ 
permission. One disadvantage with the use of voice recorder was that it prolongs the length of 
time it took to transcribe the audio data captured. The transcription exercise took over three 
months to transcribe the data and read over again to ensure data are not lost in the process. The 
approach however allowed the researcher to concentrate on the participants’ responses, secures 
accurate accounts of conversations and helps to avoid losing data or misinterpreting it (Bryman, 
2008; Saunders et al., 2014). Though, it would have been most appropriate to increase the 
interview numbers for increased sample size. Nevertheless, the strategic nature and relevance 
of the recruited participants to the phenomena investigated in the thesis reduce the possibility 
of inappropriate and relative sampling in the research. 
 
6.4.1.1 SAMPLE PROCEDURES AND ISSUES 
The issue of research sample is critical to the credibility, validity and relevance of the potential 
research findings, conclusions and possible recommendations of any research. Therefore, 
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sampling issues remain critical. The issue of concern is that the sample represents the 
population of the study; the sample size is adequate, practicable and considerable of time and 
cost; representative sample provides avenues to generalise the research findings; the research 
samples are not biased; balance over-representation and under-representation of sample to 
reduce sampling error.  
In practice, the sampling frame which involves stating clearly the listing of all units in the 
population of the study from which the research samples were selected is well-established in 
this study (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Thus, the exact sample size for the semi-interviews 
composed of twenty (n=20) informants purposively drawn (as against quota, simple random 
and multi-stage cluster sampling techniques) mainly from key informants who are well-
informed, involved or concerned with the Niger Delta crises. The sample size justification, 
participants’ inclusion criteria as well as number of interviewees per organisations are 
presented in the Table 6.5 below. 
Table 6.5: Sample Size, Inclusion Criteria and Justification 
S/N Interviewees 
Data 
Stakeholders 
Data 
Stakeholders 
Classification 
Informants Inclusion Criteria Justification 
1 Two (2) Niger Delta 
Development 
Commission 
(NDDC) 
 
 
Government 
Agencies 
 Informants with past and current 
knowledge of government 
roles in the Niger Delta crisis. 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with the crisis. 
 Informants responsible for 
managing risk and crisis 
situations 
The nature of this research 
topic and issues covered 
demand that only relevant 
participants or informants are 
included in the study. Most 
importantly, multiple sources 
of data which have been 
extensively discussed in this 
research are being used to 
triangulate data, but fewer 
interviews are further use to 
enrich the data collected. In 
fact, to increase the research 
content validity, interviews are 
only intended with key 
informants in the organisation 
who are most familiar with the 
crisis and disaster situations 
under investigation. 
 
Therefore, for critics who 
would suggest or argue that 
sample size of twenty (20) 
interview is insufficient, such 
critics should note that 
number of interviews required 
in research fundamentally 
depends on the nature of 
2 Two (2) Ondo State Oil 
Producing 
Areas 
Development 
Commission 
(OSOPADEC) 
 Informants with past and current 
knowledge of government 
roles in the Niger Delta crisis. 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with local people. 
 Informants responsible for 
making crisis decisions. 
3 Two (2) Nigerian 
National 
Petroleum 
Corporation 
(NNPC) 
 
 
Nigerian Oil 
and Gas 
Regulators 
 Informants with past and current 
knowledge of how regulators 
have managed the crisis 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with the crisis. 
 Informants responsible for 
strategies implementation. 
4 Two (2) Department of 
Petroleum 
 Informants responsible for 
taking actions when oil 
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Resources 
(DPR) 
companies violate oil and gas 
regulations. 
 Informants with past and current 
knowledge of government 
roles in the Niger Delta crisis. 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with multinational 
oil companies. 
research questions, how many 
sources of data used, and the 
research strategy. In practice, 
the issue further concerns 
whether interviews are the 
only source of data collection, 
in which case large number of 
interviews might be required. 
Thus, where multiple sources 
of data are being used like in 
this research, critics who call 
for several numbers of 
interviews to be conducted 
must acknowledged that by 
simply conducting multiple 
interviews do not necessarily 
increases research credibility 
and trustworthiness.  
 
Furthermore, the sensitive 
nature of risk and crisis 
research often requires that 
only fewer interviewees or 
informants can be identified 
and are willing to be 
interview. In fact, even though 
crisis and disaster situations 
often affect several 
stakeholders, only handful 
individuals are responsible for 
making decisions affecting 
their management or directly 
involved in processes of 
managing them. The 
implication is that only 
relevant number of individuals 
who have different roles, 
experience, backgrounds, and 
any other source of variability 
that might influence answers 
are included in risk and crisis 
research. This is the basic 
distinction of risk and crisis 
management research from 
other fields. 
 
In addition, this research is an 
in-depth exploration of moral 
disengagement in which 
sensitive and organisational 
issues are being explored. This 
requires longer and less 
structured interviews 
technique to allow for more 
probing into the issues 
identified from extant studies 
which are pertinent to 
effective risk and crisis 
5 Two (2) Movement for 
the Survival of 
Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) 
 
Local and 
Regional 
Community 
Representative 
Organisations 
 Informants responsible for 
negotiation with multinational 
oil companies. 
 Informants with past and current 
knowledge of government 
roles in the Niger Delta crisis. 
 Informants responsible for 
negotiation with government 
agencies. 
6 Two (2) Ilaje Regional 
Development 
Committee 
(IRDC) 
 Informants responsible for 
managing communities’ 
agitations. 
 Informants responsible for 
dealing with multinational oil 
companies on behalf of local 
communities. 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with the crisis 
situations. 
7 Four (4) Shell Nigeria Multinational 
Oil and Gas 
Companies 
 Informants who have first-hand 
knowledge about the Niger 
Delta crisis. 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with the risk, crisis 
and disaster situations. 
 Informants who have deal with 
regulatory agencies, 
government and local 
communities. 
8 Four (4) Chevron 
Nigeria 
 Informants who have first-hand 
knowledge about the Niger 
Delta crisis. 
 Informants directly responsible 
for dealing with the risk, crisis 
and disaster situations. 
 Informants who have deal with 
regulatory agencies, 
government and local 
communities. 
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management. Thus, it is vital 
to take into consideration time 
resources (for both conducting 
interviews and analysing the 
interview data) and the need to 
avoid “drowning in a sea of 
data” syndrome because once 
data is collected, researcher is 
obliged to analyse it. 
Source: Author (2017) 
Overall, the sample consists of senior managers/leaders purposively drawn from government 
agencies (NDDC and OSOPADEC), oil and gas regulators (NNPC and DPR), local and 
regional community representative organisations (MOSOP and IRDC) and two multinational 
oil companies operating in Nigeria (Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria). The aim of selecting 
the sample purposely was twofold. First, we wanted to document the phenomenon of moral 
disengagement in extreme case context and show that it could perpetuate organisations in at 
least one major industry. Secondly, we wanted to delve into empirical validation of existing 
risk, crisis and disaster management models and techniques.  
As a result, we searched for an industry (oil and gas) that a priori we believed would have a 
large representation of risk, crisis and disaster management models – an extreme case. 
Therefore, we chose to explore the oil and gas industry, an industry where anecdotal evidence 
suggested that multinational oil firms were plagued with several cases of risk, crisis and disaster 
situations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria were often 
accused of double standards in their risk, crisis and disaster management practice in Nigeria. 
For each firm, we attempted to determine whether moral disengagement perpetuates their risk, 
crisis and disaster management practice. This information came primarily from independent 
inquiry datasets and documentary datasets. 
 
6.4.2 TRANSCRIPTS OF CASE LAWS AND HISTORICAL RECORDS 
The second research tool used to collect raw data came from transcripts of case laws, the case 
of Bowoto v. Chevron Corporation, C99-02506 SI (2007), Ejama-Ebubu community v. Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (2010), Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Group, 133S.Ct. 1659 
(2013), Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell Petroleum (2000), Wiwa et al. v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (2000). The transcripts are over thirty (n=30) files, numbering over 
600 pages of documents. These transcripts of the case laws were obtained from publicly 
available database and treated as data for this study due to the following reasons. First, these 
171 
 
transcripts contain accounts of the Niger Delta crises especially the Shell – Ogoni crisis 
(Chapter Two) and the Chevron – Ilaje crisis (Chapter Three). Secondly, the accounts of events 
contain in the transcripts are direct evidences from the organisations involved in the crises and 
testimonies of the different stakeholders from the local communities.  
Thirdly, the transcripts contain each stakeholders’ version of events during the crises 
incubation period. Fourthly, the transcripts contain sensitive issues which the organisations 
(Chevron and Shell) would not have given the researcher access to obtain. Therefore, the 
transcripts allow the researcher to gain rich qualitative data especially on the proximate cause, 
rationalisation, arguments and irrationalities behind stakeholders’ perceptions, and responses 
to the Niger Delta crises. Furthermore, these transcripts contain historical records of the Niger 
Delta crises, which may have been lost to any single informant due to ‘historical amnesia’. 
Although these transcripts are legal documents which means that blame issues are present and 
parties are also trying to minimise their legal liability. Moreover, parties may have overstated 
their versions of the events. However, the transcripts contain valuable information which are 
integral to evaluate issues of moral disengagement in processes of risk and crisis management. 
The transcripts were carefully read to ensure that relevant data are extracted, and subjected to 
cross-interpretations using data from other sources as discussed in section 6.4. 
 
6.4.3 REPORTS AND FACT SHEETS 
The researcher goal was to gain a broad objective understanding of the Niger Delta crises, 
reports and fact sheets obtained from companies (Chevron, Shell and NNPC) archival database 
allow the researcher to gain first-hand information about the crises. The reports include 
corporate responsibility reports, annual reports, technical reports, and special reports on the 
Niger Delta crises. These reports (e.g., Shell Reports 1999-2015; Chevron Corporate 
Responsibility Reports 2000-2016) contain valuable information from the companies’ 
perspectives about the crises in the Niger Delta and their responses to them. One disadvantage 
of the selected reports is that only the views of the companies are presented. However, these 
reports are important because they detailed how the organisations have responded to the 
numerous demands of local communities in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, these reports were 
helpful in areas where questioning was difficult; for example, multinational oil companies 
preferred to offer a detail account of their operations through annual reports rather than 
commenting on some specific situations. However, the fact sheets contain specific accounts of 
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what Shell and Chevron have been doing in the Niger Delta, in terms of their responses to 
security situations, vandalism and related crises.  The fact sheets are also useful because they 
supplemented and supported data from the interviews. They also helped in cross-checking data 
where information contradicted the actual practice expressed by the key informants. 
 
6.4.4 ARCHIVAL VIDEOS AND FOOTAGE 
The archival videos and commercial videos footage reporting and interviewing stakeholders in 
the Niger Delta were obtained from public database. More than 30 archival videos and 25 
commercial videos footage (e.g., BBC and CNN videos footage on Niger Delta crises) were 
obtained. The archival videos contain a series of audio reporting and interviews conducted with 
the stakeholders in the Niger Delta. These tools were selected because the Niger Delta crises 
have persisted for more than five decades. The videos transcription provides additional 
valuable information to enrich the data especially on the proximate cause, rationalisations, 
arguments and irrationalities behind stakeholders’ perceptions, understanding, and responses 
to the Niger Delta crises. The most crucial point when using archival videos is for the researcher 
to consider the political and social context under which the videos was produced (Silverman, 
2000). This implies that the authenticity, credibility and representativeness of the video must 
be accessed using the meaning of the transcribed text and the conditions in which it was 
produced to establish the producer’s intentions (Bryman, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
6.4.5 DOCUMENTS 
The datasets for this study were also obtained from the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Commission of Inquiry Report into the investigation of risks, disasters 
and crises in the Niger Delta (UNEP, 2011). The UNEP team over a 14-month period examined 
more than 200 locations, surveyed 122 kms of pipeline rights of way and reviewed more than 
5,000 medical records in the Niger Delta. The datasets are helpful to evaluate claims and 
counter-claims from the different stakeholders involved in the Niger Delta crises. In addition, 
detailed soil contamination investigations were conducted at 69 sites and more than 4,000 
samples were analysed, including water taken from 142 groundwater monitoring wells drilled 
specifically for the study and soil extracted from 780 boreholes. The main issue with the inquiry 
document is that it is politically motivated because the UNEP was directly invited by the 
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Nigerian government to conduct the investigation into the extent of environment devastation 
and crises in the Niger Delta. 
The UNEP team carried out a total of 264 formal community meetings between November 
2009 and January 2011 with more 23,271 people present in those meetings; and carried out 
series of consultations and interviews with relevant leaders, communities, representatives of 
oil companies, and consultants (UNEP, 2011). The UNEP documents contain over 1000 pages 
of field notes, interviews transcripts, maps, pollution sites photograph and technical reports. 
This research treated both the inquiry process and findings of the inquiry as datasets and 
relevant data crucial to measure moral disengagement in risk, crisis and disaster situations were 
carefully extracted. The datasets are useful for this study because the researcher could evaluate 
the conflicting claims of the stakeholders; and supplemented the data from the interviews and 
other sources discussed above. Therefore, the documentary evidence may form an excellent 
means of data triangulation, helping to increase the trustworthiness and dependability of this 
study (Saunders et al., 2014). In conclusion, the documents give the researcher adequate data 
that would not have been possible to collect when working alone; and help reduces cost and 
access problems. 
 
6.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Research has suggested that qualitative research is susceptible to difficulties both in the 
planning for adequate data collection approach and the analysis procedures, which may become 
overshadowing tasks for researchers (Saunders et al., 2014). The lack of a well-defined or 
formulated method is the central difficulty in qualitative data analysis (Yin, 2009). The 
consideration of these potential difficulties combined with a thorough examination of how to 
analyse qualitative data, a thematic analysis was chosen as the appropriate method (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003; Bryman, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012). Data analysis comprises of two main stages 
in this research: coding data and interpreting findings. The coding of data helps the researcher 
to ‘get to know’ and understand the data. Also, the researcher undertakes an integrated analysis 
of primary and secondary data to ensure that informants’ identities are protected. The sensitive 
nature of the data which can cause harms to the informants also influence the adoption of 
integrated analysis. The researcher follows several steps in coding the data, as recommended 
by Bryman (2008, p. 550). 
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6.5.1 READING THROUGH TRANSCRIPTS AND IDENTIFYING SIGNIFICANT 
OR INTERESTING POINTS 
The ‘matrix based method for ordering and synthesising data’ (Ritchie, Spencer, & O’Connor, 
2003, p. 219) was used when the researcher read through the transcripts. This process involves 
numbering the transcripts according to their different categories, extract central themes and 
subthemes, which are presented in a matrix that closely mirror the findings in Table 8.1. At this 
stage, the researcher indicates where in the transcripts the data comes from and use limited 
quoted material. 
This stage also serves as familiarisation with the data stage (Bryman, 2008), which occurs 
during the data collection process, data transcription and reading of the data. The researcher is 
guided by (1) sensitising questions: which help to identify what might be happening, what 
stakeholders are involved and how events are constructed; (2) guiding questions: which help 
guide interviews, reports and documents gathering and analyses; (3) theoretical questions: 
which help in recognising process and variations to link concepts; and (4) practical questions: 
which assist in developing the structure of the theory and determine whether the researcher’s 
theory is logical (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 72). This step assists in focusing the analysis to 
ensure coherence; and it is an iterative process where the researcher constantly review the data 
and the categories to which the data is assigned. The researcher found that repeatedly reviewing 
the data helped identify patterns and themes. 
 
6.5.2 ASSESSING PRELIMINARY CODES 
This stage starts with themes and issues that had been identified in the case studies (Chapters 
Two and Three), which are considered crucial to resolving the problems. The researcher uses 
a two-level coding system in which the first level comprises labelling groups of loosely 
associated categories of words based on the research questions and a second level which 
involves grouping the data into themes or subsets (Bryman, 2008). The analysis was time-
consuming due to the range of data used. The researcher started by reading and summarising 
the initial codes. This was necessary to ensure that meanings were kept within their contextual 
usage. Each unit of the data were examined and codes were assigned to key concepts. The 
challenge for the researcher was to ensure that bias is not introduced, resulting to peer-reviews 
of the initial themes for possible elimination of bias. 
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The researcher recorded the preliminary codes on large sheets of paper, paying attention to the 
frequency with which each coded comment occurred. The data is then grouped into themes 
through the identification of clusters, patterns or groups. The themes identified largely related 
to key concepts outlined in the research questions. This process of themes searching involves 
looking for topics that recur again and again, categories in term of local expressions that are 
either unfamiliar or are used in an unfamiliar way (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). The researcher 
examined the data for links between the various themes, relationships to the research questions, 
and to the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Eight. These linkages 
and relationships are outlined in Table 8.1 (see Chapter Eight). 
 
6.5.3 REVIEWING CODES 
The initial codes generated too much occurrences. Therefore, the researcher reviews the 
preliminary themes earlier generated to ensure that they work together with the coded extracts 
from transcripts (Bryman, 2008). Figure 8.1 captures the initial themes generated from this 
thesis findings. There were twelve themes generated at the preliminary coding stage which 
were later reduced to seven themes after extensive review. These themes: selective risk 
perception, crisis miscommunication, inflated ethical stance, organised irresponsibility, trust 
deficit, relying or leaning on past successes, and misinterpretation of dangerous events – were 
distinct within each of the case study discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The researcher 
decided based on previous research (Creswell et al., 2003) recommendation to link the themes 
with the theoretical framework of moral disengagement and crisis management.  This serves 
as a springboard for understanding the issues identified from the case studies. 
 
6.5.4 CONSIDERING CODED DATA IN RELATION TO THEORETICAL 
CONCEPTS 
Measures or mechanisms of moral disengagement were classified as perceptual if they were 
based on rankings made by others (Bandura, 2009; Caprara et al., 2006; Caprara et al., 2009; 
Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015) or objective if they were based on quantified sources or 
independent panel reviews of moral disengagement. Based on a priori definition (Bandura, 
2007; Caprara et al., 2009), the moral disengagement mechanisms were manually coded using 
the criteria established by Bandura et al. (2000) and Caprara et al. (2009); and risk, crisis and 
disaster management strategies meeting the criteria as representing moral disengagement or 
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crisis disengagement were also coded (Bandura et al, 1996; Moore, 2008; White et al., 2009). 
The risk, crisis and disaster management strategies were coded as moral disengagement or 
crisis disengagement when they involved selection and implementation of the moral 
disengagement mechanisms. The criteria include moral justification, advantageous 
comparison, attribution of blame, euphemistic labelling, displacement of responsibility, 
diffusion of responsibility, dehumanisation and distorting the consequence (Table 5.1). 
 
6.5.5 SENSEMAKING OF DATA 
Research has shown that people try to make sense of organisations, and organisations 
themselves often try to make sense of their environment (Weick, 1995; 2010). Like 
organisations, researchers also embark upon ‘sensemaking of data’ to answer their research 
questions and clarify potential ambiguity and uncertainty in their findings/results. Sensemaking 
often involves gathering information, gaining an understanding of the information and then 
using the understanding to complete a task (Waterman, 1990; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
2005). This research adopted sensemaking analytical approach because it conceptualises 
negotiated meanings as the product of interactions between equals, ignoring the way that 
meanings may be imposed by a dominant group upon a subordinate one (Weick, 1988; 2010). 
This does not necessarily renounce the notion of unequal access to knowledge (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988; Weick et al., 2005) rather it is integral to one of the core arguments in this 
thesis that the perceived extrication of local interpretation from sole scientific elucidation 
infuse into risk and crisis management responses should be de-constructed or re-evaluated (See 
Chapter Five). 
Therefore, the data collected were analysed as product of interactions between equals. This 
implies that equal attentions are paid to the different sources of data and themes to comprehend, 
extrapolate and recommend robust risk and crisis management strategies to manage the Niger 
Delta crises. Based on previous studies (Weick, 2010; Weick et al., 2005), the researcher 
delineates the process of sensemaking in this research as a three stages model: 
 Noticing: This involves recognising patterns from the data collected and matching them 
based on the criteria outlined in section 6.5.4. This sensemaking analytical approach 
helps to balance the conflicting views and accounts of the Niger Delta crises. Through 
the process of noticing, the researcher attentively evaluates and re-evaluate what might 
constitute moral disengagement in processes of risk and crisis management, and 
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subsequently captured their characteristics (Table 9.1, Chapter Nine). The process of 
noticing also allows the researcher to identify most plausible themes and issues which 
may blocked plan of action towards effective risk and crisis management. The 
researcher started noticing evidence of moral disengagement in processes of risk and 
crisis management at this stage. The counter evidence of crisis disengagement was also 
observed resulting into if some identified issues can be classified as moral 
disengagement. By the process, the researcher transformed the encountered ambiguity 
in the findings as “problematic situations” for further processing (interpretation). 
 
 Interpretation: The ambiguity in findings due to various potential “alternative facts” 
necessitate the need to embark upon complex process of interpretation (stage two). This 
process allows the researcher to consciously combine the noticed characteristics of 
moral disengagement in processes of risk and crisis management with counter-
arguments of business case and measure of corporate responsibility, and in doing so, 
the researcher actively constructed this thesis findings in a meaningful form. Through 
this process, the researcher reached conclusion about the research findings and 
considered potential implications. 
 
 
 Action: The researcher’s sensemaking analytical approach is a continuous process 
throughout the research process, in which the ‘so what’ questions are always 
considered. This is a stage in the data analysis process at which the researcher is 
concerned with action or practical implications of the research findings. The 
interpretation of the findings based on established crisis management – moral 
disengagement framework discussed in Chapter Eight, allows the researcher to make 
some practical recommendations. The recommendations are intended to improve 
existing risk and crisis management practice. 
 
6.6 DATA AND METHOD TRIANGULATION 
The data were considered within their social and cultural settings, and reasonable measures 
have been taken to deal with data inconsistencies through data and methods triangulation. This 
approach helps to overcome the shortcomings in this research. Triangulation is a process by 
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which the same phenomenon is assessed with different methods to determine whether 
convergence across methods exists (Bryman, 2008). Thus, it is a research approach that 
involves using several perceptions as a means of explaining and illuminating meaning, 
verifying the replication of perspectives, interpretations and/or observation.  
A well-established literature reveals that triangulation approach is most useful in overcoming 
personal bias of researcher, data inconstancies, bias of respondents, and salient bias in 
secondary data (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2014). The multiple methods approach 
(comprehensive inquiry datasets, relevant transcripts of case laws, transcripts of archival 
interviews with senior executives of Shell Nigeria, semi-structured interviews, and secondary 
data) adopted meant that the research quality and validity are generally improved. 
In this research, there is strict adherence to four validity criteria (construct/confirmability, 
internal/credibility, external/transferability, and reliability/dependability) for empirical 
research as suggested by Yin (2009). Construct validity refers to the proper definition of the 
concepts used within the study. This also means that the constructs used in this thesis are 
confirmed by external reviewers through submitted articles and peer-review feedback from 
colleagues to ensure that every concept are clarified and research methods explained in detail. 
For this research, well-established concepts of moral disengagement and crisis management, 
vulnerability of the environment and people in fragile and conflict-affected states of the Niger 
Delta were used to underpin the conceptual framework and guarded construct validity. These 
concepts are well-defined and illustrated using practical case examples in previous Chapters 
Two and Three. 
External validity and transferability concerns whether the research findings are generalisable 
beyond the selected case studies of this thesis (Yin, 2009). To help to achieve this, external 
peer-review feedback from articles submitted to Academy of Management Review, Journal of 
Emergency Management, and International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 
provided the assurance that this thesis’s findings are generalisable beyond the case studies of 
Shell and Chevron Nigeria. The internal validity which concerns relations between concepts 
could be threatened by incorrect facts and results from the different sources of data. Therefore, 
in-depth semi-structured interviews or open-interviews were held with main stakeholders (oil 
companies’ workers, industrial experts and consultants, government officials responsible for 
policies formulation and implementation, and local chiefs, etc.), and archival documents and 
videos analysis to cross-check documentation found, reverse causality and confirm facts stated 
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in each interview, obtain independent confirmation of data (through content analysis of inquiry 
report) and cross-referencing of data.  
In practical context, rival explanations were addressed, and patterns were matched and most 
plausible explanation put forward. For example, as discussed both in Chapters Five and Eight, 
moral disengagement in processes of risk/crisis management could also mean crisis 
disengagement as a rival explanation. However, given the range of available multiple data and 
evidences, the descriptions are rich and the findings arguably remain internally coherent which 
further improves the research credibility. 
In conclusion, the qualitative nature of this research implies that formal reliability test appears 
impracticable especially when compared with quantitative research. However, careful 
measures have been taken to ensure that later investigators following the same or similar 
procedures using case study will generate comparable findings and reach the same conclusions. 
Given that risk behaviours and perceptions of stakeholders in risk and crisis situations differ, 
using quantitative reliability testing appear inappropriate. Nonetheless, the research questions 
and context are clearly stated from the onset and the research design is compatible with these. 
Therefore, a claim can be made about reliability and dependability of this research because 
most recent risk/crisis studies mostly followed the case study design using multiple sources of 
data. 
 
6.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
It is incumbent that potential ethical issues and implications in research, particularly, involving 
human subjects are pragmatically considered and explicitly discussed. This research involved 
human beings and aimed at advancing understanding of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster. 
It was undertaken to validate existing risk and crisis management models (or perhaps refute 
them), dispel a lack of awareness of moral disengagement in crisis and disaster situations, 
analyse unconventional methodologies of dealing with emerging crisis and disaster, and to 
understand risk behaviours and perceptions during crisis and disaster. Undoubtedly, the 
research outcomes will benefit a wide range of stakeholders involved in the management of 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster. Therefore, it is imperative to maintain participants’ 
privacy and confidentiality, and credibility of the findings, conclusions and perhaps 
generalizations. 
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The application of ethical principles such as seeking ethical approval prior to primary data 
collection, negotiating access to participants to collect data, informed consent, participants 
protection, authorised use of data, appropriateness of the research design, funding sources, 
behaviour in reporting data, subjective data interpretations, and plagiarism issue are reflected 
and complied within the entire research process of this thesis. These identifiable ethical 
principles if not carefully discussed and applied could seriously affected the research 
credibility, validity and generalizability. The researcher obtained ethical approval from the 
University Research Ethics Committee prior to data collection (Appendix Five). Likewise, 
when dealing with sensitive aspects of participants’ behaviour such as vandalism and oil 
terrorism transgression, it was imperative that ex-agitators and other stakeholders involved 
understand the essence of the questions posed and that harm cannot be caused to them. This 
scenario requires proper management to ensure that “old-wounds” and secrets are not shared 
or reported verbatim. This helps reduce new risks to the participants and the researcher.  
The case studies involve controversial issues with sensitive outcomes; as such access to 
informants and other information relevant to answer the research questions and achieve the 
overall objectives was problematic. The researcher collaborated with several practitioners, 
local youth leaders, and community leaders (in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria). Several 
engagement telephone conversations prior to primary data collection were made with relevant 
informants, which allow access to apparently unreachable research settings. It took more than 
eight months in one extreme case to get in touch with an informant after several attempts have 
been made. Persistence and resilience further help to overcome data access issue.  
Quite interestingly, as the discussion and networking with relevant informants continue and 
information relating to the proximate causes and outcomes of the Niger Delta crisis emerged, 
it became abundantly obvious that I could be stocked in “data nightmare” which could take 
hours, days and months to unravel. The crises were emotionally charged (anger, frustration, 
sorrow, guilt, anxiety) and revelations of frequent dehumanisations, destruction of properties 
and sources of livelihood were controversial and inconsistencies in account. In another 
situation, I was faced with more than one version of the crises – individuals’ perspectives 
conflict with independent investigation, and therefore play the roles of historian and detective 
in trying to reconstruct event sequences from origin to present state, make sense of sometimes 
partial and contradictory evidence because of the existence of more than one ‘factual account’ 
of the crises. 
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In overall, the foreseeable harms (physical, psychological and social) of the research did not 
outweigh anticipated benefits. Furthermore, while the risks involved in the research have been 
considered and minimised through the research designs and strategies, the difficulties in 
gaining access to primary data for the study were equally acknowledged. Nevertheless, the 
researcher contacts with key indigenes of Niger Delta (Ilaje and Ogoni communities) and 
experience both as native of Niger Delta and working within the region help in facilitating 
primary data access. Essentially, bias issue is another major ethical challenge in this research 
and like Borodzicz (2005, p. 184) the ability to treat data as strange might be compromised by 
the researcher personal familiarity with the case. Therefore, it is all but impossible to interpret 
the data outside the context of the researcher personal experience (Borodzicz, 2005). 
Nonetheless, personal experience of the researcher as native of Niger Delta and those of other 
indigenes of Niger Delta whom the principal investigator had lived with does have 
ethnographic advantages by allowing thick description to be gain as is practically possible. 
The researcher did not only promise to maintain confidentiality but likewise search prudently 
for strategic ways to deal with the ethical and legal issues that may materialized. In this context, 
as evidenced from previous research (Kenneth, Linda, & Gary, 2000), anonymity becomes 
extremely important because of the sensitivity of the research. Therefore, the data presentations 
and interpretations provide complete anonymity to participants in this research. This is 
achieved through exclusion of real names of key informants and informed consents were 
obtained. The researcher obtained approval from the University of Portsmouth Ethics 
Committee prior to data collection. 
In a specific term, the participants understood the purpose for which the data were used and 
that information was freely given. It should be acknowledged that researchers often differ 
widely over what is and is not ethically acceptable in research and that it almost impossible to 
exhaustively lists and discusses possible issue that can warrant ethical violation. Nevertheless, 
considerable measures have been made to critically explore and discusses ethical issues and 
implications of this thesis. In conclusion, considerations have been taken to address ‘research 
quality criteria’ of credibility (i.e. how believable are the findings?), transferability (i.e. do the 
findings apply to other contexts?), dependability (i.e. are the findings likely to apply at other 
times?), and confirmability (i.e. has the researcher overtly allowed personal values or 
theoretical inclinations to intrude to a high degree?). 
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6.8 RESEARCHER’S COMPETENCE 
The researcher’s personal experiences have benefited this research in several forms. Firstly, I 
have adequate knowledge of risk management having worked over a decade serving as chief 
risk officer and risk manager among others in multinational and national banks and insurance 
companies in Nigeria. Secondly, I belong to a few professional organisations such as Chartered 
Insurance Institute of Nigeria and Institute of Strategic Management, Nigeria. Thirdly, I 
contributed to teaching in higher education at postgraduate level; and I have also undertaken 
Associate Lecturer Professional Development and Associate Fellowship of the Higher 
Education Academy course. In addition, I completed over thirty research modules besides 
attending and presenting papers at numerous research seminars and conferences including the 
British Academy of Management and Operational Research Society Annual conference. 
The findings from this doctoral research have also been presented to external organisations 
such as Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Environment, National Disaster Management Organisation in Ghana and Petroleum 
Technology Development Funds in Nigeria. I have also had the privilege of writing external 
research funding applications to the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) and 
Department for International Development (DFID) as principal investigator and write a number 
of research contract projects to external organisations. Some of my papers have been published 
as book chapter, for example, “Mafimisebi, O. P., & Thorne, S. (2017). Strategies for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management: Are Lessons from Past Disasters Actionable? In C., Kuel & 
C. N., Madu, Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction & Management (pp. 843-866). London: 
World Scientific Press.” Notably, a few my articles have appeared in peer-reviewed 
international journals such as: Journal of Emergency Management (Volume 15, Number 5, pp. 
447-58), International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters (Volume 35, Number 3, pp. 
1-31), Journal of Environment and Earth Science (Volume 6, Number 3, pp. 180-204), Journal 
of Economics and Sustainable Development (Volume 7, Number 1, pp. 93-99), and Journal of 
Civil and Environmental Research (Volume 8, Number 3, pp. 129-146). I have also submitted 
articles to Academy of Management Review, Public Relations Review, International Journal 
of Disaster Risk Reduction, and Disaster Prevention and Management: An International 
Journal. Thus, I am confidence that the research projects and training I have undertaken as well 
as the numerous research seminars and conferences I have attended, and my professional 
experience in research and publication benefited this research.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SELF-INFLICTED DISASTER: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter synthesises the discussion in previous chapters with the main research findings 
and expounds the central conceptual thinking instrumental to this thesis. There are two models 
presented here. The first conceptual risk model deals with the philosophical thinking 
underpinning this research’s aims and objectives. The second theoretical risk model synthesises 
evidence from extant research and thesis findings and how these guided the research overall 
recommendations in the following chapter. As a starting point, the conceptual risk model 
connects with existing thinking in risk and crisis management (Andrew, 2011; Ansell, Boin, & 
Keller, 2010; Cutter, 2005; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Hiles, 2011; Fink, 2002; Reason, 2004; 
Dombrowsky, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 2005; ‘t Hart, 2013; Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow, 2007).  
The notion that organisational crisis and disaster are caused by human, technological, and 
organisational failures is challenged (Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Shrivastava, 1987; Weick, 
1988; Simpson, 2008; McGuire & Schneck, 2010). The conventional taxonomies of 
organisational crisis and disaster are based on three levels of analysis: micro-level, meso-level, 
and macro-level. The evidence at the micro-level is that individual factors such as human 
errors, blunders and mistakes in most crises – if not all, initiate organisational crisis.  
Additionally, the evidence at the meso-level of inquiry is that organisational factors and 
processes including human limitations and environmental factors contribute to organisational 
crisis. This view suggests that the crucial issue of human errors and the consequences of human 
failure are contextualised as inevitable and unpreventable (Reason, 1990). The alternative view 
reveals that a combination of sloppy management and an inherent blind spot for recognising 
crisis triggering events or indicators modern firms contribute to crises in the making (Turner 
& Pidgeon, 1997). Thus, it is the combination of normal human errors and normal 
organisational forms that efficiently translate into crisis outcomes.  
The macro-level of inquiry established that combination of issues such as technical systems, 
technical complexity, tight coupling, and environmental pressures lead firms to emphasise 
efficiency and output targets over safety goals produce a disaster (Beck, 1992; Perrow, 1999). 
The risk model as conceptualised in Figure 7.1 moved from general issues as identified in the 
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literature, to more specific and contextual detail. The model components were derived from 
research findings (e.g., Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Borodzicz, 2005; Hopkins, 2006; Herbane, 
2013; Hutchins et al., 2009; Shrivastava et al., 2009; Smith, 2000; 2005; Perrow, 1999; 
Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Roeschmann, 2014) and based on extensive empirical findings 
within this thesis. There are similarities and overlapping issues between extant findings and the 
current findings of this research but these findings collectively informed the research 
recommendations in the later part of the thesis.  
The crucial question is not whether an organisational crisis and disaster is normal, inevitable, 
complex and uncertain but whether organisations could self-initiate crises and how we can 
proactively manage these? There are two broader way of conceptualising and explaining 
unconventional crises and disasters: 
 Those that inflict organisations, and 
 Those that are self-initiated by organisations themselves.  
This is akin to the notion of vulnerable society which is being aggressed from outside 
(externally) and the risk society which is being threatened by itself (internally) (Rudolf, 2007). 
If unconventional crises and disasters are self-inflicted, we should ask under what 
circumstances are firms most likely to cause a crisis. The empirical evidence is that over the 
past two decades, senior executives and managers were responsible for more than half of all 
organisational crises (Institute for Crisis Management, 2011; McDonald, 2013). It was evident 
based on empirical research findings that most unconventional risk, crisis and disaster are 
mostly self-inflicted due to range of issues presented in Figure 7.1. 
7.2 SELF-INFLICTED DISASTER CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
What conceptual standard or framework can help us better understand the nature of 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster? There is no simple answer to this question. Thus, the 
notion of self-inflicted disaster fundamentally aims to draw our attention to the fact that 
established risk and crisis management standards, best practices and strategies could have 
unintended consequences which serve as a springboard for future organisational 
crises/disasters. All risk and crisis decisions have consequences which can sometimes cause 
irreparable destruction to organisational goals and objectives. This can be illustrated in research 
which reveals that “the Piper Alpha accident was one of the cases that can hardly be attributed 
to ‘an act of God’: it was mostly self-inflicted” (Pate-Cornell, 1993, p. 215).  
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Albeit the coincidence of the final events that triggered the catastrophe was not in itself 
controllable, the failure resulted essentially from an accumulation of management errors (Pate-
Cornell, 1993). The case of Piper Alpha disaster (July 6, 1988) which caused the death of 165 
men (out of 226) on board the platform itself and two men on board a rescue vessel, provides 
useful lessons for future risk management. For instance, a piece of equipment (a critical pump 
with one redundancy) had been turned off for repair and the night crew that operated the 
platform had not been informed of it. This problem, in turn, was mostly a failure of the “permit-
to-work system” that did not ensure proper communications (Pate-Cornell, 1993). As a result, 
the conceptual framework of self-inflicted disaster recognises that risk awareness among board 
and senior managers is imperative but most crucially, all organisation employees require a risk 
management awareness culture, need to understand what risk management can and cannot do, 
articulate the limitations of managing risk, and examine the risks of risk and crisis management. 
Drawing upon previous studies (e.g., Ansell et al., 2010; Cutter, 2005; Drabek & McEntire, 
2002; Dombrowsky, 2007; Hiles, 2011; Reason, 2004; Simpson, 2010; De Smet, Lagadec, & 
Leysen, 2012), many causal factors responsible for initiating disasters are recognised. These 
factors which collectively refer to the central mechanisms of self-inflicted disaster include risk 
globalisation, risk philosophy, vulnerable organisation, risk communication and vulnerable 
people. For example, risk globalisation manifests in interconnected nature of unconventional 
risk, crisis or disaster (Ripley, 2008; Rosenthal, 2009). This means that the increasing 
dependence on network society (or global society) not only makes our lives easier and more 
comfortable but also enlarges the possibility of fast-spreading disasters (cf. De Smet et al., 
2012). 
Risk philosophy suggests that unconventional risks and disasters are drastically changing and 
they often trigger cross-border effects and affect future generations (Lagadec, 2009). Risk 
communication is crucial to inform, educate and dialogue with relevant stakeholders. 
Vulnerable organisations are those that place emphasis on profitability, complexity and 
systemic issue, sidestepping risk management, rely on past successes, acting too early and too 
late, and using moral disengagement mechanisms in managing risks and crises (Lagadec & 
Carli, 2005; Rosenthal, 2009). These are the bases of self-inflicted disasters as conceptualised 
in this research (Figure 7.1). The conceptual framework also reveals that factors such as open 
communication, stakeholders’ engagement, consultative decision-making, concerns for 
environment and people, common risk perception, treat emerging crisis urgently and carefully, 
maintain consistence in risk culture, and risk governance are useful tools in preventing self-
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inflicted disaster (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; ‘t Hart, 2013; Shrivastava et al., 2009; Simpson, 
2008; McGuire & Schneck, 2010; Ulmer et al., 2007; Roeschmann, 2014). These moderating 
factors are linked to discuss the case studies presented in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis. 
 
Figure 7.1: Self-Inflicted Disaster Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
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7.3 HOW IS SELF-INFLICTED DISASTER DEFINED AND 
CONTEXTUALISED? 
In the context of this research, self-inflicted disaster refers to (1) a situation created from our 
attempt to disengage from emerging issues, and caused by contradictory responses to complex 
and uncertain events such that the response to those emerging events further amplified the 
situation; and (2) a situation which produces inescapable dilemma due to inadequate responses 
to uncertain and dangerous events. The notion of ‘self-inflicted disaster’ is contextualised, in a 
broad range of unconventional events which include safety disaster, environmental disaster, 
large-scale fraud, and financial crisis, as extreme events which were initially under control of 
management or organisation but escalated due to inability to act before the anticipated and 
unanticipated consequences happen. The empirical evidence from previous research is that 
some organisations have inflicted disasters upon themselves because of mismanagement and 
unfortunately some others will still do (Andrew, 2011; Beck, 2009; Shrivastava et al., 2009; 
Turner, 1976; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Reza, 2011; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). The 
concept of self-inflicted disaster may look too simplistic but it is a mirror of how organisations 
often cause or initiate future organisational crisis or disaster. 
For operational purposes, ‘self-inflicted disaster’ is contextualised based on the notion that 
models, approaches and strategies pertaining to the management of unconventional crisis and 
disaster may complicate the very processes of managing them in ways that can worsen or 
attenuate emerging crisis/disaster, and make organisations disengage rather than meaningfully 
engage in managing the evolving crisis/disaster. This perspective suggests that different risk 
management practices are needed in different contexts, and that risk or crisis management 
models or standards should not be universally applied to all risk and crisis situations. The 
unintended or unanticipated consequences of attempting universal application of most risk and 
crisis models, approaches and strategies to emerging dangerous events could be an 
unsustainable solution or crisis intensification especially when these risk models or strategies 
are applied based on previously held assumptions in a context totally different from the new 
situation (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Beck, 2009; Lagadec, 1997; Shrivastava et al., 2009). In 
fact, such thinking accords with Beck’s (1992) risk society thesis that institutionalised scientific 
knowledge and technical expertise have contributed to the proliferation and worsening of risks 
rather their amelioration. 
However, it is crucial to point out that Beck’s risk thesis is primarily informed by a sociological 
perspective and therefore is subject to controversial implications in practice. According to Beck 
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(2009), natural hazards have given way to manufactured risks of epic proportions as the 
unmanageable and not necessarily apparent side effects of modernisation. Equally so, 
Borodzicz (2005) put forward the concept that major risks are no longer seen as an ‘Act of 
God’ but consequences of risk failure. At the same time, the paradox of self-inflicted disaster, 
mismanaged crisis or managed crisis reflects the irony of a world risk society stressed by Beck 
(2006; 2009) and further captured in Clarke’s (2006, p. 161) reference to ‘living and dying in 
worst case worlds’. This is analogous to the concept of the boomerang effect where attempts 
to eliminate one risk creates another, also known as risk homeostasis (Adams, 1988; 1995; 
Wilde, 1982; 2001). This calls for the need to re-evaluate the ontological status of conventional 
approaches in risk, crisis and disaster management. Furthermore, Beck (2009, p. 10) maintains 
that the belief that science offered a solution has evaporated: 
“We live in a world that has to make decisions concerning its future under the 
conditions of manufactured, self-inflicted insecurity. Among other things, the world can 
no longer control the dangers produced by modernity; to be more precise, the belief 
that modern society can control the dangers that it itself produces is collapsing – not 
because of its omissions and defeats, but because of its triumphs.” 
There are a range of issues rooted in the conceptualisation of ‘self-inflicted disaster’ when we 
consider the argument made by Beck in the above quote:  
 First, risk and crisis management practice requires a methodological approach which 
should be flexible and robust to accommodate complexity and emerging issues 
(rational, irrational, normative and non-normative).  
 Second, as Green (1997, p. 154) noted: “Accidents are no longer the inevitable and 
necessarily marginal remnants of a cosmology, but have been brought to the very centre 
… if accidents are the archetypical outcome of the miscalculation of risk, they are the 
paradigmatic event with which to demonstrate the possibility of risk calculation.”  
 Third, what we are witnessing, in some cases of current unconventional crises and 
disasters, is a case of a benign crisis and disaster turned malignant.  
The pragmatist position adopted in this research is that causes and effects are not the proximate 
reality of unconventional crisis and disaster but the interactions of systemic failures and moral 
disengagement from risk decision-making as well as self-inflicted behaviours which have 
allowed those causes and effects. 
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7.4 KEY ISSUES AND DEBATES IN RISK, CRISIS AND DISASTER RESEARCH 
There appears to be an emerging consensus that organisational crisis/disaster cannot be 
sufficiently understood or addressed without a primary recognition of interrelationship of 
variables; also, an assumption of the need for interdisciplinary approaches or strategies. Yet, 
crisis and disaster management practices are widely characterised by disciplinary 
compartmentalization. The ongoing fragmentation of knowledge and resulting chaos in crisis 
management strategies are not particularly reflections of the real world but artefacts of crisis 
scholarship. The argument here is that reductive understanding of crisis and disaster 
management informing policy and actions in the real world contributes to problems. For 
example, it is not a coincidence that the current fragmentary form of thought is leading to self-
inflicted crises in organisations and in society.  
The thesis is that prevailing crisis management approaches involved high levels of abstraction 
resulting in deductive conclusions (mainly positivist and devoid of normative issues), which 
are generalised to the real world with little awareness of the dangerous consequences of doing 
so. More optimistically, the case of Niger Delta crises demonstrates an historical shift taking 
place from vulnerable of the common affecting both environment and people characterised by 
multiple realities towards a more pragmatic picture. This implies that issues of vulnerable 
environment and the vulnerable people affected by the effects of environmental degradation in 
the Niger Delta must be totally addressed. In a practical context, it is insufficient to identified 
root causes of unconventional crises and disasters. There must be moral responsibility and 
courage to commit risk management plans into actions. 
Therefore, it can be argued that although current approaches of crisis management literature 
and practice reflect the diverse nature of risks, crises and disasters. However, such models place 
particular emphasis on antique case studies and modelling past crises and disasters as a 
precursor for emerging crises and disasters, remains highly controversial and contentious in 
reality. Quite critically, these crisis management methodologies as discussed in Chapters One, 
Four and Five unfortunately do not explain much about a range of factors including: 
 The variables of unconventional crises and disasters,  
 The nature of emerging unconventional crises and disasters,  
 Issues of self-inflicted crises, manufactured risk and uncertainty,  
 Moral disengagement and normative concerns, and 
 What constitute historical reality in crisis management practice? 
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The context in which crises and disasters exist further makes issue of crisis management 
models and comparisons exceptionally difficult due to the amorphous nature of the phenomena 
(Borodzicz, 2005). Existing crisis management methodologies reveal hindsight knowledge and 
help us to understand why things went wrong and what could/should have been done. So, what 
are the practical implications for managing emerging crises and disasters? Hindsight 
knowledge of past crises and disasters does not automatically help practitioners manage 
emerging crisis/disaster. It follows from this premise that dominant approaches to crisis and 
disaster management fail partly because they do not sufficiently take seriously the role of risk 
and crisis engagement in managing organisational crisis and disaster. If the prediction is right, 
the variety and capability of theoretical and empirical research in crisis management 
methodologies to successfully defuse emerging crisis and disaster is further complicated.  
It has been contended that current cases of risk and crisis management failures are definitely 
not perceived as mere natural events but of the consequences of risk society (Beck, 1992; 
2009), communication crisis (Irwin, 1995), human error (Reason, 1990), risk homeostasis 
(Adams, 1995; Wilde, 1994), systemic failure (Turner, 1978; Perrow, 1984), irrationality 
(Lopes, 1987; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cultural misconstructions (Pidgeon, 1992), rupture 
and manufactured uncertainty (Giddens, 1999), and as in this research, self-inflicted through 
‘management crisis or crisis mismanagement’. As rightly pointed out by Borodzicz (2005), it 
is doubtful that crises and disasters could ever be successfully managed when these theories 
are taken equally. In other words, crisis and disaster are mutually exclusive events that occur 
in different definitive contexts thus arguably demand different methodological solutions 
depending on the effectiveness of the approach employed.  
Therefore, the practical questions are:  
 At what point can practitioners in risk and crisis management recognise indeed there is 
a crisis?  
 Which approach can be used to manage the crisis/disaster?  
 Which approach is more effective over the others and why?  
 Are there antecedents/precursors that might suggest we are using a failing (or more 
correctly self-initiated) approach? 
 What approach can be classified as a ‘failing approach’?  
 More critically, can there ever be universal approach to managing crises/disasters if 
they differ in context and interpretation?  
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Finding practical answers to these questions are crucial for sustainable risk and crisis 
management. The lack of attentions to these questions may cause the transition from crisis 
management to management crisis or mismanaged crisis refers to as self-inflicted crisis (or 
perhaps crisis made-worse) in this research. In a practical context, self-inflicted crisis is the 
crisis created through the exploitation of moral disengagement mechanisms in processes of 
organisation crisis, and progression in valuing a certain approach in crisis management (either 
through fear, embarrassment, communication crisis, arrogance, human error and systemic 
failure, and cultural misconstructions) over some other techniques to defuse the emerging 
event. It is useful to state that critics might argue that diverting attention to mismanaged crisis, 
management crisis or more precisely management inability to control and manage emerging 
crisis and disaster presents no or little approach to effective and sustainable crisis management. 
However, it must equally be acknowledged that what constitutes acceptable and sustainable 
crisis management practice is evidently to some extent highly subjective. In critical terms, self-
inflicted crisis refers to the intensification of organisational crisis through flaws in the choice 
of crisis management techniques and strategies adopted which provide very little help to 
successful and sustainable crisis and disaster management.  
Furthermore, present theory in crisis and disaster management disputably fails to achieve 
sustainable and effective management of crisis/disaster because historical reality and elements 
of the real-life phenomenon were left out or oversimplified in the formulation of the theory. As 
a result, their implications for practice have received little testing against emerging 
unconventional crisis/disaster. Quite significantly, this new classification and paradigm in 
crisis management is expanding in most dimensions of unconventional organisational crisis 
life-cycle. For example, three well known cases of crisis and disaster such as the Bhopal 
disaster, Shell Brent Spar, Shell-Ogoni crisis, reveal how organisations can further exacerbate 
crisis and create what has been called self-inflicted crisis in this study. Crisis management 
research and practice should recognise this paradigm and the idea of mismanaged crisis or 
management crisis and even so, the concept of self-inflicted crisis raises other problems and 
controversial implications in practice as well. 
 
7.5 SUMMARY 
The challenges with risk, crisis and disaster management are well recognised, and numerous 
empirical studies have offered insights on what constitute effective risk and crisis management. 
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The central argument running through this research is that models of risk, crisis and disaster 
can be used to assist in comprehending or diagnosing the meaning of crisis/disaster situations 
and in identifying various strategies or approaches that can be used to manage risk, crisis and 
disaster situations. However, what is crucial in this context is that organisation(s) sometimes 
in the process of managing emerging risks and crises initiate future disasters by the very choice 
or strategy used. This implies that risk and crisis models or strategies when inappropriately 
applied can cause irreparable damages to organisations. This is the paradox of risk models 
which requires the attentions of modern organisations.  
More specifically, what emerges from this research is a clear, deeper, more pragmatic, and 
more enriched understanding of the relationships of interest in risk and crisis management 
(Rindova, 2008). The paradox of the self-inflicted disaster is that organisations and scientists 
are sometimes reluctant or unwilling to admit to the possibility of being wrong. This is despite 
the obvious possibility that their risk models and strategies could be strategically incoherent.  
The controversial thesis is that when organisations unwittingly institutionalise practices that 
encourage gradual erosion of standards then self-inflicted disaster is imminent (Shrivastava et 
al., 2009). The cases of Bhopal, Challenger, Deepwater Horizon, and Bonga disaster reveals 
how organisations unconsciously institutionalised practices that encourage gradual erosion of 
standards. As Vaughan (2005) explains an acceptable outcome of risky behaviour in the 
immediate past is then allowed to set the expectation for risky behaviour on the next occasion. 
The changes in the harmful direction take place in such small increments and get injected into 
daily routines through normalization of deviance so surreptitiously that it is impossible to detect 
them until it is too late (Vaughan, 2005). This is the reality of self-inflicted disasters and the 
solution lies in what Beck called ‘reflexive scientisation’ (Beck, 1992) and radical foresight. 
Therefore, it will be argued that changes in risk culture, better internal audit and buy-in across 
the organisation are crucial to overcome self-inflicted disaster behaviours. 
In conclusion, risk and crisis management starts and ends with an organisation’s workforce. As 
a result, their behaviours and decisions about whether to engage or disengage from emerging 
extreme threats are critical to organisation resilience and sustainability. The next chapter will 
present the moral disengagement conceptual groundings underpinning this research. It will 
discuss this thesis main findings and how this meets the initial aims and objectives presented 
in Chapter One. Also, it will expound the crisis management – moral disengagement 
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relationship and the main issues evident in each of the case studies considered here and start to 
suggest possible practical recommendations to prevent their occurrence in the future. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SELF-INFLICTED DISASTERS: MORAL DISENGAGEMENT IN ERA OF 
UNCONVENTIONAL RISKS, CRISES AND DISASTERS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents findings from an empirical investigation of moral disengagement in the 
risk and crisis domain. The research uses ‘sensemaking accounts’ as a novel methodical 
approach which entails semi-structured interviews, archival dataset, commission of inquiry 
datasets, reports and fact sheets to explore unconventional risk, crisis and disaster management 
in two case study organisations. In this research context ‘sensemaking’ means articulation of 
the unknown, “the making of sense” (Weick, 1995, p. 4) and process of “structuring the 
unknown” (Waterman, 1990, p. 41) by “placing stimuli into some kind of framework” that 
enables us “to comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict” (Starbuck 
& Milliken, 1988, p. 51). The sensemaking of the cases of crises and disasters studied here 
(Chapters One, Two and Three) enables us to examine and turn the ongoing complexity of 
unconventional crises and disasters into a “situation that is comprehended explicitly in words 
and that serves as a springboard into action” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409).  
Given the crucial overlaps that existed between the literature findings and this research 
findings, it was evident that some form of sensemaking is needed to improve the current risk 
and crisis responses/strategies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. On examination of the 
unconventional crises, it was clear that even the most innovative firms are uncertain about how 
best to connect with “hyperconnected” stakeholders, who are simultaneously more informed 
about risk, crisis and disaster situations. This section is divided into two main parts. The first 
deals with the main theoretical conclusions addressing the research aims and objectives 
presented earlier in the introduction chapter. These conclusions were juxtaposed with current 
risk and crisis theories considering issues of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster that was 
reviewed in Chapters One, Two, Three, and Four. The issues and points raised from the 
literature and thesis findings guided the recommendations offered in the second part of this 
section (Figure 8.1). The second provides recommendations and critical insights into the 
management of unconventional risks, crises and disasters presented in the case studies 
(Chapters Two and Three). The essence was to contribute to better ways of improving 
organisational resilience and robustness when managing future crises and disasters; and also, 
to enhance current risk and crisis management practice. 
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Figure 8.1: Main Issues Identified from the Literature and Thesis Findings 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
 
8.2 FINDINGS 
We first present our crisis – moral disengagement framework: crisis management – moral 
disengagement relationships and links with risk and resilience management practice (see Table 
8.1). However, to illustrate a fuller range of examples, more extracts were included in the 
framework (Table 8.1). This framework emerged from the synthesis of literature and data 
analysis but also guided the structure of the findings. The framework illustrates a range of vital 
crisis-moral disengagement relationships, and each relationship form is linked with an aspect 
of potential risk and resilience management practice. Examples from risk and resilience 
management practice illustrate the potential uses to risk managers/leaders of engaging with, or 
encouraging, ethical risk and crisis management. More importantly, there are three main points 
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that should be made about Table 8.1: Firstly, it is a synthesis of primary and secondary data to 
ensure that informants’ identities are not disclosed; secondly, less quotations from informants 
are included to ensure that sensitive information which can be linked back to them are not 
included; and thirdly, the key words from the informants have been used to form the diagram 
for the trigger causes of the risk/crisis in the Niger Delta crises (Figure 8.2). 
The concept of moral disengagement has been discussed elsewhere (Chapters One and Five; 
Bandura, 2002; 2009; Baker et al., 2006; Caprara et al., 2009; Chugh et al., 2014; Mafimisebi 
& Thorne, 2015) and is worthy of much greater discussion than space allows. The profiles of 
the case study organisations (Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria) are also reiterated in Table 
8.2 as part of the overarching findings. The research findings uncovered from this research 
clearly relate to the objectives indicated at the opening chapter of this thesis and eventually 
help to address the main aims that this research is seeking to achieve. That is: Did moral 
disengagement issues exist in the response to unconventional risks, crises and disaster? Is there 
any relationship between crisis management and moral disengagement? How can existing risk 
and crisis management models help solve emerging crises and ensure sustainable crisis 
management, and broader resilience? Do existing risk and crisis management methodologies 
fit emerging crises and disasters? 
The objectives that should be met to achieve these aims are: 
 To advance an understanding of how moral disengagement perpetuates organisational 
crisis/disaster and explore potential possibilities in averting the ‘black swan’ 
implications. 
 To uncover the moral disengagement – crisis management relationship and redirect 
academic debates, research agenda, policy issues and redefining responsible business 
practice. 
 To question the influence of vulnerability, risk perception and behaviour, and distrust 
in risk and crisis management practice. 
 To examine which risk and crisis management models would be most valuable to help 
solve unconventional risk and crisis, and crisis management responses/strategies. 
 To challenge the belief that existing risk and crisis management methodologies fit 
emerging unconventional crises and disasters. 
The following Table 8.1 provides a useful breakdown of the research findings and explains the 
relationships between crisis management and moral disengagement. The different relationship 
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forms are explained using illustration from the data collected. In addition, their links within the 
broader risk and resilience management practice were discussed. This was necessary to explain 
how moral disengagement could perpetuates risk and crisis management practice. Therefore, 
it is intended that by understanding these relationship forms between crisis management and 
moral disengagement, future unconventional crises could be prevented. In a practical context, 
the crisis – moral disengagement framework as presented in Table 8.1 is useful when 
organisations may be looking at the re-evaluation of their current risk and crisis management 
practice. The framework suggested a range of useful recommendations that could help 
organisations proactively manage risks and increase organisational resilience. Thus, the 
inclusion of this framework here because it can also be used to check the robustness of risk and 
crisis management especially when considering ethical risk and crisis management practice.
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Table 8.1:  Crisis – Moral Disengagement Relationships: Links with Risk and Resilience Management Practice 
Relationship Form Description Illustration from Data Links with risk and resilience management practice Data Source 
Selective risk 
perception 
This is a view that one risk school of thought is 
superior to another or at least forms the most 
valid representation of the risk or crisis 
situation. It undermines the possibility for 
comprehensive crisis engagement in which all 
stakeholders’ views are seen as complementary 
rather than incompatible.  
 The vast majority of 
environmental disasters 
especially oil spillages 
are due to third party 
interference.  
 Our organisation [Shell] 
is committed to 
international best practice 
and cannot reasonably 
cause harm to the local 
people or environment. 
The empirical evidence that risks and crises are best 
understood by experts is no longer valid and sustainable 
view of risk and crisis management. The divergence about 
risk and crisis should be seen as opportunity for dialogue 
and not issue of legitimacy over who is right or wrong. 
Key Informants; UNEP 
(2011); Steiner (2010); 
Ereba & Dumpe 
(2010); Pyagbara 
(2010); Slovic & Peters 
(2006); Panzer & 
Renner (2009); Shell 
(2012) 
Inflated ethical stance  This denotes that individual or organisational 
ethics could be overstated when not 
subjectively evaluated. It suggests that code of 
ethics and corporate governance standards are 
insufficient because individual or 
organisational ethics never remain at 
equilibrium. 
 We [Shell] have robust 
ethical code of conducts 
and abide by 
international operational 
standards in our areas of 
operations. 
 We [Chevron] are 
committed to delivering 
superior value for 
investors, customers, 
partners, host 
governments, local 
communities and staff. 
The notion that organisational code of ethics and corporate 
governance code/standards are adequate when evaluating 
corporate ethics should be discarded. Although, these 
codes/standards may be useful but do not guarantee that 
organisational ethics will remain at equilibrium throughout 
the firm’s lifespan. Therefore, risk culture and risk appetite 
should be continually monitor due to the possibility for 
excessive risk-taking or unethical behaviours that could 
erode risk management standards. 
Key Informants; Shell 
(2012; 2015); Chevron 
(2015; 2016); Andersen 
(2016); Moore (2008); 
Gino & Bazerman 
(2009); Mafimisebi & 
Thorne (2015). 
Organised corporate 
irresponsibility 
This is a systematic or well-coordinated 
approach to managing emerging issue(s) which 
obstruct good corporate citizenship behaviours. 
 We [Chevron] conduct 
our global operations 
consistent with the spirit 
and intent of the United 
Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
 We [Shell] are a 
committed and 
responsible partner in the 
The commitment that an organisation is doing something 
right is not the same as getting them right. The mechanism 
of corporate organised irresponsibly in which firm may be 
trying to avoid liability or take responsibility for actions 
emanating from its operations has consequential 
implications for risk and resilience management. 
Key Informants; TRIP 
Report (1999); Chevron 
(2011; 2015); Dominic, 
Swartz, & Herbane 
(2010) (2010); Jakob 
(2009); Reza (2011); 
Beck (2009), Gerber & 
Neeley (2005); Shell 
(2015); Wildavsky & 
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environmental space. We 
work closely with 
regulators and host 
communities in ensuring 
that we adhere to the 
highest international 
operational standards in 
our areas of operation. 
Dake (1990); 
Mafimisebi & Thorne 
(2015). 
 
Trust deficit The gaps in credibility of those who manage 
risks on behalf of others. Trust in organisations 
and their ability to reasonably manage their risk 
exposures as well as refraining from acts that 
disadvantage or cause harms to others appears 
to be waning. This poses crucial challenge for 
organisation(s) when responding to major 
crises that involved multiple stakeholders.  
 We [Key Informants] 
don’t trust multinational 
oil companies to 
appropriately treat or 
clean up the polluted 
environment of the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria. 
 Multinational oil 
companies apply double-
standards in their 
operations in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria. 
The need to repair trust following a major crisis is crucial 
for robust risk and crisis management. It is essential for 
organisations due to its implications for risk and crisis 
communication in the aftermath of crises as reflected in the 
case studies of Shell and Chevron. Trust deficit may 
undermines all major efforts in enhancing stakeholders’ 
cooperation. This can impact the overall success of risk and 
crisis management strategies when responding to emerging 
crises/disasters. 
Key Informants; Ferrin 
et al. (2007); Galford & 
Drapeau (2003); 
Korsgaard, Brodt, & 
Whitener (2002); 
Kramer (1996); 
Lewicki & Bunker 
(1996); Mafimisebi & 
Thorne, (2015); 
Mafimisebi & Ogbonna 
(2016); Elangovan & 
Shapiro, (1998); 
Gillespie & Dietz 
(2009). 
Relying on past 
successes 
This view suggests that the arrogance of 
success is to believe that what was successful 
or useful in the past would continue into the 
future. The fact that a risk/crisis strategy has 
been successful in managing past dangerous 
event(s) does not mean it will be useful in 
managing emerging or future crises. 
 We [Chevron] have 
successfully used our 
global memorandum of 
understanding strategy in 
responding to local 
communities’ needs and 
concerns. 
 The use of government 
security forces have been 
the most viable option to 
manage disruption and 
vandalism of our oil 
infrastructures and assets 
[Shell]. 
The clear concerns about universal application of risk and 
crisis management remain relevant when organisations are 
seeking to manage emerging crises/disasters. No two crises 
are exactly the same and the fact that a strategy has been 
successful or helpful in the past should not be a license for 
their universal application. If risk and crisis management 
strategies are to be successful and sustainable, context 
matters. 
Key Informants; Boin 
& Lagadec, (2000); 
Comfort (2007); 
Garnett & Kouzmin 
(2007); Mafimisebi & 
Nkwunonwo (2014; 
2015); UNEP (2011); 
Palm & Ramsell 
(2007). 
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Crisis categorisation This is a situation whereby we routinely and 
rapidly sort emerging crises into existing 
models rather than think of each as unique. The 
notion of crisis categorisation while offering 
prejudgement advantage in crisis/disaster 
situations, it reinforced both our default risk 
strategies as best available solution and 
solidified unconscious assumption that our 
existing risk/crisis models fit emerging crises 
and disasters. 
 These crises in the Niger 
Delta are often due to 
sabotage, oil bunkering, 
and resource control 
agitation. 
 Our [Shell] new 
Remediation 
Management System 
model can help manage 
any situation occurring 
from oil disaster in the 
Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. 
While it is essential to evaluate and categorise emerging 
crises into selected pattern(s), it must also be remember that 
unconventional crises/disasters transcend borders and are 
unique in their respective right. Thus, risk and crisis 
management models need flexibility and engagement with 
local context in the course of responding to emerging crises 
or disasters. This may help avoid the mistake of constantly 
believing that existing risk/crisis models fit all emerging 
crises or disasters. 
Key Informants; 
Buchanan & Denyer 
(2013); Chikudate 
(2009); Gundel (2005); 
McConnell & Drennan 
(2006); UNEP (2011); 
Toft & Reynolds 
(1994); Turner & 
Pidgeon (1997); 
Vaughan (2004); Weick 
(2010) 
Misinterpretation of 
dangerous events 
This idea is about how moral disengagement 
cause dangerous events whether crisis, disaster, 
terrorism, or militancy to be cognitively 
redefined into wider issues of globalisation, 
risk society, normal accident, systemic failure, 
and force majeure, etc.  
 It is the lack of Nigerian 
government ability to 
provide basic 
infrastructures that cause 
local youths to engage in 
militancy and not calls 
for environmental justice. 
 The Niger Delta crises 
are due to global climate 
change to which 
everyone is responsible.  
The use of moral disengagement mechanisms such as 
attribution, displacement of responsibility, moral 
justification and distorting the consequences as reflected in 
Shell and Chevron case studies are the easiest way to 
escalate emerging crises. Therefore, given the asymmetrical 
relationship between moral disengagement and crisis 
management, such mechanisms of moral disengagement 
should be avoided altogether. This is consistent with 
previous studies which established that denial, silence, no 
comment, evading responding, blame shifting, and 
distorting accusations are the least effective crisis 
management response strategies. In practical context, risk 
and crisis management practice should be transparent, 
truthful, ethical, and inclusive of multiple views raised by 
different stakeholders especially in context of 
environmental disasters, climate change, militancy and 
terrorism as demonstrated in the Niger Delta crises. 
Key Informants; 
Bandura (2009); Cope 
et al. (2010); Frewer 
(2004); Kahan et al. 
(2012); Lofstedt 
(2003); Rutsaert et al. 
(2013); Mafimisebi & 
Nkwunonwo (2014); 
Cohen (1999); Coombs 
(2007b); Dean (2004); 
Kellerman (2006); 
Lukaszewski (1999); 
Niels & Maarten (2011) 
Source: Author (2017) 
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Table 8.2: Profiles of Case Study Companies 
S/N FOCUS CHEVRON NIGERIA SHELL NIGERIA 
1 Business 
Interest 
 Chevron is the third-largest oil and gas producer in Nigeria but 
operate through its subsidiary – Chevron Nigeria Ltd., and hold 
a 40 percent interest in 13 concessions under a joint-venture 
with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for 
the onshore and offshore assets in the Niger Delta region.  
 In addition, the firm does business through other subsidiaries in 
Nigeria. For example, Chevron is the largest shareholder in the 
West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited with 36.7 percent 
interest. The West African Gas Pipeline supplies customers in 
Benin, Ghana and Togo with Nigerian natural gas for power 
generation and industrial applications. 
 Shell is the largest oil and gas producer in Nigeria but operate 
through its four subsidiaries – Shell Nigeria Exploration and 
Production Company (SNEPCo), Shell Nigeria Gas Limited 
(SGN), Shell Nigeria Oil Products and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (SPDC) of Nigeria. Collectively, these 
four subsidiaries of Shell are referred to as Shell Nigeria or Shell 
Companies in Nigeria (SCiN) throughout this thesis. Shell Nigeria 
first discovered commercial oil field at Oloibiri (present day 
Bayelsa State, Nigeria) and started oil exports in 1958. 
 SPDC is the largest fossil fuel company in Nigeria which operates 
over 6,000 kilometres of pipelines and flowlines, 87 flowstations, 
8 natural gas plants and more than 1,000 producing wells. Shell 
also holds a 25.6% stake in Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas 
(NLNG). 
2 Operational 
presence in 
Nigeria 
 Chevron began doing business in Nigeria since 1913 when 
Texaco products were first marketed in the country. 
 Energy exploration and production work started more than 50 
years ago. 
 Following the Nigerian Indigenization Decree of 1978, 
Chevron divested 40 percent of its shareholdings in Chevron 
Oil Nigeria Plc to the Nigerian public while retaining 60 
percent equity. 
 Shell began doing business in Nigeria since 1937 as Shell D’Archy 
and by 1938 the company was granted its first exploration license. 
The first deep water production was in 2005 from the Bonga 
Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel 
operated by the SNEPCo. 
 Shell Nigeria operation is through a joint venture with the 
government – Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Total E 
& P Nigeria Ltd and Nigeria Agip Oil Company Ltd. Collectively, 
the joint venture produces oil and gas from land, swamp and 
shallow water field, swamp and shallow water fields in the Niger 
Delta.  
3 Production  The averaged net daily production of Chevron Nigeria was 
224,000 barrels of crude oil, 246 million cubic feet of natural 
gas and 6,000 barrels of liquefied petroleum gas in 2015. This 
contrast with average daily production of 516,000 barrels of 
crude oil (232,000 net), 343 million cubic feet of natural gas 
(142 million net) and 11,000 barrels of liquefied petroleum gas 
(4,000 net) in 2011 
 The Shell companies in Nigeria produced an average 693,000 
barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d), with 535,000 boe/d from 
the SPDC Joint Venture and 158,000 from SNEPCo operated 
ventures in 2013. This contrast with overall production of 949,000 
boe/d in 2012, primarily reflecting the impact of militancy, oil 
bunkering and theft, sabotage and related deferments.  
 The SPDC JV can produce an average of approximately 900,000 
boe/d. 
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4 Natural gas  Chevron is involved in several natural gas projects including 
the optimization of the Escravos Gas Plant (EGP), the Escravos 
Gas-to-Liquids facility and the Sonam Field Development 
project. A number of these projects like the EGP focused on 
eliminating routine flaring of natural gas associated with crude 
oil production. 
 The Shell Nigeria Gas (SGN) Limited operates a gas transmission 
and distribution network of approximately 115km. The SGN 
operates many gas distribution systems including the ones at 
Ogbor Hill industrial area of Aba (Abia State), Port Harcourt 
(Rivers State), and Agbara-Ota (Ogun State), serving more than 
70 industrial customers. In fact, its gas distribution systems at Ota 
has a capacity of 42 million standard cubic feet per day and 
supplies customers in the industrial parks of Agbara, Igbesaand 
Ota (Ogun State).  
5 Health, 
environment 
and safety 
 In 2004, Chevron upgraded the Okan Platform which was 
installed in 1963, and other mature platforms to improve 
pollution prevention measures and safety systems. 
 Working across all operations to eliminate routine gas flaring 
and venting in line with company requirements and local 
regulations. However, gas flaring has been a continuous 
practice till date. This practice plus other environmental 
concerns have been part of the reasons for the agitation in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
 Chevron has also constantly used the services of Nigerian 
security forces to protect its oil infrastructures and assets. 
 SPDC reduced flaring volume from its facilities about 75% 
between 2003 and 2012 and flaring intensity (the amount of gas 
flared per barrel of oil produced) by around 60% over the same 
period. 
 Since 2000 SPDC has designed all new facilities to have no 
continuous flaring and has also monitored ambient air quality 
levels around its flare sites since 1998 and regularly reports the 
results to government authorities as required by the Nigerian 
regulatory standards. 
 
6 Responding 
to 
community 
needs 
 In 2005, Chevron Nigeria became the first multinational firm 
to adopt the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) 
as a new approach to community engagement in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria, giving communities a greater role in 
managing their development through the Regional 
Development Councils. 
 Through the GMoU in over 10-plus years, the NNPC/Chevron 
Joint Venture spent more than $100 million on estimated 600 
programs that provided more than 40,000 scholarships, new 
schools, medical facilities and supplies, and housing and 
support agriculture development and projects improving water, 
bridges, jetties, drains and roads. 
 In 2011, Chevron partnered with the U.S. Agency for 
International Development in contributing $50 million to the 
Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foundation to 
support programs that promote economic development and 
help reduce conflict in the region. 
 In 2014, Chevron committed an additional $40 million to the 
NDPI over the following five years. 
 Shell actively promotes projects in the Niger Delta that support 
small businesses, agriculture, training, education, health care and 
capacity building. A number of these projects are done in 
collaboration with the government and the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC).  
 For example, in 2013 Shell operations contributed over $180 
million (Shell share $69.8 million) to the NDDC as required by 
law.  
 The company also contribute an additional $104 million (Shell 
share over $32 million) was directly invested voluntarily by the 
SPDC JV and SPENCo towards addressing social and economic 
development challenges in the Niger Delta working with NGOs, 
companies and government agencies. 
 In 2013, SPDC and SNEPCo reported to have paid about $177 
million into education fund, bringing the total investment in the 
past five years (2009-2013) to $703 million. 
 Shell also work implement its social investments in four areas of 
enterprise development for youths and women, education, 
community health, and other community driven development 
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 In 2008, Chevron directed $5 million of the $30 million 
contributed to the Global Fund to fight AIDS treatment 
programs. 
 In 2015, Chevron committed an additional $5 million to 
Nigeria through the Global Fund to support prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
 In 2012, Chevron through partnership with nongovernmental 
organisation support an initiative designed to eliminate mother-
to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV in Bayelsa state. Also, 
Chevron partnered with Born Free Africa to help develop 
capacity within state ministries of health. This partnership help 
equip more than 670 health facilities to date in order to PMTCT 
of HIV activities in Nassarawa, Bayelsa and Rivers states. 
 Chevron also supports the Lekki Conservation Centre which is 
a 190-acre (0.8 sq km) sanctuary for the flora and fauna of the 
Lekki Peninsula, Lagos. 
 Chevron also claimed to have established a postgraduate 
research scholarship for doctoral students in environment and 
conservation. This is questionable due to lack of openness and 
transparency in the application process. 
initiatives implemented through the Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU) model. 
 5,575 Niger Delta youths trained in business management and 
enterprise development through Shell LiveWIRE programme 
since 2003. 
 $7 million invested in scholarships in 2013; and 14,000 
beneficiaries of Shell school and university scholarships granted 
over 50 years. For example, 1,795 scholarship grants were 
awarded to secondary school students and 850 to university 
undergraduates in 2013. 
 27 health facilities supported by SPDC in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. 
 91% of SCiN contracts awarded to Nigerian companies in 2013. 
 4,000 people directly employed by SPDC and SNEPCo. 
 SCiN typically employ 30,000-40,000 staff and contractors at any 
one time, the large majority of whom are Nigerian. 
7 Recognitions 
received 
 Chevron Nigeria won the U.S. State Department’s Award for 
Corporate Excellence in 2003. 
 The Nigerian Conservation Foundation honoured Chevron 
Nigeria in 2002 for its Award for Environmental Excellence. 
 Chartered Institute of Personnel Management of Nigeria 
honoured Chevron with its Human Resources Best Practice 
Award in the overall and oil and gas categories in 2014. 
 Chevron was named Best Community Development Company 
of the Year by the National Association of Energy 
Correspondents in 2012. 
 Chevron was named as one of the 100 Most Respected 
Companies in Nigeria by Businessday in 2015. 
 Chevron was given an Award of Appreciation from the Tertiary 
Education Trust Fund in recognition of contributions made to 
improve the quality of education in Nigeria. 
 The Shell Companies in Nigeria (SCiN) have received numerous 
awards in recognition of performance in local content 
development. These awards include: 
 The ‘Excellence in Local Content’ award at the Nigerian Oil and 
Gas Conference in 2012. 
 The ‘Local Content Operator of the Year’ awarded by the 
Petroleum Technology Association of Nigeria (PETAN) – the 
umbrella organisation of Indigenous Nigerian oil and gas 
companies.  
Source: Author (2017) 
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8.3 THE MAIN ISSUES 
It is argued that the extreme issue or weakness in each of the case studies was that of moral 
disengagement. As expounded from the thesis findings, moral disengagement causes crisis 
warnings to be ignored, creates conditions in which dangerous events are misclassified, 
increases the risk of dangerous omissions, and encourages rogue individual behaviour within a 
weak management framework. Moreover, moral disengagement expedites senior managers’ 
failure to acknowledge and act prudently on risk concerns and perception dilemmas. As one 
senior informant involved in the Niger Delta crises noted (UNEP, 2011, p. 110) there is a 
culture of ‘organisational denial’ and risk issues raised by local people or residents were often 
overlooked. The problem also extends to senior managers “taking their eye off the ball” as 
standards erode and risk management becomes a tick-box approach or mere regulatory 
compliance. The consequence of moral disengagement similarly manifest through inability of 
management to engage with the ethical and moral dynamics of unconventional risk and crisis.  
However, the issue is not merely one type of moral disengagement: moral disengagement arose 
at individual, team and organisational levels and between regulatory agencies and local 
communities and the public. Moral disengagement in the risk and crisis domain creates 
conditions for which senior managers/ leaders latch on to one superficial cause of crisis/disaster 
to the exclusion of more fundamental but sometimes less obvious issues. The risk and crisis 
management responses in dangerous events studied here are influenced by three layers of moral 
disengagement: individuals, team, and organisations. At the individual level, moral 
disengagement upsurges or reinforces rigidity of core unethical beliefs, values and 
assumptions, which may significantly affect how one responds to risk and crisis situations. In 
some cases, of course, individuals may refrain from moral disengagement as a kind of 
‘personal defence mechanism’ but this can be overridden by team and organisational moral 
disengagement, as illustrated from both Shell and Chevron case studies.  
The nature of unconventional risk and crisis situations in which organisations must respond 
decisively are most markedly characterised by decision-making in groups among senior 
personnel. Thus, moral disengagement becomes a collective problem within the organisational 
context occurring at team, group and enterprise-wide level. In practice, though senior managers 
and Board can apportion responsibility more reasonably, organisational structure can mask risk 
and crisis decision such that it becomes complex or multifaceted and hence impossible to 
separate who is morally disengaged in such a situation. This form of moral disengagement is 
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recognised as organisation’s moral disengagement, especially as senior managers and Board 
are acting on the organisation’s behalf.  
In general, moral disengagement obfuscates causes of unconventional risk and crisis such that 
initial interpretation of what constitutes dangerous events becomes seriously flawed. Therefore, 
it is difficult for effective risk and crisis management to take place if the initial interpretation 
or understanding of what has occurred or evolving is fundamentally flawed. These findings 
validate the purpose of this research and demonstrate that existing ways of managing risk, crisis 
and disaster are insufficient and the need to incorporate moral disengagement framework into 
risk and crisis management becomes most essential for practice, policy and research in risk and 
crisis domain. The level of moral disengagement within organisations needs to be tested and 
validated, although ethical principles are often assumed as organisations develop a code of 
ethical conducts and corporate governance. If the points within each of the case studies are 
carefully considered, this becomes increasingly clear. These points are presented within the 
following subsequent sections. 
 
8.3.1 SELECTIVE RISK PERCEPTION 
This subsection sheds insight into ‘selective risk perception’ as one of the crucial factors that 
influences risk and crisis management practice, as this research findings suggest. The data 
suggest a ‘climate of blaming’ whereby stakeholders in risk and crisis situations often attribute 
the proximate cause of crisis and disaster to each other: 
Chevron has ceaselessly dig artificial canals all over our communities in Ilaje without 
proper Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) thereby opening the areas to inflow of 
the ocean into fresh water. Seawater enters the originally fresh water environment 
through these canals which cause serious ecological problems. The seawater influx has 
resulted in serious vegetation damage. Our fishermen and women can no longer catch 
enough fish to earn a living. Our farmlands, fishponds and waterways are polluted or 
contaminated by oil spills because of prolonged exploitation by Chevron and other oil 
companies. 
The above quotation as disclosed by one of the informants confirmed what has been established 
in extant research that advocated that blame could be identified in risk, crisis and disaster 
situations (Borodzicz, 2005). This view is rooted in the existing notion that current risk, crisis 
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and disaster situations are no longer an ‘Act of God’ or mere natural events but the 
consequences of risk society, communication crisis, human error, systemic failure, cultural 
misconstructions, and rupture and manufactured uncertainty (Adams, 1995; Bland, 1995; Boin, 
2004; Borodzizc, 2005; Irwin, 1995; Reason, 1990; Beck, 2009; Pidgeon, 1992; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; Toft & Reynolds, 2005; Reza, 2011; ‘t Hart, 2013).  
But, the combination of these existing risk and crisis theories: risk perception, isomorphic 
learning, risk society, risk communication, and safety culture as discussed in Chapter Four do 
not sufficiently explain the unconventional nature of risk, crisis and disaster: 
One of the informants revealed that “it is fair to say that Shell knows it is causing much 
damage in the Niger Delta but won’t commit to stopping gas flaring and ending oil 
spills.” As another local informant recalled, “for more than five decades now, Shell has 
been doing business in Nigeria’s Niger Delta with total disregard for the environment, 
the people and their livelihood. The Ogoni as well as other peoples of the Niger Delta, 
given Shell’s past records, do not want Shell back in the region again; ….Shell insists 
on coming back to the region despite its terrible records of human and environmental 
rights violations.” Reflection on the Niger Delta crisis experience makes it clear that it 
created situation involving dehumanisation of local lives and disregarding the 
consequences, and this should be taken into consideration in organisations risk/crisis 
management planning. 
One informant from Shell Nigeria reacts to some of the allegations by noting that “we 
are committed to stopping flaring and we’ve spent $3 billion on it so far, but the fact is 
that at the moment both funding restrictions and the security situation have meant that 
many gas gathering projects have been halted. It’s also a fact that 85% by volume of 
oil spilled was caused by criminal activity of one sort or another – but we are pledged 
to clean them all up – no matter what the cause.” 
Historical experience, catastrophes, and disasters in the Niger Delta are divergence in 
nature and root causes are complex to establish. The complexity of the Niger Delta 
crises is clearly captured by another informant from an international oil company 
operating in the region: “the problem is that in some areas of the Niger Delta the 
situation is way beyond ‘good neighbours’. It’s militancy, violence, crude oil theft and 
other criminal activity, lack of education and employment and so on plus, and I have to 
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say this, years of government neglect, that have created problems that are way beyond 
the scope any single company to fix.” 
While it was found based on the above quotations that establishing root causes of the Niger 
Delta crises is almost impossible, trigger causes and other basic preconditions to the 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster are possible to recognise based on data from informants 
(Figure 8.2). This view is possibly a more useful technique for proactive risk and crisis 
management in the Niger Delta. This is due to the fact that trigger causes and preconditions of 
crisis or disaster can stimulate tailored and contextual risk and crisis management responses 
and policies. 
Figure 8.2: Selected Trigger Causes of Organisational Risks/Crises in the Niger Delta  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
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is a typical example of confirmation bias as already discussed. In each of the crisis/disaster 
incidents despite the location and external differences, each of the multinational organisations 
involved selectively provided risk messages in ways that often discount local concerns or 
views. The practical implication of this finding is that experts’ and lay-people accounts of 
emerging crisis and disaster should be treated as interchangeable sources of risk and crisis 
management strategies and practice. The response of Chevron to the Ilaje crisis revealed five 
areas of selective risk perception that related to moral disengagement mechanisms:  
(1) Local communities’ concerns over environmental damages were downplayed as 
poverty and unemployment problems (i.e. risk displacement versus displacement of 
responsibility). 
(2) Chevron’s crisis management team decided to seek the Nigerian Government Security 
Forces (GSF) assistance to free their workers, based on conflicting reports that staff on 
the barge were being held hostage (i.e. absolute unrealistic risk perception versus moral 
justification and attribution of blame). 
(3) Chevron’s claim that its workers on the Parabe barge were under emotional strain and 
had been subjected to physical abuse, when in fact the Ilaje protesters were under siege 
by the GSF (i.e. comparative unrealistic risk perception versus advantageous 
comparison and euphemistic labelling).  
(4) Chevron’s negotiators are also reported to have been threatened and briefly held 
hostage by the Ilajes, and that a series of brutal, firearms attacks upon unarmed 
protesters and unarmed innocent citizens are caused by a rogue GSF who only use 
Chevron’s helicopters and boats (i.e. comparative unrealistic risk perception versus 
distorting the consequences and displacement of responsibility). 
(5) The GSF, who assisted Chevron, killed Ilaje protesters but blamed victims for 
screaming, running or raised objects in their hands (i.e. absolute unrealistic risk 
perception versus dehumanisation and attribution of blame).  
However, if we considered Shell’s response to the Ogoni crisis, similar issues could also be 
identified:  
(1) ‘Demand notice’, – which includes request for social and environmental justice, 
compensation for devastating impact of oil activities and environmental damages in 
Ogoniland, to Shell, Chevron and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
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(NNPC) were largely ignored (i.e. risk underestimation versus displacement of 
responsibility). 
(2) The crisis was attributed to resource control and ethnic clashes while incessant oil spills 
were attributed to sabotage, instead of reparation of environmental damage (i.e. 
comparative unrealistic risk perception versus attribution of blame and displacement 
of responsibility). 
(3) The military repression of Ogonis protesting against destruction of farmland, oil 
pollution and gas flaring, pipeline construction on farmland, results in thousands of 
Ogonis death, beatings, detention, exile and core leaders’ summary execution, is 
attributed to actions of government (i.e. bias risk framing versus dehumanisation, 
distorting the consequences and displacement of responsibility). 
(4) Shell was accused of environmental devastation in Ogoniland, but this was put into a 
wider issue of over-farming, over-population, deforestation and industrialisation (i.e. 
comparative unrealistic risk perception versus euphemistic labelling). 
(5) Shell’s pollution issue was compared to oil bunkering and pollution from local artisanal 
refining (i.e. comparative risk perception and advantageous comparison).  
From this, selective risk perception consists of two risk judgements: the perceived likelihood 
of ‘incurring cost’ (or value at risk) and the perceived severity of such cost. These two risk 
judgements in both case studies manifest through the perception of being at risk and the 
perception of control over risk. This is an illustration of control bias in the process of risk and 
crisis management. If organisations predominantly bias comparative risk perceptions because 
of the need to maintain a positive self-view, absolute risk perception becomes underestimated 
and the selective risk perception dilemma materialises. Both cases revealed that selective risk 
perception impacts risk framing and risk response efficacy (defined as the effectiveness of risk-
reducing behaviour), and hinders proactive risk and crisis management strategies. Like 
selective risk perception, the likelihood of ‘risk ownership’ (or being responsible for causing a 
risk problem) is often due to risk framing and our world view. 
This research’s findings suggest that our views of risk and crisis are hugely influenced by 
historical, economic, legal, environmental and cultural factors and modern risk or crisis 
theories are similarly underpinned by our views of the world. Our findings reveal how risk 
perceptions of the ‘Niger Delta crisis and disaster situations’ are skewed towards experts’ 
validation as the most accurate and valid account of those crises. Empirical evidence that risk 
and crisis are best understood by experts is no longer valid and sustainable. What is emerging 
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is an understanding that experts’ views of risk and crisis management only form part of ‘risk 
reality’. This research argues risk experts’ views and methodologies play a key, but not 
exclusive, role in risk and crisis management practice. There is no agreement on the theory and 
methodology of risk and crisis management in practice. This lack of consensus challenges the 
very legitimacy of experts’ view of risk and crisis management as constituting best practice in 
the field.  
Therefore, the effective management of unconventional risks, crises and disasters requires 
serious risk engagement, unbiased risk perception, a well-coordinated risk framing, and 
overcoming self-defensive denial or motivated reasoning (Croyle, Sun & Hart, 1997; Kunda, 
1990; Harris, Griffin & Murray, 2008; Helzer & Dunning, 2012; Shepperd, Klein, Waters & 
Weinstein, 2013). One intriguing conclusion from this point is that selective risk perception 
may often facilitate, instead of reducing, ineffective risk and crisis management. For this 
reason, this research contends that valuable insights can be gained using ‘learning from 
disasters’, isomorphic learning, risk culture and risk communication methodologies discussed 
in Chapters Four and Five. However, the crucial issue is not to simply acknowledge the 
existence of selective risk perception. The vital implication of such suggestions must be 
factored into risk and crisis management, as presented below. 
 
8.3.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO SELECTIVE RISK 
PERCEPTION 
In principle, organisations in crisis or disaster situations can selectively perceive risk due to 
their risk analysis, experience, business case, motivations, environment and culture. Given 
these motivated reasoning factors, organisations have a constrained choice between how 
emerging risks and crises are perceived inwardly (within organisations) and outwardly (outside 
organisations). At first glance, given the range of risks facing Shell and Chevron in Nigeria, it 
appears that these multinationals will be motivated to change their risk and crisis management 
practice. However, from a selective risk perception standpoint, the process is more complex 
and controversial: organisations do not only need to know their risk exposure but also value at 
risk before risk decisions can be taken. This view is supported by the empirical evidence from 
the archival dataset, documentary interviews and commission reports on the Niger Delta crises.  
As a rule, the more cognitive resources organisations spend on undesirable or unexpected risk 
information, the more plausible alternative explanations are likely to emerge. As a result, the 
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likelihood that undesirable or unexpected risk information from other stakeholders will be 
perceived as being less valid or legitimate, increases. Under these circumstances, unexpected 
or undesirable risk information (like oil pollution, sabotage, environmental degradation and 
depletion of natural resources as shown in Shell and Chevron case studies) is less likely to be 
accepted than anticipated positive risk information. These findings validate but extend previous 
studies showing that risk framing effect impact how risk messages are perceived or received 
(Slovic & Peters, 2006; Panzer & Renner, 2009).  
At the same time, several contextual and environmental factors such as vandalism, sabotage 
and oil bunkering in the Niger Delta are expected positive risk information for multinational 
firms (e.g. Shell and Chevron), because these issues exonerate them from liability and allow 
them to declare force majeure in Nigeria. The research findings reveal that declaration of force 
majeure (i.e. unavoidable accident, disambiguation) is a common risk and crisis management 
practice of multinational firms (Shell and Chevron) in Nigeria. However, it was found that this 
is often done to avoid environmental justice and compensation for environmental damages to 
sources of livelihood (e.g. farmlands and fishing waters). Therefore, it is crucial to bridge the 
divide between how multinational firms (Shell and Chevron) perceived risk and crisis, and how 
local communities within the Niger Delta perceived the same problem. In a practical context, 
situational crisis communication theory as discussed in Chapter Five can clearly help to bridge 
the gaps. 
The selective risk perception dilemmas can be addressed using simulation and group risk 
exercises incorporating stakeholders’ views of risk and crisis. This must be pragmatic to 
incorporate and reflect lessons learned from past risk failures and disasters and consequently 
leads to improvement in risk decision-makings. The suggestions concerning learning from 
disasters and isomorphic learning especially how to overcome barriers to organisational 
learning from failures and building risk informed culture discussed in Chapter Four (Table 4.3) 
can be most useful here. Likewise, three additional recommendations can be offered for 
overcoming selective risk perception dilemma.  
Firstly, the continuous review of environmental, social and health impacts assessment of Shell 
and Chevron operations on local indigenes demands adequate attention. This would have 
ensured that local risk perceptions and concerns are factored into risk and crisis management 
practice of both organisations. This view confirms previous studies relating to the Niger Delta 
crises that inadequate risk and crisis management is partly due to neglect of local concerns 
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(Steiner, 2010; Turner & Brownhill, 2004; UNEP, 2011). This is the case for Shell Nigeria, 
who initially neglected MOSOP demands notice over accusation of environmental devastation 
and irresponsibility (Boele et al., 2001; ERA, 2012; Pyagbara, 2010). 
Secondly, the need for both organisations to actively engage stakeholders on community 
relations and allow bottom-up community project approach is strongly recommended (Ereba 
& Dumpe, 2010; Pyagbara, 2010). The research findings suggest that Shell and Chevron need 
to review their current Global Memorandum of Understandings (GMoUs) and Community 
Projects Approach. The current practice of using selected community leaders as representatives 
of the wider local indigenes to determine which community projects to embark upon is 
inadequate. Alternatively, both organisations would need to work closely with local indigenes 
and not just community leaders to understand and respond to agitations and concerns on a 
timely and frequent basis. The crisis management team of both organisations can organise and 
facilitate large meetings and focus group with local indigenes with leaders in attendance to 
obtain review or feedback on areas where their risk and crisis management practice in the Niger 
Delta need substantial improvements.  
The use of social media can also help the crisis management team in both organisations to 
incorporate local concerns into risk and crisis management practice; although Shell often 
provided public information on oil spills in the Niger Delta and remediation activities on its 
website (Shell, 2012; 2015). The use of online Web-Chat ‘Tell Shell’ has been another good 
way in which Shell interacts with critics and other stakeholders, but this medium of 
communication is not readily available to local indigenes in rural areas of Nigeria. Again, other 
popular sources of social media (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) in Nigeria, crucial for risk and 
crisis communication, appear to have been neglected, as the research findings revealed. This 
should be incorporated before, during and after crisis.  
The third recommendation, is that the UNEP Inquiry recommendations into the Niger Delta 
crisis as pertaining to multinational oil firms (e.g. Shell and Chevron) must be fully heeded and 
adopted (UNEP, 2011). The UNEP inquiry recommendations must be comprehensively 
addressed and not partially adopted by Shell and other multinational oil firms. For example, it 
is recommended that Shell conduct a comprehensive review of its assets in Ogoniland and 
develop an Asset Integrity Management Plan for Ogoniland and a decommissioning plan 
(UNEP, 2011). The need for Shell and Chevron to work with the Nigerian regulators to clarify 
the paradox of remedial intervention with the parties need to agree on a consultative approach 
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to setting site-specific clean-up values are strongly recommended (UNEP, 2011). Although an 
18-month roadmap has been agreed by the Nigerian government, UNEP and Shell which 
includes a governance framework; it is unclear how this new governance framework will help 
to put an end to all forms of oil contamination, pollution and environmental devastation in the 
Niger Delta.  Unfortunately, the specific roles of the different stakeholders in the Niger Delta 
crises are not specified. This adds to the complexity and ambiguity in such crises, which could 
have been minimised through risk education and communication, and alternative livelihood 
programmes. This point will be expanded later in this Chapter. 
 
8.3.2 INFLATED ETHICAL STANCE 
This is a view that organisations’ ethical practices are often overestimated. Theoretical and 
empirical studies using a range of frameworks have shown that ethical standards and beliefs 
both at micro and macro levels are related to workplace behaviours, attitudes and other 
organisational outcomes (e.g. Bandura, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Sonenshein, 
2007; Phelps, 2006). This perspective has been challenged and extended to the risk, crisis and 
disaster domain, in our recent research (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). The current assumption 
about ethical business practice is that codes of ‘ethics’ and ‘corporate governance’ are crucial 
towards building and developing robust organisational ethics and behaviours (Daily, Dalton, 
& Cannella, 2003; Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Trevino et al., 2006). That is, once organisations 
have developed codes of ethics and corporate governance as well as compliance with all 
relevant regulations and legislations, ethical behaviours within such organisations will be 
enriched and strengthened. Nonetheless, this conventional wisdom is misleading, grossly 
inadequate and encourages rogue behaviours within modern organisations especially when 
managing risk and crisis situations, as this research’s findings indicate. The argument is that 
organisational ethics are never at equilibrium throughout the organisation’s lifecycle. It is 
argued here that any organisation’s that believed the contrary has an inflated ethical business 
practice. That is, the assumed ethical business practice is grossly overstated. 
Associated with the problem of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster situations is the issue 
of inflated ethical business stance or practice. In Chapter Five, we challenged the longstanding 
evidence that organisations are ethical and will therefore behave in a consistent, ethical manner. 
Specific to the focus of this current research, the degree of robust ethical practices within the 
multinational organisations considered in this thesis depends largely on detecting and 
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correcting moral disengagement across all levels within those organisations. For example, 
Shell noted that where communities grant access, the company cleans up and remediates oil 
spills from its facilities, irrespective of the cause of the spill (Shell, 2012; 2015). In addition, 
Shell make claims of providing transparency to all stakeholders with respect to its management 
of oil spills and environmental disasters; and work closely with regulators and host 
communities in ensuring that we adhere to the highest international operational standards in 
our areas of operation (Shell, 2011, p. 15). However, the inflated ethical business practices of 
both organisations (Shell and Chevron) are readily visible from the Niger Delta crises. In the 
practical context, in 1996, Bopp van Dessel (former head of environmental studies for Shell 
Nigeria 1992-1994), who had quit Shell because of professional frustrations, raised 
fundamental concerns with respect to Shell’s poor environmental practices in Nigeria: 
“Wherever I went; I could see that Shell was not operating their facilities properly. 
They were not meeting international standards. Any Shell site that I saw was polluted; 
any terminal that I saw was polluted. It is clear to me that Shell was devastating the 
area.” (Steiner, 2010, p. 30). 
This quote shows some insights into what Shell claimed to have done in the Niger Delta and 
what actually happened on the ground. The UNEP inquiry report (UNEP, 2011, p. 12) into the 
Niger Delta crises also highlights some empirical evidences: 
 Ten out of the 15 investigated sites which Shell records show as having completed 
remediation, still have pollution exceeding Shell and government remediation closure 
values. 
 Despite claims of clean-up and remediation, people have been consuming water with 
benzene over 900 times the World Health Organisation (WHO) guideline. 
 The control, maintenance and decommissioning of oilfield infrastructure in Ogoniland 
are inadequate. 
 Industry best practices and Shell’s own procedures have not been applied, creating 
public safety issues. 
 Despite Shell’s adoption of a new Remediation Management System in January 2010, 
Shell still do not meet the local regulatory requirements or international best practices. 
From this, it is apparent that there are indeed violations of Shell’s own ethical business practice. 
An extended view of this is that of organisations developing culture that violates ethical 
practice or professional conducts in a way favourable to them (cf. Haidt, 2001; Krebs & 
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Denton, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Gino & Bazerman, 2009; 
Trevino et al., 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). Does heightening ethical stance and corporate 
governance change people’s intentions and behaviours? Merely upholding ‘the rules of code 
of ethics and corporate governance’ are not sufficient to underpin organisation’s moral values 
and embedded risk culture across the organisation. This underlines the need for an explicit 
framework to detect moral disengagement and ethical evaporation across modern 
organisations. It is argued that without such frameworks, organisations become morally 
vulnerable to moral disengagement, in which case corrupt practices perpetuate risk and crisis 
decision-makings.  
For instance, Chevron prides itself as an organisation committed to creating superior value for 
investors, customers, partners, host governments, local communities and workforce (Chevron, 
2015). The organisation relies on its Operational Excellence Management System (OEMS) as 
a comprehensive, proven means of systematic management of process safety, personal safety 
and health, the environment, reliability and efficiency. The OEMS helps to identify and manage 
the risks facing Chevron’s global business operations. It was noted that leaders are responsible 
for managing the OEMS and enabling the OE performance but every individual in Chevron’s 
workforce is accountable for complying with the principles of “do it safely or not at all” and 
“there is always time to do it right” (Chevron, 2015).  
In practice, however, evidence of unethical conducts in risk and crisis management practices 
abound; but this also extends to both Shell’s and Chevron’s record on human rights and ethical 
business practice in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Figure 8.3 and 8.4): 
One of the informants from local oil producing community in the Niger Delta who 
experienced Chevron’s dehumanisation through the activities of Nigerian security 
forces re-counts: “On the 25th of May 1998 we made a peaceful demonstration to 
Chevron place, when we got there we talked to the naval personnel that was hired for 
security and the mobile policeman. They decided to call Chevron to them that the Ilajes 
are around. When they called them, [someone from] public relations [wanted to speak] 
to us but we refused to speak to him, we wanted to talk to Kirkland who is the managing 
director here. So later they linked us to Lagos where they have their head office, we 
talked to [the Community Relations Manager] he said he was coming over but we said 
we would not listen to him if we don't see Kirkland . . . So on the 26th [the Community 
Relation Manager] came on board the barge saying what [Chevron] wanted. We told 
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him we cannot discuss with him, he insisted that he should dialog with us. We said no, 
he should go back and either call Kirkland or he should go back to [our] community to 
discuss with the elders . . .   
On the 27th of May they went to our community where they had a meeting . . . [Our 
community] gave them our proposal: we need portable drinking water, employment, 
[we want Chevron] to resume their pledge of scholarship - because they always promise 
to give us scholarships without paying, and we need a medical facility. Since our water 
has been polluted they should compensate the people in the area for the damage to the 
area . . . [The Chevron representatives said] that before they could take any decision 
we should leave the barge and they . . . [would] arrive at a good conclusion on the 29th. 
So on the night of the 27th May they sent news to us on the barge that we could meet 
with . . . [the Community Relations Manager] be part of the discussion [in our 
community]  
But surprisingly on the 28th, as early as 6:45 in the morning before the sun could come 
up, what we saw was choppers with military men, soldiers, and mobile police inside. 
They started shooting before they even landed, start shooting indiscriminately . . . The 
end result was that we lost two of our boys and a lot of them got injured . . . Some of 
them jumped overboard and they were rescued.  Then the balance of us, we refused to 
[leave the barge]. Personally, I refused to go because if you can kill two why not add 
me?  
So they decided to arrest 11 of us. We were first taken to a Nigerian naval base at 
Warri. We were kept for four days in a cell. Then on June 1st they transferred us to 
another cell [in a different town] before taking us to the state security service at the 
Fort of Ortcuri where we were detained for 22 days before being released again . . . 
Chevron . . . first accused us of sabotage . . . and then later, I don't know if they induced 
the police but [Chevron] asked them to make me sign an undertaking that we destroyed 
their chopper, vandalised their equipment - which was a lie. [Then] I was hanged up 
by the handcuffs on my wrists on the hook on the ceiling fan.  
They asked me to sign a statement that I lead a team to the Parabe platform and that 
we vandalised the things there . . . but I refused . . . The day they took us to Warri naval 
base, one of [the soldiers] was telling us that [Chevron] promised them each 10 
thousand Naira [less than 20 pounds] to come and do the shooting. But after I was 
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released, because I knew some of them I went to them and asked, "Why did you have to 
come and shoot us"? They said that it backfired because they promised them 10 
thousand Naira (approx. 20 pounds) but they only ended up giving them 3 thousand 
Naira (approx. 6 pounds). When they brought us to the naval base the Chevron 
representative handed them their money and actually there was a row between them, 
there was a disagreement that was not the amount they had agreed on. 
The above quotations show that the presence of rational and bounded thinking increases the 
propensity for unethical conduct in risk and crisis situations. The two multinational 
organisations violate their own ethical business practices and other Nigerian regulatory 
agencies guidelines on environmental damages/degradation. The normal practice of gas flaring 
in Nigeria, for example, and the collective structures of risk decision-making contribute to the 
‘wicked problems’ in the Niger Delta (Steiner, 2010). The interaction of these factors: normal 
practice or industry best practice and collective structure of risk decisions compound the ethical 
dilemma, as supported in recent research (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mafimisebi & 
Ogbonna, 2016). Accordingly, this thesis argues that people involved in risk and crisis 
situations engage in unethical behaviour both because of ‘rational’ and ‘bounded’ thinking, as 
it is conventionally understood, and because of emotional and irrational arousal. These findings 
were corroborated by numerous previous studies which discovered that bounded rationality 
and inordinate risk taking facilitate unethical behaviours especially in situations where moral 
dilemma appears controversial (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Gino & Bazerman, 2009; 
Haidt, 2001; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007; Phelps, 2006; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 
2015; Trevino et al., 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010).
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Figure 8.3: Selected insights about Shell’s risk and crisis management practice 
 
  
Findings from literature/local informants
• There was a widely reported and recorded case in Umuechem, where Shell began operations in 1959.
Like most communities in the Niger Delta where oil companies operate, this community remained
underdeveloped and suffered from oil-related environmental disasters.
• In 1990 our community staged a peaceful demonstration to voice its complaints. Community members
noted that during the demonstration they were carrying simple placards and dancing. Shell requested
that the Nigerian police come to control the situation, and this time the result was an outright massacre.
Frome October 13 to November 1, 1990, the community was constantly bombarded by the Nigerian
mobile police. This causes the death of more than 100 people during this protest including a chief, who
was shot at the entrance of his house as he came out to try and calm the situation. Houses were burned
and looted, and the police occupied the town for months while most of our community were forced to
flee.
• But Shell is not alone in this, Chevron too has employed the military to repress community protests of its
own negligent practices, as the case of Ilaje reveals (TRIP report, 1999, p. 18). It is essential to notes that
both companies have refuted these allegations of human rights violation in the Niger Delta.
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Figure 8.4: Selected insights about Chevron’s risk and crisis management practice 
 
Selected insights about inflated ethical stance
Excerpts from local informant (a witness to Chevron's brutality in Ilaje
• Chevron operates in our area, in Ilaje area in Ondo State. During their operation we've not got one thing for
development apart from a wooden six-classroom bloock, and a potable drinking water system that was not
working from the first day that is commissioned. So, there was nothing coming to us, so we decided to write
[Chevron] a letter to call them to dialog.
• The writing of letters began [in] 1989. Then we decided to go to government directly. We wrote a letter to the
deputy governor. [He] invited Chevron and us to a meeting but Chevron refused to turn up . . . So we now
invited them a second time again, on the 15th of May 1998. When they refused to turn up, saying they have no
office in our state we decided to protest to their working zone. However, instead of dialoging with us, they
invited the police and military personnel to fire shot at us resulting into death of two people and several injuries
to our people.
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8.3.2.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO INFLATED ETHICAL STANCE 
The initial recommendation is for multinational organisations like Shell and Chevron to 
develop a robust organisational self-awareness in Nigeria. In this context, organisational self-
awareness is the ability to detach from view which only affirmed organisational stance on an 
issue and dismissed input about shortcomings. This is crucial to improve our assessments of 
ourselves given that what we know and don’t know, skills we have and don’t have can still be 
woefully inaccurate (Andersen, 2016, p. 99). For Chevron, “our company’s foundation is built 
on our values, which distinguish us and guide our actions. We conduct our business in a socially 
responsible and ethical manner. We respect the law, support universal human rights, protect 
the environment and benefit the communities where we work.” (Chevron, 2016, p. 2). Our 
findings suggest that Chevron’s risk and crisis management practice in the Niger Delta 
contradicts its business conduct and ethics code (see Figure 8.4 above). The apparent ethical 
blindness that ensued should not have occurred.  
In both case studies of Shell and Chevron, it was easier to see too much attention being paid to 
the idea that ‘we have business conduct and ethics codes’ in place and that risks and crises are 
managed according to firms’ own frameworks, industry standards and international best 
practices. There is a seeming assumption that organisational ethics will remain at equilibrium 
in both case studies organisations. However, the notion that organisational ethics in risk and 
crisis situations would perhaps remain at equilibrium has been refuted in this research. Thus, 
this thesis argues that recognising the possibility for ethical failure in risk and crisis situations 
regardless of the presence of robust ethical codes of conduct and corporate governance within 
modern organisations, is critical to sustainable ethical practice and achieving resilient 
outcomes. But how could organisations recognise the possibility for ethical failures? In this 
case, there are four guiding principles to making the right ethical decisions when faced with a 
difficult situation, in the case of Chevron: 
 Is it legal? 
 Is it consistent with company policy, including human rights policy? 
 Is it consistent with the Chevron way? 
 If it were made public, would we be comfortable? 
These four principles guide Chevron’s operation in Nigeria (Chevron, 2016, p. 4) but no ethical 
code or manual can provide complete answers to all complex and ethically problematic 
questions. Under these circumstances, this thesis recommends reflexive moral engagement and 
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explicit adoption of an organisational moral engagement model to counteract unethical 
conducts and improve risk culture. From this perspective, a moral engagement typology 
develops based on synthesis of moral issues from Badaracco & Webb (1995), Bandura (2009), 
Frederick (1988), Houlden (1988), Thompson & Martin (2010) and Hollensen (2017) is a 
useful tool to moderate an organisation ethical decision during crisis/disaster situations. This 
corporate moral engagement typology as represented in Figure 8.5 below can provides practical 
insights into ethical risk and crisis management practice. 
Figure 8.5: Typology of Corporate Moral Engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
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governance, organisational policy and guidance from senior executives, corporate compliance 
group, and relevant ethical regulations and legislations do not particularly motivate individuals 
to engage in ethical conducts when managing risk and crisis situations. These elements are 
‘moral engagement factors’ because they are in most cases intended to predominantly stimulate 
ethical or moral behaviours and decisions within the workplace.  
However, there is a caveat that must be heeded about moral engagement factors. That is, the 
presence of moral engagement factors: (1) organisation ethical code of conducts, (2) corporate 
compliance group, (3) ethics committees, (4) firms’ own ethics regulations, and (5) external 
legislations on ethics and corporate governance do not in themselves promote ethical 
behaviours but serve primarily to prevent unethical conducts within organisations. Specifically, 
moral engagement factors are comparable to good hygiene which does not in itself produce 
good health, but the lack of it will cause disease. Alternatively, we can also conceptualise moral 
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engagement factors as ethical enrichment factors because their absence or inadequacy causes 
unethical and detrimental conducts at workplace. Accordingly, ethical enrichment factors need 
constant reinforcement because they are perceived as expected or standard method of 
behaviours, rather than incentives to greater ethical behaviours or decision-makings. 
In practice, the value of moral engagement can be recognised through the involvement of 
ethical committees at Board level to focus on ethics and values as well as corporate 
responsibility and sustainability. In addition, ethical simulation training would help ascertain 
and detect possible indicators or mechanisms of moral disengagement in organisations before 
a real event ensued. The value of ethical simulation training cannot be overstated since 
advanced moral reasoning requires high levels of cognitive complexity (Moore, 2008, p. 133). 
For this reason, this thesis also advocates moral evaluation, automatic reaction and affective 
reactions, environmental and social cues to recognise the moral implications of risk and crisis 
(Haidt, 2001; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007; Phelps, 2006; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 
2015). Although critics might argue that these suggestions are unrealistic because it is too 
controlling.  
Nonetheless, if an organisation is serious of ethical risk and crisis management practice, these 
are extremely useful tools to counteract unethical business conducts especially in the risk and 
crisis domain. For instance, risk failure information about the Shell and Chevron crises contains 
valuable ethical dilemmas which can be used to train and communicate to senior executives to 
strengthen organisational resilience and improve risk culture and risk governance. Like 
traditional theorists of moral development (e.g. Bandura, 1986; Kolgberg, 1969; 1984; Rest, 
1986) and modern moral theorists (e.g. Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Gino & Bazerman, 
2009; Trevino et al., 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010) moral awareness and moral evaluation are 
crucial to overcome an inflated ethical stance. This requires some reality checks through 
comprehensive training and education about risk management and ethical decisions. 
Organisational self-deception can diminish any appetite for ethical behaviour, as the case 
studies indicate. As a rule, crucial questions such as is our organisation ethical stance accurate 
or reflecting of reality with our stakeholders? What facts do we have to support our ethical 
stance? Are our datasets used to evaluate our organisation’s ethical stance consistent with 
different views of stakeholders? These are essential to counteract an inflated ethical stance. 
These questions about an inflated ethical stance and with actions on those questions can 
reinforce ethical values across organisation like Shell and Chevron in Nigeria. In conclusion, 
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some good practical advice about overcoming unethical risk management can be offered here 
for senior executives: “All managers’ risk giving too much because of what their companies 
demand from them. But the same superiors, who keep pressing you to do more, or to do it 
better, or faster, or less expensively, will turn on you should you cross the fuzzy line between 
right and wrong. They will blame you for exceeding instructions or for ignoring their warnings. 
The smartest managers already know that the best answer to the question “How far is too far?” 
is don’t try to find out.” (David & David, 2015, p. 113). 
 
8.3.3 ORGANISED CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 
The issue of organised corporate irresponsibility is another fundamental factor that impedes 
risk and crisis management in the Niger Delta. Organised irresponsibility means that there is a 
diversity of humanly created risks for which people and organisations are certainly 
‘responsible’ in a sense that they are its authors but where no one is held specifically 
accountable (cf. Beck, 2009). For example, this thesis found that multinational firms have been 
criticised regularly for failing to protect the local environment, defend human rights, be good 
corporate citizens, and apply the same standards in their operations especially in developing 
nations; noting that they appear concerned with profit over safety, health and environment 
(Shell Report, 2011; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). This has been classified as a double-
standard elsewhere in this thesis (Chapters One, Two and Three).  
However, it is difficult to specifically attribute all blames on oil companies operating within 
the Niger Delta because illegal refineries operators are also polluting the environment and 
endanger human survival.  The UNEP inquiry recognised and identified the need to address 
some of the issues of corporate irresponsibility in the Niger Delta crises (UNEP, 2011). By 
organised corporate irresponsibility, it is meant a systematic or well-coordinated approach to 
managing emerging issue(s) which obstruct good corporate citizenship behaviours. The 
following quote from a leaked confidential communication from the British Trade 
Commissioner in Lagos to the UK Foreign Office in 1963 illustrates the organised corporate 
irresponsibility that has dominated and clouded the Niger Delta region for more than five 
decades: 
“Shell/BP’s need to continue, probably indefinitely, to flare off a very large proportion 
of the associated gas they produce will no doubt give rise to a certain amount of 
difficulty with Nigerian politicians, who will probably be among the last people in the 
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world to realise that it is sometimes desirable not to exploit a country’s natural 
resources and who, being unable to avoid seeing the many gas flares around the 
oilfields, will tend to accuse Shell/BP of conspicuous waste of Nigeria’s ‘wealth’. It will 
be interesting to see the extent to which the oil companies feel it necessary to meet these 
criticisms by spending money on uneconomic methods of using gas.” 
“In the longer run, Shell/BP is going to have to consider very carefully how it should 
explain publicly the large outflow of capital that is likely to take place towards the end 
of the decade . . . it will no doubt come as something of a shock to Nigerians when they 
find that the company is remitting large sums to Europe. The Company will have to 
counter the criticisms which will very probably be made to the effect that the company 
is ‘exploiting’ Nigeria by stressing the very large contribution it is making to Nigeria’s 
export earnings.” (ERA, 2005, p. 2) 
Instead of cleaning-up of polluted sites, multinationals often displaced responsibility to the 
wider issue of globalisation and oil theft by local militants, causing indirect but significant 
pollution (UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2014; Mafimisebi & 
Ogbonna, 2016). In fact, the official response of citing economics and lack of markets for 
regular gas flaring in the Niger Delta was complacent and exhibits the organised corporate 
irresponsibility that has persisted there for decades: “Until there is this worthwhile market and 
until there are facilities (e.g. pipelines and storage tanks) to use the gas, it is normal practice 
to burn off this by-product from the oil wells.” (ERA, 2005, P. 2).  
Similarly, multinationals have regularly cited their contributions to Nigeria’s export earnings 
as part of their corporate responsibility at the expense of detrimental operations to local 
farming, fishing, clean water, and quality air within the Niger Delta region (Shell, 2009; 2011; 
2012; Chevron, 2015). To further illustrate this point, exclusive focus on the business case and 
profitability as well as corporate focus on protecting shareholders’ values and business 
continuity can also sporadically facilitate organised corporate irresponsibility (Steiner, 2010). 
For example, gas flaring which releases greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide and 
methane into the atmosphere in the Niger Delta, has been a regular practice since 1958, despite 
endless calls from local communities, environmental activists and some government 
representatives to end gas flaring (Bassey, 2008; Aghalino, 2009; Alaba & Ifeola, 2011; Ekpu, 
1996; Eweje, 2006; ERA, 2012; UNEP, 2011; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015). This issue 
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has been attributed to corporate reluctance, collective denial of environmental impacts and lack 
of corporate morality in the case organisations.  
Perceived as corporate irresponsibility or as corporate immorality, and even worse, lack of 
corporate conscience, multinational oil firms are criticised for their risk and crisis management 
practice in Nigeria. These polarised insights represent a form of ‘moral disengagement’ that 
does apply to risk and crisis situations. In fact, existing research shows that corporate 
irresponsibility and immorality are manifested in the form of moral disengagement (Bandura, 
2007; 2009; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). Contextual data from key informants provide further 
support to these findings: 
“Shell’s attitude in Ogoniland represents an awful side of corporate Europe, a 
company without morality, a company without conscience. Its operations have killed 
over 4,000 Ogonis between 1993 and 1999 (Informant, Senior Executive, Government 
Regulatory Agency) 
“[This] oil spillage that has occurred since December 1998 to September 1999 has not 
been cleaned. The government of the state is also aware of that. You can see the level 
of injustice the community is going through. We have approached the company on 
several occasions to go and clear this spill. We have written [a] series of letters 
guaranteeing the security of their personnel. Yet the company has refused and the 
ecosystem of the place is destroyed.” 
“Our people are afraid to sue for clean-up and compensation because history shows 
that oil companies will appeal repeatedly until the plaintiffs run out of money, give up, 
or die. Going to court is something companies have no reason to fear because they can 
extend a case indefinitely. There was a case in which community took Shell to court in 
1984 but no compensation has been reached till date and nothing has been done to 
clean up water and soil.” 
“Shell shows it sense of corporate irresponsibility by failing to appreciate the simple 
truth that its operations destroyed our sources of livelihood, and that it should 
acknowledge its failures, pay compensation for the damages and hands off the Ogoni 
oilfields (Informant, Community Leader, Regional NGO)” 
The refusal to compensate local indigenes for environmental damages to their sources of 
livelihood, clean-up of the polluted environment and an end to gas flaring in the Niger Delta is 
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more evidence of corporate irresponsibility, but multinational oil companies have often refuted 
these claims. Even though we find evidence of commitment to human rights and corporate 
social responsibility in both Shell and Chevron annual reports (Shell Report, 2011, p. 32), at 
least on paper. For example, according to one informant from Shell:  
“Shell is a committed and responsible partner in the environmental space. We work 
closely with regulators and host communities in ensuring that we adhere to the highest 
international operational standards in our areas of operation.” The view of local 
community members is different as revealed from the following quotation by another 
local community informants: 
“These oil companies don’t keep to their own operational standards, not to mention 
international standards. Their operations have completely cut us out from the state. 
Transport boat[s] no longer apply because of oil pollution. They don't go to Epubu 
community. You have no communication with the outside world. So, we are appealing 
to the international community to come to our aid by providing boats that will enable 
us [to] communicate with the outside world, because we are completely cut out. And, 
to assist [in] establish training schools, so that our children can go to school and we 
too will know that is happening. Because if you are not educated you cannot come here 
and talk the way I am talking. So that is our passionate plea to the international 
community.” 
In another instance, Shell Nigeria reported in its sustainability report that: “we support the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and have made specific reference to this in our 
Business Principles.” (Shell, 2012, p. 44). Equally, Chevron’s Human Rights Policy 520 states 
that “we conduct our global operations consistent with the spirit and intent of the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” (Chevron, 2016, p. 9). Human rights, in this 
context, are basic standards of treatment to which all people are entitled regardless of 
nationality, gender, race, economic status or religion.  
Despite our case organisations’ (i.e., Shell and Chevron) commitment to human rights, their 
operations in the Niger Delta regularly encroach upon human rights from constant gas flaring 
to lack of clean-up of contaminated soil and water, leading to deprivation of the right to good 
air, clean water and good health (Bolorunduro et al., 2005; Okon & Akunna, 2010; Steiner, 
2010; Ubhenin, 2013; UNEP, 2011). Under Nigerian law (National Environmental Standards 
and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act 2007), companies are not obliged to clean up or 
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compensate for the effects of oil spills caused by sabotage (Steiner, 2010). According to key 
informants and existing findings (Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011), multinational oil firms often 
depend on this law to refuse compensation for oil spillages, delayed clean-up exercises and 
sometimes cite community hostilities and government responsibility as basis for non-
compliance with environmental right in the Niger Delta. This is clear in the following 
quotations from informants: 
“Umuechem has been the scene of spectacular failures of Shell’s ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ projects. In 2002 the Centre for Social and Corporate Responsibility, an 
NGO linked to various Ecumenical NGOs based in the UK, reported that a programme 
of community projects has been a “100 per cent failure”. I visited Umuechem recently 
and observed that six ‘community projects’ funded by Shell, and two funded by the 
NDDC (i.e. a water supply system and a hospital) were not operational. I observed that 
because the water supply system was not operational, women from the community spent 
much of their time walking to and from a polluted stream nearby, the only available 
source. I also observe a gas flare near the village. These situations have continued to 
date.” When attribution of blame is present in risk and crisis situations, it makes 
organised irresponsibility even more prevalent: 
“Shell waited until it had run out of options before deciding to settle in the Saro-Wiwa 
case, during which time its relationship with host communities deteriorated badly. 
Surely it could have saved itself a lot of bad press and illwill if it had rather put its 
efforts into addressing the kind of issues that informed the law suit in the first place. 
More than 20 years after the lawsuit was instituted, Shell is hardly seen as a force for 
good in the community.”  
These situations noticeably offer an example of organised irresponsibility pervading the Niger 
Delta crises (Figure 8.6 and 8.7). When the Ogoni and Ilaje crises began, evidence emerged 
that senior executives in both Chevron and Shell were more concerned about business 
continuity and the effects of community protests on firms’ profitability (ERA, 2012; UNEP, 
2011). The evidence suggests that multinationals often violate the Environmental Guidelines 
and Standards for Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) and other environmental 
legislations like the Associated Gas Reinjection Act 1979. In fact, the Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act 1979, for example, makes flaring of associated gas illegal in Nigeria since 
1984 but multinationals have continued to flare gas till date. This practice has continued partly 
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because of research evidence that it is cheaper to flare gas and pay the nominal fine than the 
huge investment involved in gas flaring elimination projects in Nigeria (ERA, 2012; Steiner, 
2010; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). It is argued that in this instance, overcoming the 
predicament of organised corporate irresponsibility requires several issues intended to 
challenge the status quo across organisation, as highlighted in the subsection below. 
 
Figure 8.6: Issues of organised corporate irresponsibility 
 
 
 
 
Findings from literature/local informants
•On average, three major oil spills in the Niger
Delta are recorded each month.
•Between 2002 and 2015 alone, Shell recorded
more than 2000 incidents of oil spills in its
operation.
•For example, in June 1998, a leak near the
Otuegwe 1 community was reported to have
been going on for months had spilled over
800,000 barrels of crude from a 16-inch buried
pipeline belonging to Shell.
•Local villagers in most areas claimed that when
pipelines corrode and leak, oil workers will
inspect but not repair the leak. Local people say
oil companies often claim sabotage.
•In describing Shell's reported sluggishness to
repair leaks, one local chief in a community
where Shell has 44 oil wells, said: "They
[Shell] don't treat us like humans. They treat us
like animals."
•In October 1998, a pipeline leak that flooded a
large region near the village of Jesse exploded
causing the death of over 700 people mostly
women and children.
Selected insights about organised 
irresponsibility
•There is an oil spillage that occured in Epubu
community that was discovered and reported on
the 5th and 14th of December, 1998. The
operators of the current burst [pipe]...is
Nigerian Agip Oil Company. And up till
September 1999 that spill was not cleaned. The
flora and fauna and the entire ecosystem of the
place is destroyed.
•To be candid, I don't know what Epubu
community has done to Nigerian Agip Oil
Company. We are contributing to the growth of
Nigerian Agip Oil Company. We know that the
operators of the . . . oil [companies] are there to
maximise [their] profit. But you don't maximise
your profit to the detriment of the people.
Excerpts from interview with local chief - His
Royal Highness, Paramouth ruler of Epubu
(TRIP report 1999, p. 7)
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Figure 8.7: Issues of organised corporate irresponsibility  
 
 
8.3.3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO ORGANISED CORPORATE 
IRRESPONSIBILITY 
It is crucial to emphasise here that the notion of organised corporate irresponsibility remains 
loose, complex and controversial. Within our case organisations we find a range of moral 
disengagement mechanisms from moral justification, advantageous comparison, and 
attribution of blame to euphemistic labelling and distortion of the consequences in risk and 
crisis domain. These findings advanced previous studies on moral disengagement to the 
risk/crisis domain but diverge strongly in terms our reconceptualization of the mechanisms of 
moral disengagement, as discussed in Chapter Five, as constituent to organised corporate 
irresponsibility. For these reasons we have elsewhere (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015) referred to 
these mechanisms both as organised corporate irresponsibility and crisis disengagement.  
As a result, we suggest that repairing organised corporate irresponsibility requires building 
mutual trust, exhibiting appropriate ethical values and standards, demonstrates moral courage 
and consistency in corporate responsibility. In this context, it is argued that the Board and 
senior executives must set the moral and ethical tone for risk governance and culture across 
our case organisations. This is something that Shell and Chevron are both committed to doing 
Findings from literature/local informants
• In Eleme, Ogoniland of Rivers State,
Nigeria, the site of a pipe blowout and
massive oil spill that took place in 1970 and
according to Shell has been "cleaned up" was
left unclean till 1999.
• Ilaje women protested and occupied
Opuekeba Flow Station, Ewan field and Isan
field in Ilaje Local Government Area of
Ondo State, but instead of dialoguing with
them, ChevronTexaco Nigeria Ltd attacked
them by hired armed mobile policemen by
pouring hot water on the women; flogged
them with horse tail, capsized their boats and
their out-board engines, and women were
fired at by policemen.
• Even when the oil companies do provide
compensation for damage caused by spills
and leaks, their system of assessment and
payment are often very unsatisfactory.
Insights about organised irresponsibility
•The truth about the whole situation is that
Epubu was attacked through the sponsorship
of the Nigerian Agip oil company. We are
appealing to the international community to
come to our aid. Specifically to rehabilitate
the people of the community. All our wealth
is burned down. People are dying daily of
starvation and hunger. All our schools are
closed . . . We are going back to the primitive
primordal days where people don't go to
school anymore. And for fear of possible
attack, . . . teachers are afraid to go there. -
Excerpts from plea to the international
community by local chief - His Royal
Highness, Paramouth ruler of Epubu (TRIP
report 1999, p. 17)
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in Nigeria (Shell, 2012; 2015; Chevron SRR, 2012; Chevron, 2015). A reasonable approach is 
to ensure ethical leadership in which the Board serves as a role model and sets moral standards 
and risk culture that discourages organised corporate irresponsibility and moral disengagement. 
One possible implication is that ethical risk management and leadership through reporting of 
minor ethical violations in risk governance and management practices could signal a zero-
tolerance policy for rogue and questionable behaviours. This is not about a finger pointing 
approach but shifting ethical risk management to ‘we must’ approach. 
The alternative implication would be that failure to report incidents of moral disengagement or 
ethical violations in risk decisions and crisis management responses are tolerated, not least 
become routine practices within the organisation. Given the polarised views and many different 
interest groups including those defending human rights in crisis and disaster situations, regular 
ethical awareness training for managers and senior executives is crucial to resolve the corporate 
irresponsibility dilemmas in the Niger Delta crises. Under these circumstances, robust 
commitment to continuous professional development programmes to identify and assess areas 
they are at risks of possible violation of human rights is indispensable to maintaining positive 
corporate responsibility. In addition, it also means addressing some of the fundamental 
concerns and demands raised by local communities in the Niger Delta (Figure 8.8). 
 
Figure 8.8: Main Themes Emerging from Local Communities’ Demands  
 
Source: Author (2017) 
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At times some demands from local people in the Niger Delta crises would seem problematic 
for multinationals like Shell and Chevron to fulfil. We recognise that factors such as dramatic 
global change, rapid improvements in technology, risk globalisation, forces of globalisation, 
and instantaneous global communication via social media have intensified tension and created 
confusion about what is – and is not – expected of multinational business. Here, two main 
complex dilemmas face multinationals oil companies (e.g., Chevron and Shell) in Nigeria: 
First, should multinationals provide infrastructure and social services where government does 
not, and afterward face allegations that they are interfering or buying influence from local elites 
(political class)? Second, should these multinationals concentrate on their core business 
functions: serve their customers and get the best return for shareholders?  
It is argued here that multinationals desirous of sustainable risk and crisis management, in the 
context of Niger Delta crises, should determine what risk outcomes are acceptable to them. For 
instance, Shell acknowledged (Shell Annual Report, 2011; Shell, 2012; 2015) it played an 
insufficient role in the tragic execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogonis by the Nigerian 
authorities; these local environmental activists had protested Shell’s environmental pollution 
and degradation in Ogoniland (Chapter Two). It is imperative to state that adequate crisis 
communication by the crisis teams could have helped prevent the emerging crisis in Ogoniland. 
For example, Shell’s inadequate crisis management response to crisis was clear as depicted in 
Figure 8.9. In the global context, Shell also acknowledged that it’s ill-preparedness for the 
public reaction to plans to dispose of the Brent Spar off-shore storage buoy in deep water in 
the Atlantic (Shell, 2011). Though Shell’s crisis management approach to the Brent Spar differs 
substantially to that used during the Ogoni crisis. In fact, as shown in Figure 8.10, while Shell 
engaged the protesters against the Brent Spar in a two-year dialogue process, the Ogonis 
protesters were not – suggesting possible double standards in its risk and crisis management 
practice as assumed in several existing studies (ERA, 2012; Pyagbara, 2010; Steiner, 2010). 
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Figure 8.9: Shell’s initial crisis management response to Ogoni’s emerging crisis 
 
Figure 8.10: Shell’s initial crisis management response to Brent Spar 
 
Before Mr Saro-Wiwa's arrest we said that while we did not necessarily agree with all of his
views, he had right to voice his opinions. After his arrest we said he should be treated fairly in
prison and should be given the necessary medical attention. We did not seek to influence his
trial, but after the verdict the Chairman of the Shell Group's Committee of Managing
Directors sent a letter to the Nigerian head of state urging him to grant clemency for all those
sentenced.
Twenty Ogonis were detained in Nigeria in connection with the same incident. We are the
only major company operating in the country to call publicly, and repeatedly, for humane
treatment, a fair trial for the detainees and clemency for those found guilty. We have made
these appeals both publicly and privately. We will continue to promote humanitarian values in
Nigeria.
For example, when oil unions took part in the general strike of 1995, production by Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) fell by a half. We took the position that we would
not work under military protection to increase the flow of oil . . . Nigeria has many
development challenges.
There is a lack of government investment in the social infrastructure of the area in which we
operate. We recognise a responsibility to act. In 1997, the Shell joint venture spent US$ 32
million on a wide range of community and development projects, including the building of
hospitals and schools. - excerpts from Shell Annual Report (2011, p. 43)
Brent Spar, the redundant storage and loading buoy which was the centre of conversy over plans for
its deep-sea disposal in 1995, will be used to build a quay extension near Stavanger in Norway, if
the plan meets official approval.
The original plans, which were given statutory and government approval, were opposed when the
time came to carry them out. Protesters felt that the sea should not be used as a dumping ground
and were concerned that other oil installations would be disposed of in the same way if the sinking
of the Spar went ahead. Many false allegations were made but these were difficult to rebut in the
highly-charged atmosphere of confrontation that prevailed at the time.
Protests were vocal and physical. They ranged from the personal intervention of senior politicals in
several European countries, to the occupation of the Spar by Greenpeace activists. There were
violent attacks on Shell service stations in Germany, with 50 damaged, two fire-bombed and one
raked with bullets.
In the face of such public opinion against its plan, Shell UK halted the disposal and the Spar was
towed to a mooring in a Norwegian fjord while its final fate was decided. Tests by an independent
Norwegian foundation, Det Norske Veritas, disproved claims by Greenpeace later apologised.
A two-year dialogue process then started with a series of meetings in Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK to help Shell UK identify a solution by gathering a wide range of views -
known as the Brent Spar Dialogue. Shell UK consulted with non-governmental organisations,
opinion formers and experts on the best disposal options. Participants were asked for their opinion
on the issue, and later on in the selection process, to help choose between the shortlisted options for
the Spar's disposal.
- excerpts from Shell Annual Report (2011, p. 61)
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The fundamental lesson from both cases is that the conviction that an organisation is doing 
something right is not the same as getting them right. Although it appears that some of the 
elements of the so-called ‘effective crisis management’ strategies such as taking immediate 
actions to cope with emerging crisis (Gottschalk, 2002), establishment of crisis management 
teams before crisis (Regester & Larkin, 1997), crisis management plans (Augustine, 2000; 
Fink, 2002), and business continuity plans (Morley, 2002) were present within our case 
organisations. However, these were not sufficient to deal with the emerging crises. In fact, as 
we argue, two fundamental elements of unsustainable and ineffective crisis management that 
were included in both case organisations approach are issues of moral disengagement and 
organised corporate irresponsibility. The evidence from existing studies is that crisis or disaster 
situations are the moment of truth (Edward, 2009) in which organisations moral stance are 
called into question (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015).  
Like previous research conducted with respect to the Three Mile Island incident, it can be 
concluded here that ‘fear of the unknown caused a large of the human crisis; fear of the truth 
caused a large part of the business crisis’ (Fink, 2002, p. 6). How does an organisation like 
Shell or Chevron overcome these issues of corporate immorality and organised corporate 
irresponsibility? It will be indicated here that senior executives are more likely to perceive 
emerging dangerous problems including complex emergencies, crises and disasters to be 
ethical issue because they know them as posing complex ethical dilemmas. This corresponds 
to the knowledge view of risk perception discussed in Chapter Two, Beck (2009), Gerber & 
Neeley (2005), Wildavsky & Dake (1990) and Mafimisebi & Thorne (2015).  
Thus, senior executives in our case organisations need frequent risk and crisis training that 
incorporates spotting early warning signals of emerging crises or disasters, situational 
awareness, exercise preparedness, learning from past disasters or failures, real-life scenarios of 
crises, business continuity and crisis planning (Borodzicz, 2005; Dominic, Swartz, & Herbane, 
2010; Jakob, 2009; Reza, 2011; Mayer, Mayer, Moss & Dale, 2008). The crisis training and 
exercise preparedness should: 
1) Focus on addressing complex dilemmas of organised corporate irresponsibility: This 
must be done to ensure organisational commitment to high standards in risk and crisis 
management; 
2) Clearly and concisely simulates the boundary among corporate morality, senior 
management ethics, corporate responsibility and crisis management: The intention is to 
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describe in broad terms how unethical decisions or conduct by senior executives could 
impact overall organisational ethics, corporate morality and crisis management 
decisions; 
3) Focus on thinking the unthinkable by challenging the status quo: The existing risk and 
crisis management frameworks must be challenged and dissected to uncover their 
practicality or otherwise in the event of crises or disasters; 
4) Make unethical practices or conducts visible for senior management or those involved 
in the training to see clearly: The more unethical conducts or practices in risk and crisis 
situations are seen easily by decision makers, the less likely their nature and 
consequences can be disregarded, minimised or distorted for long. This implies that 
lessons would be learned and incorporate into future risk and crisis management 
decisions. 
In conclusion, whatever approach that is adopted by our case organisations in counteracting 
moral disengagement and organised corporate irresponsibility, it must focus on personalising 
and publicly addressing the concerns of stakeholders (Bandura, 2002; 2009). Thus, 
organisations should focus on robust corporate social responsibility programmes as signs of 
good corporate citizenship; and ensure that stakeholders’ concerns are not distorted but taken 
into accounts. 
 
8.3.4 TRUST DEFICIT 
The complex, controversial and emotive nature of unconventional crises, as reflected in the 
Shell and Chevron case studies underpinning this research, indicates why trust is pivotal to risk 
and crisis management. This thesis findings suggest that trust in risk management and risk 
managers, and organisational ability to exercise its corporate conscience in proactive and 
ethical risk management appears to be waning. Clearly, in both cases, trust between 
multinationals and local stakeholders, particularly local indigenes, environmental activists, 
government agencies and non-governmental organisations has been largely decimated. Albeit 
various definitions of trust exist in previous research but a generalised trust, defined as a set of 
“socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of the 
organisations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders that 
set the fundamental understandings for their lives” (cf. Barber, 1983) is used here.  
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This conceptualisation depicts the duality of trust in which the trustors form an estimate of the 
trustworthiness of the average person (cf. Luhmann, 1988; Paxton, 2007). Although existing 
studies on generalised trust is largely bifurcated and controversial producing mixed results 
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser, Liabson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Nannestad, 
2008; Paxton, 2007; Mewes, 2014; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Nonetheless, there is 
convergence evidence about the implications of trust deficit for organisation in risk and crisis 
situations, as found from the two case studies. First, trust deficit appears to have undermine 
reputation of the organisations involved in those crises. Second, trust deficit also appears to 
have damage the effective working relationships imperative for organisational resilience and 
authenticity. Furthermore, trust deficit also affects the public evaluation of the trustworthiness 
of organisation to act both in the public interest and with respect to best possible technical 
standards and practice (Flynn, Burns, Mertz, & Slovic, 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; 
Slovic, 1993; Wynne, 1980; 1992a; 1996b). 
The evaluation of one of the local informants reflect the perception that oil companies 
in the Niger Delta can be hardly trusted due to refusal to clean up the environment: 
“institutional system failure in Shell Nigeria to promptly and properly respond to the 
containment and clean-up of oil spills including associated compensations and 
remediation promotes community conflicts. In Bodo City, Ogoniland Nigeria, it took 
several months before SPDC came to do containment and this was following the 
intervention of the Rivers State Commissioner for Environment following SOS by a 
local NGO. The process of bringing relief materials did not follow any survey or 
assessment. Also, community contractors have been instigated against the community 
and due process.” 
The analysis of case studies revealed that there was no disputing trust deficit among 
stakeholders. For example, as revealed in the quotation and corroborated by existing literature 
decades of oil pollution and environmental devastation without sustainable comprehensive 
clean-up and compensation generates an atmosphere of distrust among stakeholders in the 
Niger Delta (UNEP, 2011). Yet, senior executives in our case organisations were still in denial. 
This practice of organisational denial is in direct contrast to the fundamentals of effective risk 
and crisis management practice, reviewed in Chapters One, Four and Five. It also appears that 
the crisis management methodologies of both organisations were deficient due to MD 
mechanisms such as diffusion of responsibility and attribution of blame. This was previously 
identified in Chapter Five as crisis disengagement problem, complicating organisational crises 
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that could have been avoided. The views of staff within the case organisations seem to reflect 
the notion that the Niger Delta crisis is mainly caused by issues of resource control and 
economic benefits for local communities (Chevron, 2015; Shell, 1995; 2011; 2014): 
“On stakeholder management of the Niger Delta community. It has been Shell’s 
position that when it comes to providing electricity and most structural development in 
the communities we operate, we leave it to the Government. The trust is that most of the 
communities need only pipe borne water, electricity, roads and a means of livelihood. 
Why can’t we provide these for the communities we operate in? I am sure the cost of 
this is nothing compared to the NPV we lose every day due to militant problems. I say 
this knowing that the Government has been unable to deliver these basic needs which 
every human should have. Is Shell willing to change its position on relying on the 
government to deliver these promises that have remained empty for decades to the 
communities? The cost can, am sure, be treated as part of the operations cost which 
will reduce the tax paid to the government.” 
These views are inherently rooted in mechanisms of moral disengagement, particularly 
attribution of blame, displacement of responsibility and diffusion of responsibility as discussed 
in Chapters One and Five. Overall, the main sources of trust deficit between multinationals and 
local indigenes were issues of resource control, environmental injustice, corruption, corporate 
social irresponsibility and maltreatment of human rights and environmental protesters, as a 
number of key informants revealed. Specifically, the disconnection between organisational 
behaviour and corporate ethical conduct in unconventional risk and crisis situations is largely 
responsible for the trust deficit between businesses and the public in the Niger Delta (Steiner, 
2010; UNEP, 2011). The position of Shell to environmental damages caused by fossil fuels is 
telling, at least based on the following quotation from an informant from Shell: 
“Society depends on fossil fuels. Shell cannot be blamed for this. The role of energy 
companies is to deliver the energy that consumers need. We have a responsibility to 
that as efficiently as possible protecting the environment and benefitting people as we 
do so. At the same time, we are looking at developing new energies that will become 
more important in the future and help reduce the carbon footprint. With regard to 
Nigeria we act responsibly. More than 85% of oil spilled there is due to sabotage. 
SPDC is committed to cleaning up oil spills and restoring the environment for every 
spill no matter the cause and works hard to do so.”  
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Although our case organisations operate in a volatile region of Nigeria characterised by civil 
disorder, oil bunkering and oil theft, malicious practices, extremism, armed insurgency, 
militancy and terrorism or guerrilla warfare, cultism and inter-tribal conflicts, and oppressive 
regimes. These situations prompted them to engage security arrangements in protecting their 
assets and people in Nigeria (Shell, 2011; Chevron, 2015). There were assurances in both 
organisations that security guidelines and actions do reflect current international best practices 
in risk and security management. For instance, Shell Nigeria stated that it has reviewed its 
“security force guidelines against three United Nations documents: UN Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers; UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials; and UN Pocket Book on human rights for the Police.” (Shell, 2011, p. 
72). For Chevron Nigeria, its security policies and practices are “consistent with Chevron’s 
participation in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, a global initiative 
that provides guidance on companies’ engagement with security forces.” (Chevron, 2015, p. 
9).  
Accordingly, Chevron noted that “preserving the trust of our stakeholders is the responsibility 
of every individual in the company. Our Business Conduct and Ethics Code is designed to help 
each of us meet that obligation.” (Chevron, 2016, p. 1). But, the strategy of using military 
personnel in protecting oil infrastructures and in the process causing violation of local 
indigenes human rights undermines trust in those organisations and their ability to proactively 
manage risks to the environment and local people without compromising ethical standards. The 
UNEP inquiry into the crisis recommends the creation of an Ogoniland Environmental 
Restoration Authority and an Environmental Restoration Fund for Ogoniland are crucial to 
build trust (UNEP, 2011). The creation of the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project 
(HYPREP) – an organisation charged to fully implement the UNEP report is vital to repair trust 
deficit. The Nigerian government is required to take the lead in coordinating the activities of 
the many stakeholders involved in the crises. Presently, the government has commenced the 
process of environmental clean-up in Ogoniland (Shell, 2015; 2016). However, it has been 
noted by the UNEP Commission of Inquiry report into Ogoniland that decades of oil pollution 
and environmental devastation would take at least 30 years to clean-up (UNEP, 2011). 
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8.3.4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO TRUST DEFICIT 
There is compelling research evidence about trust repair after an organisational crisis 
(Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; 
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Trust repair 
requires moral engagement, benevolence and integrity. Firstly, moral engagement, defined here 
as the ability to care for others and nature even without the legal obligation to do so, is crucial 
to repairing and restoring trust during and after an organisational crisis. In our context, senior 
executives in Chevron and Shell Nigeria face multiple stakeholders for which issues of ‘interest 
prioritisation’ become problematic and difficult to ascertain without constructive engagement. 
Thus, if these organisations continue to depend on using only the business case and corporate 
social responsibility as the basis for stakeholders’ engagement in risk and crisis situations, trust 
in those organisations will continue to suffer.  
Secondly, organisational benevolence or kindness is critical to repairing and rebuilding the 
trust of local stakeholders. For example, crisis management response strategies of simple 
denial, shifting blame, minimisation and transcendence regularly promoted as best practice 
(Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Harlow et al., 2011; Smudde & Courtright, 2008) undermine 
stakeholders trust. More critically, when organisations in risk and crisis situations suppress 
information via no comment, outright denials, countersuits, attribution of blame and redefining 
the crisis origin and nature as well as focusing attention on profitability or economic 
performance, the probability for building and repairing trust during and after major crisis will 
decline. Therefore, acceptance of culpability and remorse are more likely to be seen by local 
stakeholders as display of corporate benevolence and integrity.  
In contrast, the disclosure of organisational errors and mistakes may damage working 
relationships with stakeholders and trustworthiness perceptions in the short term, particularly 
if it shows that previous lessons from risk failures were not learned. Nevertheless, non-
disclosure of mistakes can be interpreted as concealment of material facts, in which the 
organisation is trying to hide the truth, which could have an even more deleterious effect 
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 139). Thus, it is recommended that benevolence form of crisis 
management responses including corrective action, compensation, and mortification should be 
used in handling the Niger Delta crises. These crisis management strategies have implications 
with respect to reduction in pipeline vandalism, militancy, oil terrorism and constant 
destruction of oil infrastructures in the Niger Delta. 
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Thirdly, openness and engagement with local stakeholders can be used to correct negative 
expectations and prevention of moral transgressions (Bandura, 2009; Ferrin et al., 2007; 
Galford & Drapeau, 2003; Korsgaard, Brodt, & Whitener, 2002; Kramer, 1996; Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Although 
there have been repeated violations which make trust repair during and after the Chevron and 
Shell crises much more difficult. Thus, correcting the problem of trust deficit in such risk 
failure and crisis situations would broadly involves two major interventions of distrust 
regulation and trustworthiness demonstration (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Table 8.3 provides a 
range of examples of trust repair interventions which can be used to resolve some of the issues 
identified in the Niger Delta crises. 
Table 8.3: Examples of Trust Repair Interventions for Each Organisational System 
Component 
Component Distrust Regulation: Constrain 
Untrustworthy Behaviour 
Trustworthiness Demonstration: Signal 
Renewed Trustworthiness 
Leadership 
and 
management 
practice 
 
 
 
 
Culture and 
climate 
 
 
 
Strategy 
 
 
Structures, 
policies, and 
processes 
 
 Suspend operations and/or withdraw 
faulty product(s) 
 Reprimand, discipline, or remove 
culpable parties 
 Investigate practices, conduct, and 
attitudes 
 Ensure enactment and compliance of 
reforms; influence other system 
components to regulate 
trustworthiness (e.g., change 
incentives and reporting structures) 
 
 Use cultural interventions (e.g., 
induction, socialisation) to instil 
values and norms that discourage 
trust violations 
 Impose sanctions for breaches of 
trust-related norms 
 Create ‘cultural artefacts’ that act as 
deterrents (e.g., ethical codes of 
conduct, public statements) 
 Shape organisational and unit-level 
priorities and goals (e.g., primacy of 
safety and integrity), resource 
allocations, and the content of 
policies and procedures 
 Direct behaviour in line with 
organisational strategies 
 Revise decision-making authority 
and accountability 
 Impose checks, balances, and 
disciplinary procedures 
 Enact transformational leadership: 
act as a role model, symbolising 
organisational values and conduct; 
create a shared, value-driven vision 
and goals 
 Issue trust-enhancing 
communications 
 Enhance the trustworthiness of 
other system components (e.g., 
procedural fairness, ethical strategic 
goals and implementation) 
 Commit resources to trust repair 
effort (e.g., money, time, 
manpower) 
 Use cultural interventions to instil 
values and norms around integrity, 
honesty, competence, 
responsibility, reliability, and 
respect 
 Create ‘cultural artefacts’ that 
symbolise and promote 
trustworthiness and affirm its 
priority over competing imperatives 
(e.g., codes of conduct, 
commemorative events, legends and 
stories) 
 Revise strategy to be consistent with 
espoused trust-based values 
 Reform strategy to show an 
enduring commitment to treat 
shareholders benevolently and with 
integrity 
 Promote ethical conduct and 
corporate social responsibility 
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External 
governance 
 
 
Public 
reputation 
 Standardise work processes and 
training to compensate for lack of 
skills and/or knowledge 
 Offer coaching and mentoring to 
assist employees facing ethical 
dilemmas or difficult decisions 
 Comply with external regulatory 
codes of conduct and monitoring 
(e.g., professional, industry, 
consumer) 
 Gain external accreditation, 
licensing, approval, or audit 
 Make public statements committing 
the organisation to uphold reformed 
strategies, operations, and targets 
 Internally publish the diagnosis, 
evaluations, and audits 
 Revise policies and procedures to 
ensure employees perceive them to 
be fair, effective, and just (e.g., 
transparent and equitable appraisal 
systems, dispute resolution and 
whistleblowing procedures). 
 Use recruitment, selection, 
induction, and training procedures, 
emphasising personal values 
symbolising trustworthiness 
 
 Voluntarily engage with external 
regulatory bodies 
 Seek licensing/accreditation (e.g., 
SA8000 on ethical conduct) 
 Campaign government for sector-
wide regulations 
 Use trust-enhancing 
communications, marketing, and 
branding 
 Offer public apologies and 
reparations (where appropriate) 
 Voluntarily communicate to the 
public (the diagnosis and 
evaluations) 
Source: Gillespie & Dietz (2009, p. 135) 
In conclusion, the four-stage process of organisational trust repair: (1) immediate responses; 
(2) diagnosis; (3) reforming interventions; and (4) evaluation can be useful for Shell and 
Chevron in Nigeria (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). At the immediate response stage, both Shell and 
Chevron would need to acknowledge local concerns and divergent perceptions; express regret 
and commit extensive resources to prevent reoccurrence of constant oil spillages and gas flaring 
in the Niger Delta. In practical context, this means demonstration of accuracy and transparency 
in crisis communication with relevant stakeholders. The senior executives of Shell and Chevron 
must express sincere compunction, through local engagement meeting, for the consequences 
of the decade environmental pollution and devastation in the Niger Delta. This local 
engagement meeting can help aid forgiveness and trust repair (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & 
Murnigham, 2002). 
The diagnosis stage requires systematic and multilevel examination of triggering causes of the 
crisis. Examples include the use of independent risk assessors and joint investigation with 
relevant regulators to discuss and clarify potential risks that could affect health, safety and 
environment. While Shell Nigeria has adopted the UNEP commission of inquiry report as basis 
for independent diagnosis and the services of private firm called Bureau Veritas to verify the 
oil spill investigation system in Ogoniland (Shell, 2012), Chevron Nigeria still lack any form 
of independent exercises over its operation in Ilajeland. The reforming interventions stage 
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involves taking crucial steps and actions to correct any act of organisational irresponsibility, 
environmental clean-up of the affected areas and offers of reparations to affected stakeholders 
(Bottom et al., 2002; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015; Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). As 
noted, Shell and Chevron have face shareholders and senior management pressures to “save 
face” and “never admit culpability” (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009), probably closing off avenues 
for reconciliation and settlement with local communities in the Niger Delta.  
However, Shell Nigeria has started a series of programmes such as desktop inventory of assets 
in Ogoniland, completion of a comprehensive review of its Remediation Management System 
(RMS), re-training of its contractors and their supervisors on clean up and remediation 
techniques, as well as convening meetings with relevant government regulators to discuss and 
clarify aspects of the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for Petroleum Industry in 
Nigeria (EGASPIN) (Shell, 2013; 2015). These efforts are laudable but sustainable crisis 
management strategies must also include local indigenes and other stakeholders in the Niger 
Delta. Therefore, evaluation stage of the organisational trust repair must take into 
considerations the complex and unconventional nature of the crises in the Niger Delta. The 
additional recommendations involve addressing the triggering causes of the crises, evaluate 
impact and proximity, and actively engage local community (Mafimisebi & Ogbonna, 2016). 
Thus, we summarise these recommendations in the Table 8.4 below: 
Table 8.4: Examples of recommended strategies for resolving trust deficit in the Niger 
Delta crises 
Mechanisms of Resolution Impact and Proximity 
Consideration 
Mechanisms for Trust 
Engagement 
 Examine and evaluate 
issue of local 
communities’ agitations 
and concerns 
 Listen to local 
stakeholders and 
discuss the problem of 
environmental pollution 
and devastation 
 Determine appropriate 
settlement method with 
local stakeholders  
 Assess the potential 
risks to the organisation 
and local communities 
 Express regret over 
damages done 
 Consider which 
stakeholders are most 
affected and the extent 
of damages to their 
interests 
 Examine how likely 
will future damage or 
risk failure occurs 
 Inform local 
stakeholders about 
environmental impacts 
and what actions are 
available 
 Manage expectations 
of local stakeholders 
 Actively engage with 
local communities 
 Communicate 
frequently about 
organisational efforts 
to address local 
concerns 
 Take responsibility for 
damages caused 
especially clean up 
exercise 
 Welcome community 
participation 
 Clarify and explain 
any environmental 
issue via crisis 
communication team 
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 Stop the use of 
attribution of blame. 
 Consider how issues of 
perception and culture 
are likely to impact risk 
behaviour. 
 Correct mistakes and 
make statement of 
assurance about the 
robustness of future risk 
mitigation. 
 Examine the possibility 
for reputational 
damage 
 Conduct environmental 
impact assessment 
 Check the closeness of 
oil infrastructures to 
residential areas 
 Investment in pipeline 
protection   
 Treat local concerns as 
urgent matter 
 Maintain close 
monitoring 
 Constant review of 
environmental 
performance 
 Create stakeholders’ 
forum within 
communities 
 Focus on direct 
meeting with local 
youths 
Source: Adapted from Mafimisebi & Ogbonna (2016, p. 202) 
 
8.3.5 MISINTERPRETATION OF DANGEROUS EVENTS 
This research conceptualises unconventional risks, crises and disasters as dangerous events due 
to their rapid variation, urgency, complexity, unpredictability, globalisation and volatility 
nature (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Comfort, 2007; Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007; Palm & Ramsell, 
2007). The successful management of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster may depend 
profoundly on their conceptualisation or the meaning assigned to them. Specifically, this does 
not suggest the need for universal definition of risk, crisis or disaster but that these terms should 
be defined in terms of what they mean to an organisation with relative to its stakeholders.   
The initial discussions about risk, crisis and disaster as noted previously in Chapters One and 
Four challenge the notion of a unified definition of dangerous events. This universal definition 
of dangerous events is desirable, as empirical studies suggest the need for common 
understanding of risk, crisis and disaster (Andrew, 2011; Ansell et al., 2010; Augustine, 1995; 
2000; Borodzicz, 2005; Boin et al., 2010; Lerbinger, 2012; ‘t Hart, 2013), but the practical 
implication is that such approach promotes rigidity instead of flexibility in risk and crisis 
management (Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). This was apparent in the two incidents considered 
here (Chapters Two and Three) in which multiple interpretations of those crises exist but both 
Shell and Chevron initially treated the events as militancy and oil terrorism problems. The 
following quotations from informants are typical examples of misinterpretation of dangerous 
events: 
“We are as concerned about oil spills as you are. Remember that the majority of spills 
follow attacks at our installations, cutting into pipelines or spills that follow the oil theft 
which is a major problem. To be able to assess damages and clean up as speedy as we 
want to, it requires safe access for our staff. This is not always the case in the Niger 
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Delta, and our handling of the spills gets an unfortunate delay. Following access we 
stop leak and make an assessment together with authorities and community what clean-
up is required. Irrespective of reasons for the pollution, we are cleaning up.” 
“Shell believe that pollution and environmental damage associated with the oil industry 
(including oil spills, gas flaring, waste disposal, river dredging) over the past five 
decades has contributed to poverty and conflict in the Niger Delta. But even more so is 
the baseline demand of the people of the region for the Federal Government to grant 
them greater share of the oil proceeds (a political matter), as well as corruption, 
criminality, and general poor governance.” 
It also appears from the quotations above that both Shell and Chevron were also treating these 
incidents as government laxity in providing employment, lack of basic infrastructures and 
technical problems instead of public relation and crisis disengagement problems. Clearly, had 
the general principles of what constitute crisis or disaster were agreed upon among main 
stakeholders prior to those incidents, appropriate crisis management strategies or responses 
would have been used. There was evidence about this lack of consensus among stakeholders. 
For example, the UNEP commission of inquiry report established that treating the 
environmental contamination and disasters within Niger Delta (Ogoniland and Ilajeland) 
merely as a technical clean-up exercise would ultimately lead to failure (UNEP, 2011, p. 224). 
This confirms our previous proposition that risk, crisis and disaster management strategies or 
models should be context-based.  
From our case studies (Chapters Two and Three), it is apparent to see that the initial incidents 
were misinterpreted as attempts were made to force existing crisis management models on to 
the emerging crises without flexibility or adaptation. Therefore, the stage-based models of risk 
and crisis management should be avoided altogether due to their intransigent nature. As the 
case study analysis revealed, Shell and Chevron were treating the crisis and disaster situations 
in the Niger Delta using stage-based models of risk and crisis management as the incidents 
were treated in isolation from other complex issues of environmental injustice and local 
communities’ demands. In another instance, the incessant oil spillages from corrosion and gas 
flaring incidents in the Niger Delta, Nigeria were treated as normal accidents inherent to the 
oil and gas sector (Perrow, 1994; 1999; 2004). This view appears to reinforce the notion of 
normal accident as proposed by Perrow (Perrow, 1994; 2004) but failed to account for the role 
of internal and external interventions during disaster incubation period. The discourse of some 
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informants was more emotional (including outright disengagement and diffusion of 
responsibility) than critical risk/crisis assessment or even addressing the public relations crisis: 
“In any country in the world the government has primary responsibility for the 
development of its people and this is true of Nigeria . . . . and the Niger Delta 
communities. The contribution that Shell makes anywhere it operates is intended to 
supplement this.” 
“Most of the over 30 million people living in the Niger Delta remain poor despite oil 
production. Unrest has grown. Frustrated by the lack of benefits from oil production, 
communities have targeted the operations of energy companies including Chevron and 
Shell.” 
“The funds we contribute in our social investment will not solve the problem but we do 
our best to make a difference. Our greatest contributions are through the taxes and 
royalties we pay. The federal government receives about 95% of the revenue after costs 
from oil and gas production in the Niger Delta.” 
“You may be aware that the most crisis impacted parts of the Niger Delta is the marine 
and riverine part completely devoid of Government’s social and economic 
infrastructure. This has hampered development. The little there is what oil companies 
have provided. . . . . But given that this is an area the size England the oil companies 
can help but really it is for Government to do.” 
Here, using the above quotations from informants, it is essential to argue that part of the 
conceptual fuzziness of Perrow’s idea of normal accident is that unconventional risks, crises 
and disasters are no longer ‘normal’ (cf. Perrow, 2004) but consequences of micro and macro 
moral disengagement. In other words, Perrow’s notion of normal accident is at best passive 
approach to risk management (Hopkins, 1999; 2001; Shrivastava, Sonpar, & Pazzaglia, 2009) 
which does little to change the way organisations and risk managers manage unconventional 
risks and crises. The manifestation of normal accident view was seen in both incidents 
(Chapters Two and Three) but this increases risk failure propensity and escalate the problem 
from incubation period as proposed by Turner’s model to rescue and salvage stage and later 
full cultural readjustment stage (Appendix One, Chapters One and Four). 
In practice, risk management experts in our case organisations were so focused on data that 
subjective and cultural views from local people appears to have been neglected. The following 
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quote from an informant is an example where local community concerns are displaced into 
wider issue of government laxity: 
“The challenges facing the Niger Delta are complex and covers poverty, unemployment, 
growing population, governance and several other issues. Handling of these issues are 
for the State and Federal government and for the communities to handle. The oil 
industry’s footprint is impacting on small parts of the Niger Delta. Something you will 
know if you have been in the area with the size of Portugal. Environmental impact is 
according to the World Bank mainly from local industrialisation and population 
growth. We are handling environmental issues linked to our operations.” 
In terms of classification of dangerous events, this example as shown in the above quote 
represents an attitude in which the organisation is convince of their ability to handle 
environmental risk management. However, this prevented effective risk and crisis 
communication before, during and after those incidents in the Niger Delta. Specifically, the 
two organisations (i.e. Shell and Chevron) involved and their risk management experts appear 
to have been too rigid in their interpretation of unconventional risk, crisis and disaster. This 
rigidity negates innovation, resilience and creativity critical to successful risk and crisis 
management. The misinterpretation of those incidents also caused them to often use the crisis 
management response strategies of denial, differentiation, defensibility, minimisation and 
accidental or normal accident to handle the emerging crises in the Niger Delta.  
However, these crisis management strategies are harmful to sustainable risk and crisis 
management, and represent organisational moral disengagement or crisis disengagement 
(Chapters One and Five). There were discrepancies among stakeholders about risk 
communication messages to the local communities; and the fact that each organisation involved 
in those incidents treated them as normal accident and not systemic or ambiguous risk problems 
is also of concern because it muddles the management of those crises and disrupt the entire risk 
and crisis management practice in the Niger Delta. As a final point, the lack of agreement or 
consensus as to what constitutes the Niger Delta crisis and the extent of damages to 
stakeholders in those crises hindered effective crisis management response. 
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8.3.5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DANGEROUS EVENTS 
MISINTERPRETATION 
Following the initial demand notice to Shell by MOSOP, it was recognised that Shell failed to 
accurately establish the nature of the ensuing crisis due to inability to proactively engage with 
MOSOP and underestimation of the severity and magnitude of the situation. Also, in the 
aftermath of the Chevron – Ilaje crisis, initial crisis management response was based on 
understanding that the protesters were armed militants whereas the evidence refuted that claim. 
This is where isomorphic learning and learning from failures theories could be useful in 
identifying lessons which were not captured or learnt in previous crises. Although, it is 
important to consider cultural factors when learning from past risk failures, as the Niger Delta 
is known for its tenacious culture in which broken trust could be difficult to repair.  
To counteract the effect of continual risk failures in the Niger Delta, risk simulation training 
with local stakeholders’ involvement and independent assessment of the problems are essential. 
The issue of emergency response organisations such as NEMA, NIMASA, NNPC and DPR 
working independently need to be addressed. The coordination and collaborative action among 
inter-agencies (such as NEMA, NDDC, MOSOP, IRDC, MNDA, NNPC, and DPR) and local 
communities in the Niger Delta are imperative to develop common understanding of the Delta 
crises. This thesis would argue that amplified dialogue and developing trust between all the 
parties involved should form part of the broader business continuity and resilience management 
strategy.  
The emergence of a new militant group called Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in 2015 further 
complicated issues for multinational oil firms in Nigeria. The triggers of the crises have not 
been specifically addressed. Thus, the lasting solution to the crisis and disaster situations rest 
upon addressing and treating all triggering causes and preconditions to crises/disasters as 
illustrated in section 8.3.1 above. For example, negotiation with local communities and 
incorporation of social concerns into risk and crisis management practice in the Niger Delta 
should be high on multinational companies’ agenda. The assumptions and perceptions 
underlying risk and crisis management should be clear to stakeholders due to different attitudes 
regarding crisis and disaster situations in the Niger Delta.  
The review of the Shell – Ogoni crisis highlighted the confusion over how the incident was 
perceived and this undermines overall strategies used to handle the crisis. The extent of 
sustainable risk and crisis management decisions is arguably related to the definition and 
strategies adopted. The lack of consensus about what constitutes crisis or disaster suggests that 
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we need to shift attention to more pragmatic issues: (1) crisis management behaviour; (2) crisis 
management response; (3) risk management behaviour. These three main issues as contained 
in the decision-based model of risk and crisis management should be context-based and not 
purely applied as a universal or best-practice approach (see section 8.4 below). This concept 
would make crisis and disaster management more flexible and responsive to change and 
consequently make the organisation more resilient and robust.  
Overall, the Board of directors in organisations cannot abrogate the responsibility of managing 
emerging crises and disasters anymore but should be thoroughly informed and trained in risk 
and crisis management, just like in every other activity such as auditing, governance, 
leadership, human resources and finance. Shell and Chevron are examples of best practice in 
this area. The practical implication is that classification and conceptualisation of events remain 
an important component of risk and crisis management. This view supports the tenet of this 
thesis that those responsible for managing risk, crisis and disaster should be sufficiently trained, 
which suggests that risk and crisis management experts should at least be part of the Board in 
organisations. 
 
8.3.6 CRISIS MISCOMMUNICATION 
There is compelling evidence that crisis miscommunication was another significant factor 
undermining the effectiveness of risk and crisis management practice of multinational oil firms 
like Shell and Chevron in Nigeria. For example, communication breakdown between MOSOP 
and Shell in 1993 lead to the ensuing complex crisis facing Shell in the Niger Delta. The case 
analysis reveals how Shell cited intimidation and harassment of its staff in Ogoniland; and used 
that as the basis for engaging the services of the Nigerian military in suppressing protesters. 
This is reflected in the following quotations from informants across the organisations: 
“The loss of civilian lives in the recent military offensive in the Niger Delta is a cause 
for grave concern. The offensive indicates that the Nigerian military is more interested 
in protecting oil company facilities than it is protecting its people.” 
“We regret any use of violence. Of course, it is not in line with our principles to operate 
behind a military shield. In the Niger Delta, we’ve seen violence escalate in recent 
years, as armed militants have attacked oil installations. It is hard to make sure that 
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our staff and operations are safe, in this situation – as you know we have shut down 
parts of our operations since 2006.” 
A similar situation happened in the case of the Chevron and Ilaje crisis where the protesters 
were brutalised by the Nigerian security personnel who acted on Chevron’s instructions in 
1998. Comparing the two incidents, crisis miscommunication was a common factor that 
escalated the problems. The individuals and local groups involved in both incidents were 
poorly handled due to inappropriate crisis context analysis. The initial context of the Shell – 
Ogoni crisis was misdiagnosed due to risk underestimation and misplaced crisis management 
response. This is clear in the following quotation from one of the informants: 
“Given the fact that the political demand by the people in the Niger Delta for a greater 
share of the oil income is the main cause of the crisis in the region (as every person in 
the region will tell you) and not pollution or other secondary issues, I believe that the 
current dialogue between the Federal Govt. and the people of the region if approached 
honestly and generously will lead to a solution.” 
The prodromal crisis stage (Fink, 2000) comparable to the first stage of Turner’s models 
(Turner, 1976; 1978) was missed in both incidents when ‘demand notices’ were sent to both 
Shell and Chevron. These demand notices could have signalled warnings of impending crises 
to the crisis management team and calculated crisis communication message which incorporate 
some of the principles of effective crisis communication discussed in Chapters Four and Five 
could have help avert the incidents. The empirical evidence from this research and existing 
studies (e.g., Andrew, 2011; Augustine, 1995; Hoffman, 1996; Kash & Darling, 1998; Fink, 
2002; George & Pratt, 2012; Olaniran & Williams, 2001; ‘t Hart, 2013; Morley, 2002; 
Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2014; 2015; Seeger, 2006; Stephens, 
Malone, & Bailey, 2005) reveals the utility and value of risk and crisis communication 
strategies as crucial success factor in managing risk and crisis situations. Nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of Shell and Chevron crisis communication strategies in both incidents are 
doubtful. There is an asymmetrical relationship between what these two organisations 
professed to do in terms of risk and crisis management, and the reality of constant militarisation 
approach which alienate and suppress protesters over environmental injustice in Nigeria. 
Although the wider responsibility lies with the Nigerian government. 
During the acute crisis stage Shell was declared ‘persona non grata’ by MOSOP on 4th January 
1993 and eventually forced to move out that same month as a result of crisis 
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miscommunication. The sentiment of local communities in the Niger Delta region concerning 
oil companies was expressed by one of the informants: 
“Gas flaring is still a major occurrence in most of Shell’s operations and its impact 
both on the environment and on those living in these Niger Delta field are quite 
significant. Having worked on several SPDC locations both in the east and west of 
Nigeria, I have personally witnessed the devastating effect of gas flaring. My national 
service in Sangana-Akassa also afforded an opportunity to live and interact with people 
living in a typical oil community and I could see that most of them had developed a 
deep-rooted anger for oil communities as a result of their alteration of their natural 
environment which deprives them of their primary source of income, being fishing and 
farming.” 
Overall, with the benefits of hindsight, effective business continuity and crisis planning could 
have helped to spot the complexity of the problem and allow senior executives to use adapted 
crisis communication strategies in responding to the emerging crisis. In this instance, inclusive 
risk and crisis communication strategies which integrate normative and social concerns such 
as corrective action and compensation are crucial to gain local stakeholders acceptance and 
social trust in the Niger Delta.  
The chronic crisis stage of both incidents resulted from the series of warnings from local 
communities and activists which went unheeded by both Chevron and Shell. The consequences 
manifested in form of oil terrorism and vandalism as well as constant kidnapping of oil workers 
usually for ransom and in protesting environmental injustice in the Niger Delta (Mafimisebi & 
Nkwunonwo, 2014; 2015; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mafimisebi, 2016; Mafimisebi & 
Ogbonna, 2016). The mechanisms of moral disengagement clearly manifest in risk behaviours 
of both organisations and the local communities’ response towards multinationals attitudes in 
handling crises. For example, moral justification of oil terrorism and vandalism were apparent 
in militants’ behaviours whereas attribution of blame, displacement of responsibility, and 
distorting the consequences also manifest in risk and crisis management behaviours of 
multinational oil companies. The following quotation, from an informant, clearly reveal the 
element of moral disengagement in the crisis: 
“First, no-one wants flaring. It is not good environmentally and it is not good 
economically, and we would have liked to have stopped it well before now. So why flare 
in the first place? That’s because Nigeria’s oil contains a lot of gas, which is produced 
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with the oil. When the fields were first developed there was no local market for the gas, 
and the fact that many Nigerian reservoirs are small and geologically faulted meant 
that it couldn’t be reinjected. And, of course, there was no awareness of global warming 
at the time. So the gas was flared, in line with normal industry practice. And bear in 
mind that the flares were generally installed away from where people were living – it 
is the communities that have since grown up around industry operations.” 
The crisis communication messages to local stakeholders were incompatible with the nature of 
the crisis. Specifically, local communities were told that most oil spillages and pollution were 
due to activities of illegal bunkering and militancy in the Niger Delta. Meanwhile, in both 
cases, independent assessment of the different incidents demonstrated that corrosion, lack of 
maintenance and unending gas flaring within the local communities have caused untold 
damages to the environment which would take at least 30 years to clean-up (UNEP, 2011). In 
this regard, crisis miscommunication occurs largely due to inaccurate risk assessment, selective 
risk perception, generalised risk messages and moral disengagement. The overall lesson was 
that generalised risk and crisis messages were ineffective to engage stakeholders due to trust 
deficit and different risk perceptions. 
Therefore, it is essential to design risk and crisis messages in such situations that incorporate 
real-time feedback into the broader risk and crisis management strategy. This is essential at the 
crisis resolution stage or resolving the crisis stage. Several attempts including a Global 
Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) strategy targeted at local community participation 
have been made by Shell and Chevron to resolve the crises within the Niger Delta but these 
have been insufficient. There are other practical recommendations that could help organisations 
become more resilient and responsive in such situations, as highlighted in the following sub-
section. 
 
8.3.6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO CRISIS MISCOMMUNICATION 
The evidence is clear that knowing how and when best to intervene in an emerging crisis is 
difficult in practice. This was the case with both Shell and Chevron in responding to the 
emerging crises in the Niger Delta. The crisis miscommunication issue arose partly due to 
misunderstanding of the nature of the incidents. Also, in the aftermath of the crises, mistakes 
were made regarding whether efforts should be directed mainly towards crisis communication 
or risk communication because both concepts are marginally different in practice. In this 
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context, risk communication deals with what might occur or has already happened, whereas 
crisis communication deals with what is presently happening. This distinction is crucial to 
address problems of crisis miscommunication in dangerous events.  
For example, instead of Shell addressing the ongoing crisis, efforts were directed at attributing 
the causes of the incident to resource control agitation, deforestation, sabotage, vandalism and 
wider governmental neglect of local communities. Likewise, multiple agencies such as the 
DPR, NNPC, Nigerian Police Force, NEMA, Nigerian Navy, and Joint Military Taskforce were 
working from different perspectives which often leads to conflicting information, compounded 
issues of crisis communication. However, an effective crisis communication team working 
from the victims’ perspective and acting flexibly by incorporating messages from different 
sources could have helped minimised the crisis impact on Shell and Chevron. This suggestion 
is rooted in image repair strategies which recognise the need for crisis communication to be 
initiated from a variety of perspectives (Olaniran & Williams, 2001; Stephens, Malone, & 
Bailey, 2005). 
Crucially, it is important to state that evidence about crisis miscommunication is mixed as one 
strand of evidence reveals that reasonable attempts were made to engage local communities 
but another strand confirms calculated attempts were made to use local leaders as mediators 
between multinational firms and local indigenes. This sometimes manifests in forms of hiring 
as many local people as possible including ‘ghost workers’ such as community leaders or 
members who lack the relevant skills and were not needed for a project but put on the payroll 
even though they are not expected to report for work (Oilwatch, 2006, p. 45). The findings 
suggest that both companies failed in areas of wider consultation and engagement with the 
public. Here, this thesis argues that four fundamental macro strategies of crisis communication 
including (1) empathy and caring, (2) competence and expertise, (3) honesty and openness, and 
(4) dedication and commitment, are essential tools of moral engagement, trust repair and 
sustainable survival during and after major incidents like that of Shell and Chevron. 
The risk and crisis communication strategies should have been tailored towards cultural 
diversity to gain trust and aim to establish or maintain relationships with local indigenes, and 
networking with other stakeholders (e.g., agencies, the media, and officials) in Nigeria. This 
corresponds to the situational crisis communication theory which asserts that the threat to an 
organisation increases as stakeholders’ belief that the organisation was responsible for the crisis 
intensifies (Coombs, 2007a; Ferguson, Wallace, & Chandler, 2012). Hitherto, it was revealed 
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that the use of social media as a medium of risk and crisis communication could assist 
organisations and their risk managers to provide instantaneous, up-to-date information about 
what they are doing to reduce or minimise crisis impact, and respond to questions from 
concerned individuals (Rutsaert et al., 2013; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2014). Social media 
provides vast public networks which could help create a forum for actual dialogue where public 
concerns are integrated into risk and crisis communication messages, and not just purely 
depending on traditional communication platforms such as newspapers, television, radio, and 
press conferences. The implementation of this approach could assist organisations and their 
risk managers to directly address stakeholders’ concerns instead of simply giving them 
information that risk professionals think is important and valuable (Cross, 1998; Cope et al., 
2010; Frewer, 2004; Kahan et al., 2012; Lofstedt, 2003). 
The expression of regret (mortification), corrective action and compensation are essential tools 
that can be used to shape public relations of Shell and Chevron in Nigeria. This 
recommendation advanced previous empirical research findings that initial crisis response 
should focus on expressing concerns and/or compassion for the vulnerable victims instead of 
using strategies such as denial, accidental, provocation, shifting blame and attack accuser 
(Cohen, 1999; Coombs, 2007b; Dean, 2004; Kellerman, 2006; Janoske, Liu, & Madden, 2013; 
Lukaszewski, 1999; Niels & Maarten, 2011). Although, image restoration theory of crisis 
communication suggests the need to use five fundamental macro strategies of mortification, 
reducing the offensiveness, denial, evading of responsibility, and corrective action (Benoit, 
1995; Ferguson et al., 2012).  
However, macro strategies of crisis communication including denial, diffusion and evading of 
responsibility, attribution of blame, and advantageous comparison are analogous to moral 
disengagement mechanisms which are considered in this research as least effective strategy in 
crisis management response (Chapter Five). The reason being that the presence of moral 
disengagement in both organisations (Shell and Chevron) appears to have escalate the 
situations which should have been prevented. The broader implications of organisational moral 
disengagement include the need to review the senior management team responsible for risk and 
crisis management and complete restructuring of the crisis communication team. 
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8.3.7 RELYING ON PAST SUCCESSES 
Relying on past successes can sometimes cause organisations to be ill-equipped to plan and 
prepare for potential crises, communicate and work with local stakeholders during and after 
crisis. This point is reflected in the two case studies considered in this research (Chapters Two 
and Three). For example, Shell Nigeria believed that its operation has been successful due to 
its Remediation Management System Models, Business Principles and Standards relevant to 
managing risks and crises (Shell, 2012; 2015), whereas Chevron Nigeria relies greatly on its 
OEMS models for managing risk, crisis and disaster situations in the Niger Delta (Chevron, 
2010; 2015). Both Shell and Chevron are convinced that their successful operations in the Niger 
Delta, before the start of militancy era since 1998, are due to robust global risk management 
standards and compliance. The increased dependence on planned risk and crisis models without 
flexibility and regards to creative thinking can be, and has been, counterproductive. For 
instance, too much belief in the past successes of using selected local leaders as mediators in 
the Niger Delta made both the Chevron – Ilaje crisis and Shell – Ogoni crisis as ‘disasters 
waiting to happen’ (ERA, 2012; Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011). 
The cross-case studies analysis reveals how both Shell and Chevron depend on their past good 
deeds to excuse current practices relating to unending gas flaring, environmental contamination 
and oil pollution in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. This position is reflected in the following quote 
from an informant within the organisation: 
“The future is going to depend on a number of things – many of which are outside the 
control of the oil and gas producers. We are committed to Nigeria for the long haul – 
we’ve been in the country for more than 50 years and thousands of people depend on 
us directly or indirectly for their livelihood. We also generate a significant proportion 
of the Country’s income. The keys to the future are peace and stability in the oil 
producing regions, a stable economic and political foundation, which will enable 
investment and development and strong leadership at national and state level. We have 
said many times that the real issues in the Niger Delta are violence, criminality, 
corruption and poverty. Eliminating these is the key to real progress and development.” 
While Shell Nigeria has been successful in creating a reputation as a safety-conscious and 
socially responsible firm since 1958, Chevron Nigeria is also known for its several corporate 
social responsibility programs in Nigeria. Although, the empirical evidence reveals that Shell 
is more associated with negative publicity than Chevron due partly to scale of operation. Shell 
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is the biggest oil and gas multinational firm whereas Chevron is the third largest oil and gas 
multinational firm in Nigeria (Table 8.2). However, the events of the Ogoni and Ilaje crises 
which started in 1993 and 1998 respectively appear to have dramatically alter the corporate 
reputation and public perceptions of both Shell and Chevron (Chapters Two and Three). This 
is also reflected in the following quotations from informants: 
“Now Shell’s image has been battered in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, the people 
cannot trust Shell again. . . . . Shell is not loved in our local community because of their 
operations which cause devastation to our sources of livelihood.”  
“Shell missed an opportunity to apologise when it settled with the Saro-Wiwa family. I 
think all but the most cynical would believe that Shell has changed its outlook as an 
organisation, and now take its social responsibilities more seriously. Isn’t it the ideal 
time for Shell to just say “sorry” for its behaviour in the 80s, a time when its’ not alone 
in believing that making money was the only factor of any importance.” 
It is argued that relying on past successes can, and has, caused laxness in risk and crisis 
management practice. For example, “much belief in the success of previous shuttle missions 
caused NASA to ignore warning signals related to both the O-rings damage prior to the 
Challenger disaster in 1996 due to cold weather before launch, and again on the fuel tank foam 
losses prior to the Columbia disaster in 2005” (Labib & Read, 2013, p. 407). Like NASA in 
the Challenger disaster, Shell’s and Chevron’s safety culture had become reactive, complacent 
and subjugated by moral disengagement mechanisms and unjustified optimism in Nigeria 
(Steiner, 2010). According to the UNEP investigation report ‘industry best practices and 
Shell’s own procedures have not been applied’ creating public safety concerns (UNEP, 2011). 
In worst-case scenarios, overdependence on previous successes and established risk models 
without periodic independent assessment promotes excessive confidence so that future 
organisational crises or risk failures will follow similar patterns of past crises/disasters. To 
substantiate this claim, empirical evidence from both Shell and Chevron crises reveal how 
senior management team are stuck with the habits of using military personnel to suppress 
environmental protesters and local indigenes (Bustany & Wysham, 2000; ERA, 1998; 2012; 
Steiner, 2010; Turner & Brownhill, 2004) despite warnings that such an approach could cause 
a black swan event. Local indigenes still cannot understand why these senior executives of 
multinational oil companies could not change their detrimental habits and look for exceptions 
(ERA, 2012). Thus, relying on past successes of previous risk strategies seemed to have supply 
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the blinders. The misconception of relying on past successes might be a reason why most 
unconventional risks and crises are self-initiated. Misconception about previous successes over 
risk and crisis situations initiates risk behaviours and decisions which undermine learning from 
past disasters and masked human errors across the organisation (Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 
2015; Pearson & Sommer, 2011). 
 
8.3.7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO RELYING ON PAST 
SUCCESSES 
The solution to overcoming excessive reliance on past successes in risk and crisis management 
lies on several recommendations. First, reorienting those responsible for managing risk and 
crisis situations should be high on the senior management agenda, emphasising that future 
threats and crises could defy existing knowledge and risk models. Therefore, Shell and Chevron 
should act to immediately review and revise their risk and crisis management policies, models 
and strategies in Nigeria. The fact that risk behaviours and decisions are viewed by local 
indigenes as double-standards and irresponsible corporate behaviours could be an indication of 
the need to restructure those in charge of risk and crisis management in Nigeria. Otherwise, 
both Shell and Chevron could continue to experience negative publicity as well as hostility to 
their staff, facilities and oil infrastructures in Nigeria. It is also suggested that current risk and 
crisis management strategies should alter old and produce new risk policies which incorporate 
repeated concerns raised by local indigenes, communities, non-governmental organisations and 
staff of both Shell and Chevron in Nigeria. 
 
8.4 RISK AND CRISIS METHODOLOGIES: BEST PRACTICE VS CONTEXT 
BASED 
This thesis maintains that risk and crisis management models are most valuable when trigger 
causes of crises/disasters can be proactively identified, eliminated, prevented, or managed 
within the organisation(s) risk appetite level. In this context, if we applied Augustine’s six stage 
model of crisis management to the case studies (Chapters Two and Three) to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Shell’s and Chevron’s responses to the crises, a few events can be identified.  
Firstly, the avoiding the crisis stage which correlates to prevention of emerging crisis was 
missed in both case studies despite this being recognised as the least costly and best means to 
256 
 
control potential crisis (Augustine, 2000). In both cases, there were demand notices sent to both 
Shell and Chevron which could have signalled possibility for impending crises but this was 
missed altogether (Boele et al., 2001; Pyagbara, 2010; Steiner, 2010). This was akin to 
structural failure of foresight and crisis disengagement which make intervening in an emerging 
organisational crisis extremely difficult (Barton, 2008; Edward, 2009; Garvin & Roberto, 2001; 
Morley, 2002; Andrew, 2011). Although, research acknowledges that perfect prevention of 
organisational crisis/disaster is clearly unachievable (Augustine, 2000).  
Secondly, the preparing to manage the crisis stage in both cases occurs due to lack of control 
over the crises origin but does not prevent both Shell and Chevron from living with the 
consequences in Nigeria. This stage started when Shell was declared ‘persona non-grata’ by 
MOSOP and as a result forced to leave Ogoniland on January 1993. This was also true of 
Chevron –Ilaje crisis, in which Chevron ignored warnings of impending crisis when Ilaje 
protesters occupied its Parabe platform and demanded for open negotiation in July 1998. In 
hindsight, both incidents could and should have been prevented with effective crisis leadership, 
crisis planning, excellent crisis communication and crisis engagement (Kash & Darling, 1998; 
Borodzizc, 2005; Coombs, 2007a; Curtin & Husein, 2005; Dominic, Swartz, & Herbane, 2010; 
Fink, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2001; Olaniran & Williams, 2001; Thorne, 2010). This stage ended 
shortly leading to the next stage of crisis recognition.  
Thirdly, the crisis recognition stage could have been avoided when ‘demand notices’ were sent 
to both Shell and Chevron but lack of flexibility in crisis management response and ignoring 
the victims’ perspectives complicate both incidents. There is no doubt that acting flexibly in 
crisis management response and incorporating local perspectives into risk strategies could have 
helped manage those crises (Constantinides, 2012; Denis & Dominic, 2006; Farazmand, 2007; 
Ulmer, 2001). In critical context, both Chevron and Shell refuted local communities’ claims 
noting how the indigenes were active saboteurs and thus displace responsibility, distort the 
consequences and morally justified their actions. The implications of such strategies include: 
(1) the issue of how local people and non-experts perceived the crises were overlooked, (2) 
they failed to challenge their own assumption, and (3) the crises were misclassified in which 
issues of local vulnerability, perceptions and ethics were finally neglected.  
Fourthly, containing the crisis stage was missed due to the complex nature of both crises and 
the tough decision-making process involved. This was not particularly a surprise due to the fact 
warnings of impending crisis often go unheeded in most past cases of risk failures (Augustine, 
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2000). The crises could have been contained using strategies such as admittance, increased 
openness to dialogue, collaborative stakeholders’ engagement, environmental remediation, 
apologetic and mortification, bolstering, compensation, and corrective action (Kellerman, 
2006; Ferguson, Wallace, & Chandler, 2012; Stephens, Malone, & Bailey, 2005). It would be 
argued that decisiveness is crucial when organisations are trying to contain and manage emerge 
crises as both incidents demonstrated.  
Fifthly, resolving the crisis stage in both incidents was lost and the crises escalated into large 
scale disasters causing reputational damages, trust deficit, destruction of oil infrastructures, and 
reduction in crude oil production. In context, both crises have still not been successfully 
resolved but initial clean-up costs of oil contamination in Ogoniland was estimated at over $1 
billion for the first five years and the process is expected to last at least 30 years (UNEP, 2011). 
This is nothing compared with the $20 billion fund set-up by BP to manage the aftermath of 
the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico (Steiner, 2010).  
Sixthly, the profiting from the crisis stage which offers opportunities to regain control over the 
crises, repair trust and maintain robust close working relationships with stakeholders still 
cannot be reach at the moment. The analysis of the case studies reveals that the crises contain 
different stratums and remain difficult to manage due to their recurrent nature, as supported by 
previous studies (Andrew, 2011; Constantinides, 2012; ‘t Hart, 2013; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 
2015; Mafimisebi & Nkwunonwo, 2015). In a practical context, Augustine’s warned that doing 
what is right within each of the six stages do not guarantee successful management of crises or 
disasters. Thus, this research would argue that neither the stage nor process based models of 
risk/crisis management provide sufficient means to manage emerging risks, crises or disasters. 
Quite critically, this thesis refuted the idea of stage-based model of risk and crisis management 
as too simplistic view which (1) fail to capture the simultaneous and overlapping nature of 
risks, crises and disasters, and (2) tends to conceptualise risk and crisis as purely linear events. 
The fact remains that knowledge about unconventional risk, crisis and disaster extend beyond 
linear problems to complex, uncertain and ambiguous problems. For example, linear risk 
problems can be managed using stage-based risk and crisis model whereas complex risk 
problems can be manage using process-based risk and crisis model. Retrospectively, stages of 
crisis can easily be identified once the event has occurred but it is much more difficult to use 
stage-based and process-based models such as Turner’s, Augustine’s and Fink’s models in 
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managing emerging unconventional crises and disasters which often do not fit existing risk 
models.  
Therefore, this research calls for a decision-based model of risk and crisis management (See 
Figure 8.11 below). This is due to the complex, uncertain and ambiguous nature of 
unconventional risk and crisis as reflected in both case incidents. The uncertain risk problems 
require the use of ‘resilience-focused’ and ‘precaution-based’ strategies whereas ambiguous 
risk problems require ‘dialogue-based’ and ‘culturally-sensitive’ strategies. Therefore, since 
unconventional risks and crises are characterised as uncertain, complex and ambiguous 
situations a decision-based risk and crisis model which takes into considerations resilience-
focused, precaution-based, dialogue-based and culturally-sensitive strategies is crucial to 
successful risk and crisis management practice. In fact, decision-based models of risk and crisis 
management arguably represent the latest thinking in the risk and crisis domain due to its ability 
to consider:  
 The overlapping nature of risk, and crisis/disaster,  
 Multiple phases or processes of crisis/disaster concurrently,  
 The interwoven links of stage/process model of risk and crisis management, and 
 The significance of external interactions and multiple views with their implications for 
risk and crisis management. This can be the subject of future research.  
In conclusion, it would be argued that had these crisis management success factors such as 
leadership, communication, moral engagement, common risk framing, social concerns and 
experts’ judgement, and risk governance contained in Figure 8.11, both incidents could have 
been avoided or at least managed effectively. Figure 8.11 suggests that risk and crisis 
management models should be context-based given that their universal application could mean 
ignoring issues of culture, perception, moral engagement, and social concerns which are critical 
to effective risk and crisis management. The implication is that emerging unconventional risk 
and crisis should be conceptualised and managed in a contingent and contextual manner rather 
a prescriptive manner, usually depicted by stage and process based models of risk and crisis 
management.
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Figure 8.11: Decision-Based Model of Risk and Crisis Management 
Source: Author (2017)
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8.5 SUMMARY 
The intended consequences of risk and crisis management programs and strategies are well-
documented in extant research. However, the unintended consequences of risk and crisis 
management are less-known in most theoretical and empirical studies. The empirical evidence 
from this research draws our attention to both the intended and unintended consequences of 
risk and crisis management practice. The implications of the research findings are crucial 
towards changing current risk and crisis management practice. First, the Nigerian government 
can deal more proactively with cases of terrorism and militancy related crises when there is 
clear understanding of what motivate delinquents to perpetuate such acts. This research, 
through the incorporation of moral disengagement into the risk and crisis domain, demonstrates 
how multinational organisations operating in conflict and crisis-affected areas of Nigeria, can 
overcome the emerging crises in the Niger Delta.  
Second, it was found that the activities of terrorists and militants pragmatically reduce the 
production of crude oil in the Niger Delta. This affects revenues of multinational oil companies 
and the Nigerian government. The research findings indicate how organisations can deal more 
proactively and effectively when responding to complexity and uncertainty surrounding their 
business operations in conflict-ridden and crisis-affected regions of Nigeria. The empirical 
findings revealed that crises and disasters affect different stakeholders differently in Nigeria. 
At the basic level, lack of sustained growth of businesses and local communities suggest the 
impossibility of lifting people out of poverty. In contrast, reduction in crises and disasters in 
Nigeria can lead to increased sustained growth for small and medium size firms in crisis-
affected areas, improve firm’s performance, increased profitability and wealth creation, 
expansion of businesses and employment opportunities, reduction in poverty and increase 
opportunity cost of disasters, and consequently the environment and local people become less 
vulnerable.  
Collectively, this research findings provided additional impetus for comprehensive risk and 
crisis management reform, policy and strategies, informing a robust approach to risk, crisis and 
resilience management in Nigeria. In conclusion, robust regulation is needed in the Nigerian 
oil and gas sector and the government should avoid being defenders of vested interest (Turner 
& Brownhill, 2004; Steiner, 2010), opposing reform especially the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB) to protect the status quo. The PIB is a right step in the right direction but several pundits 
(Adedayo, 2011; Aghalino, 2009; Emmanuel, 2010; Fatusin et al., 2010; Steiner, 2010; 
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Pyagbara, 2010; UNEP, 2011) have raised concerns about its perceived over politicisation 
which undermined collaboration and engagement among stakeholders in Nigeria. In this 
research context, it is argued that if the PIB is successfully pass into legislation, it can help 
addresses some of the main issues raised by local oil producing communities (Figure 8.8); and 
resolves issue of distrust between local oil communities and multinational oil companies. 
The next chapter examines the implications of risk and crisis management models and 
highlights areas for future directions. The chapter contains useful suggestions about the 
potential implications of moral disengagement in risk/crisis management and what can be done 
to enhanced organisation resilience against unconventional risks and crises. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT MODELS – IMPLICATIONS 
9.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
The existing studies and commission reports about the Niger Delta crises considered each of 
the case studies in isolation but this research is the first study to collectively integrate and 
discussed these case studies within the risk and crisis domain. This area was not initially 
considered but realised in the process of this research. This research extends existing risk and 
crisis management scholarship on the management of risks, crises and disasters and argues that 
issues of moral disengagement mechanisms are responsible for generating competing 
constructions of unconventional risks, crises and disasters. At the root of most organisational 
crises and disasters, ethical dilemmas and moral disengagement mechanisms are noted to have 
underpinned the decision-making of leaders and organisational members which are suggested 
to have initiated a chain of events leading to those crises. Moral disengagement can prejudice 
our thought and decision process and keep us from not just doing the right things but also 
inhibit us from doing things right. 
The implications for senior executives and organisations is that moral disengagement suspends 
moral reasoning or awareness at micro and macro levels and causes the magnitude and 
consequences of moral violations to be overlooked or disguised, and consequently potentially 
promotes excessive risky behaviours beyond the organisational risk appetite or limit. The 
empirical evidence suggests that moral disengagement mechanisms (1) weaken or destroy 
established approaches to mitigating and managing risks and crises, (2) facilitate sanctionable 
behaviours in risk, crisis and disaster situations without self-condemnation, and (3) help to 
maintain high moral self-image even in obviously detrimental and unethical conducts. These 
findings which are consistent with several previous empirical studies related to moral 
disengagement in different domains (e.g., Bandura, 1999; 2002; 2007; Beu & Buckley, 2004; 
Baker et al., 2006; Caprara & Capanna, 2005; Caprara et al., 2009; Chugh et al., 2014; Frey, 
2000; Jones, 1991; May & Pauli, 2002; Moore, 2008; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Trevino, 
1986; Reynolds, 2006) have crucial implications on firm’s reputation, shareholders value, 
corporate integrity and trust, community acceptance, resilience and sustainability of 
organisation(s).  
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For example, moral disengagement at the organisational level when publicised (or made 
known) degrades corporate reputation, reduces public trust in organisations, and affects social 
and community acceptance of firms, as validated by the findings from this research. Due to 
these factors, organisational resilience weakens and organisational survival or sustainability 
within an environment becomes doubtful. Collectively, these issues call for robust risk 
engagement, decisive risk/crisis communication, ethical risk management, and resilience-
focused strategies which embrace multiple views and take into consideration social, 
environmental, cultural and moral issues that are incorporated into organisational learning and 
strategies. These are longer-term views of moral disengagement implications in the risk and 
crisis domain. 
This research emphasised that crisis management and moral disengagement are not mutually 
exclusive phenomena but collectively exhaustive paradigms because at least one of the events 
must happen. One implication is that with the presence of moral disengagement in 
organisations, those responsible for managing risks, crises or disasters wouldn’t care enough 
to proactively prevent them. At a surface level, this could be interpreted by risk practitioners 
to mean that organisations need to invest more into risk and crisis behaviours programs/training 
as well as extensive ethical/moral simulation and risk auditing programmes. However, 
investment in risk and crisis management training does not automatically translate into 
improved and better risk management decisions. This would suggest organisations should also 
frequently have their risk and crisis management reviewed. This may help organisations create 
better tailored risk training, obtain feedback about the maturity of their risk/crisis management 
models from external risk consultants and avoid using risk and crisis management strategies 
which could be producing unintended consequences when some unplanned happenings occur. 
Alternative implications are that moral disengagement considerably constrains risk/crisis 
management strategies and infiltrates individual risk-decisions within organisations. As a 
result, risk and crisis management activities before the occurrence of dangerous events become 
overrated and local perspectives or contexts are discounted in the process. This research has 
implications for our conceptualisations of the risk and crisis management decision-making 
process. Regardless, these findings generate a plausible explanation of why existing risk and 
crisis management models or strategies may fail to prevent, reduce or contain emerging 
crises/disasters and illustrates the importance of understanding moral disengagement in risk 
and crisis management processes.  
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It would be premature for organisations to conclude that their risk management activities are 
robust and resilient without some form of stress testing and independent risk verification. 
Therefore, it is the suggestion of this thesis that the risk management of such organisations as 
reflected in Shell and Chevron cases need risk management. In other words, your risk 
management needs a risk management. The real implication is that because the presence of 
moral disengagement in the risk and crisis domain across organisations diminishes risk 
management practice or at least causes risk management to be overrated, companies should 
have their risk and crisis management activities audited by external risk experts/consultants 
much akin to the auditing of financial statements. 
This research rejected the conventional wisdom that ‘the best predictor of future events is past 
events’ (Fink, 2002, p. 43). The implication suggests that current existing risk and crisis models 
proceeded as if future crises and disasters will always follow similar patterns of the past; views 
that have been challenged by the nature of unconventional risks and crises. The fact remains 
that no two crises or disasters are the same even though comparable lessons could be learned 
from them. Attempts to force existing risk and crisis models on to emerging crises without 
adequate regard for their context, uniqueness and complexity are commonly responsible for 
organisations unintentionally creating their own worst disasters. The unintended consequences 
connected with self-inflicted disaster can be extreme: ranging from regulatory penalties; 
negative publicity; huge, sudden costs; lost revenues; lawsuits and criminal judgments; 
liquidation and take-over; hostile attacks – vandalism, and kidnapping; fallen share prices; 
shareholder value reduction; and reduced production or sales.  
In contrast to conventional perspectives (e.g., learning from disaster, normal accident, risk 
society, systemic failure and risk homeostasis), the implications from this research further 
suggest that initial triggers of disaster which are contextualised to be systemic and exogenous 
event(s) were often under management control and critical decisions that could have averted 
the disaster/crisis were hardly acted upon. This perspective reveals that the potential downside 
of moral disengagement, risk underestimation, over-turning established risk framework and 
reducing risk management to ‘tick-box’ or compliance exercises are known in advance prior to 
organisational crisis/disaster. The crucial matter is that perception of risk across the 
organisation diminishes over time and inappropriate organisational behaviours become normal 
practices initiating future crisis/disaster. This is comparable to the so-called ‘no texting while 
driving rule’ – a driver who has successfully text while driving at times thinks little of the rule. 
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Companies engage in similar habits – overlooking or sidestepping their risk management 
practices to temporarily benefit themselves and slowly get into self-inflicted behaviours. 
Another implication of this research is that moral and ethical components of risk and crisis 
must be divulged and factored into risk and crisis management models to provide more 
informed or better decisions. The findings further suggest that when attempting to improve 
risk/crisis management culture and strategy in organisations, leaders or senior executives 
should take the initiative to better educate managers and other staff about the moral values of 
risk management processes, models, strategies and standards more generally. Markedly, 
improving managers’ and other staff’s appreciation for such moral guides increases their ability 
to access moral frameworks in the face of harmful situations and in cases of seemingly 
inconsequential violations of norms (Reynold, 2006; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015). This point 
is significant because many of the scandals, organisational crises and disasters began with 
simple violations of professional norms, safety standards and sidestepping risk management in 
which harm did not emerge until much later in the process (Table 9.1 below). This calls for an 
explicit ethical crisis management framework as depicted in Figure 5.2 (Chapter Five) to detect 
moral disengagement across organisation(s). As revealed, the lack of an explicit framework to 
detect moral disengagement within organisations makes them vulnerable to unethical and 
irresponsible corporate behaviours. 
Table 9.1: Case Studies of How Moral Disengagement Perpetuate Scandals, Crises and 
Disasters 
Mechanisms of MD Description Case Examples 
Attribution of blame Blaming one’s adversaries or compelling 
circumstances can serve self-exonerating 
purposes. This implies that by fixing the 
blame on others or on circumstances, not 
only are one’s own injurious actions 
excusable but one can even feel self-
righteous in the process. 
Union Carbide – Bhopal 
disaster; Shell – Ogoni 
Crisis; BP Deepwater 
Horizon disaster; Three 
Mile Island; Challenger; 
HIH Insurance Group 
crisis, Chevron – Ilaje 
crisis, etc. 
Moral justification People do not ordinarily engage in 
reprehensible conduct until they have 
justified to themselves the rightness of 
their actions or decisions. 
Chevron – Ilaje crisis; 
Bonga oil disaster; London 
7/7; 9/11 Terrorist Attacks; 
Enron scandal; Satyam 
scandal; FIFA 2015 
scandal; BCCI scandal, etc. 
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Displacement of 
responsibility 
People view their conducts as springing 
from social pressures or dictates of others 
rather than something for which they are 
personally responsible. 
WorldCom; BP Deepwater 
Horizon disaster; Union 
Carbide – Bhopal disaster; 
Chevron – Ilaje crisis; Shell 
– Ogoni crisis; New York 
9/11 Terrorist Attacks, etc.  
Distorting the 
consequences 
When people pursue activities that serve 
their interests but produce detrimental 
effects they avoid facing the harm they 
cause or minimise it 
Parmalat; Enron; Bonga oil 
disaster; BP Deepwater 
Horizon disaster; Bhopal 
disaster; Shell – Ogoni 
crisis, etc. 
Euphemistic labelling Language shapes perceptions and thought 
processes on which actions are based. 
Activities can take on quite different 
appearances depending on what they are 
called. 
Environmental protesters 
are labelled as militants in 
the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria; Drones and 
Terrorists; Civilians killed 
because of counterterrorism 
measures are called 
collateral casualties; Enron 
scandal; WV emission 
scandal, etc. 
Advantageous 
comparison 
Reprehensible conduct can assume very 
different qualities depending on what it is 
compared with. 
Shell Brent Spar; Shell 
Nigeria and Chevron 
Nigeria pollution and 
environmental devastation 
compared with local illegal 
oil refining pollution, etc. 
Diffusion of 
responsibility 
The deterrent power of self-sanctions is 
weakened when the link between conduct 
and its consequences is obscured by 
diffusing responsibility for culpable 
behaviour. 
Three Mile Island; Exxon 
Valdez disaster; Shell 
Nigeria crisis; Chernobyl; 
Challenger; Chevron 
Nigeria crisis; Maxwell 
Group scandal, etc. 
Dehumanisation The strength of moral self-censure for 
harmful practices depends on how those 
who suffer the consequences are regarded. 
Bhopal disaster; Shell – 
Ogoni crisis; Chevron – 
Ilaje crisis; Bonga oil 
disaster, etc. 
Source: Author (2017) 
The real challenge and controversial issues include: who is morally disengaged in the 
organisation, to what extent is the moral disengagement, what is the nature of morality or ethics 
(i.e., social contracts, rights/wrongs, virtue ethics, eights/liberty, legislation/regulation), and 
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how does individual moral disengagement shape organisational ethics and vice versa. These 
are crucial issues that should be addressed by organisations to gain the benefits of operating as 
good corporate citizens and ethically conscious organisations. It was clear that wider 
consideration of the risk and crisis context and conceptualisation of dangerous incidents to 
reflect multiple perspectives is crucial for robust risk and crisis management.  
This research has substantial implications for theories of moral development, moral behaviour, 
risk and crisis management. Given that practitioners and researchers focus more of their energy 
on developing methods and programs to standardise and institutionalise ethics in organisations, 
but as expounded in this research, a critical component of corporate ethics resides at the micro 
level of analysis and is driven largely by how leaders or managers think about morality of 
situations and decisions. This could limit efforts to improve moral behaviour and ethical 
leadership in organisations when individual differences and moral disengagement are not 
addressed from the onset.  
Perhaps these findings will encourage a re-examination of moral development, moral reasoning 
and moral behaviour theories in risk and crisis situations to glean from their basic arguments 
insights into other areas of ethical leadership, moral decision making, and risk management. 
Although much research has been conducted about their details, their limited applications to 
risk, crisis and disaster management has somewhat undermined the value these theories 
espouse in managing emerging unconventional risks, crises and disasters. 
 
9.2 RISK AND CRISIS MODELS – UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 
The concerns noted above suggest three unconventional challenges face all risk and crisis 
managers in the 21st century: Firstly, deciding whether unconventional risks, crises, and 
disasters should be treated as stages, processes, or both. That is, how should managers organise 
the management of organisational risks, crises, and disasters? The extant research treating crisis 
as a triggering event or a process of incubation remains inconclusive and inadequate. The event 
view of organisational crises portrayed crises as unexpected, low probability and high impact 
events which involve high stakes and demanding urgent action (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Boin 
& McConnell, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Roux-Dufort, 2007b).  
In contrast, the process view of organisational crises emphasises how organisational conditions 
(e.g., managerial ignorance, imperfections, organisational failures, resistance to learning) 
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cumulate for crisis to be triggered but largely centred on the pre- and post-crisis stages, besides 
the pressing crisis response (Andrew, 2011; Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Coombs, 2007; 
Reza, 2011; Roux-Dufort, 2007a). Neither the event nor the process view of organisational 
crises sufficiently addresses the concerns that unconventional crises/disasters are highly fluid, 
temporal, interwoven with complicated factors and multiple perspectives, which could be 
passive. This implies that risk and crisis models should not be rigid, but flexible to 
accommodate diverse views. These are some of the challenges that risk/crisis managers should 
overcome when managing organisational risks, crises or disasters. 
Secondly, deciding whether risk and crisis strategies should be applied as best practice, context-
based, best fit or unique fit. That is, should risk and crisis models or strategies be applied 
uniformly, contextually, or perhaps intuitively? 
Thirdly, deciding whether the risk and crisis management process should be top-down, bottom-
up, or enterprise-wide across the organisation? These are challenges that should be overcome 
if organisations are to remain relevant and proactive in managing unconventional risks, crises 
and disasters. 
 
9.3 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE, METHOD AND 
PRACTICE 
As noted throughout this thesis, the ideas argued here are clearly not unfamiliar to moral 
psychologists and ethical researchers, particularly the paradox of moral disengagement and the 
impossibility of conducting moral disengagement research without substantive context and 
case studies (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 2000; Fiske, 2004; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 
2015; McAlister et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2012; Rogers, 2003; White et al., 2009; Young et 
al., 2007). The broader contribution of this research is that it would require a courageous, 
ethical and socially responsible decision to overcome issues of moral disengagement in the risk 
and crisis domain. This research further advanced previous studies on moral disengagement to 
the risk/crisis domain but diverge strongly in terms of our reconceptualization of the 
mechanisms of moral disengagement, as constituent to organised corporate irresponsibility. 
There are five main contributions from this research to existing knowledge in risk and crisis 
management that are worth noting.  
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Firstly, this research contributes to the established bodies of literature in risk, crisis and disaster 
management, and to the practice within these fields. In context, the research brings a new 
perspective to the field of risk, crisis and disaster management, terrorism and resilience 
management through the concept of moral disengagement. The fact that when moral 
disengagement fragment into risk and crisis situations causes rogue and detrimental behaviours 
that may not be originally intended, signal the need to revisit current thinking in risk and crisis 
management. It may be that the entire conceptual confusion surrounding the effectiveness of 
risk and crisis management responses, strategies and models is rooted in this idea. However, 
one can also argue that absolute elimination of moral disengagement in risk and crisis situations 
is practically impossible especially in cases where organisations operate in an environment or 
society which inherently promote the use of such moral disengagement mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, an alternative explanation is to create new forms of research agenda capable of 
uncovering the heinous aspect of organisations’ behaviours and decisions in processes of risk 
and crisis management. Specifically, this is the first original attempt to empirically investigate 
the relationships between moral disengagement and crisis management. Following this view, 
this research shows a divergence in relationship between moral disengagement and crisis 
management leading to misclassification of dangerous events and overestimation of existing 
risk/crisis models. This insight go beyond existing explanations and models available in the 
extant risk and crisis research through which previously independent concepts become 
associated (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Andrew, 2011; Ansell et al., 2010; Aquino et al., 2007; 
Bandura, 2007; Beu & Buckley, 2004; Boin & McConnell, 2007; Caprara et al., 2009; Coombs, 
2007; Jackson & Sparr, 2005; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011; Roux-Dufort, 2007a; Fiske, 
2004; McAlister et al., 2006; Moore, 2008; Rogers, 2003). 
Secondly, albeit extensive studies have been conducted to evaluate risk and crisis management 
across organisations in different sectors following the aftermath of major organisational 
scandals, crises and disasters, the link between moral disengagement and risk/crisis 
management has not been examined and the implications for practice in risk and crisis 
management are still under-researched or lacking. This thesis complements this focal area of 
risk and crisis research due to empirical evidence that individuals and organisations with moral 
disengagement may make, or at least superficially present as artificial effective risk leaders and 
organisations (cf. Bandura, 2007; 2009; Caprara et al., 2009; Chugh et al., 2014; Fiske, 2004; 
Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Ntayi et al., 2010; White et al., 2009). At the same time, ample 
evidence from this research suggests that individuals and organisations using moral 
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disengagement mechanisms can be self-destructive in the long-term. In critical terms, high 
moral disengagement is associated with ineffective crisis management response whereas low 
moral disengagement is associated with unsustainable crisis management. The perspective is 
that moral disengagement mechanisms create multiple and conflicting interests in risk/crisis 
situations; too much MD mechanisms the organisation self-inflicted disaster; too little create 
complexity and chaos in which organisational risk culture become contaminated. 
Thirdly, this thesis challenges both stage-based and process-based models of risk and crisis 
management as deficient in managing emerging unconventional crises/disasters. In addition, 
the notion of best practice or universal application of risk and crisis management models or 
strategies are refuted due to multiple perspectives and complexities that characterise 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster situations. In practical settings, this research adds that 
risk and crisis management should not proceed as if all crises/disasters are equivalent in which 
case best practices or standards become a norm (Andrew, 2011; Boin et al., 2010; Borodzizc, 
2005; Constantinides, 2013; Elliott, 2009; Hiles, 2011; Lagadec, 2004; 2009; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; Perrow, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011; Roux-Dufort, 2007b; 
Shrivastava, 1993; Turner, 1976; ‘t Hart, 2013). As a result, best fit or unique fit in risk and 
crisis management which aligns and integrates the risk/crisis management processes with 
broader organisational strategy, environment, tools, context, culture, perceptions, governance, 
moral engagement and social acceptability are proposed as the future of risk and crisis 
management. Thus, this research strongly calls for unique fit and decision-based model of risk 
and crisis management in order to improve risk/crisis management practice and organisational 
resilience. The vast amount of risk and crisis literatures are mostly dominated by Western 
thinking and philosophies over the decades but this thesis adds African perspective using case 
studies to the body of knowledge in risk and crisis management. Albeit it is acknowledged that 
different cultures exist within the African context, however it is claim that moral 
disengagement mechanisms are prevalent in cases of self-inflicted disasters which could cut 
across different cultures. 
Fourthly, this research uses qualitative rather than quantitative or mixed approach to evaluate 
issues of moral disengagement and crisis management practices. Although, there is significant 
mixed approach at theoretical level in terms of combining theories from moral psychology, 
ethics, risk and crisis management. This was due necessary because of the initial proposition 
in this thesis that the way organisations manage disasters/crises matters. The context suggests 
that it is difficult for effective risk and crisis management to take place if the initial 
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understanding of what constitutes risk, crisis or disaster is utterly flawed. The wider implication 
of moral disengagement in risk and crisis domain is that it complicates the initial understanding 
of what constitutes crisis or disaster as demonstrated by the case studies. 
The last main contribution is that moral disengagement in the risk and crisis domain is about 
people and risk management. In this context, the use of moral disengagement mechanisms in 
risk and crisis situations has short-term benefits but long-term detrimental consequences. For 
example, the use of attribution of blame and displacement of responsibility could help minimise 
the amount of compensation an organisation would has to pay in the event of culpability. In 
contrast, the use of such MD mechanisms could signify that organisations are irresponsible and 
that could lead to hostile attacks on such organisations as the Chevron and Shell case studies 
reveal. Somewhat surprisingly, however, use of MD mechanisms were also viewed as crisis 
disengagement mechanisms.  
These potentially important results raise the possibility that moral disengagement may be a 
double-edge sword, fostering detrimental conducts and disengagement from ethical 
conducts/behaviours in the workplace (Bandura, 2007; Beu & Buckley, 2004; Chugh et al., 
2014; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Rogers, 2003; White et al., 2009; Young et al., 2007). 
Specifically, the two-fold implications are about ‘the dark side of leadership’ and ‘the dark side 
of organisation’ in risk, crisis and disaster situations. These represent new directions for future 
research to consider. These directions include a largescale research project investigating 
organisational ethics and risk governance, inflated-organisational ethics and risk culture, and 
the disequilibrium nature of organisational ethics. These issues are critical to understand how 
responses to risk, crisis and disaster situations are influenced and informed by factors such as 
environment, ethics, culture, perception, moral disengagement and philosophy. In conclusion, 
this thesis contributes that the presence of moral disengagement in organisations increase the 
complex and multi-categorical descriptions of unconventional crisis or disaster. This view 
indicates that causes of crisis and disaster are diffuse into wider problems of complexity, 
normal accident, risk society, risk homeostasis, and force majeure. In closing, this research 
contributes to understanding why, despite the adoption of enterprise risk management 
framework, organisations still seem unwilling and unable to mitigate unconventional 
risks/crises and to provide an effective solution. 
 
  
272 
 
CHAPTER TEN 
10.1 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to add to scholarship on risk and crisis management which has 
increasingly acknowledged that the current risk and crisis models are incompatible with 
emerging dangerous events (Andrew, 2011; Ansell et al., 2010; Boin, 2004; Boin & 
McConnell, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 2005; Roux-Dufort, 2007a). Numerous attempts have 
earlier been made to highlight different, alternative ways of understanding the nature of risk, 
crisis and disaster and to provide several risk and crisis models (e.g., Andrew, 2011; Boin et 
al., 2010; Borodzizc, 2005; Constantinides, 2013; Elliott, 2009; Hiles, 2011; Lagadec, 2004; 
2009; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Perrow, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Reza, 2011; Roux-
Dufort, 2007b; Shrivastava, 1993; Turner, 1976; ‘t Hart, 2013). However, what these accounts 
have lacked is a recognition, or incorporation, of perspectives from the moral psychology and 
ethical leadership literature, specifically in relation to the connections between moral 
disengagement and risk/crisis management. This, as argued in this thesis, has proven 
detrimental to the pursuit of pragmatic and sustainable risk, crisis, disaster, and resilience 
management. As a result, it is crucial that organisations do what they do on purpose and 
mindfully rather than habitually or because they are simply following conventions in risk and 
crisis management. 
Given the above, this thesis has sought to encourage greater reflection about the relationship 
between moral disengagement, crisis management and a broader resilience approach to 
managing emerging unconventional risks, crises and disasters. The opening chapter addresses 
contemporary challenges and salient issues of militancy and oil terrorism rooted in the Niger 
Delta crises. In fact, it was argued that an attention to moral disengagement and the practicality 
of risk/crisis theories can contribute significantly to current efforts in improving risk and crisis 
management practice; and the need to develop a truly interdisciplinary risk/crisis research, 
firstly by bringing to the fore the moral and ethical dimension of unconventional risk, crisis 
and disaster which represent a defining, yet neglected, characteristic of risk and crisis research. 
The fragmented nature of risk and crisis management literature was noted to have contributed 
to the inadequacy and insufficiency of current risk and crisis management practice. The lack 
of consensus about what constitutes risk, crisis and disaster was noted to have undermined 
efforts towards their management. This has potential implications for the management of 
unconventional risks, crises and disasters; if our views of risk, crisis and disaster are 
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ambiguous, then our approaches to their management are even more confused and increasing 
organisational resilience become most difficult. These issues are consistent with several 
existing traditional and current risk and crisis research (Andrew, 2011; Augustine, 2000; 
Bauman, 2002; Beck, 1992; 2009; Borodzizc, 2005; Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011; Fink, 
2002; Coombs, 2007; Lerbinger, 2012; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; 
Ulmer et al., 2007; Roxburgh, 2010; Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; ‘t Hart, 2013; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Of importance, this thesis expands upon arguments about the ontological and epistemological 
nature of unconventional risk and crisis, and induces a greater sensemaking appreciation of 
dangerous events, that flows among risk experts (researchers and practitioners) and non-risk 
experts (lay audience or people). The practical implication suggests that by seeing risk/crisis 
experts not as separate and superior to non-risk experts but as one amongst many others, then 
such collective interdisciplinary and multiple views will help to soften the divide that has 
characterised unconventional risks, crises and disasters and their management. This is an area 
for which many resources and increased attention are still required in risk and crisis 
management practice. The lack of consensus among those responsible for managing risks and 
crises, as well as the tendency to treat non-risk experts as less superior or lacking understanding 
of risk/crisis nature, undermines sustainable risk/crisis management; something that was clear 
following the emerging crises of Niger Delta especially the Shell – Ogoni crisis and Chevron 
– Ilaje crisis discussed in Chapters Two and Three. 
The second and third chapters of this thesis contains an early empirical section in which two 
unique case studies of crises were considered, focusing on the challenges posed to the 
organisations involved and other stakeholders, in managing the emerging crises and disasters 
in the Niger Delta. The opening section deals with issues of vulnerable environment and 
vulnerable people, especially how local militants often clashed with multinational oil 
companies in Nigeria due to the so-called ‘resource-control dilemma’ and environmental 
justice. Each of the case studies provide unique challenges for organisations and their risk/crisis 
managers operating in conflict-ridden and crisis-affected areas of Nigeria. The inclusion of the 
two case studies are notable due to their global and ill-structured nature, complexity and large-
scale impacts on the environment and local people.  
The consequences of crises/disasters are unprecedented for stakeholders in Nigeria and even 
extend to countries beyond, as reflected in the well-known human rights legal cases of Kiobel 
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vs. Royal Dutch Shell Group, and Bowoto vs. Chevron, both instituted in the United States 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for crimes against humanity. The case studies were 
secondary analyses of Shell and Chevron responses to dangerous events. The thesis found that 
the detrimental impact from Niger Delta crises/disasters intensifies as vulnerabilities of local 
people increase. For example, rapid migration from local communities is linked to destruction 
of natural resources that usually trap people to remain in rural communities. Critically, both 
case studies represent opportunities to learn from risk failures and disasters with an increased 
advantage to improve early warning, disaster preparedness, risk model verification, simulation 
and training which focus on flexibility, resilience, sustainability and business continuity. The 
importance of local engagement and a sustainable view of ethical risk management were also 
identified as two characteristics of successful risk and crisis management. The role of 
regulation and regulatory agencies in managing the persistent crises in the Niger Delta were 
noted. A mounting interest and increased environmental campaigns about the consequences of 
oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria was also apparent. This was a positive move 
towards improving environmental management practices and crisis management in Nigeria. 
The most crucial risk and crisis management theories relevant to this thesis were also 
considered with special focus on risk perception, risk/crisis communication, risk society and 
risk culture, and learning from disasters in Chapter Four. The concern raised about each of 
these theories was not about their validity but rather on their collective synergy which could 
produce more far reaching effects than when applied in isolation. This perspective was rooted 
in the recommendations emanating from this research, as it provides an all-encompassing 
approach to responding to or managing emerging risks, crises and disasters. Arguably, it is 
insufficient to manage risks and crises using one model or theory but a more pragmatic 
approach incorporating multiple views and strategies leading to greater flexibility and 
resilience is likely to have greater success. 
There are several issues regarding the inadequate, incompatible and insufficient nature of 
current risk, crisis and disaster models also raised in the fourth chapter of this thesis, especially 
with respect to divergence in the conceptualisation of risk, crisis and disaster, or other 
dangerous events. The debates about event, stage and process views of risk and crisis 
management were expounded to highlight the dynamic and complex nature of unconventional 
risk, crisis and disaster. The inclusion of these debates was deliberately intended to suggest the 
need for incorporating multidisciplinary research into the risk/crisis management literature to 
reflect the multiple realities of unconventional risks, crises and disasters. 
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The fourth chapter also considered the epistemological and ontological nature of risk, crisis 
and disaster by focusing on the definition and debates surrounding these terms. The difficulties 
surrounding gaining consensus about what constitute risk, crisis and disaster were highlighted; 
it was argued that understanding what these terms mean for different people is critical to 
effective risk and crisis management. Although it is recognised that not all situations described 
as crises or disasters should be labelled as such, but understanding and incorporating multiple 
views into risk and crisis management could lead to broader approaches which may increase 
resilience and robustness of organisations before, during and after major crisis/disaster. 
In concluding Chapter Four, a call was made for risk and crisis management to be context-
based and focus on the uniqueness of unconventional risks, crises and disasters, instead of often 
attempting universal application of existing risk/crisis models or standards which have 
dominated risk and crisis research for decades. It was also suggested that a few risk theories 
such as risk society and Normal Accident are still influential but represent a passive approach 
to unconventional risks, crises and disasters which did little to change the way risk/crisis 
managers manage emerging risks and crises. The conclusion from the literature is that 
successful risk and crisis management requires moral engagement, flexibility, improved risk 
culture and governance, and robust leadership. 
Chapter Five reviewed the literature on crisis management and moral disengagement. The 
concept of moral disengagement is central to the discussion surrounding this thesis; it 
emphasised that moral disengagement presents a fundamental paradox in crisis management 
practice. Following the review of the moral disengagement literature, the conclusion is that 
moral disengagement and crisis management may co-exist. The thesis underscored the fact that 
both concepts are mutually exclusive only if crisis management is defined in a restrictive way 
as the absence of crisis or disaster. In context, the introduction of moral disengagement into 
the risk and crisis domain exposes some potential factors or issues that make modern 
organisations vulnerable to crises and disasters. The duality of moral disengagement in risk 
and crisis situations was revealed where on one hand, moral disengagement is the use of 
mechanisms which sanction detrimental conducts/behaviours in risk/crisis response; and on the 
other hand, it manifests as crisis disengagement mechanisms in which organisations are 
constantly seeking to reduce or discount culpability in risk/crisis situations. Although each of 
the mechanisms of moral disengagement was corresponding to some crisis management 
response strategies, this research focused on the need for broader resilience and sustainability 
when managing emerging crises/disasters. In concluding Chapter Five, it was noted that moral 
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disengagement mechanisms represent justifiable evils which are harmful and risky strategies 
that potentially lead to crisis intensification and greater vulnerability of organisations. 
The philosophical and methodological perspectives adopted for this research were reviewed in 
Chapter Six. The issues of research design, a multiple case research approach, data collection 
and research philosophy were clarified. There was extensive discussion about the rationale for 
the case research approach and justification for the selection of the chosen case studies. In 
addition, explicit attention was paid to the research philosophy in risk and crisis research as 
well as discussion regarding sample issues and techniques, and case selection strategies. Given 
the extremely emotive nature of this research, great care was taken to ensure that the research 
validity, reliability, generalisation and ethical concerns were reflected upon. The implications 
for conducting sensitive research of this nature was extensively discussed. 
While Chapter Seven focused on the philosophical thinking underpinning this research, 
Chapter Eight presented the empirical evidence of this thesis. The analysis of the case studies 
considering the issue of moral disengagement in risk and crisis situations posed exceptional 
challenges for organisations. The research findings were presented in Chapter Eight with two 
main sections. The first addressed the theoretical conclusions regarding the research aims and 
objectives while the second part provided extensive recommendations which incorporated 
notable risk and crisis theories such as learning from disasters/failures, risk perception, risk 
culture and risk governance, and risk/crisis communication. The empirical section also 
discussed moral disengagement in the context of risk and crisis management. The research 
model was presented and discussion of the moral disengagement and risk models were 
connected to further justify the recommendations. 
Chapter Nine of this thesis extensively discussed the research implications and lessons learned 
from the discussions and empirical findings. The essence was to address the ‘so what’ aspect 
of this research and to integrate that discussion into broader risk, crisis and disaster 
management. For example, despite the increasing evidence of moral disengagement 
mechanisms in risk and crisis situations, it was found that less attention was being paid to their 
implications. Perhaps equally disturbing is the fact that due to use of moral disengagement in 
risk and crisis situations, organisations and their risk/crisis managers may not be persuaded 
about the detrimental or dark side of their activities or strategies which could be disastrous for 
several other stakeholders. To date, the most compelling evidence for this claim derives from 
studies demonstrating that moral disengagement is positively associated with peace and 
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conflict (Jackson & Sparr, 2005; McAlister, 2001), computer hacking (Rogers, 2003; Young 
et al., 2007), ethical intervention (Chugh et al., 2014), ecological sustainability (Bandura, 
2007), corporate transgressions (Bandura et al., 2000; Beu & Buckley, 2004; White et al., 
2009), organisational corruption (Moore, 2008), genocide, war, greater aggression, and 
terrorism (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura et al., 1996; Caprara et al., 2009; Fiske, 2004; Ntayi et 
al., 2010; Mafimisebi & Thorne, 2015).  
At first glance, evidence of moral disengagement in risk and crisis situations seems compelling. 
Yet many of the earlier studies on which this research was based are marked by methodological 
and contextual flaws that do not adequately address the trigger causes and features of moral 
disengagement in environmental or organisational settings which are characterised by inherent 
ethical or moral contamination. Nevertheless, the evidence of the ‘double-edged sword’ of 
moral disengagement in risk and crisis situations was robust. Albeit the evidence is still at a 
preliminary stage, there is need for more research to replicate and extend the samples to other 
contexts and domains. Moreover, if moral disengagement indeed functions as a double-edged 
sword, it is unclear whether moral disengagement is suspended in situations that naturally 
promote detrimental conducts (e.g., terrorism and counter terrorism, climate change and 
climate change mitigation), or whether different components or mechanisms such as unethical 
contagion, moral hypocrisy, ethical salience, moral barrenness, ethical pollution, or ethical 
fading, are preferentially linked to one set of mechanisms and outcomes. 
Critically, this thesis contributes to better ways of improving organisational resilience and 
robustness when managing future crises and disasters, also enhancing current risk and crisis 
management practices. At the beginning of this thesis, it was acknowledged that the 
effectiveness of conventional risk and crisis management models and strategies remain difficult 
to measure or define at incident onset. How do we measure or define risk and crisis 
management models/strategies effectiveness? Also, effectiveness of risk models and strategies 
can only be validly and empirically defined with the benefits of hindsight. For this reason, the 
inadequacy of existing risk and crisis management models is well documented. Yet, the crucial 
issue is whether risk experts and academics have become trapped in the logic of their field, 
obstructing knowledge from the outside world? Risk and crisis management models/strategies 
have rational foundations but people’s actions and decisions about risk, crisis and disaster 
situations comprise complex and not necessarily rational behaviours. Clearly, a paradigm shift 
in how we manage emerging crises and disasters, and response strategies is essential. In 
summary, the effectiveness of risk and crisis management models and responses is affected by: 
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1. Organisation’s risk culture: This defines how organisations manage or respond to risk/crisis. 
2. Organisation’s risk governance: This play pivotal role in the way an organisation develops 
strategies for risk/crisis management and affected the way relationships are forged with 
stakeholders. 
3. Elite cues (i.e., importance of trusted elites as risk messengers): Risk managers play a crucial 
role in how successfully their organisations respond and adapt to unconventional risks/crises. 
4. Contextual influences (e.g., political, social, economic, security, regulation, trust, etc.): No 
two crises are exactly the same; thus, understanding contextual influences remain central to 
effective and sustainable risk/crisis management. 
5. Situational influences (e.g. past experiences, communication, lack of dialogue, local climate 
or temperature, vulnerable people and environment, etc.): This change how an organisation 
would respond to actual crisis/disaster especially the broader enterprise risk management 
strategy. 
6. Models fundamentalism (the conviction that our models or strategies are flawless or at least 
the best available risk/crisis management practice): This impact how an organisation perceived 
external perspectives or lay-folks opinions which may be crucial to robust risk management 
strategy. 
7. The individual’s pre-existing worldview (egalitarian/communitarian vs 
hierarchical/individualistic): This may cloud risk decision making and overshadow an 
organisation’s own risk culture. 
8. Moral disengagement and contagious effect: This may confuse risk/crisis evolution with 
respect to defining or re-defining the risk origin and consequently influences overall risk 
management decisions. 
9. Imperfection in risk knowledge: This may lead to failure of imagination and causes flaws in 
the risk/crisis management practice of an organisation. 
10. Taken-for-granted values and assumptions; and organised irresponsibility: This results 
from over dependence on business case as the best rationale for managing risks/crises, leading 
to confusion over best practice v. best fit in risk/crisis management. 
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Overall, it was clear that the domains of risk and crisis management need to be expanded. The 
awareness and understanding of the multiple, interdisciplinary nature of unconventional 
risk/crisis management is crucial to building robust and resilient organisations. Although, the 
real challenges of managing emerging crises and disasters, especially terrorism and related 
crises in the Nigerian context, should not be underestimated. However, the consistent 
discontinuation of risk/crisis management practices from risk and crisis theories are partly 
responsible for the ineffectiveness of organisational capability in responding to emerging 
unconventional risk, crisis, and disaster. The value of risk simulation, training and consultation 
with independent risk consultants should not be undervalued.  
In conclusion, it will be argued that past cases of risk failures, crises and disasters as 
demonstrated in the case studies of Shell and Chevron should be viewed as learning 
opportunities but this requires active learning, collaboration, communication, engagement with 
other stakeholders, ethical decisions, and constant risk/crisis management auditing. It is 
interesting that most organisations and their risk/crisis managers forget to conclude that the 
main reason they are failing in managing emerging crises or disasters is because they are either 
following a process that does not work or using strategies that do not fit the unique nature of 
unconventional risk, crisis and disaster. 
10.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The UNEP commission’s construction of documentary reality on the Niger Delta crises had 
directly affected the researcher. There had been damage done to the environment and the local 
people because of the crises in the Niger Delta before the UNEP Commission started its 
investigation which was completed in 2011. There have been notable concerns such as 
attribution of blame, displacement of responsibility, moral justification and distorting of 
consequences of detrimental conducts arising from the environmental pollution and disasters 
in the Niger Delta over the decades. Collectively, these issues create familiarity with the case 
studies and multiple perspectives regarding the crises. Therefore, the organisation of the 
Commission investigation and hindsight had prevented the UNEP Commission from grasping 
ethical or moral issues in the risk and crisis situations of the Niger Delta, Nigeria. The 
researcher had initially duplicated the Commission’s errors in their starting hypothesis about 
vulnerable environment and vulnerable people in the Niger Delta. The working hypothesis had 
assumed harm to both environment and people which appears to discount normative issues 
such as moral dilemmas, perceptions, and culture which are passive in the crises. 
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However, the hindsight bias was overcome through collection of data from multiple sources 
and data triangulation. Likewise, working alone, the researcher could never have amassed the 
amount of datasets that the UNEP Commission produced, but the unconventional nature of this 
investigation and creativity gave the researcher a resource they did not have: the opportunity 
to reconstruct the events in context of moral disengagement, putting actions, interpretations 
and meanings into risk and crisis management context, and revising social, cultural and ethical 
aspects of risk and crisis leading the researcher to different conclusions. Taken together, these 
points provide robust assurance about the internal validity, construct validity and 
trustworthiness of this research.  
The generalisation of the research findings should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the research conclusions. The context and scope of this research are limited to the 
Niger Delta crises especially the two foundational case studies of the Shell – Ogoni crisis and 
Chevron – Ilaje crisis, although several other global case studies of crises and disasters have 
been cited during this research. Nonetheless, the empirical settings and contexts should be 
considered in future research. It is crucial to notes that findings from this research are consistent 
with several existing studies but also extend to issues which were not explicitly discussed in 
extant research. The findings were robust across data sources and cross-analyses until data 
saturation was reached. 
A limitation of this research that should be acknowledged is that the thesis does not address 
moral disengagement in contexts where it is almost impossible for businesses or organisations 
to operate without compromise and inducement. The Nigerian context provides a typical 
illustration of such a context, and it is reasonable to conclude that the moral disengagement 
model may not sufficiently explain unethical or detrimental conducts or actions in such 
contexts. In addition, the issue of self-reported moral disengagement is a major concern; and 
extracting data about moral disengagement could depend largely on proxy or dummy methods. 
For example, organisations and their staff may be reluctant to give information about moral 
disengagement because of the need to avoid scrutiny that may produce embarrassing or 
negative findings.  
The sensitive nature of moral disengagement in risk and crisis situations may involve issues of 
liability, trust, confidentially and reputation. Organisations and their senior executives may 
understandably be anxious about revealing to researchers their inner thoughts and concerns 
about moral disengagement, for instance, if they fear that research data and reports may be 
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discoverable in the event of a legal proceedings and subsequent major dangerous events. 
Researchers and practitioners should think more clearly about the role that moral 
disengagement mechanisms can play in disrupting organisations’ survival, business continuity, 
and resilience. Specifically, moral disengagement research is more likely to be valid using case 
research method or strategy due to the need for empirical analysis which directly involves 
case(s). These issues should be taken into consideration in future research.  
Finally, the highly emotive nature of risk and crisis management especially the case studies 
which formed part of the Niger Delta crises was another factor that tended to affect objective 
analysis. Yet, with careful planning and collation of empirical evidence from multiple sources 
and data triangulation, possible inherent bias was overcome. As a result, the researcher feels 
that the thesis is robust and consequently the research aims and objectives have been fulfilled. 
10.3 NEW DIRECTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The thesis aims have been achieved during this research process. Nonetheless, there are new 
directions and future research areas that are essential to risk, crisis, disaster, and resilience 
management.  
Firstly, theoretically, moral disengagement and crisis management interacts at two levels of 
analysis and is a robust predictor of unethical and detrimental conducts across different 
organisations in different industries. Moral disengagement emergence is a micro phenomenon 
as evidenced by several early studies of moral disengagement (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura et 
al., 1996; 2001; Bandura, 2007; Beu & Buckley, 2004; Caprara et al., 2009; Jackson & Sparr, 
2005; Fiske, 2004; McAlister et al., 2006; Moore, 2008; Rogers, 2003) – that is, moral 
disengagement emerges at individual level. The current research contributes empirical data and 
analysis to compare moral disengagement mechanisms with crisis management responses in 
risk and crisis situations. The datasets did not specifically seek to test or address the detrimental 
conducts of leadership and organisations in risk and crisis situations but the data allows some 
theoretical generalisation with respect to risk behaviours, crisis management strategies and 
organisational resilience. The caveat is that the relationships between moral disengagement and 
other concepts like risk management, sustainability and resilience, may be more complex 
especially where harm was not involved; and issues such as magnitude of consequences, 
selective risk perception, corporate organised irresponsibility, and social consensus should also 
be considered. This offers potential for more future theoretical and empirical research to 
understand these complex relationships and their implications. 
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Secondly, moral disengagement, as conceptualised and represented in this research, can also 
emerge at the macro level particularly when managing risk and crisis situations in which senior 
managers or leaders exhibit behaviours that appear to protect their organisations but could be 
detrimental to other stakeholders. Thus, moral disengagement is defined in terms of micro – 
macro phenomenon. Therefore, while an individual’s level of moral disengagement has been 
investigated, subsequent evaluation cannot be devoid of the organisation’s level of moral 
disengagement. Although, individual moral disengagement and organisation moral 
disengagement could be distinct in theory but in practice the criteria sometimes become 
blurred, particularly when individuals (leaders) acted in the organisation’s interest. The 
empirical investigations of micro and macro levels of moral disengagement are scarce and 
under-researched in extant literature. 
Future research should also analyse the interaction between micro and macro moral 
disengagement in dangerous events. The implications for disaster risk reduction and risk 
behaviours/decisions especially in cases such as environmental disaster, climate change related 
crises, terrorism, fraud, tax avoidance and emission scandals, which are found to be rooted in 
moral disengagement, requires deeper understanding and extensive research. For example, 
research should investigate the mediating role of moral disengagement in climate change 
mitigation. It would be interesting to see if despite the empirical scientific evidence about 
climate change or global warming, whether critics would be persuaded as moral disengagement 
may influence how they responded to climate mitigation actions and policies.  
In another context, a large-scale project examining responses to terrorism and militancy using 
the concept of moral disengagement in de-radicalisation programmes would be an interesting 
area for future research. Specifically, given the lack of understanding about the best way to 
reduce unconventional terrorist attacks, and the ineffectiveness or counterproductive nature of 
repressive policies, it would be interesting to research how moral disengagement scales can 
help combat terrorism root causes. In fact, due to the recognition (Owolabi & Okwechime, 
2007; Turner & Brownhill, 2004; Ubhenin, 2013) that militarisation approaches as 
counterterrorism tools may be insufficient, research on moral disengagement could help 
uncover best non-militarisation strategies to sustainably combat root causes of terrorism. For 
example, given that it is impossible to kill or capture all potential terrorists, should the Nigerian 
government invest more resources into improving education, roads, access to business loans, 
and essential public services for those who reject terrorist or militant violence? Of course, in 
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order to address these questions, data must be collected about what governments have been 
doing in response to terrorism.  
Another possible area of future research is the investigation of sustain growth, sustainability or 
business continuity of small and medium scale firms operating in conflict and crisis-affected 
areas especially in low-income countries. For example, the crucial issue of how the Niger Delta 
crises are affecting small and medium scale (SMEs) businesses within the crisis-affected areas 
remain unexplored. The policy and practical implications of understanding how SMEs can 
sustained growth or increased resilience would be significant for economic development, 
growth and poverty reduction in low-income countries or developing nations.  
Finally, perhaps the most crucial stream of future research, pertains to the relationships between 
attribution of blame, displacement of responsibility, distorting the consequences, moral 
justification, moral awareness, moral judgement, ethical evaporation, and moral decision in 
risk and crisis situations. The multiple factors and issues involved will be difficult but it is 
essential to unravel and document the full moral or ethical implications in dangerous events 
and other rare cases. The challenge for future research would focus on the issues of data 
collection, sensitivity and ethical issues involved during investigation. Given the sensitivity of 
moral disengagement, risk and crisis management research, data collection methods should be 
carefully planned and fitted into achieving the broader research aims and objectives. The 
research conducted in this thesis has positively contributed to the risk/crisis management 
debate, highlighting the need to more clearly account for the role that moral disengagement 
mechanisms can play in disrupting organisations’ survival, business continuity, and resilience. 
These suggested areas for future research would further help build on the work in this thesis. 
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Name of person taking consent: ...............................................................................   
Signature: .......................................... Date: .......................................................... 
(When completed, one copy to be retained by participant; one copy for researcher’s file) 
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Thank you for taking out time to complete this consent form and answering these exploratory questions. 
Any further information, please do not hesitate to contact the principal investigator using the email 
address: oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk  
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APPENDIX TWO 
Research Student: Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi,  
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Email:  oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk  
First supervisor: Dr Sara Hadleigh-Dunn,  
Strategy, Enterprise and Innovation Subject Group, 
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: +4423 9284 4822 
Email:  sara.thorne@port.ac.uk  
Invitation Letter: Individual Participants 
Study Title: Self-Inflicted Disasters: Moral Disengagement in Unconventional Risk, Crisis and 
Disaster Management. 
REC Ref No: E319 
Dear Potential Participant,  
I am Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi currently undertaking a PhD research degree at the University of 
Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom. I am conducting a research on the impact of moral 
disengagement in risk, crisis and disaster management practice using case studies of multinational oil 
companies and local communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The research fundamentally 
focuses on sustainable strategies and models of risk, crisis and disaster management that could help 
uncover proactive ways of managing emerging unconventional risk, crisis and disaster situations. I have 
already collected multiple data from different sources such as United Nations Environment Programme; 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company; companies’ annual reports and internal documents; community 
reports; media reports; archival data and documentary videos on the crisis and disaster situations in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
However, I will be asking you questions to validate or refute claims made in the series of documents 
that have been obtained. Thus, I will be asking questions relating to the strategies and approaches use 
by multinational oil companies in handling the Niger Delta crisis and disaster situations. There are no 
right or wrong answers because the questions are intended to ascertain the current practices relating to 
the crisis and disaster situations within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The research questions aim 
at identifying mechanisms of moral disengagement in the Niger Delta crisis and disaster situations. The 
interview questions may change slightly from one individual to another to allow further probing of any 
issue raise during the interview discussion. In addition, it is expected that all questions will be related 
to the research problems and limited to the crisis and disaster situations in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. You are free to made comparison to other global incidents of risk, crisis and disaster across the 
globe for illustration. The response you provided will contribute towards enriching the research and 
provide avenues to validate or refute the conceptual model developed from the research. The research 
provides sustainable strategies and models of managing unconventional complex situations such as 
crises and disasters, pipelines vandalism, oil theft and bunkering, militancy and terrorism, conflicts, and 
illegal refineries causing extensive pollution and environmental degradation which make people and 
environment most vulnerable in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
You have been invited to participate in this research due to your knowledge of the crisis and disaster 
situations in Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Please note that participation in this research is totally 
voluntary and it is up to you to decide whether you want to participate or not. However, if you 
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voluntarily agree to participate in this study, I will describe the study and go through this information 
sheet with you again and I will ask you to sign a consent form. I must state that you will not be asked 
about personal involvement in the Niger Delta crisis therefore there is no personal reputation risk. This 
research aim to contribute to long-term reconciliation process between the parties involved in the crisis. 
Therefore, the intention is to seek to minimise rather than ameliorate the existing problem in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria. Please contact me via email if you are interested in taking part in this research. 
Participants are under no obligation to participate, and there will be no negative consequences if they 
withdraw from the study.  
Thank you for reading this letter.  Please feel free to contact me if you have any further questions.  
Yours faithfully, 
Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi  
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APPENDIX THREE 
Research Student: Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi,                 Respondent Code: ………………… 
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre, 
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Email: oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk. 
First supervisor: Dr Sara Hadleigh-Dunn, 
Strategy, Enterprise and Innovation Subject Group, 
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: +4423 9284 4822 
Email:  sara.thorne@port.ac.uk  
 
INTERVIEW FOREWORD 
I really appreciate your time today and for agreeing to take part in this interview. 
I understand that you must have seen the information sheet about the research project. However, I would 
also like to draw your attention to the research purpose which is to critically assess the impact of moral 
disengagement in risk, crisis and disaster management practice using case studies of multinational oil 
companies and local communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The data you provided will help 
me ascertain the current practices and strategies of multinational oil companies in dealing with emerging 
complex unconventional risk, crisis and disaster in Nigeria. In addition, the data will enable the claims 
made by multinational oil companies like Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria to be validated or refuted 
and suggest sustainable methods of handling the crisis and disaster situations in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. Please understand that there are no wrong or right answers and that your comments or 
perspectives will be treated solely for academics or research purposes only. 
In addition, I understand that you have been given a consent form to read and sign. I would like to 
inform you again that all the data or information provided to me will be treated confidentially and 
personal data will be eliminated from the data presentation and analysis. Although you have been given 
the participant invitation letter, information sheet, and consent form which provide details information 
that you will be completely protected, I will like to state again that your name, position and organisation 
that you represent cannot be easily identified. This will be achieved through anonymization of data and 
the data collected will only be used for this research purpose including future publications. 
Please note that I will appreciate that you ask any questions or concerns that you may have at this stage 
before we continue with the interview. I will also like to inform you that the interview will be recorded 
and please confirm that you have given consent that the interview can be audio-recorded. 
  
349 
 
Research Objective Questions Themes Data Sources 
Objective I: To what extent 
moral disengagement could 
impact on risk, crisis and 
disaster management 
practice. 
Interview Question (1, 
4, 5, 6 and 7)  
Self-Initiated Disasters  
Objective II: Identify moral 
disengagement and crisis 
management relationship. 
Interview Question (4, 
5, 6 and 7) 
Risk and Crisis 
Disengagement 
 
Objective III: Identify how 
moral disengagement 
perpetuates organisational 
crisis and disaster; and how 
to avert the black swan 
implications. 
Interview Question (1, 
2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
Moral Disengagement 
Mechanisms 
 
Objective IV: Examine the 
influence of vulnerability, 
risk perception and 
behaviour, and distrust in 
risk, crisis and disaster 
management practice. 
Interview Question (1, 
3, 6, 7 and 9) 
Communities At Risk  
Objective V: Examine the 
impact of vulnerable 
environment on vulnerable 
people using two case 
studies of multinational oil 
firms in Nigeria. 
Interview Question (3, 
5, 7 and 9) 
Vulnerable of the 
Common 
 
 
Interview Questions 1. Do you think multinational oil 
companies in Nigeria often collaborate 
(or should collaborate) with the 
government to use military and mobile 
police force in protecting their assets and 
supressing protests environmental 
practices? 
2. If so, what other measures or approaches 
should (or did) multinational oil 
companies often adopt in managing the 
emerging escalation of crisis and disaster 
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria? 
3. To what extent does the environmental 
pollution and disaster in the Niger Delta 
affect local communities?  
4. Are local communities through 
aggressive youths justified in attacking 
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oil facilities and assets of multinational 
oil companies in Nigeria? If so, what 
measures can be adopted in managing the 
problems? 
5. What are the factors that contribute to the 
crisis and disaster situations in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria? 
6. Do you believe that multinational oil 
companies in Nigeria would have acted 
differently in managing the crisis and 
disaster situations in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria if these situations 
happen in Europe or America? If so (or if 
not), why would this be case? 
7. How would you react to this statement: 
Who does more damage or harm in the 
Niger Delta region (is it multinational oil 
companies, federal government, or local 
militants)? 
8. What alternative measures would you 
suggest in dealing with the ongoing crisis 
and disaster situations in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria? 
9. Do you think there is any trust left 
between local communities and 
multinational oil companies; and does 
this trust level as well as the 
environmental disasters affect how local 
people react in the whole situations? 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
I really appreciate your time and thank you for the answers you have provided to the interview 
questions. These answers will contribute towards enriching the data already collected and will help 
validate or refute claims made by the three main stakeholders (government, multinational oil companies 
and local communities). However, I would appreciate if you have further materials or documents that 
are relevant and useful to this research project. Materials or documents needed include: (1) community 
letters to multinational oil companies; (2) complaints letter to government agencies and representatives; 
(3) government current policies documents on Niger Delta; (4) Shell Nigeria Environmental Policy 
document; (5) Shell Nigeria Risk Management Policy; (6) Chevron Nigeria Environmental Policy 
document; (7) Chevron Nigeria Risk Management Policy; (8) Technical Experts Policy document on 
Niger Delta crisis and disaster. Notably, giving these documents is totally voluntary but where you have 
decided to provide any of the documents, there will be no mention of your name, organisation, location 
and other details that may linked the documents to you. In conclusion, I can assure you that your 
confidentiality is guaranteed due to the research design and strategy. 
Thank you and God bless. 
 
Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
Research Student: Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi,  
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Email: oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk  
First supervisor: Dr Sara Hadleigh-Dunn,  
Strategy, Enterprise and Innovation Subject Group, 
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: +4423 9284 4822 
Email:  sara.thorne@port.ac.uk  
 
Participant Information Sheet: Individuals 
Study Title: Self-Inflicted Disasters: Moral Disengagement in Unconventional Risk, Crisis and 
Disaster Management. 
REC Ref No: E319 
I would like to invite you to participate in my PhD research study. However, before you decide, 
I would like you to understand the purpose of this research and what it would involve for you. 
If you have any specific concerns, please feel free to contact me and I would be happy to clarify 
any concerns or issues that you may have or you can discuss these issues with friends or 
colleagues. 
What is the purpose of this research?   
The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of moral disengagement in risk, crisis 
and disaster management practice in Nigeria. In specific context, my PhD research scope is the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry but limited to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The research 
draws on practical case studies of risks, emergencies, security, terrorism, militancy, crises and 
environmental disasters – oil spills, pollution, explosion, industrial hazards, gas flaring, climate 
change, oil theft and pipeline vandalism. The overall aim of the research is to uncover and 
evaluate: (1) moral disengagement impact on risk, crisis and disaster management practice; (2) 
moral disengagement-crisis management relationship and redirect debates, policy issue and 
redefining risk, crisis and disaster management practice; (3) how moral disengagement 
perpetuate organisational crisis and disaster, and explore potential possibilities of averting the 
black swan implications; (4) the influence of vulnerability, risk perception and behaviour, and 
distrust in risk, crisis and disaster management practice; (5) impact of vulnerable environment 
on vulnerable people using two case studies of multinational oil firms in Nigeria. 
The response you provided will contribute towards enriching the research and provide avenues 
to validate or refute the conceptual model developed from the research. The research provides 
sustainable strategies and models of managing unconventional complex situations such as 
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crises and disasters, pipelines vandalism, oil theft and bunkering, militancy and terrorism, 
conflicts, and illegal refineries causing extensive pollution and environmental degradation 
which make people and environment most vulnerable in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
There are several other practical case studies of actionable learning from disasters or failures 
(Bhopal disaster, Exxon Valdez, BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, Piper Alpha disaster, 
Challenger, Three Mile Island, Fukushima disaster, Shell Brent Spar, Kings Cross, Bonga oil 
disaster, etc.) that are presented and comparison of the Shell-Ogoni crisis with that of Chevron-
Ilaje crisis. This research is significant because of the mechanisms of moral disengagement 
which are espoused in the context of risk, crisis and disaster management. The understanding 
of how moral disengagement could impact risk, crisis and disaster management is critical to 
sustainable development. Please note that the use of “moral disengagement” does not make 
negative value judgements on participants own attitudes or actions. Instead, the concept is 
adopted in this research due its impact in risk and crisis evolution, and risk management 
failures. 
Why have I been invited?  
You have been invited to participate in this research due to your knowledge of the crisis and 
disaster situations in Niger Delta region of Nigeria. You are identified as key informant in this 
study because: (1) you are a stakeholder within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry; (2) you have lived and worked within the Niger Delta region for 
over 10 years; (3) you have in-depth knowledge about multinational oil companies and their 
activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
Do I have to take part?  
Participation in this research is totally voluntary and it is up to you to decide whether you want 
to participate or not. However, if you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, I will 
describe the study and go through this information sheet with you again and I will ask you to 
sign a consent form. 
Please note that your participation in this research project is completely voluntary and you do 
not have obligations to continue with the study if you wish to withdraw at any stage prior to 
the data being analysed. There are no negative consequences if you discontinue from this 
research project. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The nature of the interview is semi-structured and you will partake as an individual to express 
your perspectives and knowledge on the subject matter. There will be list of questions that will 
be asked to each key informant but the questions may be modified to reflect individual accounts 
and allow for probing of further questions. With your consent, the interview will be audio 
recorded and once the data have been transcribed you would have the privilege to confirm the 
accuracy. The essence is to ensure that the views you have provided during the interviews have 
not been misrepresented. The interview is estimated to last for 45 minutes each. It is important 
to state that I may asked that you provide additional information through company documents, 
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government reports, community reports, civil society organisations report on the subject 
matter. You do not have to provide these documents because it is totally voluntary to do so. 
Please note that the consent form states that the information you have provided may be shared 
with authorised people (i.e. research supervisors and examiners) when requested for academic 
purposes. In additional, data will not be shared to any other unauthorised persons and your 
personal data will not be included in this research findings and analysis. The collected data 
through audio-recorded of the interviews and copies of documents that may be provided will 
be transferred to a computer. Data will be anonymised and password protected. Data on the 
recording device will be transcribed and immediately deleted or erased from the recording 
device once the file has been transferred to a secured computer system. The information 
collected will be saved securely because of the possibility of future academic publications and 
data will be completely erased once all relevant publications have been made from the project. 
Please note that there will be no data linked to your name or organisation because personal data 
are deliberately eliminated from the initial stage of the interview process. In all reports and 
publications that may emerge from this project, data will be anonymised and your name or 
organisation you might represent cannot be easily identified. 
Expenses and payments 
The interview is schedule to take place at your most convenient time and no payment will be 
made to participants for offering their views about the subject matter. Please be reminded that 
participation in this study is completely voluntary and the interview is non-paid activity. 
What will I have to do? 
Once you decide whether to accept this invitation and kindly return the consent form, I will 
contact you again to arrange and fix a convenient time that is most suitable for you. This will 
allow effective audio-recording of the interview especially when you have been asked 
questions relating to the issues covered in this study.  
Please note that the interview is intended to be conducted in a quiet environment to facilitate 
recording purpose. The interview is anticipated to be completed within 45 minutes of your 
time. Although, additional time may be required if you are asked to send documents that could 
support your claims. Please note that you will not be asked about your own involvement in the 
Niger Delta crisis hence no embarrassment and personal reputation risk. The interview data 
will be transcribed and documented to form part of the research findings and analysis. You 
should wish to be updated about the future publications that emerge from this research project; 
I would ask that you verbally inform me about it. This will allow me to add you to my mailing 
lists of research publications – which provide update about any of my research publications. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks from taking part?  
There are risks associated with you taking part in this research. However, these risks which 
may include personal safety and reputational risk have been minimise due to the research 
design. For example, data provided will be anonymised which means personal data, names, 
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gender, location, and organisations will not be disclosed. This means that your name or 
organisation will not be provided; and the research findings and analysis will be presented in 
such a way that name or company cannot be identified. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The understanding of how moral disengagement impact risk, crisis, and disaster management 
is critical for sustainable strategies in managing complex unconventional dangerous events. 
The conceptual models emanating from this study is valuable for key stakeholders in Nigeria 
and international community (government, organisations, local communities, civil societies, 
and individuals) because of the adaptability, mitigation, behavioural change, business 
continuity, environmental and sustainability impact. The findings from this research will 
inform debates about risk, crisis and disaster management; and the practical implications on 
government and multinational oil companies in Nigeria is crucial for current best-fit in risk, 
crisis and disaster management. 
Will my participation be kept confidential?  
Participation in this research is strictly confidential and as such your contributions will keep as 
confidential. The complexity of the research topic and the sensitivity of the case studies particularly 
suggest that participants must be protected. In this case, both in the data collection and the research 
findings stage of the research, there would be no link of comments from the participants to their actual 
persons in terms of name, position and organisation they might represent. The respondents’ names and 
positions will be deliberately excluded from the research findings; and during data transcription data 
will be anonymised to guide against reference to respondents and organisations they represent. This 
would help safeguard anonymity and eliminate perceived risks from the research to the participants. As 
a result, the risk of reputation and attack to persons who might have participated in the research would 
have been eliminated. 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with this study?  
You are not compelled to complete the interview once you have given consent because it is 
understood that your situations may change and that you may no longer wish to participate in 
this research anymore. Therefore, you are free to withdraw your consent to participate at any 
time prior to data analysis. You are not also obliged to give reasons for leaving the study and 
all the information you have provided will be deleted.  
What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should contact the researcher; 
Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi via email (oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk) or my first 
supervisor Dr Sara Thorne (sara.thorne@port.ac.uk) who will do their best to answer your 
questions. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact Dr Judy 
Rich, Faculty Research Degree Coordinator, Portsmouth Business School, University of 
Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom (judy.rich@port.ac.uk). 
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
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The results of the study will be published in a PhD thesis which would be publicly available at 
the University of Portsmouth library and the British library. It is also hoped that the results will 
produce journal articles, book chapters and academic conference presentations, which again, 
will be available via the University of Portsmouth library electronic resources. You will not be 
identifiable from the results in any document. Once the research and the publications are 
completed all data collected will be deleted. 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
This research project is self-funded but future research funding collaboration is highly 
welcomed.   
Who has reviewed this study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by an independent group of people, called 
the Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and 
given a favourable opinion by the Portsmouth Business School Research Ethics Committee. 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to know the further details of research in the University, please follow the 
following link to the University of Portsmouth research website; 
http://www.port.ac.uk/research/  
If you would like details on the research carried out in the Portsmouth Business School, please 
follow the following link to the Portsmouth Business School research website;  
http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/faculties/portsmouthbusinessschool/research/ 
If you would like further information about this research, please contact the principal 
investigator: Oluwasoye Patrick Mafimisebi, E-mail: oluwasoye.mafimisebi@myport.ac.uk 
Thank you for your time in reading through this document. I do hope that the information 
provided has answered all your questions and should you have further concerns please do keep 
in touch. If you decide to participate in this research project you will be given a copy of this 
information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
Ethical Review Checklist – Staff and Doctoral Students 
This checklist should be completed by the researcher (PhD students to have DoS check) and sent to 
Sharman Rogers who will coordinate Ethics Committee scrutiny. 
No primary data collection can be undertaken before the supervisor and/or Ethics Committee 
has given approval. 
If, following review of this checklist, amendments to the proposals are agreed to be necessary, the 
researcher must provide Sharman with an amended version for scrutiny. 
 
1. What are the objectives of the research project? 
The research critically seeks to uncover and evaluate: 
a.   To what extent moral disengagement could impact on risk, crisis and disaster management 
practice. 
b.   The moral disengagement-crisis management relationship and redirect academic debates, 
research agenda, policy issues and redefining risk, crisis and disaster management practice. 
c.   How moral disengagement perpetuates organisational crisis and explore potential possibilities 
in averting the black swan implications. 
d.   The influence of vulnerability, risk perception and behaviour, and distrust in risk, crisis and 
disaster management practice. 
e.   Impact of vulnerable environment on vulnerable people using two case-studies of 
multinational oil firms in Nigeria. 
Note: Moral disengagement signifies a psychological process through which individuals make 
unethical, sanctionable and detrimental behaviours or conducts become congruent with their moral 
and ethical standards. In fact, moral disengagement equates to switching off one’s conscience and there 
is nothing like self-righteousness to exonerate and sanitize misconduct in the name of worthy causes. 
 
2. Does the research involve NHS patients, resources or staff?    YES / NO (please circle). 
If YES, it is likely that full ethical review must be obtained from the NHS process before the 
research can start. 
3. Does the research involve MoD staff?  YES / NO (please circle). 
If YES, then ethical review may need to be undertaken by MoD REC.  Please discuss 
your proposal with your Director of Studies and/or PBS Ethics Committee 
representative and, if necessary, include a copy of your MoD REC application for 
quality review.   
4. Do you intend to collect primary data from human subjects or data that are identifiable 
with individuals? (This includes, for example, questionnaires and interviews.) YES / 
NO (please circle) 
If you do not intend to collect such primary data then please go to question 15. 
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If you do intend to collect such primary data then please respond to ALL the questions 5 through 
14. If you feel a question does not apply then please respond with n/a (for not applicable). 
5. How will the primary data contribute to the objectives of the dissertation / research 
project? 
The primary data will contribute to the research objectives in the following ways: 
   Reduce philosophical and research bias as well as increase trustworthiness, data 
reliability and credibility, and provide confirmatory data evidence (fundamental for 
triangulation purpose). 
   Enable data on the current state of crisis and disaster situations in Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria, and current response strategies of multinational oil firms (crucial to 
explore research objective 1). 
   Data from key informants on crisis disengagement approach involved in the two case-
studies (critical to explore research objective 2). Studies involving risk, crisis and 
disaster situations are often design retrospectively and have been criticised for often 
neglecting the perspectives of the direct or main actors involved in such crisis and 
disaster situations. Thus, the primary data is necessary to overcome this limitation in 
previous studies and further add thick description to the research problems and the 
case-studies. 
 Enable data on the mechanisms of moral disengagement in risk, crisis and disaster 
situations (crucial to explore research objective 3). 
 Data to measure influence of vulnerability, risk perception and behaviour in risk, 
crisis and disaster management (crucial to explore research objectives 4 and 5). 
The breakdown of how the primary data contribute to the research objectives is as shown 
below and the interview questions are attached as a supplementary material.  
           
Research Objective Questions Themes Data Sources 
Objective I: To what extent moral 
disengagement could impact on 
risk, crisis and disaster 
management practice. 
Interview Question (1, 4, 
5, 6 and 7)  
Self-Initiated 
Disasters 
 UNEP Dataset 
 World Bank Dataset 
 National Inquiry 
Report. 
 Case Laws 
Transcripts 
 Archival and 
Industry Dataset 
from NNPC. 
 Companies Annual 
Reports (1999-
2015). 
 Personal Interviews 
with Senior 
Managers. 
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Objective II: Identify moral 
disengagement and crisis 
management relationship. 
Interview Question (4, 5, 
6 and 7) 
Risk and Crisis 
Disengagement 
 UNEP Dataset 
 World Bank Dataset 
 Archival Video 
Interviews with main 
stakeholders. 
 National Inquiry 
Report. 
 Case Laws 
Transcripts 
 Archival and 
Industry Dataset 
from NNPC. 
 Companies Annual 
Reports (1999-
2015). 
 Personal Interviews 
with Senior 
Managers. 
 Literature Review 
Objective III: Identify how moral 
disengagement perpetuates 
organisational crisis and disaster; 
and how to avert the black swan 
implications. 
Interview Question (1, 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
Moral 
Disengagement 
Mechanisms 
 UNEP Dataset 
 National Inquiry 
Report. 
 Documentary 
Evidence from 
national and 
international media. 
 Case Laws 
Transcripts 
 Archival and 
Industry Dataset 
from NNPC. 
 Companies Annual 
Reports (1999-
2015). 
 Personal Interviews 
with Senior 
Managers. 
Objective IV: Examine the 
influence of vulnerability, risk 
perception and behaviour, and 
Interview Question (1, 3, 
6, 7 and 9) 
Communities At 
Risk 
 Personal Interviews 
with Senior 
Managers. 
 UNEP Dataset 
 UNDP Dataset 
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distrust in risk, crisis and disaster 
management practice. 
 World Bank Dataset 
 Case Laws 
Transcripts 
 Archival and 
Industry Dataset 
from NNPC. 
 Companies Annual 
Reports (1999-
2015). 
 Literature Review 
Objective V: Examine the impact 
of vulnerable environment on 
vulnerable people using two case 
studies of multinational oil firms 
in Nigeria. 
Interview Question (3, 5, 
7 and 9) 
Vulnerable of the 
Common 
 Literature Review 
 UNEP Dataset 
 UNDP Dataset 
 World Bank Dataset 
 National Inquiry 
Report. 
 Case Laws 
Transcripts 
 Archival and 
Industry Dataset 
from NNPC. 
 Companies Annual 
Reports (1999-
2015). 
 Personal Interviews 
with Senior 
Managers. 
 
 
6. What is/are the survey population(s)? 
The survey population for this research project comprises of all senior managers within the 
main stakeholders’ organisations and government agencies (Niger Delta Development 
Commission and Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission), oil and gas 
regulators (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Department of Petroleum Resources), 
local and regional community representative organisations (Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni People and Ilaje Regional Development Committee) and two multinational oil 
companies operating in Nigeria (Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria). 
This research is based on case study approach using two embedded cases of multinational oil 
companies in Nigeria. The two case studies of multinational oil companies (Shell Nigeria and 
Chevron Nigeria) are selected because both case-studies are well documented in case laws, 
companies reports (1999-2015), national inquiries and government reports. The results of the 
case studies will also allow moral disengagement mechanisms to be measured and validated in 
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the context of risk, crisis and disaster management. There are two main sources of data utilised 
in this research: (1) datasets and; (2) empirical data obtained through personal interviews. 
Notably, there are panel datasets on the Niger Delta crisis and disaster situations available from 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Bank. Therefore, following 
the advice from the Major Review Panel and based on the sensitivity of the research project, 
survey will not form part of the primary data collection methods. There are already multiple 
data available for this research project: documentary evidence; case laws transcripts; archival 
and industry data from Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; companies reports; video 
transcripts on the case-studies; and web-transcripts interviews with officials involved in the 
crisis and disaster situations. 
 
 
7. How big is the sample for each of the survey populations and how was this sample 
arrived at? 
 The sample consists of senior managers purposively drawn from government 
agencies (Niger Delta Development Commission, and Ondo State Oil Producing 
Areas Development Commission), oil and gas regulators (Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, and Department of Petroleum Resources), local and 
regional community representative organisations (Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni People and Ilaje Regional Development Committee) and two 
multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria (Shell Nigeria and Chevron 
Nigeria). The goal for selecting the sample purposely was twofold. First, we 
wanted to document the phenomenon of moral disengagement in extreme case 
context and show that it could perpetuate organisations in at least one major 
industry. Second, we wanted to delve into empirical validation of existing risk, 
crisis and disaster management models and techniques. As a result, we searched 
for an industry (oil and gas) that a priori we believed would have a large 
representation of risk, crisis and disaster management models – an extreme case. 
Therefore, we chose to explore the oil and gas industry, an industry where 
anecdotal evidence suggested that multinational oil firms were plagued with 
several cases of risk, crisis and disaster situations in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. The two case organisations (Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria) 
included in the research were often accused of double standards in their risk, 
crisis and disaster management practice in Nigeria. For each firm, we attempted 
to determine whether moral disengagement perpetuate their risk, crisis and 
disaster management practice. This information came primarily from 
independent inquiry datasets and documentary dataset. 
 It essential to state that there are numbers of data collection available for this 
research which include – archival data, inquiry commission report and data, 
internal organisational reports on the crisis, archival video interviews with those 
directly involved in the crisis and disaster situations, series of documentary 
evidence, and extant literature. The interviews become necessary to explore 
what might have change over the period of the crisis incubation and the current 
reality of the case studies under investigation (historical period covered:1990-
2015). 
 The exact sample size for the interviews composed of twenty key informants 
purposively drawn mainly from key stakeholder organisations identified above. 
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More specifically, a total of 20 interviews is intended to be conducted with 
informants drawn from these eight organisations mentioned above; sample size 
justification, participants’ inclusion criteria as well as number of interviewees per 
organisation are captured in the table below. However, it is important to state that 
two informants are selected purposively from each stakeholder organisations 
except in case of Shell Nigeria and Chevron Nigeria where four informants are 
being selected. The reason being that these multinational oil companies are often 
blamed for the crisis and disaster situations in Niger Delta; and it crucial that 
more perspectives from informants in these organisations are included in this 
research in order to refute, verify and censure the problems and phenomena under 
investigation. 
 
 
S/N Interviewees 
Data 
Stakeholders Data Stakeholders 
Classification 
Inclusion Criteria Justification 
1 Two (2) Niger Delta 
Development 
Commission (NDDC) 
 
 
Government 
Agencies 
 Informants with past 
and current 
knowledge of 
government roles in 
the Niger Delta 
crisis. 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with the 
crisis. 
 Informants responsible 
for managing risk 
and crisis situations 
The nature of this 
research topic and 
issues covered 
demand that only 
relevant 
participants or 
informants are 
included in the 
study. Most 
importantly, 
multiple sources of 
data which have 
been extensively 
discussed in this 
research are being 
used to triangulate 
data, but fewer 
interviews are 
further use to 
enrich the data 
collected. In fact, to 
increase the 
research content 
validity, interviews 
are only intended 
with key 
informants in the 
organisation who 
are most familiar 
with the crisis and 
disaster situations 
under investigation. 
 
Therefore, for 
critics who would 
suggest or argue 
that sample size of 
twenty (20) 
interview is 
insufficient, such 
critics should note 
that number of 
2 Two (2) Ondo State Oil 
Producing Areas 
Development 
Commission 
(OSOPADEC) 
 Informants with past 
and current 
knowledge of 
government roles in 
the Niger Delta 
crisis. 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with local 
people. 
 Informants responsible 
for making crisis 
decisions. 
3 Two (2) Nigerian National 
Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) 
 
 
Nigerian Oil and 
Gas Regulators 
 Informants with past 
and current 
knowledge of how 
regulators have 
manage the crisis 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with the 
crisis. 
 Informants responsible 
for strategies 
implementation. 
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4 Two (2) Department of 
Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) 
 Informants responsible 
for taking actions 
when oil companies 
violate oil and gas 
regulations. 
 Informants with past 
and current 
knowledge of 
government roles in 
the Niger Delta 
crisis. 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with 
multinational oil 
companies. 
interviews required 
in research 
fundamentally 
depends on the 
nature of research 
questions, how 
many sources of 
data used, and the 
research strategy. 
In practice, the 
issue further 
concerns whether 
interviews is the 
only source of data 
collection, in which 
case large number 
of interviews might 
be required. Thus, 
where multiple 
sources of data are 
being used like in 
this research, critics 
who call for several 
numbers of 
interviews to be 
conducted must 
acknowledged that 
by simply 
conducting 
multiple interviews 
do not necessarily 
increases research 
credibility and 
trustworthiness.  
 
Furthermore, the 
sensitive nature of 
risk and crisis 
research often 
requires that only 
fewer interviewees 
or informants can 
be identified and 
are willing to be 
interview. In fact, 
even though crisis 
and disaster 
situations often 
affect several 
stakeholders, only 
handful individuals 
are responsible for 
making decisions 
affecting their 
management or 
directly involved in 
processes of 
managing them. 
The implication is 
that only relevant 
number of 
individuals who 
have different 
roles, experience, 
backgrounds, and 
any other source of 
5 Two (2) Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) 
 
Local and Regional 
Community 
Representative 
Organisations 
 Informants responsible 
for negotiation with 
multinational oil 
companies. 
 Informants with past 
and current 
knowledge of 
government roles in 
the Niger Delta 
crisis. 
 Informants responsible 
for negotiation with 
government 
agencies. 
6 Two (2) Ilaje Regional 
Development 
Committee (IRDC) 
 Informants responsible 
for managing 
communities’ 
agitations. 
 Informants responsible 
for dealing with 
multinational oil 
companies on behalf 
of local communities. 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with the 
crisis situations. 
7 Four (4) Shell Nigeria Multinational Oil 
and Gas 
Companies 
 Informants who have 
first-hand knowledge 
about the Niger Delta 
crisis. 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with the risk, 
crisis and disaster 
situations. 
 Informants who have 
deal with regulatory 
agencies, 
government and local 
communities. 
8 Four (4) Chevron Nigeria  Informants who have 
first-hand knowledge 
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about the Niger Delta 
crisis. 
 Informants directly 
responsible for 
dealing with the risk, 
crisis and disaster 
situations. 
 Informants who have 
deal with regulatory 
agencies, 
government and local 
communities. 
variability that 
might influence 
answers are 
included in risk and 
crisis research. This 
is the basic 
distinction of risk 
and crisis 
management 
research from other 
fields. 
 
In addition, this 
research is an in-
depth exploration 
of moral 
disengagement in 
which sensitive and 
organisational 
issues are being 
explored. This 
requires longer and 
less structured 
interviews 
technique to allow 
for more probing 
into the issues 
identified from 
extant studies 
which are pertinent 
to effective risk and 
crisis management. 
Thus, it is vital to 
take into 
consideration time 
resources (for both 
conducting 
interviews and 
analysing the 
interview data) and 
the need to avoid 
“drowning in a sea 
of data” syndrome 
because once data 
is collected, 
researcher is 
obliged to analyse 
it. 
 
 
 
 
8. How will respondents be selected and recruited? 
 Key informants are to be selected based on their knowledge about the risk, crisis 
and disaster situations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
 The nature of the research problems requires key informants with thorough   
knowledge of the risk, crisis and disaster situations in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. In this context, it is only appropriate to use purposive and cluster non-
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probability sampling technique to arrive at the sample size for the interviews. 
This would ensure that only participants who are residents and informants within 
the study areas and having full knowledge of the risk, crisis and disaster situations 
are included in the sample size. 
 Therefore, the participants are to be selected through purposive and convenient 
sampling technique as to guide against recruiting participants who are unaware 
about the risk, crisis and disaster situations within the study areas. The target is to 
recruit key informants who are main stakeholders within the study areas; and 
participants shall be drawn from government agencies (Niger Delta Development 
Commission), regulators (Nigeria National Petroleum Company and Department 
of Petroleum Resources), multinational oil companies (Shell Nigeria and Chevron 
Nigeria), local community representative organisations (Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People and Ilaje Regional Development Committee). 
 The recruitment process will typically involve sending out letter of introduction 
and invitation to the participants. This can be found in the appendices or 
supplementary materials. This would ensure informed consents are sought and 
uninformed respondents as well as unwilling respondents are eliminated from the 
study. It is important to state that respondents can withdraw consent at any time. 
However, prior to sending out the letter of introduction and invitation for 
participation in the research, personal contacts would have been made to reduce 
the rate of non-participation and response. 
 
 
9. What steps are proposed to ensure that the requirements of informed consent will be 
met for those taking part in the research? If an Information Sheet for participants is to 
be used, please attach it to this form. If not, please explain how you will be able to 
demonstrate that informed consent has been gained from participants. 
A letter of participation and informational sheet for participants in the study would be 
sent out for the completion before the semi-structured interviews and respondents shall 
be assured of their confidentiality and anonymity. The essence of the research shall be 
made known and respondents would voluntarily agree if to partake in the research. 
Letter of participation, information sheets and consent forms for this purpose have been 
developed (please see the attached documents in the supplementary materials). 
 
 
10. How will data be collected from each of the sample groups? 
The primary data will be collected using semi-structured interviews with key informants 
(employees in multinational oil firms, senior management, industry regulators, government 
agencies, community leaders, and senior consultants) conversant with the risk, crisis and 
disaster situations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The key informants are main 
stakeholders within the Nigerian oil and gas sector, and knowledge about the Niger Delta crisis 
and disaster situations. A copy of interview guide is attached to this ethical approval form. The 
interview guide was developed from extant literature and inputs from leading experts in risk, 
crisis and disaster management. In another context, the emerging results from the interviews 
with key informants will be cross-reference with findings from literatures. A conceptual model 
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of self-initiated disaster and moral disengagement which has been developed from the research 
project will be enriched through the primary data collected. 
The interviews data will be recorded and where written data are collected such data will also be 
collated in their raw form. There will be written note taking during the interviews as well as 
real-time recording of voice data. However, respondents have option to refuse recording of 
voice data or note taking. Consents will be sought and respondents can choose whether to allow 
audio recording or not. 
 
11. How will data be stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the research? 
   The research data are to be stored electronically and all digital information will be 
downloaded and securely stored on the N drive of the university. The voice data will 
be transcribed and the resulting data as well as other word documents will be securely 
stored on the university N drive. Handwritten notes will be typed in word documents 
and stored in a secure locked location and hard copies will sent for secure disposal via 
electronic shredding at the end of the research project. 
   Data will not be available for open access because of the extremely sensitive nature of 
project. However anonymised data may be made available at the end of the research 
project. All data will be stored until publications are finalised and this will form part 
of the participant consent obtained prior to data collection. The publications expected 
include PhD thesis, journal articles, book chapters and conference presentations. The 
findings and results in the research will fundamentally base on anonymised data. The 
data collected will be kept for least as long as the latest retention period required by 
any journals in which any data resulting from the project is published. 
 The interviews will be conducted in English and there is no need for translation of data. 
 
12. What measures will be taken to prevent unauthorised persons gaining access to the 
data, and especially to data that may be attributed to identifiable individuals?  
    Key informants will not be identified by their real names and organisations they might 
represent. The names of key informants will be anonymised and this will be used during the 
recording and data transcription process. The data collected during the fieldwork will be 
protected using secured brief-case and filing cabinet with lock. This implies that only the 
researcher has access to these data. However, once the fieldwork is completed, data collected 
and transcribed will be stored securely on the N drive of the university and password 
protected, and consent forms will be stored separately from the data collected and locked in 
cabinets provided at the university. 
   The raw data will only be made available on request mainly to the supervisory team (Dr Sara 
Hadleigh-Dunn and Dr Andreas Hoecht) and the PhD examiners on request. The data 
collected will be coded and identifying data stored in a separate file. However, to completely 
remove the possibility of identifying key informants, their names, positions and organisations 
they represent will be anonymised.  
  
 
13. What steps are proposed to safeguard the anonymity of the respondents? 
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    Anonymity of the respondents shall be assured through the letter of participation that names 
and positions are not to be included in their responses. Likewise, the interview form would be 
devoid of name and position of the respondents in the design process. The complexity of the 
research topic and the sensitivity of the case studies particularly suggest that participants must 
be protected. In this case, both in the data collection and the research findings stage of the 
research, there would be no link of comments from the participants to their actual persons in 
terms of name, position and organisation they might represent. 
   The respondents’ names and positions will be deliberately excluded from the research 
findings; and during data transcription data will be anonymised to guide against 
reference to respondents and organisations they represent. This would help safeguard 
anonymity and eliminate perceived risks from the research to the participants. As a 
result, the risk of reputation and attack to persons who might have participated in the 
research would have been eliminated. Copies of the completed research work shall be 
disseminated through publication in international journals and participants can 
therefore have access to the research outputs. 
   Finally, to safeguard the anonymity of the informants, the researcher may have to 
further anonymise participant details such as location, gender, organisation, etc. or 
other contextual information if necessary in order not to compromise identities. 
 
 
14. Are there any risks (physical or other, including reputational) to respondents that may 
result from taking part in this research?    YES / NO (please circle). 
If YES, please specify and state what measures are proposed to deal with these risks. 
   The research is highly complex and sensitive because of the persistent cases of 
militancy, kidnapping and vandalism in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Hence, it is 
imperative that participants are protected potential risks. The opinions of respondents 
in the research can generate media attacks which can cause reputational risk and 
physical assaults or attacks on them.  
   The names, positions and organisations which the participants may represent would be 
protected and eliminated from the research findings and analysis. This measure of 
anonymization technique is crucial to protect key informants from future risks that 
may arise as a result of taking part in this research. The anonymization approach will 
reflect in the research findings and analysis, and future publications. 
   None of the respondents will be asked about their own personal involvement in the 
Niger Delta crisis or disaster situations presented in the research hence no 
embarrassment and no personal reputation. Previous research on the topic has already 
been done and respondents are used to being asked questions on this topic because the 
crisis has gone for more than 20 years. 
   This research aim to contribute to long-term reconciliation process between the parties 
involved in the crisis. Therefore, the research seeks to minimise rather than ameliorate 
the existing problem in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
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15. Are there any risks (physical or other, including reputational) to the researcher or to the 
University that may result from conducting this research?    YES / NO (please circle). 
If YES, please specify and state what measures are proposed to manage these risks.1 
   There may be risks arising from this study to the researcher but not to the University. The 
research process would particularly involve collecting primary data from relevant 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta crisis. In order words, this implies that data would be 
collected from key stakeholders such as the government representatives and multinational oil 
companies’ representatives within the study areas. Therefore, it may not be surprising to see 
that the research might be perceived as propaganda for revealing environmental disasters and 
damages in the Niger Delta. Likewise, it may become risky to interview some groups of 
informants like ex-militants in the process of the research. Therefore, to eliminate personal 
risk, some notable key informants like armed militants have been eliminated purposely from 
the research participants. 
    In addition, being a native of the Niger Delta region and having lived in the region for over 28 
years, experience of living with some of the key informants would contribute to personal 
safety. Most importantly, following the advice from the Major Review Panel and discussions 
about personal safety, semi-structured interviews with key informants will be conducted 
outside the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. I have already made established contact with 
relevant stakeholders. This work involves the investigation of moral disengagement in risk, 
crisis and disaster management practice. Quite critical to the research, the study cannot be 
completed without collecting data from the actors involved in the crisis. Thus, the participants 
targeted for the research are to be drawn from local organisations in host oil communities in 
the study areas and representative of the government and multinational oil companies.  
   It is important to state that the key informants contacted for the purpose of facilitating the 
process of data collection have been briefed and they understood the purpose for which data 
collection will be used. 
16. Will any data be obtained from a company or other organisation? YES / NO (please 
circle) For example, information provided by an employer or its employees. 
If NO, then please go to question 19. 
 
 
17. What steps are proposed to ensure that the requirements of informed consent will be 
met for that organisation? How will confidentiality be assured for the organisation, such 
that unauthorised persons will be prevented from accessing the data? N/A 
 
 
18. Does the organisation have its own ethics procedure relating to the research you intend 
to carry out?   YES / NO (please circle).  N/A 
If YES, the University will require written evidence from the organisation that they have approved 
the research. 
                                                          
1 Risk evaluation should take account of the broad liberty of expression provided by the principle of 
academic freedom. The university’s conduct with respect to academic freedom is set out in section 9.2 of the 
Articles of Government and its commitment to academic freedom is in section 1.2 of the Strategic Plan 2004-
2008. 
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19. Will the proposed research involve any of the following (please put a √ next to ‘yes’ or 
‘no’; consult your supervisor if you are unsure): 
       
• Vulnerable groups (e.g. children) ? YES   NO  √ 
       
• Particularly sensitive topics ? YES √  NO  
       
• Access to respondents via ‘gatekeepers’ ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Use of deception ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Access to confidential personal data ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Psychological stress, anxiety etc ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Intrusive interventions ? YES   NO √ 
 
If answers to any of the above are “YES”, how will the associated risks be minimised? 
Sensitive topic: It has been clearly stated in question 14 that this research is a highly 
sensitive topic which required that both the researcher and respondents are protected 
from potential risks. The associated risks will be minimised through data 
anonymization approach. The real names and organisations of key informants will not 
reflect in the research findings and analysis. Informed consents will be fully sought and 
obtained from all participants; and purpose of the data collection will be made known 
to the respondents. The voluntary nature of the participation in the research will be 
emphasised and verbal consent will be obtained in addition to written consent. The case 
studies are well-documented and crisis situations in the Niger Delta are therefore not 
sensitive to the individuals (informants) that participate in this research. 
 
 
 
20. Are there any other ethical issues that may arise from the proposed research? 
There are no other ethical issues anticipated other than those already discussed in this ethical 
approval form. 
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